





































Although more than 75 years have 
elapsed since the end of the Second 
World War, the magnitude of crimes 
and their long-term effects, caused 
also by lawyers e.g. in German special 
courts, make the subject of liability 
of the state in the context of the Second 
World War ever topical and valid. His-
toria magistra vitae est, and the process 
of learning from history should in this 
case cover not only the years 1933–1945, 
but also the entire post-war period. 
Justice was neither restored nor meted 
out. One of the reasons for the lack of 
administration of justice was West Ger-
many’s conscious policy of personal 
continuity after the Second World War. 
The latter was the topic of the Rosen-
burg Exhibition – the Federal Ministry 
of Justice of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in the Shadow of National 
Socialist Past. The texts grew out of 
the context of the exhibition and show 
the far-reaching consequences of War 
and Nazi crimes in international rela-
tions of a legal nature.
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The Rosenburg Project – Federal Ministry 
of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany 
in the Shadow of National Socialist Past in Poland
A lthough more than 75 years have elapsed since the end of the Second World 
War, the magnitude of human rights violations between 1939 and 1945 and 
their long-term eff ects both on the macro scale (e.g. the division of Europe by 
the Iron Curtain for long 45 years or the enormous social, economic and cultural 
impoverishment of Central and Eastern Europe) and on the micro scale (loss 
by the citizens of the occupied countries of their loved ones, most oft en in very 
dramatic circumstances1, and oft en all their belongings, either due to wartime 
destruction or ruthless ownership shift s, an aft ermath of the Red Army activities) 
makes the  subject of liability of the state in the context of the Second World 
War ever topical and valid. Despite an attempt made in 1945 to create an inter-
national community based on a ban on inter-state aggression, massive human 
rights violations have taken place and continue to take place, and many countries, 
including the EU Member State Croatia, are confronted with the need to restore 
justice aft er a period of lawlessness and chaos.
Historia magistra vitae est, and the process of learning from history should in 
this case cover not only the years 1933–1945, but also the entire post-war period, 
because aft er a time of injustice and lawlessness2, justice was neither restored nor 
meted out. Th is refers to the macro level (e.g. in the form of concluding a peace 
1 D. Brewing, W cieniu Auschwitz. Niemieckie masakry polskiej ludności cywilnej 1939–1945, 
Poznań 2019, e.g. p. 113ff . p. 193, p. 193.
2 German documents and legal act use the term NS-Unrecht (national socialist lawlessness) 
cf. ‘Świadczenia Niemiec związane z bezprawiem narodowosocjalistycznym dla ofi ar w państwach 
środkowo- i  wschodnioeuropejskich, jak również dla ofi ar reżimu SED.  Dokumentacja z  dnia 
10 października 2017 r. przygotowana przez Służby Naukowe Bundestagu’, in: M. Bainczyk, ‘Ra-
porty Służb Naukowych Bundestagu w  sprawie reparacji wojennych dla Polski i  odszkodowań 

















































8 Magdalena Bainczyk / Agnieszka Kubiak Cyrul
treaty and regulating reparations3, or the return of stolen works of art4) and to 
the micro level (e.g. meting out justice to individuals responsible for the crimes 
committed during the Second World War, or the payment of compensation to 
the victims for the losses incurred at that time5). D. Brewing strongly claims that 
‘Th e history of the legal settlement of the massacres on Polish civilians is a his-
tory of defeat’.6 In this context, the establishment of the International Military 
Tribunal in Nuremberg was of historic importance for the development of in-
ternational criminal law, but given the process of administering justice to war 
criminals, it is of individual importance. Th e Court’s activities have not, by any 
means, become a signpost for the German justice system with regard to crimes 
committed during the Second World War7. In this volume, the Court’s activity 
is assessed by A. Eichmüller. In the text titled ‘Die strafrechtliche Verfolgung von 
national sozialistischen Verbrechen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Bilanz 
und Weichenstellungen’ (Prosecution of Nationalist Socialist Crimes by the 
Criminal Law of the Federal Republic of Germany – balance and strategy), he 
presents striking results of his long-term studies in diff erent bodies of the justice 
system concerning the number of proceedings and sentences passed as well as the 
types of sanctions adjudicated on. Th e results of studies are staggering – given 
the millions of victims of the Th ird Reich, only 6,700 convictions for National 
Socialist crimes were handed down by West German courts. 
While unprecedented human rights violations led to the creation of inter-
national and national systems for their protection, paradoxically, these systems 
were almost exclusively future-oriented and did not include the victims of World 
War II, whose suff ering was at the heart of the UN Charter: – “We the People 
of the United States determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge 
3 K.H. Roth, H. Rübner, Wyparte. Odroczone. Odrzucone. Niemiecki dług reparacyjny wobec 
Polski i Europy, Poznań 2020, p. 209ff . Th is volume also contains very interesting source docu-
ments: 26. Interview by Federal Chancellor Kohl with the President of the United States G. Bush 
in Camp David (excerpts). Consent as to the rejection of Polish reparation claims; 27. Presentation 
by Government Director Mertes and Legislative Counsellor Hinz to Federal Chancellor Kohl. 
Rejection by Poland of reparations as a compensation for the international legal recognition of the 
border on the Oder and the Neisse by a united Germany; 28. Counsellor rapporteur Ueberschaer 
to Ministerial Director Teltschik. Polish claims for damages; 29. letter from Federal Chancellor 
Kohl to Prime Minister Mazowiecki (excerpt). Recognition of the Oder-Neisse border by the unit-
ed Germany and waiver of reparations and compensation by Poland.
4 E.g. M. Tureczek, Dzwony pożyczone. Studia historyczne i prawne nad problematyką strat dóbr 
kultur, Poznań 2020.
5  M. Bainczyk, ‘Asymetria odszkodowań dla obywateli Polski za szkody poniesione w II wojnie 
światowej w stosunku do odszkodowań wypłaconych obywatelom innych państw’, Przegląd Za-
chodni, 2019, no. 1, p. 83ff .
6 D. Brewing,  op. cit., p. 333.
7 C.  Saff erling, ‘Aufarbeitung von NS-Unrecht durch die deutsche Nachkriegsjustiz’, in: 















































9The Rosenburg Project – Federal Ministry of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany 
of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and 
to reaffi  rm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person”8, the Statute of the Council of Europe – “the Governments (…) 
convinced that the pursuit of peace based upon justice and international cooper-
ation is vital for the preservation of human society and civilisation”9, of the Basic 
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinaft er BL FRG)10 – the pream-
ble which lays out that “Conscious of their responsibility before God and man, 
Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in 
a united Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, 
have adopted this Basic Law” and Art. 1 BL, enshrining the principle of respect 
for human dignity11. Th e concept of the responsibility of the German people, 
which opens up the text of the German constitution of 1949, is signifi cant in 
the context of this topic. In the relevant literature, however, the historical context 
of this part of the preamble is now being relativised12. Th is is somewhat in line 
with the practice of the state authorities over the next few decades. 
One of the reasons for the lack of administration of justice aft er the Second 
World War, both on a macro and a micro scale, was Germany’s conscious policy 
of personal continuity aft er the Second World War. Th e year 1949 turned out to 
be only a symbolic beginning of a new state based on the principles of respect for 
human dignity, democracy and the rule of law, in relation to the political princi-
ples of the Th ird Reich13; the above principles are defi ned as immutable in light 
of Art.  79 section 3 BL14. Th e fi rst decades of Germany were marked by per-
sonal and material continuations from the Th ird Reich period15, especially as re-
gards the functioning of state authorities, both at federal and national level; they 
8 United Nations Charter, Journal of Acts of 1947, no. 23, item 90.
9 Statute of the Council of Europe adopted in London on 5 May 1949, Journal of Acts of 1994, 
no. 118, item 565.
10 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (German Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepu-
blik Deutschland of 23 May 1949 (Bundesgesetzblatt, Federal Journal of Acts, hereinaft er referred 
to as BGBl., p. 1), recently amended by the Act of 29 September 2020 (BGBl. I p. 2048).
11 M. Bainczyk, ‘Wpływ europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka na interpretację praw pod-
stawowych w RFN’, Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe, 2018, no. 4, p. 35ff  and the relevant liter-
ature indicated there, https://repozytorium.ka.edu.pl/handle/11315/19685?locale-attribute=en 
(accessed 15.01.2021).
12 H. Dreier, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Bd. I: Präambel, Tübingen 2013, para. 42; P. Kunig, 
‘Präambel’, para. 19, in: I. v. Münch, P. Kunig (eds.), Grundgesetz. Kommentar, Bd. I, München 
2012.
13 K.-P. Sommermann, ‘Art. 20 GG’, in: H. von Mangoldt, F. Klein, C. Starck (eds.), Grundge-
setz, München 2018, para. 20ff . 
14 M. Sachs, ‘Art. 79 GG Änderungen des Grundgesetzes’, para. 27ff , in: M. Sachs (ed.), Grund-
gesetz. Kommentar, München 2018.
15 Cf. N. Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik. Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit, 















































10 Magdalena Bainczyk / Agnieszka Kubiak Cyrul
failed to restore a state of justice in both domestic16 and international relations. 
Th e widely promised denazifi cation17 was very limited in scope. 
According to the authors of the exhibition ‘Rosenburg – Federal Ministry of 
Justice in the Shadow of Nationalist Socialist Past’, to be discussed below, K. Ade-
nauer’s objective was reached. Only 1.4% of people subject to denazifi cation pro-
cedure were considered to be “principally guilty” or “guilty”, and as a result of 
the rationale adopted, also former Gestapo or SS members acquired the right 
of re-employment.18
Th e personal and material continuity in the bodies of state authority of the 
Federal Republic of Germany aft er 1949 were crucially analysed by research 
teams, which in the early 21st century gained access to the archival records of 
the above authorities. Th e fi rst such analysis concerned the careers begun in the 
Th ird Reich and continued in the German Ministry of Foreign Aff airs19. No less 
important for the functioning of the state was the examination of the recent past 
of the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, which acts as a kind 
of centre of federal legislation and has a signifi cant impact on the functioning of 
the federal justice system due to the exceptionally broad competence of the Min-
ister of Justice in administering the federal judiciary and prosecution service20. 
In 2012, the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection (hereinaf-
ter as FMJ) appointed an independent commission of scholars led by historian 
M. Görtemaker and lawyer C. Saff erling. Th e commission was tasked with ana-
lysing personal and material continuations from the period of the Th ird Reich 
within this Ministry in the three decades following the war. Th e report, which 
came out in 2016 and numbered over 500 pages, bears the title Die Akte Rosen-
burg21 (Th e Rosenburg Files). Th e title refers to the FMJ headquarters in the years 
1950–1973, i.e. the Rosenburg villa in a district of Bonn. Th e work and fi ndings 
16 E.g. the fi lm Th e People vs. Fritz Bauer [original title: Der Staat gegen Fritz Bauer] dir. Lars 
Kraume, Germany 2015. As for victims-citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany the monog-
raphy by A. Pross, Wiedergutmachung: Der Kleinkrieg gegen die Opfern, Berlin 1988 under the 
telling title “Redress: a small war against victims”, interesting data on the amounts of compensation 
paid out to former offi  cials of the Th ird Reich and those paid out to their victims. By 2000, the 
former received EUR 306 billion and the victims EUR 52.51 billion, K.H. Roth, H. Rübner, op. 
cit., p. 285f. 
17 Critically H.A. Winkler, Długa droga na Zachód, vol. II: Dzieje Niemiec 1933–1990, Wro-
cław 2007, p. 123ff .
18  Rosenburg – Federalne Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości Niemiec w cieniu narodowosocjalistycz-
nej przeszłości. Publikacja towarzysząca wystawie, transl. M. Bainczyk, https://www.iz.poznan.pl/
plik,pobierz,3298,91f27b643892ae4937b2adafd6af61f2/BMJV%20Rosenburg%20Katalog%20
wystawy.pdf (accessed 15.01.2021), p. 21f.
19 E. Conze, N. Frei, P. Hayes, M. Zimmermann, Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche 
Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik, München 2010.
20 M. Bainczyk, ‘Wybrane aspekty prawne niezawisłości władzy sądowniczej w RFN’, IZ Policy 
Papers, 2019, no. 30, https://www.iz.poznan.pl/plik,pobierz,3026,1cf079cc57256ac2eeaa534c58
1c132a/IZ%20Policy%20Papers%203=0.pdf (accessed 15.01.2021).
21 M. Görtemaker, Ch. Saff erling, Die Akte Rosenburg. Das Bundesministerium der Justiz und 















































11The Rosenburg Project – Federal Ministry of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany 
of the commission are summarised in a text by one of its leaders, M. Görtermaker, 
entitled ‘Das Bundesministerium der Justiz 1949–1973 und die NS-Zeit: Kon-
tinuität und demokratischer Neuanfang – Ein historischer Rückblick’ (Federal 
Ministry of Justice 1949–1973 and the Nazi period: continuity and a democrat-
ic new beginning – a historical retrospective). One of the most striking fi ndings 
of the committee was the extent to which the FMJ management positions con-
tinued to be staff ed by the same people.
Th e work of the commission headed by M. Görtemaker and C. Saff erling was 
based on the concept of “public history”, while both interim and overall results of 
the work have been repeatedly presented and debates at open meetings targeted 
at various social groups. A major part of the “public history” project was more-
over the development of an exhibition that concisely and transparently presents 
the fi ndings of an independent commission of scholars. Th e itinerant exhibition, 
excellent in terms of content and form, has since 2017 toured Germany and since 
been shown 2019 abroad, in an English version. Poland was the second country, 
aft er the United States of America, where the FMJ in cooperation with the In-
stitute for Western Aff airs in Poznań decided to show the exhibition. Th is logis-
tically complicated undertaking could not have been made p ossible without the 
great commitment of the FMJ staff , especially Ms. I. Hanke. 
One should emphasize at this point the superb graphics of the exhibition, in 
perfect harmony with the content presented. Th e exhibition panels depict the 
double face of the FMJ in the post-war years; the light front of the exhibition 
panel is contrasted with its dark back side. One side demonstrates the superi-
or competence of many lawyers, whereas the other side shows their dark past 
and deep entanglement with the Th ird Reich. Th e slanting and crooked forms 
of the exhibition panels increase the feeling of ambiguity, while the oversized 
offi  ce lamps literally bring to light what has long remained hidden in the shadows 
and was the subject of scientifi c research of M. Görtemaker and C. Saff erling’s 
commission.
Th e exhibition toured three Polish cities: Wrocław, Krakow and Poznań, and 
was accompanied by scholarly and popular events and the publication of a com-
prehensive catalogue in the Polish language22. Th e scholarly events included 
the international conference Liability for International Crimes. Conclusions and 
Perspectives/Verantwortung für Völkerverbrechen. Konklusionen und Perspektiven 
on 5–6 November 2019 in Krakow and a seminar titled Post Confl ict Justice on 
21–22 January 2020 in Poznań. Importantly, both events gathered scholars and 
students from Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany. Th e texts reviewed 
and collected in this volume and in one published in Polish grew out of the con-
text of  the  exhibition, the curatorial tour of the FMJ Ministerial Counsellor 















































12 Magdalena Bainczyk / Agnieszka Kubiak Cyrul
A. Grapentin, speeches and debates of the above scholarly events. 
Events popularising the subject of the personal continuation in the West 
German judiciary were reviews of fi lms related to the subject of the exhibition, 
prepared by M. Wagińska-Marzec from the Institute for Western Aff airs. Th e 
screenings, held in Wrocław, Krakow and Poznań, included three fi lms: Laby-
rinth of Lies [original title: Im Labyrinth des Schweigens], dir. Giulio Ricciarelli, 
Germany 2014; Th e People vs. Fritz Bauer [original title: Der Staat gegen Fritz 
Bauer] dir. Lars Kraume, Germany 2015; Th e Nuremberg Epilogue dir. Jerzy 
Antczak, Poland, 1969.
Research on the settlement of the post-war history of the German state au-
thorities and in particular of the justice system continues to this day. In early 
2018, the General Prosecutor’s Offi  ce set up a scientifi c committee for this pur-
pose, headed by lawyer C. Saff erling and historian F. Kießling. Th e fi ndings of 
this committee are as appalling as those of other bodies: 50% of the Prosecutor 
General’s Offi  ce staff  were NSDAP members.23 
In February 2020, the then President of the Federal Constitutional Court of 
the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinaft er FCC) A. Vosskuhle announced 
during an annual meeting with communications media representatives that both 
the FCC Senates had passed a regulation on the study of personal continuations 
from the socialist nationalist period in the operation of the Court, set up in 
1951.24 Compared to other German authorities and offi  ces, the continuation of 
careers from the Th ird Reich period was relatively limited in the FCC. Out of 
24 judges appointed in 1951, 9 were persecuted during the Th ird Reich, which 
was rather an exception in Germany’s post-war personnel policy. It was even be-
lieved that the composition of the FCC was a kind of compensation for those 
not connected with the Th ird Reich, who in other bodies and offi  ces could not 
continue their careers interrupted between 1933 and 1945. Th is does not mean, 
however, that the FCC had no people with a controversial past. Among the cases 
examined so far, the following are mentioned: H. Höpker-Aschoff , President of 
the FCC between 1951 and 1954, member of the NSDAP, chief lawyer of the 
Central Trust Offi  ce East (German: Haupttreuhandstelle Ost, HTO). Th is par-
ticular offi  ce was responsible for the collection and administration of the property 
of Polish citizens in the area annexed by the Th ird Reich.25 In addition, there was 
W. Geiger, an FCC justice between 1951 and 1977, a member of the NSDAP 
and SA, prosecutor at the Special Court in Bamberg in the years 1941–1943, 
23 K.  Hempel, Eine belastete Behörde, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/gba-ns-
vergangenheit-101.html (accessed 15.01.2021).
24 BVerfG will NS-Erbe aufarbeiten lassen, Redaktion beck-aktuell, 19 February 2020 (dpa), 
https://rsw.beck.de/aktuell/daily/meldung/detail/bverfg-will-ns-erbe-aufarbeiten-lassen (ac-
cessed 15.01.2021).
















































13The Rosenburg Project – Federal Ministry of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany 
responsible for the delivery by that court of fi ve death sentences, including 
two for Polish citizens. In addition, four more FCC judges continued their 
careers began in the Th ird Reich.26
At present, a commission of scholars is looking into the socialist nationalist 
past of the post-war judges of the Federal Supreme Court (German Bundesgericht-
shof, BGH). Th e continuation of employment of persons previously involved in 
the Th ird Reich machinery was 71.2% in the BGH in 1964 and over 40% in nine 
Higher Land Courts (German Oberlandsgericht, OLG). It was the BGH which 
delivered a  number of controversial rulings in cases concerning Th ird Reich 
war criminals, e.g. an acquittal of the judges who sentenced to death Admiral 
W.  Canaris and the Reverend D.  Bonhoeff er.27 In the context of this ruling, 
J. Perels pointed to the discrimination of victims of national socialism by the legal 
system of the Federal Republic of Germany and further violations of their rights 





































































































Continuations in Higher Land Courts and Highest Federal Courts in 1964.
Source: H. Rottleuthner, Karrieren und Kon tinuitäten deutscher Justizjuristen vor und nach 1945, 
Berlin 2010, p. 69. 
26 M. Görtemaker, C. Saff erling, op. cit.
27 A. Koch, ‘Der „Huppenkothen-Prozess”. Die Ermordung der Widerstandskämpfer um Pa-
stor Dietrich Bonhoeff er von der Schranken der Augsburger Justiz’, in: A. Koch, H. Veh (eds.), Vor 
70 Jahren – Stunde Null für die Justiz, Baden-Baden 2017, p. 131ff ; J. Perels, Das juristische Erbe 
des „Dritten Reiches“. Beschädigungen der demokratischen Rechtsordnung, Frankfurt am Main 1999, 
p. 181ff .
28 J. Perels, ‘Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Entstehung und Gefährdung einer Ver-















































14 Magdalena Bainczyk / Agnieszka Kubiak Cyrul
Th e continued staffi  ng of higher courts and supreme courts is very 
controversial. Between 1933 and 1945, the German justice system was deep-
ly involved in the policy of the Th ird Reich. Th is is perfectly illustrated by 
W. Kulesza’s text, shocking for contemporary lawyers, entitled ‘Criminal bend-
ing of the law by German special courts in occupied Poland. A contribution to 
further research’, in which the author analyses the crimes committed by judges 
of German special courts (German Sondergerichte) in their judicial decisions. 
Th e justices, adjudicating exorbitant penalties under a  special regulation on 
criminal proceedings of Poles and Jews, delivered judgements per analogia 
iuris, thus violating the elementary principles of criminal law: nullum crimen 
sine lege, nulla poena sine lege, nullum crimen sine lege certa, lex retro non agit, 
cogitationis poenam nemo patitur. 
Th e active participation of members of the Th ird Reich regime, including 
judges of all court instances, in the post-war state authorities at the federal and 
Länder level, undoubtedly had an impact on the prosecution, or rather the 
failure to prosecute war criminals in West Germany. German literature even 
uses the term Krähenjustiz (literally crows’ justice), meaning that crows will 
not harm another crow.29 
Th e negative balance is no doubt one of the main reasons why the respon-
sibility of a  state for international crimes should be considered more broadly 
and the restoration of justice aft er massive human rights violations should be 
analysed. We are taking here about a state that has transformed itself in polit-
ical terms and as to its system, abiding by the values of democracy, respect for 
human rights and the rule of law, and has established numerous institutions to 
implement these values. In view of the fundamental structural problems out-
lined above, even the establishment of specialised institutions to assist in the 
prosecution of war criminals has not fundamentally aff ected the restoration of 
justice. Such institutions include the Central Unit of the National Administra-
tion of the Judiciary for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes in Lud-
wigsburg (German Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufk lärung 
nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen). Its task is to conduct preliminary inves-
tigations, on the basis of which prosecutors in the Länder can bring charges 
against perpetrators from the Th ird Reich. Since 1958, 7600 preliminary inves-
tigations have been carried out. Th e Central Offi  ce is still in operation today. 
Th e practical aspects of the activity of public prosecutors in such proceedings 
were discussed during the Post Confl ict Justice seminar by Chief Prosecutor 
J. Lehman (General Prosecution Authority Celle).
Apart from internal settlements with national socialism and its legacy in 
Germany, issues concerning Germany’s liability for the eff ects of the Th ird 















































15The Rosenburg Project – Federal Ministry of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany 
Reich’s action in international relations and the reaction of national legal sys-
tems to crimes of international law remain extremely important. In particular, 
to date, the process of post-war settlements has not been completed and the 
damage suff ered by citizens aff ected by warfare has not been redressed. Th is 
is pointed out by M. Bainczyk in the text entitled ‘Constitutional courts vs. 
jurisprudence of international tribunals in a question of just compensation for 
the losses incurred as a  result of international crimes’, where the author pre-
sents the question of fair compensation and redress for the victims of the Th ird 
Reich in light of case of law of national constitutional courts: of the Italian 
Constitutional Court, Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the Polish Constitutional Court, as well as the International 
Court of Justice. Th e fact that compensation was not dealt with in the post-
war period has resulted in signifi cant relevant decisions of national and in-
ternational supreme courts over the last decade. Th ey also provide interesting 
material for analysing the relationship between constitutional law and public 
international law.
Th e far-reaching consequences of the massive human rights violations dur-
ing the Second World War in German-Polish relations of a  legal nature are 
shown in three other texts in the volume. Th ey refer to the so-called “Polish 
concentration camps” and various ways of eradicating this expression from 
public discourse. Th e above term is most painful for the Poles who remember 
the times of World War II and the horrors of German concentration camps lo-
cated within the borders of present-day Poland. Th e attempts to introduce le-
gal regulations in this area prove the urgency of this problem in Polish society, 
despite the passage of years. Th ey moreover indicate how emotionally charged 
statements denying the crimes committed by Th ird Reich functionaries or at-
tributing these crimes to Poles are. At the same time, they show how diffi  cult 
it is to regulate these issues eff ectively by means of legal provisions. A. Strzelec 
in the text ‘Polish death camps…’, referring to the amendment of the Act on 
the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of 
Crimes Against the Polish Nation of 26 January 2018 presents the genesis of 
this untrue yet widespread concept and discusses the attempt to criminalise 
its use in the public domain. Particular attention should be paid to analyses to 
verify whether the new criminal law regulations have reduced the frequency of 
use of such defective memory codes. Th e research carried out shows, however, 
that the emergence of provisions in the Polish legal system ensuring criminal 
liability for the use of such terms has had the opposite eff ect to that intended, 
and has even led to these phrases being perpetuated in the public domain. 
At the same time, a regulation of a civil law nature has appeared in Polish law, 
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good name of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation. Th is regulation is 
addressed by A. Kubiak Cyrul in the text ‘Protection of the good name of the 
Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation in the Act on the Institute of National 
Remembrance’. Th e author presented an analysis of the new provisions of the 
Act on the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) against the background 
of the civil law acquis to date with regard to general provisions on the protection 
of personal rights, and in particular the protection of the sense of national iden-
tity. Th e new provisions are a source of numerous doubts as to their subjective 
and material scope and the means available to the “wronged party”. Th eir anal-
ysis leads to the conclusion that these provisions in their current form will not 
contribute to the elimination of statements which falsify Polish history, either at 
home or abroad. In Poland, on the other hand, they may constitute a restriction 
on public debate and on the freedom of scientifi c research.
Th e practical aspect of this question is addressed by P. Mostowik and E. Figu-
ra-Góralczyk in the text ‘Polish Death Camps’ as an ‘Opinion’ of which Express-
ing is Protected by German Law? Questionable Bundesgerichtshof ’s Judgement 
of 19.7.2018’. Th e authors present problems related to the enforcement of de-
cisions of Polish courts in civil matters in the Member States of the European 
Union, issued in cases involving statements about “Polish concentration camps”. 
Th ey point to a specifi c example of the refusal to enforce a judgment issued by 
the Court of Appeal in Krakow in the case against the German television ZDF. 
In these proceedings, the Federal Supreme Court of Germany challenged the 
Polish court’s assessment of the use of the term “Polish death camps” by the ZDF 
and invoked the public order clause. Th e authors demonstrated beyond doubt 
that this decision of the German court is a violation of EU law, private interna-
tional law and public international law.
Th e passage of time is one of the important elements of the process of com-
pensating for the wrongs associated with warfare, in relations between the par-
ticipating countries. Th is issue is analysed in the next two texts in this volume 
relating to the statute of limitation. In the text entitled ‘Evolution of the statute 
of limitations of crimes under international law in international law’ by K. Ba-
nasik discusses the development of the statute of limitation of crimes of inter-
national law in instruments of international law. In turn, R. Pawlik in the text 
‘Scope of the exclusion of the statute of limitations on prosecution in Article 
105 § 1 of the Polish Penal Code in the context of the State’s responsibility 
for crimes under international law’, presents considerations on the principle 
of non-applicability of the statute of limitation with regard to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in the context of the Polish Penal Code. Both authors 
draw attention to problems concerning the defi nition of the scope of the con-















































17The Rosenburg Project – Federal Ministry of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany 
results in doubts about the scope of non-applicability of the statute of limita-
tion with regard to war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
A  unique problem of international responsibility for starving civilians 
and prisoners of war during wartime operations is highlighted by T. Srogosz 
in the text entitled ‘Starvation as an international crime’. Th e author analyses 
the example of the so-called Hungerplan (der Backe-Plan), developed under 
the  supervision of H.  Göring as part of a  broader economic plan to exploit 
and destroy the eastern territories; the plan was codenamed Oldenburg. When 
considering the issue of criminal liability in international law, he refers to the 
legacy of the Nuremberg Trial, which made the international community aware 
that starvation may be an instrument of state policy aimed at exterminating na-
tional or ethnic groups. 
Th e compilation of the report published as Th e Rosenburg Fi les, the crea-
tion of exhibitions and their catalogues reaching German and international 
audiences, the participation of Polish and German academics and students 
in conferences and seminars, as well as the exemplary cooperation with FMJ 
representatives in these projects created an added value in Polish-German re-
lations on an intellectual and personal level. Th e exhibition and related events 
provided space for a qualitatively new German-Polish dialogue involving not 
only scientists but also Polish and German school and university students as 
well as non-academic circles. 
We would like to once again express our heartfelt gratitude to the project 
leaders, Prof. Manfred Görtemaker and Prof. Christoph Saff erling, as well as 
to Ms. Isabel Hanke and Ms Senior Counsellor Alexander Grapentin from the 
Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection.
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Abstract
Does it make sense to talk about the consequences of the Second World War more than 
70 years aft er its conclusion? Meetings of scholars, which are at the same time meetings of 
a personal nature in the context of the exhibition ‘Rosenburg – German Federal Ministry 
of Justice in the Shadow of the National Socialist Past in Poland’ justify an affi  rmative an-
swer to the above question. It turned out that the subject of liability of the state for inter-
national crimes arouses many questions and refl ections both in German-Polish relations 
and in relation to the contemporary international community. Th is volume, therefore, 
addresses the issue of the international responsibility of the state from the point of view 
of past and present, history and law. Th ese meetings aim to contribute to the future of 
Poland and Germany in a united Europe. 
Th e Rosenburg exhibition, which off ered an opportunity to analyse the issue of lia-
bility of the state for international crimes in the light of international law, as well as na-
tional constitutional, criminal and civil law, is part of a comprehensive process of research 
into the activities of the state authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany in the post-
war years, e.g. at the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs and more recently at the Federal Consti-
tutional Court of Germany. Th e subject matter of the exhibition stirred great interest in 
both Polish and German academic circles. Th e material and personal continuations from 
the time of national socialism in the Federal Republic of Germany were poorly known, 
yet they have to date had signifi cant implications for German-Polish relations, a matter 
which is also addressed in this volume.
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Crime of bending the law (Rechtsbeugung) 
by German special courts in occupied Poland. 
A contribution to research
Introduction 
Th e article will outline the activities of special courts in the Polish territories in-
corporated into the Th ird Reich as “Gdańsk – West Prussia” and “Wartheland”, 
the fi rst to be completely Germanised, within a short time at that.1
Wartheland Gauleiter Arthur Greiser openly announced from Poznań: 
“Th e Führer appointed me a trustee of the German cause in that country with 
an unequivocal injunction to re-Germanise it. It will therefore be my most no-
ble task to do everything in my power to remove all signs of Polishness, irre-
spective of their kind, in the next few years”.2
Albert Forster was said to admonish from Gdańsk: “Amidst enthusiastic 
applause, the Gauleiter urged judges and prosecutors to always remember that 
whatever serves the nation can be called the law, while what harms it is unlaw-
fulness”.3
Th e notion of law-bending, or perversion of justice, used in the title of this 
paper is the name of an off ence known to the German penal law as the Rechts-
beugung, defi ned by the German Penal Code of 1871 as follows: “§ 336. An 
offi  cial, including a justice of the peace, who intentionally bends the law to the 
benefi t or detriment of a party while presiding over or recognising a legal case 
shall be liable for a strict prison sentence of up to 5 years”.
1 Referring to this part of the Polish territory, K.M. Pospieszalski consistently uses the term 
“eingegliederte Ostgebiete” in inverted commas, calling them “annexed territories” (pursuant to 
a Hitler decree of 8.10.1939 “über Gliederung und Verwaltung der Ostgebiete”, Reichsgesetzblatt 
I, p. 2044). Th is is also the way he refers to Nazi “law” as containing unlawful provisions (K.M. Po-
spieszalski, Hitlerowskie „prawo” okupacyjne w Polsce. Wybór dokumentów. Część I. Ziemie „wcielo-
ne”, Poznań 1952, p. 329).
2 Quoted aft er C.  Łuczak, Arthur Greiser hitlerowski władca w  Wolnym Mieście Gdańsku 
i w Kraju Warty, Poznań 1997, p. 43.
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As of the change of article numbers introduced by the law of 18.8.1997 – 
§  339 (instead of §  336), the StGB stipulates as follows: “Bending the law. 
A justice, another offi  cial or a justice of the peace, who intentionally bends the 
law to the benefi t or detriment of a party while presiding over or recognising 
a legal case shall be liable to the deprivation of liberty for a period between one 
year and fi ve years”.
If we look through the prism of the constituent elements of this crime at the 
activities of special courts in occupied Poland, it is not easy to fi nd convictions 
whose contents would not meet the essence of punishable perversion of justice. 
In other words, “bending the law to the detriment” of harshly punished inhabit-
ants of a country that was the fi rst victim of war crimes, crimes against peace and 
humanity, which began with the assault on Poland on 1 September 1939, was the 
daily practice of German special courts as an instrument of mass terror.
The “execution of justice” by German special courts
1. A  thorough examination of the activity of the Sondergericht Łódź led 
J. Waszczyński to conclude that “only with respect to the criminal activities of the 
population may one, not always at that, accept the legal qualifi cation applied to 
them by the Special Court in Łódź ”.4 Th is group included “the following kinds 
of off ences: larceny and misappropriation, fraud, robbery and extortion, trade 
in stolen goods, brawls and bodily harm, homicide, rape and immoral acts with 
minors, pimping, perjury, forgery, and other acts”.5
Special courts were generally involved in systemic persecution and extor-
tion, atrocious penalisation and intimidation, and demanded total submissive-
ness and absolute obedience of a population deprived of fundamental means of 
existence. As J. Waszczyński writes, the special judiciary sanctioned “the crim-
inal nature of the orders of the occupying authorities, regulating the trade in 
necessities in a way that clearly led to the biological extermination of Poles”.6 
Th erefore activities detrimental to the occupier’s economic system, such as 
food traffi  cking, illegal swine slaughter, illegal trade in food or clothing cou-
pons, treated as criminal off ences, “were a  manifestation of the population’s 
most fi erce and widespread fi ght against discrimination, a struggle for physi-
cal survival in a situation where compliance with the occupiers’ orders led to 
the destruction of the nation’s biological substance as a result of malnutrition 
4 J.  Waszczyński, ‘Z  działalności hitlerowskiego Sądu Specjalnego w  Łodzi (1939–1945)’, 
Biuletyn Głównej Komisji Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce, 1972, vol. XXIV, p. 78.
5 Ibid., p. 79.















































22 Witold Kulesza 
and disease, above all tuberculosis”7. Th e convictions for these crimes were in 
fact “a merciless persecution of the self-defence of Polish society, which faced 
the threat of extermination by hunger if it had to limit themselves to rationed 
food”.8 Importantly, during the occupation Poles received meagre food rations, 
purchased against coupons, roughly 1/3 of what the Germans received in the 
fi nal stage of the war, in 19459.
Actions which the special courts treated as “political” crimes, a  form of 
self-defence of the population of the occupied country, included listening to for-
eign radio stations and forwarding to others information about the situation at 
the frontlines, off ering hope that the Th ird Reich would not survive a millenni-
um, as Hitler would have it, as well as allegedly malicious statements about the 
leaders of the Reich.
Judges of the special courts moreover executed revenge on Poles for their ac-
tions against the Germans taking place prior to the attack on Poland and claimed 
that stringent punishment met the expectations of justice of the victors.
2. Th e extermination objective of punishing Poles by the Sondergerichte in the 
territories incorporated into the Reich for all categories of crimes, i.e. criminal, 
economic and political, was particularly evident in the unrestricted use by Ger-
man judges of the death penalty, made possible by the regulation “on criminal 
proceedings against Poles and Jews in the annexed Eastern territories” (Polen-
strafr echtsverordnung) of 4.12.1941.10 Provision of section I subsection 3 of the 
regulation stipulated as follows:
“Th ey (Poles and Jews – author’s note) will be subject to the death penalty 
and in less severe cases deprived of liberty, if their hateful or seditious activ-
ities display an attitude hostile towards Germans, in particular if they speak 
in hostile terms about Germans, tear down or damage public announcements 
7 Ibid., p. 78. Th e author shows that Poles were mercilessly punished not only for illegal slaugh-
ter of own pigs, but also for all the assistance off ered, e.g. lending premises or heating up the water 
needed to wash the slaughtered meat, as well as for meat trade and purchasing even the smallest 
quantities of such meat. J. Waszczyński, ‘Z działalności hitlerowskiego Sądu Specjalnego w Łodzi 
w latach 1939–1945’, in: C. Pilichowski (ed.), Zbrodnie i sprawcy. Ludobójstwo hitlerowskie przed 
sądem ludzkości i historii, Warszawa 1980, p. 554.
8 J. Waszczyński, ‘Z działalności…’, op. cit., Warszawa 1972, p. 97. Th e sentences issued by this 
court is discussed in detail by H. Schlüter, ‘„…für die Menschlichkeit im Strafmaß bekannt…”. Das 
Sondergericht Litzmannstadt und sein Vorsitzender Richter’, Juristische Zeitgeschichte Nordrhein-
Westfalen, 2007, Band 14, p. 100 ff ; see also: W. Kulesza, ‘Sąd Specjalny (Sondergericht) w Łodzi’, 
in: Gmach i jego tajemnice. Sąd Okręgowy w Łodzi 1917–2017, Łódź 2017, p. 60 ff .
9 Braunbuch. Kriegs- und Naziverbrechen in der Bundesrepublik. Staat. Wirtschaft . Verwaltung. 
Armee. Justiz. Wissenschaft , Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland. 
Dokumentationszentrum der Staatlichen Archivverwaltung der DDR (Hrsg.), Berlin 1965, p. 138.















































23Crime of bending the law (Rechtsbeugung) by German special courts in occupied Poland
of German authorities or services, or if by their other actions they reduce or 
harm the honour or interest of the German Reich or the German nation”.
A provision formulated in this way threatened the inhabitants of the occu-
pied country with the death penalty for “manifestations of an attitude hostile 
to the Germans”, who from the fi rst days of the war committed war crimes 
against Poles and Jews and against humanity. Th is provision therefore become 
a handy extermination tool used by prosecutors and judges, and justifi ed the 
draconian punishment of any behaviour that a  judge would consider to be 
“detrimental to the interest of the German nation”, even if it were not defi ned 
as a concrete punishable off ence. Th e above provision was also cited as the basis 
for the imposition of the most severe penalties if the judge wanted to impose 
a penalty in excess of the penalty for the off ence described in the less severe 
provision.
As K.M.  Pospieszalski pointed out, the announcement of the Polenstra-
fr echtsverordnung opened up another chapter in the system of occupation un-
lawfulness and it was no coincidence that it took place in Poznań, the capital 
of the Mustergau (“a model state”), on 17.12.1941. Th e author recounts: “In 
mid-December 1941, general prosecutors of the ‘annexed territories’ led by 
General Prosecutor Sturm from Wrocław gathered in Poznań to discuss the 
prosecution of crimes and execution of penalties, fi rst and foremost the special 
treatment of Poles and the relevant earlier experience”. He then quotes an ac-
count provided in Ostdeutscher Beobachter of 20.12.1941 with a transcript of 
a speech delivered during the meeting of the prosecutors by a secretary of state 
in the Ministry of Justice R. Freisler, who stressed that the Polenstrafr echtsver-
ordnung: “is a developed authoritative criminal law, which is based on the ob-
ligation of Poles and Jews to obey the Reich”. Th e speaker pointed out that 
“Th e regulation applies only to Poles and Jews whose position in the Greater 
German Reich is completely unique and which Poles and Jews should only 
attribute to themselves and their conduct”.11
Th e lawyers cooperating in the application of the Polenstrafr echtsverord-
nung accepted its contents and objectives: “Th e Regulation constitutes a spe-
cial criminal law for Poles and Jews in the Eastern annexed territories, off ering 
the possibility, in all appropriate cases, of applying the strictest penalties, in the 
fastest proceedings, with immediate enforceability of sentences. Th is regula-
tion will create a state in which vigorous cooperation will make the objectives 
of the Führer in the Eastern annexed territories a reality”.12
11 K.M. Pospieszalski, op. cit., p. 329.
12 Offi  cial document of 7.11.1941 quoted in the ratio decidendi of the judgement of 11.10.1981 
issued by the Stadtgericht Berlin – Hauptstadt der DDR in the case of the Sondergericht Grudziądz 















































24 Witold Kulesza 
Th e regulation of 7.01.1942 on the execution of penalties adjudicated with 
respect to Poles (Polenvollzugsordnung) had a discriminatory character;13 under 
this regulation Poles sentenced to deprivation of liberty were sent to penal camps 
rather than to prisons. Th e specifi c provisions and their implementation were 
a token of “organised sadism, which in practice was to bring about the death of 
a prisoner who suff ered hunger, was inhumanely treated and made to work be-
yond their strength”.14 Th e daily brutal abuse of prisoners by sadistic guards re-
sulted in an average life expectancy of 6 months for a camp prisoner.15
J. Waszczyński sums up his studies with remarks about the Sondergericht em-
ployees: “Th e judges who hand down such sentences and the prosecutors who 
demanded them cannot be treated diff erently from the organisers and accom-
plices of these de facto legalised mass death sentences, which are then carried out 
in large part by callous camp guards”.16 Importantly, a prisoner who served more 
than 6 months was not released but transferred to a concentration camp until 
the end of the war, which in the majority of cases ended with the inmate’s death.
A researcher of the Sondergericht fi les may fi nd it astonishing to fi nd sen-
tences which testify to the conviction of German judges that, by terrorising 
Poles with the threat of the death penalty for evading service in the Wehr-
macht, they will force them to join its ranks and defend the Reich against the 
impending defeat.
3. Th e separation between conviction and sentencing decisions by judges was 
based on their conviction that criminal law, serving the National Socialist ide-
ology, exempts them from following elementary rules and thus gives them the 
opportunity to demonstrate their initiative in unlimited punishment per analo-
giam iuris. In fact, this was the aim of amending the content and normative sense 
of the provision of § 2 StGB of 1871. Originally, the provision read: “An action 
entails a penalty only when this penalty was set out in a law prior to the commit-
ment of the act”. Leipziger Kommentar explained in the 1925 edition that this 
provision actually means that: “there is no punishable off ence and no penalty 
without a law, nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege”.17 In the amended 
StGB of 28.06.1935, the provision is designated as “§ 2a” and preceded by article 
“2”, which set out that punishment will be meted out on a person committing 
13 Deutsche Justiz, 1942, p. 35. 
14 J. Waszczyński, ‘Z działalności…’, op. cit., Warszawa 1972, p. 37.
15 Ibid., pp. 75, 77.
16 Ibid., pp. 97–98.
17 A.  Lobe, in: L. Ebermayer, A.  Lobe, W.  Rosenberg, Reichs-Strafgesetzbuch (Leipziger 
Kommentar), Berlin und Leipzig 1925, p.  109. Th e commentary to §  2 StGB began with the 
sentence: “Th e provision states at the outset that a penalty can be imposed solely pursuant to an 















































25Crime of bending the law (Rechtsbeugung) by German special courts in occupied Poland
a punishable off ence defi ned in a  law or deserving punishment “in line with 
the foundation doctrine of a penal law” (nach dem Grundgedanken eines Straf-
gesetzes) and “in line with a healthy national sense” (nach gesundem Volksemp-
fi nden). Th e commentary clarifi es that the new provision “in the interests of 
material justice” enables a  departure from previously adopted rules and the 
punishment of an act which is not punishable by law, if this is supported by 
the basic idea of punishment and the judges ’ wholesome national sense.18 Th us 
it was stressed that “the acts and the law” (Gesetz und Recht) became sources 
of a penal law of the same status.19 “Th e acts” included provisions established 
when it was in force, while “the law” was all that “served the German nation”. 
Th e purpose of the judge’s punishment, according to his sense of “the law,” 
was to pass convicting sentences to eliminate unintentional “loopholes in the 
acts,” and to make punishable those defendants’ behaviour that, although not 
included as punishable off ences in existing acts, were nevertheless “presumed 
by the legislator to be punishable because they thought of them when passing 
the acts”. Th is was the interpretation of the second sentence of Section 2, which 
states that “if no provision of the law is directly applicable to a given act, then 
the behaviour will be punished according to the law whose guiding principle 
best applies to it”. Th is conduct of the judge ensured that the behaviour was 
punishable because of the “material unlawfulness” contained therein, even if it 
was not formally declared an off ence. Th e “material unlawfulness” of the con-
duct was recognized by the judges themselves, oft en completely ignoring the 
verbal wording of the act, citing the fact that the interest of the German people 
is above written law.
Th is created a kind of template for the judge’s reasoning to justify the pun-
ishment not only of those defendants who had committed an off ence under 
criminal law, but also of those who had not committed any crime, because their 
actions did not constitute any kind of criminal act, but were nevertheless be-
lieved by the judge to deserve punishment. If the actions they were charged 
with were not prohibited by a provision of a written law, the judge referred 
to the “guiding spirit” of another law, and generally chose as the basis for the 
criminal law qualifi cation the provision that carried the most severe punish-
ment. Applying these categories, the judges themselves added to the lawlessness 
of the Th ird Reich; “without their active participation, the National Socialist 
criminal law project would not have been implemented”.20
18 Ibid.
19 A.  Dalcke, K.  Schäfer, in: A.  Dalcke, E. Fuhrmann, K.  Krug, K.  Schäfer, Strafr echt und 
Strafverfahren, Berlin und München 1940, p. 8.















































26 Witold Kulesza 
In many cases this line of reasoning of judges led to a juristically ridiculous 
subsuming of the behaviours attributed to the accused to the penal provisions 
invoked in the judgments, a practice that could have seemed absurd and gro-
tesque had it not been for the risk of the most stringent penalties resulting 
from the legal nonsense contained in the judges’ judgments.21
4. Th e German special courts served as a murder instrument, terrorizing the 
population during the entire period of the occupation. It must be noted, too, 
that from the fi rst days of the war the invaders exterminated the upper echelons 
of Polish society as part of the prearranged Intelligenzaktion campaign. In the 
fall of 1939, at least 70,000 people were murdered without even the appear-
ance of any legal proceedings. Th eir mass executions were carried out on the 
basis of previously draft ed personal lists of those who might have been able to 
incite resistance against the occupier.22 Th e ultimate goal was to reduce Poles 
to the role of powerless slaves, to Germanise the Eastern territories annexed to 
the Reich, i.e. Pomerania and so-called Reichsgau Wartheland and the annihi-
lation of all Jews.23 In relation to the Jews, the procedure of trials before special 
courts was repealed by the decree of April 1, 1943, and they were transferred 
to be punished by the police with an indication: “Aft er the death of a Jew, their 
property is the property of the Reich”.24
21 Th e activity of a 21-year-old Pole who, encouraged by a German girl at the age of 14 years 
and 5 months, had physical relations with her, was not a punishable off ence. Th is was because § 176 
of the StGB stipulated that a  punishment of up to 10 years would be imposed on those “who 
commit or incite to commit or tolerate immoral acts with persons under 14 years of age”. Th e Son-
dergericht Łódź, headed by Dr H. Neubauer, sentenced this Pole to the death penalty, citing as the 
basis for the criminal law qualifi cation the most vaguely worded provision of paragraph I.1. 3 of the 
Polenstrafr echtsverordnung, which refers to action “to the detriment of the German Nation”, from 
which he derived the principle of punishment: “Any Pole who has relations with a German woman 
or immorally approaches her must know that they are bound to lose their life because of this”. 
Th e second death penalty was imposed by Neubauer in the same sentence, on the same defendant 
for imposing himself on another German girl, embracing her from behind and saying schönes Fräu-
lein. More on this W. Kulesza, ‘Karanie za zbrodnię “zhańbienia rasy” (Rassenschande) i odpowie-
dzialność karna sędziów za zbrodnicze skazania’, in: A. Adamski, J. Bojarski, P. Chrzczonowicz, 
M.  Leciak (eds.), Nauki penalne wobec szybkich przemian socjokulturowych. Księga jubileuszowa 
Profesora Mariana Filara, vol. I, Toruń 2012, p. 349.
22 D. Schenk, Albert Forster…, op. cit., p. 233. Th e fact that the commander of the police ex-
ecution command placed crosses on the list of arrested Poles at their names was enough for their 
group execution. On the criminal trial of Lölgen, who handed over such lists to the executioners: 
W. Kulesza, ‘Ustalenie prawdy jako cel postępowania sądowego – refl eksje historyczne’, in: H. Cza-
kowska, M. Kuciński (eds.), Dialog wielokulturowości i prawda, Bydgoszcz 2018, p. 183.
23 At a meeting held between 10 and 15 September 1939, Gauleiter A. Forster instructed the 
chief of police and the SS in Gdańsk to “eliminate” all dangerous Poles, all Jews and Polish clergy. 
Th e President of the Higher National Court, Wohler, stated that for the time being he would not 
delegate the judges to the operation site so as not to delay it and, if necessary, he would “instruct 
them accordingly”. D. Schenk, Albert Forster…, op. cit., p. 213.















































27Crime of bending the law (Rechtsbeugung) by German special courts in occupied Poland
The fi rst German court murder during the Second World War
1. In the opinion of D. Schenk, an eminent researcher of the historical and legal 
aspects of the defence of the Polish Post Offi  ce in Gdańsk on 1 September 1939 
and the death penalty imposed on its 38 heroic defenders: “Th e verdict of the 
Gdańsk Court Martial of 8 September 1939 is considered to be the fi rst verdict 
of a military court during the Second World War”.25 Th e sentence passed on the 
defenders of the Post Offi  ce was at the same time a blatant case of bending the 
law and violating its fundamental principles, and a researcher of fi les of special 
courts will easily observe the same thinking shown by the prosecutors and judges 
of the court martial.
Th e fi les of the trial involving the Polish defenders of the Post Offi  ce had the 
fi le numbers StL 41/39 and 42/39 and have never been discovered.26 Th e course 
of events in the Post Offi  ce building in Hevelius Square and the trial of the post 
offi  ce staff  had therefore to be recreated on the basis of detailed documentation 
gathered by the aforementioned author and his comprehensive analysis.
At midnight on August 31, 1939, there were 58 people in the Polish Post 
Offi  ce building, including offi  cials who stayed aft er the day shift  and arrived for 
night duty. Th e director, Dr. J. Michoń, convened a meeting at which he read the 
secret order to defend the Post Offi  ce against an expected German attack and 
introduced his subordinates to “Inspector Konrad (Guderski – author’s note)”, 
a person put in charge of the military command. “Konrad” had the guns, am-
munition, grenades, and one light machine gun for each of the three fl oors of 
the building distributed, and then assigned defence positions. Th e estimates were 
that the post offi  ce workers would need to fi ght for six hours, until divisions of 
Pomorze Army would come to the rescue. Around 4:00 a.m. the defenders no-
ticed that electricity as well as phone and telegraph connections had been cut off .
Th e attack was carried out by a police unit from Police Station no. 2, located 
in the side wing of the same building in which the Polish Post Offi  ce was based. 
Th e police were reinforced by police reserves, the SA and the SS-Heimwehr un-
der the command of the head of the Gdańsk Police Col. W. Bethke.
In the fi rst attack, which started at 4:45 am, i.e. in parallel with the shots 
fi red from the battleship Schleswig-Holstein at Westerplatte (possibly earlier, at 
4:30 am)27, the Germans tried to force their entry into the building via the yard 
entrances and the east side entrance on the narrow wall of the building. Th e Post 
25 D.  Schenk, Polska Poczta w  Gdańsku. Dzieje pewnego niemieckiego zabójstwa sądowego, 
Gdańsk 1999, p. 278. At the same time, this is the only judgment that has been legally recognised 
as an off ence of bending the law (§ 336 of the StGB), consisting in judicial murder, for which the 

















































28 Witold Kulesza 
Offi  ce employees opened fi re and managed to withstand the attack. Th e group 
who managed to penetrate the packages room on the fi rst fl oor of the building 
was forced out by the defenders with grenades. One policeman and one SS of-
fi cer were killed and seven attackers were wounded. None of the postmen were 
seriously wounded. All the windows in the Post Offi  ce building had already been 
blown out and an SS-Heimwehr armoured car shelled the building with a ma-
chine gun.
Th e commander of the attack ordered a ceasefi re and called the defenders 
through a megaphone to surrender, threatening to blow up the building with-
in two hours. All the defenders gathered on the fi rst fl oor and no one objected 
when it was decided that they should not give up at this point.28
Th e second phase of the attack, conducted with a howitzer, two cannons and 
machine guns, focused on the façade of the Post Offi  ce building and the main 
entrance.29 Shots were fi red from the Post Offi  ce building. Hevelius Square was 
screened by a billow of dust and the noise was deafening. Postman A. Flisykowski 
ran to the uppermost fl oor of the Post Offi  ce as the machine gun there had 
ceased to operate and noticed that Inspector “Konrad” was dead. In this situation 
A. Flisykowski, despite his thigh wound, took over command of the defenders.
Th e third phase of the attack, according to an account in a German propagan-
da publication in 1940, was as follows: “Th e attack was scheduled for 5 p.m. It 
was to commence with the release of an explosive device placed by sappers under 
the building. Th e earth was shaken by a rapid explosion; then, for a few seconds, 
a paralyzing silence fell, interrupted by a sudden, intense fi re of machine guns 
and the sound of cannon shots. (…) Bullets pound on the facade of the Polish 
bastion, tearing a hole in the wall the size of a barn gate. Th e fence made of brick 
pillars and iron bars collapsed. (…) Machine guns shell the windows. (…) Th e 
Poles respond with fi re. A barrage of all weapons forces the Poles to descend from 
the upper fl oors. Th ey retreat to the basement and continue fi ghting. Th ey do 
not want to give up.”30 Unnoticed by the defenders, sappers from the Wehrmacht 
unit of the Eberhardt Group planted under the building an explosive device re-
ferred to at the beginning of the aforementioned account. Th ey tried to enter the 
Post Offi  ce through the basement yet were unable to do so because the defenders 
pre-empted the assault and barricaded the basement entry with wooden logs.31
28 Ibid., p. 65.
29 A staff  member, Dr. H.-W. Gieseke, a counsellor of the group’s war court, took care of bring-
ing a howitzer from the military Eberhardt Group to Hevelius Square in order to make the po-
lice attack on the Post Offi  ce more eff ective. Aft er the war, he testifi ed as a witness: “I personally 
ensured that this order was carried out. Th e cannon fi red at the building from a close distance 
(approximately 300–500 m). Around noon on September 1, 1939, I was still on the square near 
the Polish Post Offi  ce for half an hour aft er the cannon was launched” (ibid., pp. 65–66).
















































29Crime of bending the law (Rechtsbeugung) by German special courts in occupied Poland
Th e fourth phase was the execution of the order given by W. Bethke to the fi re 
department: delivering a petrol tanker to the front of the building and pumping 
the fuel to the basement of the Post Offi  ce. Th en the gasoline was set on fi re 
with a hand grenade. Th e explosion had terrible consequences: fi ve people were 
burned alive, six Poles died as a result of severe burns during the next few days in 
hospital, among them Erwina, a ward of the married couple who were the man-
agers of the Post Offi  ce building.
Th e course of events could be watched by journalists from German newspa-
pers, reporters from the Radio of Great Germany and cameramen of the Wochen-
schau newsreel, screened in cinemas a few days later. Th e information about the 
use of gasoline was removed from the news and coverage, an example of National 
Socialist propaganda.
When the Postmen surrendered, the fi rst to leave the building was the 
wounded director J. Michoń, carrying a white towel. He was killed by a shot in 
the belly and a shout was heard: “Th ese are the Polish dogs”. Th e next was the 
head of the Post Offi  ce, J. Wąsik, who was shot – according to a version known 
in Poland – aft er a fl amethrower was directed at him.32 Th e next Postmen leaving 
the building, their hands crossed on the nape, were taken captive.
2. Th e trial of the twenty-eight defenders of the Polish Post Offi  ce took place 
a week aft er the German attack. Th e indictment was draft ed by councillor of the 
military court H.-W. Gieseke, who decided that the trial of the gravely wounded 
and unable to stand trial was to take place later; it fi nally was held on 29 Sep-
tember 1939. Dr. K. Bode, the then vice-president of the Gdansk Higher Land 
Court, was appointed chairman of the three-person jury panel of the Eberhardt 
Group Military Court Martial. Th e jurors were police major Dr. H.-W. Schim-
melpfennig and an undefi ned offi  cer. All the defendants were assigned only one 
offi  cer as a defence attorney. Th e sitting of the court took place in the hall of the 
Higher Land Court in Gdańsk. It began in the aft ernoon and lasted until early 
evening. Th e court was not presented with a written indictment, which was de-
livered orally by H.-W. Gieseke, who claimed that the accused postal workers had 
committed the “crime of guerrilla activity”.33 
32 Ibid, pp. 70–71.
33 Th e regulation on the wartime special penal law – Kriegssonderstafr echtsverordnung (KSS-
VO) of 17.08.1938 (Reichsgesetzblatt 1939 I, p. 1455). Provision § 3 (1) of the Regulation read as 
follows: “Th e death penalty for guerrilla warfare (Freischärlerei) shall be imposed on anyone who 
does not belong to the enemy armed forces and who, being unable to be recognised as belonging to 
them by virtue of the external markings carried and provided for by international law, uses or pos-
sesses fi rearms or other weaponry with the intention of using them to the detriment of the German 
Wehrmacht or its allied armed forces with the intention of murdering members of those forces, or 
















































30 Witold Kulesza 
Th e charge was justifi ed by the words of one of the defendants, whom 
H.-W. Gieseke interrogated earlier and who told him that the defenders would 
be considered as guerrillas. In response, he heard that “if he meant volunteers 
(Franktireurs), it was right”.34 Aft er the hearing of one witness on the occasion 
of the fi ghting on September 1, 1939, the trial ended with the imposition of 
the death penalty on all defendants. Th e trial on September 29, 1939 against 
the other ten defendants of the Post Offi  ce concluded with the same sentence. 
Subsequently, the sentences were approved by the superior, and requests for 
clemency were denied. Th e sentenced defenders of the Polish Post Offi  ce were 
executed on 5 October 1939 by SS-Heimwehr commandoes in Gdańsk-Zaspa, 
on a military property.
3. Th e sentence of the decision of the Lübeck Land Court of 25 May 1998, 
concluding the resumed proceedings concerning the sentencing of defenders 
of the Polish Post Offi  ce reads that the court “repeals the judgements of the 
Eberhardt Group Military Court Martial in Gdańsk issued on 8 September 
1939 and 29 September 1939 with respect to the defendants (fi le nos. StL 
41/39 and 42/39) and acquits the defendants”.35 At the beginning of the ratio 
decidendi it was observed that the repealed judgements had not been presented 
to the court and a searc h for them had proved futile for a number of decades. 
Th e reader of the ratio decidendi is made aware that both the account of the 
course of events on 1 September 1939 and the legal analysis of the trial and 
sentence of the Postmen fully corroborated D. Schenk’s fi ndings. D. Schenk’s 
1995 publication under the telling title Die Post von Danzig. Geschichte eines 
deutschen Justizmords was impactful for the judicial procedure of resuming the 
proceedings concerning this judicial murder.
In the justifi cation of the decision of the Lübeck Land Court, there is a key 
sentence stating that Judge Dr. K. Bode: “while examining the case commit-
ted a punishable breach of offi  cial duties, namely bending the law (§ 336 of 
the Penal Code). Th is was due to his participation in a conviction for guerrilla 
activity, which he later confessed on several occasions in the investigations con-
cerning him”.36
In view of the procedural chronology of the claim that the conviction 
of the Post Offi  ce workers was a  case of bending the law within the meaning 
34 D. Schenk, Die Post von Danzig. Geschichte eines deutschen Justizmords, Reinbek bei Ham-
burg 1995, p. 98. 
35 Decision of the Th ird Grand Penal Chamber of the Lübeck Land Court, Se. 3 AR 1/98 
in a resumed proceeding in the case of the Eberhardt Group led by the Wartime Military Court 
in Gdańsk. Th e text of the decision was appended to the Polish edition of D. Schenk, op. cit., 
p. 283 ff .















































31Crime of bending the law (Rechtsbeugung) by German special courts in occupied Poland
of Section 336 of the StGB, it is necessary to refer fi rst of all to prosecutor 
H.-W. Gieseke as the one who qualifi ed the criminal act and pressed it before the 
court. Th e focus should therefore be on the provision cited by the prosecution, 
on the basis of which he demanded the death penalty for the defendants. Th is 
provision entailed the death penalty for anyone “using or possessing fi rearms or 
other weaponry with the intention of using them to the detriment of the German 
Wehrmacht”.37 Being an eyewitness to the events, H.-W. Gieseke knew that the 
accused Postmen shot back, defending themselves against the attack of Gdańsk 
policemen, members of the SA and the SS-Heimwehr. Th e attackers were there-
fore not soldiers and even the broadest interpretation could not possibly equalise 
the term “the German Wehrmacht” with those of “Gdańsk police, the SA and 
the SS-Heimwehr”. Th e rejection by the prosecution of the natural right of Polish 
Postmen to necessary defence against unlawful assault did not in a  legal sense 
turn the attacking policemen into members of the Wehrmacht.38
Prosecutor H.-W.  Gieseke implemented in the room of the Gdańsk Land 
Court his intention to kill all who on 1 September 1939 happened to be in the 
building of the Polish Post Offi  ce and dared to resist uniformed Germans, no 
matter what the uniforms were. Although, as he admitted, he brought a howitzer 
which shelled the Post Offi  ce building, he failed to achieve his goal at that time, 
but a week later he managed to use a court martial as a legal deadly tool.
4. A question arises what a defence attorney countering the claim of the prose-
cution should have said had he really performed his role. Th is question was an-
swered in detail by D. Schenk in his seminal text. Th e defence of the accused 
Postmen should have referred the court to the fact that the Regulations concern-
ing the laws and customs of war on land, an annex to the Hague Convention of 
1907, excluded in its Article 1 the possibility of treating the accused defenders 
of the Polish Post Offi  ce as guerrillas.39 Th en the defence should have raised that 
this Convention provision was reiterated in § 3 (2) of the Kriegssonderstrafr echts-
verordnung, stipulating that guerrillas are not “members of militia and volunteer 
units, provided that they meet the following conditions: 1) they are headed 
37 Vide footnote 33.
38 “Th e attackers were police offi  cers and auxiliary police offi  cers, who were not soldiers. Ac-
cording to the laws in force at the time, both the German one and those of the Free City of Gdańsk, 
they had no legal basis for the assault. Th us, also from a legal point of view, the defenders of the Post 
Offi  ce were entitled to act in necessary defence”. D. Schenk, op. cit., p. 106.
39 Regulations concerning the laws and customs of war on land. Section I. On warring parties. 
Chapter I. Defi nition of a warring party. Art. 1. Acts, rights and duties of war apply not only to the 
army, but also to the common mobilization and volunteer troops, provided that they meet the fol-
lowing conditions: 1) they are headed by a person responsible for their subordinates; 2) they wear 
a permanent and distinguishable distinction badge; 3) they openly carry weapons; 4) they observe 















































32 Witold Kulesza 
by a person responsible for their subordinates; 2) they wear a permanent and 
distinguishable distinction badge; 3) they openly carry weapons; 4) they ob-
serve the laws and customs of war in their actions”. D. Schenk aptly indicates 
that the content of the provision stipulated that “As a result one could not deny 
the defenders of the Post Offi  ce veteran status, and thus they should not have 
been sentenced for guerrilla activity.”40 Vicariously transferring D. Schenk’s ar-
gument to the courtroom where the Postmen were put on trial, his interpreta-
tion of the defendants self-defi nition as Franktireurs is fully convincing: “Th e 
Postmen were simply Polish patriots who did not know the term >Freischärler< 
(>guerrilla<) and linked the term >Franktireurs< (>volunteer<) with the gen-
eral notion of honour”.41 Th eir calling themselves “volunteers” protected them 
under the Hague Convention as members of a “volunteer unit” who met all the 
criteria of being called “warriors” i.e. veterans and as such should not have been 
sentenced for unlawful “guerrilla warfare” (Freischärlerei) as precisely § 3 section 
2 KSSVO had excluded this. Th ey had their commanders (Inspector K. Gud-
erski, A.  Flisykowski), most of them wore recognizable postmen’s uniforms, 
fought openly, and respected the laws and customs of war. In justifi cation of the 
acquittal of the defendants, the Land Court in Lübeck emphasized that during 
the criminal trial: “Th e question of what the defendants understood by this term 
(Franktireurs) was left  unanswered by the court”.42
5. However, the determination of the importance of the Postmen’s statement was 
not a prerequisite for their acquittal in light of the charge that they had com-
mitted the crime of “guerrilla warfare”, because according to the fi ndings of the 
Land Court in Lübeck, made earlier by D. Schenk, “the application of provi-
sions of a ‘special wartime penal code’ was inadmissible”.43 Th e KSSVO Regula-
tion entered into force in Gdańsk only as of 16 November 1939, and under “the 
Law on a reunifi cation of the Free City of Gdańsk with the German Reich…” 
of 1 September 1939, the city became part of the Reich, while the authority of 
the Wehrmacht judiciary embraced its operation zone outside the Reich’s bor-
ders. Th erefore the Land Court in Lübeck observed that “§ 3 of the special war-
time penal code (guerrilla – Ferischärlerei) was inapplicable” to the Defenders of 
40 D. Schenk calls “blatant insinuation” the statement by prosecutor Giesecke, who claimed 
that the defenders admitted before him to the crime of Freischärlerei. Admittedly, Alfons Flisy-
kowski and others during the preliminary hearings, when accused of shooting being Franktireurs, 
answered: “Franktireurs, ja, das sind wir gewesen”, i.e. “volunteers, right, we were them”. D. Schenk, 
Die Post von Danzig…, op. cit., p. 98; eadem, Polska Poczta…, op. cit., p. 105. Th e term (Frank-
tireurs) most probably referred to the name of the corps of French volunteers during the war with 
the Prussians from 1870/71. 

















































33Crime of bending the law (Rechtsbeugung) by German special courts in occupied Poland
the Polish Pots Offi  ce in Gdańsk as a crime “committed within the country”.44 
Furthermore, the court raised that “under Article IV of the Basic Law of the Free 
City of Gdańsk on the reunifi cation with the German Reich, until the Führer 
made the fi nal decision on the introduction of German law, all laws (apart from 
the constitution) remained in force”.45 
6. Th e criminal bending of the law, which was carried out by the judges of the 
war court in the judgments of 8 and 29 September 1939 in cooperation with the 
military prosecutor, consisted in the sentencing to death on the basis of a non-ex-
istent law, under which the provision on “guerrilla crime” to the detriment of the 
Wehrmacht was made against the facts, a subsumption of the behaviour of the 
Postmen who defended the Polish Post Offi  ce against an illegal police attack.
German special courts in Polish territories annexed to the Reich
1. Th at special courts will be set up in conquered Poland was decided still prior to 
the attack on the country, as evidenced by the order of the commander-in-chief 
W. von Brauchitsch of 26.08.1939, redated to 1.09.1939, authorising army com-
manders to create such courts in the acquired territories. Th e activities of the 
special courts in the occupied country were based on the ordinance of 21 March 
1933 establishing special courts in Germany.
On 30 September 1939 in Frankfurt (Oder), 170 judges, prosecutors and of-
fi cials appointed by the Reich Ministry of Justice to carry out tasks “in the East” 
were addressed by Secretary of State R. Freisler, who pointed out that “every ap-
pointee should feel that they are part of the front command (…) as representa-
tives of German culture, the German will for order, and the German sense of law 
(Rechtsempfi nden)”46. According to the deputy minister for justice, they were the 
“pioneers of law” with a “political mission”, and each of them as a “national social-
ist and warrior of German law (…) fi ghts in a national war in the East, shoulder to 
shoulder with others for the sake of the victory of Germanness (Deutschtum)”.47
2. In view of the title of the panel in which the main fi ndings of this paper were 
presented at the conference, i.e. “Responsibility for International Crimes under 
National Law”, below the reader will fi nd a discussion of judgments, the contents 
of which were examined by the author of this paper. Handed down by judges of 
special courts, they are examples of perversion of German national law and vio-
lations of Article 43 in Division III of the Regulations on the Laws and Customs 
44 Ibid., p. 293.
45 Ibid.
















































34 Witold Kulesza 
of War on Enemy State Territory, annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention. Th is 
provision stipulated that “except in the event of absolute impediments,” the oc-
cupier was to observe the laws of the occupied country. Th e discussion will there-
fore focus on the doubly lawless conduct of the judges: due to their bending the 
criminal law of the Th ird Reich and their violation of international law. Although 
the judges of special courts were aware of the importance of the standards re-
lating to them, prohibiting violations of the law and protecting the population 
of the occupied Polish territory, they completely ignored them in their rulings. 
Th e justifi cations for their judgments bear no trace of refl ection on the notion of 
bending German law as a prohibited behaviour of the adjudicating judge, nor of 
thinking in terms of international law that protected the rights of civilians in the 
occupied territory.
Analysis of the judgements seems to indicate that the normative devaluation 
of apparently inviolable principles of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege 
and lex retro non agit, originally adopted as the cornerstone of the 1871 StGB, 
paralleled the conviction that the notion of Rechtsbeugung (§ 336 StGB) does 
not at all apply to judicial decisions. Th e following are judgments that will help 
to understand this normative notion, which seems in order also because some 
purely theoretical publications and comments on the particular elements of the 
crime of “bending the law” are oft en removed from the specifi c decisions of the 
judges of the Sondergerichts, which were in fact crimes of judicial lawlessness.
Retroactive punishment
1. A judgement of the Special Court in Gdańsk of 08.05.1942 is an example 
of the violation of the prohibition of retroactivity (Rückwirkungsverbot)48. Th e 
ruling stipulates that the commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht introduced the 
entry into force of German penal law in Polish territories as early as 5 September 
1939 and indicates that formally this law applied to “annexed Eastern territories” 
on 6 June 1940.49 However, these ordinances were cited by the judges of the Son-
dergericht as “merely confi rming” their own conviction of the correctness of the 
generally accepted practice of punishing Poles pursuant to German regulations 
for acts committed in Poland, even years before the outbreak of the war, if they 
were directed against Germans who “today, aft er their victory, expect justice”.
Such an “act of justice” was performed by the Sondergericht in Gdańsk when 
it punished two Poles, members of the Union of Polish Reservists, who along 
48 Fil no. 6 Sg K Ls 55/42 Federal Archives Berlin, DAHL – RMJ IV g 22 Nr des Aktenbandes 
1384.
49 Verordnung über die Einführung des deutschen Strafrechts in den eingegliederten Ostgebi-
eten vom 6.6.1940 Reichsgesetzblatt 1940 I, p. 844 ff . – Ordinance on the introduction of German 















































35Crime of bending the law (Rechtsbeugung) by German special courts in occupied Poland
with others on 14 June 1935 joined a gathering of the Party of German Youth 
in a location near Gdynia and obstructed the proceedings by “making vile state-
ments and singing incendiary Polish songs”. As the Polish policeman did not take 
action, the moderator of the meeting moved for its conclusion and the German 
participants leaving the venue were “beaten by Polish reservists, who turned into 
a thuggish horde”. Th e fi rst defendant, who did not take part in the brawl, was 
sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for participating in a riot under the ordi-
nary type – § 125 para. 1 StGB.50 Th e other was sentenced to 3.5 years in prison, 
justifi ed by the fact that he “used weaponry, throwing a light chair and hitting in 
the back a German speaker passing by, a member of the Gdańsk Senate”.51 It is 
not clear from the verdict how far back in time the judges’ power to punish Poles 
was to satisfy the German “expectation of justice”. Th us, an unrestricted principle 
was adopted with regard to German criminal law on occupied Polish territory, 
namely lex retro agit.
2. It is not easy, sine ira et studio, to recreate the convoluted interpretation of 
the judges of the Sondergericht Grudziądz, (Dr Schönfeld – presiding judge, 
justices Dr Bull, Grossmann), who in a judgement of 12.12.194152 sentenced 
to death a Polish offi  cer, a prisoner of war, for an act committed 7 days prior 
to the attack of the Reich on Poland. Th e defendant, Lieutenant W. Bekierski 
brought by the Sondergericht from an Ofl ag, or a camp for POWs – offi  cers, 
arrested on 24.8.1939 “the Volksdeutsche Husarek and Teschendorf for their 
having assisted other Volksdeutsche, who had recently received draft  letters to 
the Polish army, to escape across the Reich’s border”. It was pointed out that 
such escapes from Poland were called for by the German radio, and the brother 
of the Volksdeutsch Hussarek captured by the Polish army, called to serve in the 
Polish army, had already managed to escape to the German side of the border. 
In this way, it was claimed, the Volskdeutsche, who were Polish citizens, “evad-
ed military service in the Polish army”; it was rightly pointed out that “it was 
a crime under Polish law”.53
50 § 125 para. 1 StGB: If a crowd gathered in a public place perform acts of violence against 
persons or property, anyone who takes part in such a gathering will be punished for violating public 
order (Landfr iedensbruch) with a prison sentence of no less than 3 months. 
51 § 125 para. 2 StGB: Th e leader, as well as anyone who violates a person or plunders things, 
destroys or damages them, will be punished with imprisonment in a strict prison for up to 10 years.
52 File no. KLs 61/64 Federal Archives Berlin, DAHL – RMJ III g 22 Nr des Aktenbandes 
1007/42.
53 Th e Polish Military Penal Code of 1932 set out: Article 45 § 1: Anyone who, while being 
obliged to perform military service, fails to comply with an appointment or public call for such 
service within a specifi ed period of time, shall be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty in 
a prison or fortress for up to two years or to the penalty of military arrest. Th e more severe penalty 
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Th e defendant, commanding a small unit of Polish border guards at the rail-
road station, reported the arrest of two Germans escorting Volksdeutsche across 
the border. His commanding offi  cer, a  colonel inspecting the border post, or-
dered that “25 strokes be dealt to each of them”. Th is order was carried out with 
the use of military leather belts, “which was the usual practice for a long time in 
relation to both Germans and Poles trying to cross the border illegally, and then 
they were let go”.
According to the fi ndings of the investigation, in the conditions of the mobi-
lization ordered in Poland,54 the arrested Germans could have been handed over 
to a military court and executed under an ad hoc conviction by such a court, for 
providing assistance to fugitives to illegally cross the border and evade military 
service. However, the Volksdeutsche Husarek and Teschendorf were released aft er 
the subordinates of the lieutenant who commanded the unit obeyed his order, as 
directed by the colonel. In a detailed justifi cation of the verdict, it was stated that 
“the defendant did not have to carry out such an unlawful order.” Nevertheless, 
as the Sondergericht concluded, he “aggravated” the execution of this order by 
the soldiers under his command by ordering the detainees to take off  their pants, 
lie down one by one on a bench in the station’s waiting room, aft er which the 
soldiers dealt calculated “strikes with leather belts on the bare behinds” of each of 
them (Schläge mit den Lederkoppeln auf das entblösste Gesäß). As the judges not-
ed, in this way “the defendant humiliated both Germans and manifested his fa-
natical hatred of Germanness (Deutschtum), defaming their honour (die Ehre)”.
When, in accordance with procedure, the death sentence was handed down 
to the Minister of Justice in Berlin, who could, by virtue of the authority vested 
in him by the Reich Führer, pardon the convict, the judges of the Sondergericht 
vociferously opposed this option. Th ey justifi ed their position on the grounds 
that the convict had shown particular contempt for the honour of the two Ger-
mans, praised by the Sondergericht for their behaviour as they “had only acted in 
accordance with their duty to the German nation (die nur ihre Pfl icht gegenüber 
ihrem Volkstum taten)”. Furthermore, the prosecutor general in Gdańsk in his 
opinions justifi ed the necessity to carry out the execution in that “the convict’s 
conduct was a mockery devoid of any legal sense and points to a general atti-
tude, which must have impacted his subordinates and other Polish circles, being 
an element of the persecution of Germans taking place still before the outbreak 
of the war, making the situation unbearable”. It was therefore concluded that 
“the Volksdeutsche, helpless at that time and maltreated, can today expect that 
(the perpetrators – author’s note) would be appropriately punished”.
Th e fi les of this case show the typical reasoning of judges who fi rst decided 
on the death penalty, required “for the sake of the German people,” and then 















































37Crime of bending the law (Rechtsbeugung) by German special courts in occupied Poland
invoked, even beyond analogia iuris, any criminal provision, even if not in force 
at the time of the act, to justify the conviction.
In the aforementioned case of a Polish offi  cer, his conviction was based on 
a provision of the ordinance of 5.12.1939 “against violent criminals” (Verordnung 
gegen Gewaltverbrecher – Gew-VVO), whose underlying idea could in no way 
be seen as even tangentially related to the conduct alleged to the defendant. Th e 
provision invoked in the sentence read as follows:
“Violent acts committed with the use of weapons. § 1 (1) Whoever, in the 
course of rape, street assault, bank robbery, or any other grave act of violence 
uses a fi rearm, a cutting or stabbing weapon, or any other equally dangerous in-
strument, or endangers the life or health of another, shall be punished by death”.
Ignoring in their justifi cation of the criminal qualifi cation that this provision 
could not be applied to the defendant at all, even by the most far-reaching anal-
ogy, the judges found that the defendant’s conduct constituted an “objectively 
severe act of violence committed with the use of dangerous tools, which were 
military belts and his fi st” (he allegedly hit witness Teschendorf in the face with 
his fi st aft er the latter had called Polish soldiers who had beaten him with mili-
tary belts a “gang”.
A desk offi  cer at the Berlin Ministry of Justice, while preparing a submission 
for the Minister of Justice on the execution of the sentence, confi rmed and elabo-
rated on the claim that “objective assumptions of the provision of § 1 Gew-VVO” 
applied to the case at hand since maltreatment with the use of leather belts, even 
without the use of their metal buckles55 meets the criteria of a “equally dangerous 
instrument in the meaning of this provision” and moreover included punching 
Teschendorf. However, the consensus of opinion as to the legal classifi cation of 
the defendant’s act did not lead to acceptance of the punishment meted out to 
the accused Polish offi  cer. A ministerial offi  cial pointed out that the prosecutor 
at the Sondergericht had concluded that there were grounds for commuting the 
death penalty to “a suffi  cient sentence of 10 years in a stringent penal camp”. At 
the same time, it was pointed out that the Polish offi  cer did not correspond to the 
“type of criminal” referred to in § 1 of the Gew-VVO (committing rape, street 
assault or bank robbery) and that the consequences of his act were not severe 
for the Volksdeutsche victims within the meaning of this provision, so a qualifi ca-
tion on the basis of the relevant provisions of the criminal code was proposed56. 
55 Both the Volksdeutsche admitted that they had been beaten “only with the leather parts of 
military belts, without the use of (metal) buckles”.
56 Th e Sondergericht prosecutor already at the trial moved for a change of the legal qualifi -
cation, indicating a possible invocation of § 223 StGB (“Whoever intentionally abuses another 
person’s body or causes damage to their health will be punished for bodily harm in prison for up 
to three years or a fi ne”) and § 223a StGB (“If the injury was infl icted with a weapon, in partic-















































38 Witold Kulesza 
Th e decision to commute the death sentence to 10 years of strict penal camp for 
the Polish offi  cer as a “criminal making use of violence” was signed by Minister of 
Justice F. Schlegerberger on 19.3.1942.
Criminal bending of the law taking place in this judgement violated the 
1907 Hague Rules, whose Article 4 ordered the humane treatment of prisoners 
of war. Depriving the sentenced person of the status of a prisoner of war and his 
incarceration in a penal camp in the conditions calculated to physically annihi-
late the prisoners meant subjecting him to inhumane and cruel treatment and 
left  him with no chance of survival. Th e conviction was predicated on a crim-
inal law that was not in force at the time of the events and violated the basic 
rule of subsumption. 
Punishing Poles for evading military service in the Wehrmacht
1. In the judgment presented above the judges of the Sondergericht stated that 
the Volksdeutche who were Polish citizens fl eeing to the Reich aft er being called 
up to the Polish army, “acted in accordance with their duty towards their nation”. 
A diff erent view was taken by the German judges in relation to Poles in the occu-
pied country, who were considered to be evading the service in the Wehrmacht.
In the Polish territories incorporated into the Th ird Reich (Gdańsk-West, 
Prussia, Wartheland), a system was created that degraded Poles in all legal and 
social aspects and consequently, contrary to the Hague Regulations of 1907, 
enforced the “oath of allegiance to the enemy state” through applications for 
registration on the German nationality list (Volksliste). Such an entry protected 
against deportation which meant a loss of the entire possessions and off ered food 
inaccessible for other inhabitants of the annexed territories. In many cases it was 
the one and only chance for survival.
Aft er the Eastern front was halted near Moscow, special courts in 1942 most 
clearly concluded that they need to terrorise Poles to enrol in the Wehrmacht and 
as a result made a military pledge and defended their new “Fatherland”.
To this end was “bent” a provision of the Kriegssonderstrafr echtsverordnung 
(KSSVO) of 17.08.193857. It read as follows: “Th e weakening of the defence 
power will be punished by death (…) of anyone who for the purpose of wholly, 
partially, or temporarily evading his own or another person’s obligation to per-
form military service, commits self-mutilation or uses a means calculated to de-
fraud or another manner”.
or in a life-threatening manner, the punishment will be at least two months’ imprisonment”. Th is 
provision off ered no grounds for a death sentence; in his fi nal speech at the trial, the prosecutor 
requested a 10-year prison sentence.















































39Crime of bending the law (Rechtsbeugung) by German special courts in occupied Poland
2. As for punishment for the crime of weakening the defensive power, the most 
far-reaching reasoning bending the law, with reference to the judge’s “healthy 
national sense”, found expression in a judgment handed down on 6.2.1942 by 
the Sondergericht Grudziądz, sentencing to death B. Kruczinski .58 Although 
the defendant himself did not apply to be entered on the Volksliste, he did ap-
ply for permission to marry a Volksdeutsch woman, and when asked by a police 
offi  cial about his military service he said: “I serve if I must” (Ich diene, wenn 
ich muß). Uttering these words was considered by the judges of the Gru ziadz 
Sondergericht to be criminal evasion of military service, weakening the de-
fensive power of the Reich and cited as the basis for conviction § 5 (1) Ziff . 
3 KSSVO. Although the fi nal part of the provision referred to the evasion of 
conscription by “any other means” than self-infl icted injury or fraud, the court 
did not explain why it considered Kruczinski’s incriminating words to be tan-
tamount to the commission of a crime.
When the case came before the Reich Minister of Justice, in a  clemency 
proceeding, the ministerial clerks relied on the opinions of the Oberkomman-
do der Wehrmacht (24.03.1942) and the minister of the interior (08.06.1942). 
Both jointly questioned the punishment of B. Kruczinski who, as they no-
ticed, had no German citizenship and was therefore unfi t for committing the 
crime of evading the military service obligation in the Wehrmacht. As can be 
inferred, it was concluded that sending Poles with no German citizenship to 
the ranks of the German army by the judges of the Sondergericht under the 
threat of the death penalty would not strengthen the defensive power of the 
Reich but could have the opposite eff ect. It was written in the opinion of the 
Wehrmacht command that the convict’s statement to the offi  cial “was not fi t to 
implement evasion of military service”.59 It was found that the meaning of the 
words he spoke expressed a willingness to serve – “I serve if I must” – and not 
an intention to avoid it. Th e death sentence therefore appeared to be a pun-
ishment for the Pole’s lack of enthusiasm about the prospect of serving in the 
Wehrmacht, which conduct was neither defi ned as a crime under § 5 (1) Ziff . 
3 KSSVO, nor could be justifi ed per analogiam iuris, especially that not being 
a Reich citizen he could not serve in the Wehrmacht.
58 Strafsache gegen B. Kruczinski, IV g 22/1248/42, Federal Archives Berlin, DAHL – NJ 
–2964. Th e matter elaborated on in: W. Kulesza, ‘Polacy wpisani na Volkslistę a obowiązek służ-
by w Wehrmachcie w świetle wyroków Sądu Specjalnego w Toruniu’, Studia Iuridica Toruniensia, 
2018, vol. XXIII, p. 113, footnote 23.
59 It may be assumed that the Wehrmacht command reasoned that faced with a possible the 
death penalty, Poles would comply with the order to obediently serve in the army in order to avert 
an immediate danger to their lives, and then would desert the army at an opportune moment. 















































40 Witold Kulesza 
3. Th e death sentence was passed on W. Zydel for evading military service by 
the Sondergericht Toruń by a judgement of 19.05.1942;60 the judges justifi ed 
it in a manner typical of penalisation by analogy with the principle indicated 
in § 2 StGB. In an argument relating to the criminal qualifi cation of the con-
duct attributed to the accused, they stated: “If one does not directly apply to 
such an off ender § 5 (1) Ziff . 3 KSSVO, it is necessary to look upon his act as 
reprehensible at least according to the underlying idea of this provision and 
a sound national sense.” Th e defendant in the case was enrolled on the Volksliste 
without his consent, and when he received a summons to appear at the military 
draft  board to enrol for military service, he did not do so, but sent back his 
Volksdeutsch identity card, writing to the offi  ce: “Having been summoned for 
conscription, I inform you that I am not aware that I remain in a duty relation-
ship with the German Wehrmacht. Previously, I had Polish citizenship, and at 
the moment I have no other citizenship.”
W. Zydel’s conviction was justifi ed on the grounds that “those entered on the 
German Volksliste in Chapter III, as applicants for citizenship, could, contrary to 
the law, commit acts to evade the military service expected of them.” Th e argu-
ment concludes as follows: “A German, also a Volksdeutsch in the position of the 
defendant, who is not ready to defend the country at the moment of grave danger 
to the Nation and the Reich cannot count on pardon”. Speaking out against their 
pardon of the convict in an opinion submitted to the Reich Ministry of Justice, 
the judges (Breier, Deike, Dr von Grosschopff ) raised: “Zydel, who was undoubt-
edly a self-declared Pole and did not try to be considered a Volksdeutsch, sent back 
the Ausweis only to avoid becoming a soldier, which is highly reprehensible”.
4. In the cases of B. Kruczyński and W. Zydel, both sentenced to death, an ef-
fective exceptional appeal for the nullifi cation of the verdicts was lodged on the 
grounds that they did not have German citizenship. In the case of W. Zydel, it 
was pointed out that his inclusion in Part III of the Volksliste did not in itself 
mean that he had been granted the citizenship of the Reich.
Th e Reichsgericht recognised a nullifi cation complaint on 28.09.1942,61 re-
pealing the judgement of the Sondergericht Toruń, stating that the “very fact of 
a  former Polish citizen being entered into the Th ird Division of the German 
Volksliste did not justify the military service obligation”. Th e conclusion noted 
that “former Polish citizens will not be obliged to defend the Reich until they 
have acquired German citizenship, which makes it impossible to apply to them 
§ 5 (1) of the KSSVO to justify their obligation as Polish nationals and to force 
60 4 Sg. K.Ls. 45/42 Federal Archives Berlin, DAHL – NJ – 2964. More on the course of the 
case in W. Kulesza, ‘Polacy wpisani na Volkslistę…’, op. cit., p. 111.















































41Crime of bending the law (Rechtsbeugung) by German special courts in occupied Poland
them into military service.” Th erefore, “the annulled conviction of the defendant, 
who had no German citizenship, as being based on erroneous legal considera-
tions is unjust (ungerecht)”.
It continues with a  passage whose juristic hypocrisy is unbeatable and in 
which the Reichsgericht indicated the bending of the law it expected from the 
judges of the Sondergericht, writing that: “Th is, however, is not suffi  cient for an 
immediate acquittal of the accused by the special court. It cannot be established 
with the requisite certainty that the accused is not guilty of attempting to evade 
military service.” With this recommendation, the case was referred for recon-
sideration, which meant that the special court could convict any Pole who was 
not a Reich citizen for attempted evasion of military service and impose a heavy 
prison sentence of 3 to 15 years (§ 44, § 14 StGB).62 With this ruling, the Reichs-
gericht created a legal state in which lack of Reich citizenship was no obstacle to 
the draconian punishment of a Pole for evading the defence of Germany.
It would be hard to assume that the Reichsgericht justices (Klingsporn – pre-
siding judge, Dr. Schäfer, Dr. Rohde, Dr. Iber, Dr. Everling) would not have been 
aware that W. Zydel’s rejection of German citizenship could not in any way be 
juristically seen as an attempt, i.e. “the onset of a crime” of a Reich citizen evading 
military service in the Wehrmacht. According to the then commonly accepted 
commentary to the Criminal Code, attempt, as the punishable beginning of the 
execution of a crime, occurs when “the very behaviour of the perpetrator cre-
ates an immediate danger to the legally protected interest.”63 In a situation where 
there was no legal obligation to serve in the army because the man did not have 
German citizenship, he could not be punished for attempted evasion of military 
service understood as creating an imminent danger of weakening the defensive 
power of the Reich. Th e position of the Reichsgericht meant in fact that persons 
without citizenship, which entailed an obligation of enrolment in the army, can 
also be made to serve in the military by the threat of punishment for attempted 
dodging of the obligation which did not apply to them. 
5. Th e Regulation of 31.01.1942 (RGBl. I, p.51) on the German national list 
amended the earlier regulation, which did not link the entry in Division III of 
the Volksliste with the granting of citizenship, and thus did not entail an obliga-
tion of enrolment in the army. Th e new regulation stipulated that this regula-
tion imposed an obligation of military service in the Wehrmacht, invoked by the 
Sondergericht Toruń (Breier as the presiding judge, Deike, Dr. von Grosschopff ), 
62 Attempt was “penalised less stringently than the act”, yet if “a crime is punishable by the death 
penalty (…) then the penalty of a strict prison will be no less than three years (§ 44 StGB). A strict 
prison sentence entailed “a permanent exclusion from service in the German army” (§ 31 StGB). 
63 A.  Dalcke, K.  Schäfer, in: A.  Dalcke, E. Fuhrmann, K.  Krug, K.  Schäfer, Strafr echt und 















































42 Witold Kulesza 
which issued a death sentence on 15.10.1942, under § 5 (1) Ziff . 3 KSSVO, on 
W. Miszalowski, a Pole who married a Volksdeutsche, was entered on a Volksli-
ste and was notifi ed orally to “expect an immediate call to arms”. Not wanting 
to leave his wife alone, aft er their several-month-old child died, on 11.07.1942 
he “cut off  four fi ngers of his left  hand with an axe on a stump”. Th e ministerial 
offi  cial referred approvingly to the Sondergericht’s judgement and made a note 
in a document dated 08.12.1942, as he did before (28.09.1942), and the Reichs-
gericht noted that “Th e defendant would have attempted to breach his military 
service obligations even if he had not been a German citizen”.64
Punishing a Polish girl for thinking about the victory of Polish soldiers
Under a judgement of 24.04.194265, the Sondergericht Poznań (presiding judge 
Bömmels, justices Dr. Hucklenbroisch, Dr. Görner) sentenced 16-year-old B. 
Pięta for “showing an attitude hostile to the Germans by her hateful activity”, an 
off ence under section I subsection 3 of the Polenstrafr echtsverordnung.
Th e defendant’s criminal behaviour consisted in the possession of a piece of 
paper with a Polish text, hidden in her Ausweis. Th e judges emphasized that the 
defendant attached considerable importance to the content of the note, which 
had been translated into German, and stored it in a special way. Th e note with the 
aforementioned words was revealed by chance, when the defendant off ered her 
Ausweis in a cover to the offi  cial to receive a sickness certifi cate (Krankenschein).
Since the published verdict contains only the German text, its translation 
must be off ered here:
“Hitler: My soldiers are like green grass all over the world.
Mussolini: My soldiers are like the most beautiful roses.
Sikorski: My soldiers are like bulls that eat grass, shit on roses and will win.
Take off  the furs and sheepskins with which the German army can warm their 
cold asses.
For Easter, people will bake cakes pale like Hitler, thick like Göring and crisp 
like the Germans will be.
Th e carpenters were searched and the last rescue beams were taken away”.66
It was emphasized in the justifi cation of the sentence that the accused ex-
plained her behaviour to the police and before the court in a diff erent way as 
to how long she had been in possession of the note, lying that she had not read 
the sentences written on the note and had forgotten about it. According to 
the judges, she preserved the note “with care” in order to further disseminate 
64 Th is sentence was underlined in the original document. File no. Sg.K.Ls. 208/42, Federal 
Archives Berlin, DAHL – RJM IV g 22, Nr des Aktenbandes 2099/42. 
65 140/42, III P 74, published by K.M. Pospieszalski, op. cit., pp. 370–371.















































43Crime of bending the law (Rechtsbeugung) by German special courts in occupied Poland
its content at an opportune moment, aware of the punishable nature of her 
conduct. When sentencing the accused, the court did not examine the content 
of any of the written sentences, limiting itself to stating that, as quoted, it re-
quired “no further arguments”.
Recognising that the accused, because of her age, had no knowledge of 
the “full signifi cance of her behaviour”, the court punished her with “a lenient 
3-month sentence in a penal camp”.
Th e provision of section I, subsection 3 of the Polenstrafr echtsverordnung 
used as the basis for the conviction described the punishable act as the behav-
iour of Poles who “by their hateful or seditious activities display an attitude 
hostile towards Germans, in particular speak in hostile terms about Germans”. 
Contrary to the basic rules of understanding the nature of any criminal provi-
sion, the judges assumed that the mere “possession” of a note was tantamount 
to committing a crime.
Sentence for writing a letter to a brother
Another sentence by the same the Sondergericht in Poznań of a  year later, 
05.03.1943,67 (presiding judge Rex, justices Dr. Müller, Rüdiger) analysed in 
detail the contents of the sentences in a  letter written by F. Walinski to his 
brother Anton, who “was a  Polish soldier and as such was incarcerated in 
a camp in Hungary”. Understandably, aware of the then situation on the front-
line and the imminent defeat of the Th ird Reich, the judges wished to contrib-
ute to the “ultimate victory” in the total warfare announced aft er the Battle of 
Stalingrad. Th e letter bore the date “24 January 1943” and in a veiled form, 
with the use of codewords, described the progress made by the Allies in the war 
and shared a prediction of its further course: “I suspect that the current period 
will conclude in June at the latest” and furthermore: “When one looks at all 
this, they may really take heart and think: One more year to go…”.
Th e court decoded the semantics behind the sentences of the letter:
“Th e Bollard lays all of them on the table and mercilessly tans their skin”; 
“Th e Bollard works perfectly well”;
“Th e English lad along with his foster brother make great headway in the 
learning of a strategy”.
Th e ratio decidendi mentioned that the defendant, the author of the letter, 
wrote about the Soviet Union (Bollard), England (English lad) and the Unit-
ed States (English lad’s foster brother) and admitted to it. In the letter he also 
wrote about two popular actors before the war, broadcasting satirical dialogues 















































44 Witold Kulesza 
on a Lviv radio station (most likely Szczepko and Tońko)68, who said that aft er 
the war one of them would “wash and the other one hang”. In the following 
sentence the defendant wrote: “Our old man is preparing for this task…”. 
An in-depth exegesis of the entire text and the pride of the judges in their 
ability to carry out deductive reasoning (probably supported by the Gestapo 
interrogation technique, helping to determine the content of the coded mean-
ings of the words), as seen in the justifi cation for the conviction, led the court 
to formulate the following statement : “Th e accused expressed in a letter that 
the German resistance (deutsche Widerstand) would break down in June 1943 
and this would end the war, followed by the hanging of the Germans by Poles, 
in which even his 70-year-old father would like to participate.” In this way, “the 
accused showed joy with and consent to the acts of revenge he desired,” which, 
according to the court, expressed his hostile attitude towards the Germans and 
constituted an off ence under section I subsection 3 of the Polenstrafr echtsver-
ordnung.
Th e Sondergericht began refl ection on the punishment from the statement 
that the defendant “knew and wanted” the letter with news about the military 
situation reach “former Polish soldiers” in an internment camp and this would 
strengthen their will to resist (Widerstandswille). It was stressed in the convic-
tion of the court that the accused would have instigated and participated in ac-
tual assaults on the Germans himself and “would not have refrained from such 
brutality and atrocities against German women and children as had already 
taken place in Poland in September 1939 ” was also justifi ed.
Th e summary of the argument states that the accused poses a  real threat 
to the German people (Deutschtum) because he would have participated in 
actions against the Germans if there had ever been an attempted uprising of 
Poles, and therefore “only the death penalty is a  just punishment for the ac-
cused’s action”. In fact, the accused was sentenced not for the “deed,” but for his 
thoughts, which he wanted to share with his brother, a soldier of September 
1939. Judges in the service of barbaric criminal law therefore ruled as if they 
had not understood the basic principle of justice, namely cogitationis poenam 
nemo patitur, during their studies in the Law School. Th e death sentence in 
this case clearly shows that, according to National Socialist law and the law-
yers serving it, all Poles were to be subject to judicial extermination for their 
thoughts arising from “hostile attitudes towards Germans”. Special Courts 
were in fact “judicial execution squads” and members of the jury should not be 
seen as “judges” but rather as murderers ordering an execution.
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Conclusion
Th e judgments presented above may serve as a casuistry illustrating the concept 
of criminal bending of the law within the meaning of § 336 of the StGB, in stark 
violation of elementary principles of justice. Under German law, the criminal 
bending of the law in a death sentence should, on the basis of a  single, actual 
confl uence of crimes, also entail liability for murder, and the bending of the law 
concluding with a  prison sentence should entail liability for the unlawful im-
prisonment of the convicted person. In cases where a conviction would not be 
carried out, its delivery should be qualifi ed as an attempt to commit an eff ective 
crime by bending the law. Th is model of responsibility was not, however, con-
fi rmed in the Federal Republic by convictions of the Sondergerichte judges who 
passed criminal judgments.69
Th e reason cited to justify the exemption of National Socialist judges from 
criminal liability for bending the law was that they were unable to prove to them 
the direct intention with which they were attributing the characteristics of an act 
prohibited by Section 336 of the StGB. It was considered that a possible inten-
tion was not suffi  cient for the existence of this judicial off ence.70 Th e presenta-
tion of this issue, taking into account the most recent literature, has exceeded the 
scope of this paper and has been therefore singled out for a separate publication.
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Abstract
German criminal law provides for the criminal liability of a judge for the crime of vio-
lating the law. Since the beginning of World War II, this crime was committed in the 
occupied Polish territory by the judges of German special courts (Sondergerichte), sen-
tencing Poles and Jews to draconian punishments under a special regulation on criminal 
proceedings against these nations. Th e death penalty was common, including for acts 















































47Crime of bending the law (Rechtsbeugung) by German special courts in occupied Poland
national sense”. Th e punishment was based on legal analogy, violating the elementary 
principles of criminal law: nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege, nullum crimen 
sine lege certa, lex retro non agit, and cogitationis poenam nemo patitur. Th e paper provides 
examples of such judgments aimed at terrorizing inhabitants of occupied Poland and its 
systemic extermination, carried out under the guise of applying laws. Th e fi rst contro-
versial verdict sentenced to death 38 heroes of the Polish Post Offi  ce in Gdańsk before 
the invasion of the German police on the day the war broke out, i.e. 1 September 1939. 
In the last referenced sentence, a Pole who was sentenced to death wrote a letter to his 
brother, a soldier who participated in the struggle in September 1939; the letter, from the 
beginning of 1943, expressed hope for the imminent victory of the Allies over the Th ird 
Reich. Judges who issued such judgments were murderers who perverted justice, which 
raises the question of their responsibility for the crimes committed.
Keywords: World War II, German special courts (Sondergerichte) in occupied Poland, 
crime of bending the law (Rechtsbeugung), Nazi criminal law for Poles and Jews (Polen-
















































Die strafrechtliche Verfolgung von nationalsozialistischen 
Verbrechen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – 
Bilanz und Weichenstellungen 
Die alliierte Ahndung von NS-Kriegsverbrechen 
nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg
In der Zeit unmittelbar nach Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs bestimmten die al-
liierten Besatzungsmächte die strafrechtliche Ahndung von NS-Verbrechen in 
Deutschland. Sie hatten schon während des Krieges deutsche Völkerrechtsver-
letzungen angeprangert und in der „Moskauer Deklaration“ vom 30.10.1943 de-
ren justizielle Verfolgung angekündigt. Grundsätzlich sollten die Täter an dieje-
nigen Staaten ausgeliefert werden, in denen sie ihre Verbrechen begangen hatten 
und dort abgeurteilt werden. Außerdem einigte man sich in der Folge darauf, 
eine kleine Gruppe von Hauptverantwortlichen in einem symbolischen Akt – 
und bis dahin völkerrechtlich einzigartigen Vorgehen – vor ein internationales 
Gericht zu stellen und damit auch die Öff entlichkeit über die Verbrechen der 
Nationalsozialisten aufzuklären. Zu diesem Zweck wurden ein Internationaler 
Militärgerichtshof geschaff en und in einem eigens für ihn entworfenen und an 
die Prinzipien des Völkerrechts anknüpfenden Statut die Rechtsgrundlagen für 
eine Bestrafung festgelegt. Von November 1945 an verhandelte der Gerichtshof 
in Nürnberg fast elf Monate lang gegen 22 Angehörige der Führungsriege des 
NS-Staates, gegen Parteikanzleichef Martin Bormann allerdings in Abwesenheit. 
19 der Angeklagten wurden schließlich verurteilt, darunter zwölf (einschließlich 
Bormann) zum Tod.1
Daran anschließend fanden in Nürnberg zwölf sogenannte Nachfolgepro-
zesse statt, die aufgrund der zunehmenden Uneinigkeit der Alliierten von den 
1 Einen Überblick über die alliierten Prozesse bieten: N. Frei (Hg.), Transnationale Vergangen-
heitspolitik. Der Umgang mit deutschen Kriegsverbrechen in Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, 
Göttingen 2006, zu den hier und nachfolgend genannten Zahlen, S. 31; K.C. Priemel, A. Stiller 
(Hrsg.), NMT.  Die Nürnberger Militärtribunale zwischen Geschichte, Gerechtigkeit und Rechts-
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Amerikanern allein geführt wurden. Sie richteten sich gegen führende Vertreter 
der Exekutive des NS-Staates aus den Bereichen Medizin, Justiz, Ministerien, SS 
und Polizei, Militär sowie der Industrie. Gesetzliche Grundlage für diese Prozes-
se war das Gesetz Nr. 10 des Alliierten Kontrollrats vom 20. Dezember 1945, das 
sich an das Statut des Internationalen Militärgerichtshofs anlehnte. Schon 1945 
begannen außerdem in allen vier Besatzungszonen Militärgerichtsprozesse der 
jeweiligen Mächte, die sich unter anderem gegen das Personal von Konzentrati-
onslagern richteten. 
Von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen hatten all diese Prozesse Verbrechen 
zum Gegenstand, die in der Zeit des Weltkriegs zumeist an nichtdeutschen 
Staatsangehörigen begangen worden waren. Insgesamt wurden von den Alli-
ierten in den westlichen Besatzungszonen in der Zeit von 1945 bis 1951 über 
4000 Personen wegen NS-Verbrechen verurteilt.2 
Die Grundlagen und Ergebnisse der westdeutschen Strafverfolgung
Auch die deutsche Justiz ahndete seit dem Herbst 1945 NS-Verbrechen. Die 
deutschen Gerichte waren zwar von den alliierten Besatzungsmächten zunächst 
geschlossen worden. Ab Juni 1945 konnten sie jedoch sukzessive ihre Arbeit wie-
der aufnehmen, allerdings mit gesäubertem Personal und unter alliierter Ober-
aufsicht. Außerdem blieb ihre Zuständigkeit in den ersten Jahren beschränkt auf 
Verbrechen begangen von Deutschen an Deutschen und Staatenlosen.3 Rechts-
grundlagen dieser Ahndung waren das von wesentlichen NS-Bestimmungen 
gesäuberte deutsche Strafgesetzbuch sowie das alliierte Kontrollratsgesetz Nr. 
10, aus dem fast ausschließlich die Strafb estimmung wegen Verbrechen gegen 
die Menschlichkeit zur Anwendung kam. Allerdings konnte dieses Gesetz, das 
anders als das Strafgesetzbuch auch eine rückwirkende Bestrafung ermöglichte, 
nach entsprechender Ermächtigung der Besatzungsmächte nur in der britischen 
und der französischen (wie auch der sowjetischen) Besatzungszone zur Anwen-
dung gebracht werden, nicht jedoch – mit Ausnahme von Berlin – in der ame-
rikanischen. Soweit möglich wendeten die Gerichte das Kontrollratsgesetz und 
das deutsche Strafgesetzbuch in Idealkonkurrenz an.
Seit 1948 wurden die alliierten Beschränkungen in der Gerichtsbarkeit lang-
sam gelockert und zu Beginn des Jahres 1950 weitestgehend ganz aufgehoben. 
In Summe waren bis dahin (1945–1949) von deutschen Gerichten auf dem 
2 Die in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone bzw. der späteren DDR von der Besatzungsmacht 
und der ostdeutschen Justiz durchgeführten Prozesse bleiben in diesem Aufsatz mangels Vergleich-
barkeit der Zahlen außerhalb der Betrachtung. Zu groß sind die Unterschiede bei den rechtlichen 
Grundlagen und den bestraft en Tatbeständen. Außerdem wurden in Ostdeutschland in nicht we-
nigen Prozessen grundsätzliche rechtsstaatliche Garantien nicht beachtet.
3 Vgl. dazu grundlegend E. Raim, Justiz zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur. Wiederaufb au und 
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Gebiet der nunmehrigen Bundesrepublik (inklusive West-Berlin und dem bis 
1955 autonomen Saarland) immerhin 4685 rechtskräft ige Verurteilungen we-
gen NS-Verbrechen ergangen.4 
Auch nach Gründung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Mai 1949 blieb 
die ordentliche Strafgerichtsbarkeit dem föderalistischen Staatsaufb au folgend 
Sache der in ihrer Mehrzahl schon 1945/46 gebildeten Bundesländer. Mit dem 
Bund betrat jedoch ein neuer justizpolitischer Akteur das Feld, der auf ein Ende 
der Entnazifi zierungsmaßnahmen, eine Aufh ebung von alliierten Gesetzen und 
eine Wiederherstellung der Rechtseinheit im Staatsgebiet drängte. Der Ende 
1950 errichtete Bundesgerichtshof sollte als zentrales Obergericht für Revisio-
nen in Strafsachen die Einheitlichkeit der Rechtsprechung garantieren.
Wesentliche Folgen sollte es haben, dass die Bundesregierung auch hinsicht-
lich der Ahndung von NS-Verbrechen ein striktes Rückwirkungsverbot von 
Gesetzen vertrat. Dieses Rückwirkungsverbot, das sich auf den weithin akzep-
tierten Rechtsgrundsatz „nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege“ stützte, war im 
1949 verabschiedeten Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Artikel 
103) verankert und setzte sich vom NS-Recht ab, wo dieser Grundsatz vielfach 
missachtet worden war. Auch die 1950 in Kraft  gesetzte Europäische Menschen-
rechtskonvention bekennt sich zu ihm, lässt aber in Ausnahmefällen in einem 
gerade im Hinblick auf die Verbrechen des NS-Regimes eingefügten Zusatz eine 
Durchbrechung zu. Die Konvention wurde 1952 auch in das bundesdeutsche 
Recht übernommen, allerdings ausdrücklich ohne den eine rückwirkende Be-
strafung ermöglichenden Passus. Ein Fortwirken des alliierten Kontrollratsgeset-
zes 10 zur Bestrafung von nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen oder dessen Über-
nahme in deutsches Recht lehnte der Bund in Konsequenz ebenfalls ab. 1951 
erreichte er von den Briten und Franzosen für deren westdeutsche Besatzungs-
zonen eine Rücknahme der Ermächtigung deutscher Gerichte zur Anwendung 
dieses Gesetzes; eine entsprechende Rücknahme für das Gebiet von West-Berlin 
folgte 1952. Von da an galt im Bundesgebiet einheitlich allein das deutsche Straf-
recht als Rechtsgrundlage für die Ahndung von NS-Verbrechen.5
Das für die Bestrafung der alltäglichen Kriminalität geschaff ene und auf indi-
viduelle Täterschaft  zugeschnittene deutsche Strafgesetzbuch war jedoch wenig 
geeignet, dem kollektiven Charakter der organisierten Massenverbrechen des 
4 Die hier und im Folgenden genannten Zahlen beruhen auf einer Auswertung von im Archiv 
des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte in München zugänglichen Daten: Die Verfolgung von NS-Ver-
brechen durch deutsche Justizbehörden seit 1945. Datenbank aller Strafverfahren und Inventar 
der Verfahrensakten, bearbeitet im Auft rag des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte München-Berlin von 
Andreas Eichmüller und Edith Raim, München 2013. Für den vorliegenden Aufsatz wurden die 
Zahlen vom Autor bis ins Jahr 2019 aktualisiert.
5 Zur Entwicklung in den 1950er Jahren vgl. A. Eichmüller, Keine Generalamnestie. Die Straf-
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NS-Staates Rechnung zu tragen. Seine Täterzentrierung behinderte außerdem 
eine angemessene Berücksichtigung der Leiden der Opfer und der Bedürfnisse 
der Überlebenden. Zentrale rechtliche Fragen drehten sich um die Grenzziehung 
zwischen Mord und Totschlag oder Täterschaft  und Beihilfe, um die Berück-
sichtigung des Unrechtsbewusstseins, von Befehls- oder anderen Notstandssitu-
ationen. Das Verbot einer rückwirkenden Bestrafung versuchte man in einigen 
Fällen mit besonders ausgeprägtem Unrechtsgehalt durch eine Berufung auf das 
Naturrecht oder ein „übergesetzliches Recht“ (Gustav Radbruch) zu begegnen. 
Jedoch blieben das Einzelfälle. Allgemein setze sich eine weitgehend legalistische 
Rechtsauslegung durch, die eine Gültigkeit der ordentlich verkündeten NS-Ge-
setze akzeptierte, Befehle als schuldmindernd oder schuldausschließend berück-
sichtigte und stark auf die subjektive Seite des Täters rekurrierte.
Insgesamt wurden von westdeutschen und bundesrepublikanischen Staats-
anwaltschaft en in den Jahren 1945 bis einschließlich 2019 rund 37.000 straf-
rechtliche Ermittlungsverfahren wegen NS-Verbrechen gegen 175.000 nament-
lich benannte Beschuldigte geführt. In 5694 oder 16 Prozent aller eingeleiteten 
Verfahren wurde Anklage gegen 16.789 Beschuldigte erhoben. Ein rechtskräft i-
ges Urteil erging gegen rund 14.000 Angeklagte. Von diesen wurden 6676, also 
etwas weniger als die Hälft e, verurteilt und 5190 freigesprochen. Gegen die übri-
gen 2120 Angeklagten verfügten die Gerichte eine Einstellung. Die Freisprüche 
erfolgten in den allermeisten Fällen, weil nach Ansicht der Richter die vorliegen-
den Beweise für eine Verurteilung nicht ausreichten. Die Einstellungen begrün-
deten sich mit Amnestien oder einer Verjährung der Straft aten.
Sehen wir uns die Verurteilungen etwas genauer an, so ist festzustellen, dass 
sie größtenteils nur geringe Bestrafungen zur Folge hatten (siehe Schaubild 1). In 
60% der Fälle betrug das Strafmaß weniger als ein Jahr, in 90% weniger als fünf 
Jahre Haft . Auf lebenslange Haft  (und in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren verein-
zelt auf Todesstrafe) lautete das Urteil nur in 3% der Fälle. Dies hatte vor allem 
damit zu tun, dass die Verurteilungen in überwiegendem Maß minderschwere 
Verbrechen betrafen (siehe Schaubild 2), wie Ausschreitungen gegen Juden beim 
Pogrom 1938, Misshandlungen von NS-Gegnern nach der Machtübernahme 
1933 oder Denunziationen (zusammen 70% der Verurteilungen). Lediglich 15% 
aller Anklagen und 17% der Verurteilungen erfolgten wegen Tötungsdelikten. 
70% der Verurteilungen datieren in die Jahre der Besatzung 1945 bis 1949.
Weichenstellungen in den 1950er Jahren
In der ersten Hälft e der 1950er Jahre gingen sowohl die Zahl der neu eingelei-
teten Ermittlungsverfahren wegen NS-Verbrechen (siehe Schaubild 3) wie die 















































52 Andreas Eichmüller 
Beschränkungen stark zurück.6 Die Ursachen dieses Rückgangs waren viel-
schichtig. Zum Teil lagen sie in der Natur der Sache: Viele der minderschwe-
ren Straft aten, die die Ahndung in den späten 1940er Jahren dominiert hatten, 
waren weitgehend ausermittelt oder verjährt. Zum Teil manifestierte sich darin 
aber auch eine sich sowohl in Politik als auch Gesellschaft  und Teilen der Justiz 
ausbreitende Schlussstrichmentalität. 
Die Politik der ersten Bundesregierungen unter Bundeskanzler Konrad Ade-
nauer grenzte sich zwar strikt vom Nationalsozialismus und politischen Extre-
men von rechts wie links ab. Sie bekannte sich auch zu einer Entschädigung von 
Opfern politischer, „rassischer“ und religiöser Verfolgung sowie zu einer Bestra-
fung von NS-Verbrechen. Ausgangspunkt dabei war allerdings, dass die Zahl der 
„wirklichen Verbrecher“ gering gewesen sei, die Masse der Bevölkerung sich eine 
Distanz zum Nationalsozialismus bewahrt habe oder von der relativ kleinen Füh-
rungsriege der Nationalsozialisten verführt worden sei. 
Allgemein war die Politik darauf ausgerichtet, die durch Kriegsniederlage, 
Besatzungsherrschaft , Entnazifi zierung und Flüchtlingszustrom aus den Fugen 
geratene westdeutsche Gesellschaft  zu stabilisieren und gesellschaft liches Kon-
fl iktpotential abzubauen oder zu beruhigen. Sie setzte auf ein rasches Ende 
der Entnazifi zierung und eine Reintegration der Masse der Funktionäre und 
Parteigenossen des NS-Staates. Das führte nicht zuletzt in den für die Strafver-
folgung zentralen Bereichen Justiz und Polizei zu weitreichenden personellen 
Kontinuitäten zur NS-Zeit. Die meisten der von den Alliierten wegen NS-Be-
lastung entlassenen Richter und Staatsanwälte konnten, befördert durch den 
allgemeinen Personalmangel in den Justizverwaltungen und die milde Beur-
teilung ihrer Tätigkeit in den Jahren 1933 bis 1945, bald wieder in den Justiz-
dienst zurückkehren.7
Das Denken weiter Kreise der bundesdeutschen Bevölkerung war bestimmt 
von einer Mischung aus Schuldabwehr, und Leidensaufrechnung, Hinwendung 
des Blicks auf Existenzsicherung und Wiederaufb au sowie einem Wunsch nach 
Normalisierung, Sicherheit und Ruhe. Dieses gesellschaft liche Klima begüns-
tige eine nationalistische Gnadenkampagne für die von den Alliierten verur-
teilten NS- und Kriegsverbrecher, die bald nur noch als „Kriegsverurteilte“ 
bezeichnet wurden. Der Unterschied zwischen Kriegs- und NS-Verbrechen 
wurde dabei nahezu ganz verwischt. Der Kampagne mangelte es nicht an Un-
terstützung aus den Reihen der Kirchen und der großen politischen Parteien. 
6 Zur Entwicklung der jährlichen Zahlen vgl. A. Eichmüller, Die Strafverfolgung von NS-Ver-
brechen durch westdeutsche Justizbehörden seit 1945. Eine Zahlenbilanz, in: Vierteljahrsheft e für 
Zeitgeschichte, 56 (2008), S. 621–640.
7 Zu den personellen Kontinuitäten im Justizbereich vgl. H. Rottleuthner, Karrieren und Kon-
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Sie mündete in einer Begnadigungswelle der West-Alliierten, die die Deutschen 
als Bündnispartner im Kalten Krieg brauchten, und das führte dazu, dass im Lau-
fe der 50er Jahre auch schwerster Verbrechen schuldige Einsatzkommandoführer 
aus alliierter Haft  frei kamen. Parallel zur Aufstellung neuer Streitkräft e wurde 
der deutschen Wehrmacht jegliche Schuld an den Verbrechen des NS-Regimes 
abgesprochen.
Die Bundespolitik zeigte sich unter Federführung des Bundesjustizminis-
teriums hinsichtlich der Ahndung von nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen sehr 
nachsichtig. Ende 1949 und 1954 erließ der Bund zwei Amnestien, die sich 
auch auf NS-Verbrechen erstreckten. Die erste stellte neben Vergehen aus der 
Besatzungszeit auch NS-Verbrechen bis zu einer Strafh öhe von sechs Monaten 
Haft  und damit mehrere tausend minderschwere Taten straff rei. Die zweite 
begünstigte zwar auch Täter von Tötungsverbrechen, aber aufgrund ihrer Be-
schränkung auf in der Kriegsendphase ab September 1944 begangene Straf-
taten bis zu einer Höhe von drei Jahren Haft , nur recht wenige. Vorhandene 
Pläne für eine umfassendere Strafb efreiung ließen sich politisch nicht durch-
setzen. Die Hoff nung der Amnestielobby, die auf eine Art Generalamnestie 
spekuliert hatte, wurde damit aber enttäuscht und klargestellt, dass NS-Verbre-
chen auch weiterhin strafrechtlich verfolgt werden sollten.
1955 begannen dann die Zahl der neu eingeleiteten Ermittlungsverfahren 
und auch der Anklagen wegen NS-Verbrechen wieder leicht zu steigen. Bei der 
gängigen Einleitungspraxis für Strafverfahren blieb jedoch insbesondere bei 
im Ausland begangenen Straft aten wie den Massenmorden an Juden in Osteu-
ropa nach wie vor Vieles dem Zufall überlassen. Reagierten die Behörden doch 
nur entweder auf Anzeigen von Bürgern oder wurden von Amts wegen tätig, 
wenn sich eine Tat in ihrem Amtsbezirk ereignet hatte oder der Täter eines 
ihnen bekannten Verbrechens im Amtsbezirk wohnhaft  war.
Dabei war der Holocaust in Osteuropa keineswegs eine völlige Blindstelle 
der Strafverfolgung der 1950er Jahre. So gab es Prozesse etwa zu den Vernich-
tungslagern Auschwitz, Sobibor und Treblinka oder zu mehren Gettos und 
Zwangsarbeitslagern in Polen und sogar zur Erschießung von Juden durch 
eine Wehrmachtseinheit. Jedoch standen dabei meist einzelne oder eine kleine 
Gruppe von Tätern vor Gericht. Eine systematische Aufk lärung der jeweiligen 
Verbrechenskomplexe war meist gescheitert oder ganz unterblieben, vor al-
lem weil es den einzelnen Staatsanwaltschaft en an personellen Ressourcen, an 
Erfahrungen mit derartigen Ermittlungen und an historischem Wissen fehlte.
Die Justiz entwickelte erst relativ spät im Zusammenhang mit den Ermitt-
lungen zum sogenannten Ulmer Einsatzgruppenprozess ein Gespür für diese 
Defi zite. Mitte 1958 ergriff  schließlich der Stuttgarter Generalstaatsanwalt 















































54 Andreas Eichmüller 
der Ermittlungen. Er erhielt tatkräft ige Unterstützung seitens der Medienöf-
fentlichkeit. Eine Reihe von Journalisten und Intellektuellen setzte sich seit 
Mitte des Jahrzehnts zunehmend kritischer mit der bisherigen Strafverfol-
gungspraxis und dem bundesdeutschen Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit 
überhaupt auseinander. Nicht zuletzt das beförderte eine Einigung von Bund 
und Ländern für die Schaff ung einer „Zentralen Stelle der Landesjustizverwal-
tungen zur Aufk lärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen“ zum 1. Dezember 
1958. Diese übernahm fürderhin systematische Vorermittlungen und Koor-
dinierungsaufgaben; selbst Anklage erheben durft e sie jedoch nicht, sondern 
musste zu diesem Zweck die Verfahren an die zuständigen Staatsanwaltschaf-
ten der Länder abgeben. Trotz ihrer komplizierten Konstruktion als Koopera-
tionsbehörde der Bundesländer sowie ihrer beschränkten Kompetenzen und 
Zuständigkeiten erlangte sie in den nachfolgenden Jahren als Ausgangspunkt 
für zahlreiche neue Ermittlungen rasch eine herausragende Rolle bei der Straf-
verfolgung von NS-Verbrechen.8 Im ersten Jahr ihres Bestehens leitete die Stel-
le über 400 Vorermittlungsverfahren ein. Im Zentrum ihrer Arbeit stand dabei 
die Ermordung der Juden im von deutschen Truppen besetzten Osteuropa in 
Vernichtungslagern, durch Einsatzkommandos oder örtliche Sicherheitspoli-
zeidienststellen.
Dass es 13 Jahre nach dem Ende der NS-Herrschaft  zu dieser Wende in der 
Strafverfolgungspraxis und damit zu einer Intensivierung der Ahndung von 
NS-Verbrechen kam, war auf der einen Seite durchaus bemerkenswert. Politisch 
konnte dies auf der anderen Seite aber nur durchgesetzt werden, weil man davon 
ausging, die bislang noch nicht geahndeten schweren Verbrechen innerhalb einer 
relativ kurzen Zeit erledigen zu können. Entsprechend gering fi el die personelle 
Ausstattung der Zentralen Stelle zunächst aus. Und man hatte sich stillschwei-
gend darauf geeinigt, nur die Täter mit Befehlsverantwortung oder Befehlsüber-
schreitung zu verfolgen. Die sogenannten kleinen Täter am Ende einer Befehls-
kette, also etwa die Schützen bei Massenerschießungen, sollten mit Berufung auf 
einen Notstand straff rei bleiben.
Die Entwicklung nach Gründung der Zentralen Stelle 
In der ersten Hälft e der 1960er Jahre stiegen nicht zuletzt infolge der Arbeit der 
Zentralen Stelle die Zahl der neuen Ermittlungsverfahren wie auch der Ankla-
gen und Verurteilungen wegen NS-Verbrechen vorübergehend wieder etwas an 
(siehe Schaubilder 3 und 4). Gegenstand der Prozesse waren nun meist schwers-
te Delikte wie Tötungsverbrechen und Massenmorde in Konzentrations- und 
8 Vgl. A. Weinke, Eine Gesellschaft  ermittelt gegen sich selbst. Die Geschichte der Zentralen Stelle 
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Vernichtungslagern oder Massenerschießungen von Juden durch SS- und Po-
lizei-Einheiten.9
Hervorzuheben ist hier vor allem der Frankfurter Auschwitz-Prozess, der 
hinsichtlich Dauer, Anlage, Umfang und Publizität einen für die damalige Zeit 
außergewöhnlichen Charakter trug.10 Nach rund fünf Jahren Ermittlungen 
verhandelte das Gericht ab Dezember 1963 20 Monate lang bis August 1965 
gegen 22 Angeklagte. 360 Zeuginnen und Zeugen wurden im Prozessverlauf 
vernommen, darunter 221 Überlebende des Lagers. Diese kamen nahezu aus 
der ganzen Welt nach Frankfurt. Eine Besonderheit war außerdem, dass sich 
das Gericht im Dezember 1964 zu einem Lokaltermin nach Auschwitz in Po-
len und damit in ein kommunistisch regiertes Land begab, mit dem keine dip-
lomatischen Beziehungen bestanden. Die öff entliche Resonanz auf den Prozess 
war enorm. Insgesamt besuchten etwa 20.000 Menschen die Verhandlungen, 
darunter Schüler- und Studentengruppen. Zeitungen und Rundfunk berich-
teten nahezu von jedem Sitzungstag; viele hatten Sonderkorrespondenten vor 
Ort. Der Prozess hatte damit eine wichtige aufk lärende Wirkung hinsichtlich 
der Verbrechen des NS-Regimes.
Die Anlage des Prozesses und sein aufk lärerischer Impetus waren vor al-
lem dem Frankfurter Generalstaatsanwalt Fritz Bauer geschuldet. Er hatte das 
ursprünglich in Stuttgart anhängige Auschwitz-Verfahren in seinen Zustän-
digkeitsbereich geholt, weil er die Chance sah, die komplizierten historischen 
Zusammenhänge und grauenhaft en Vorgänge in diesem Konzentrations- und 
Vernichtungslager, in dem mehr als eine Million Menschen umgebracht wor-
den waren, in einem Großverfahren darzustellen und damit auch das Mensch-
heitsverbrechen der Ermordung der europäischen Juden in der bundesdeut-
schen Erinnerung zu verankern. Für den Prozess setzte Bauer in bis dahin 
ungewöhnlichem Maß auf die Unterstützung durch Historiker. Er ließ vom 
Institut für Zeitgeschichte in München mehrere Fachgutachten erstellen mit 
dem Ziel, das Gesamtgeschehen und den historisch-politischen Kontext der 
Verbrechen in den Prozess einzuführen. Das war seiner Ansicht nach in den 
bisherigen NS-Prozessen nur sehr unzureichend geschehen. Die Folge war ge-
wesen, dass es den Verteidigern der Angeklagten gelungen war, die Taten vom 
9 Vgl. zu den 1960er Jahren M. von Miquel, Ahnden oder amnestieren? Westdeutsche Justiz und 
Vergangenheitspolitik in den sechziger Jahren, Göttingen 2004; M. Greve, Der justitielle Umgang mit 
den NS-Gewaltverbrechen in den sechziger Jahren, Frankfurt/Main u. a. 2001.
10 Vgl. Fritz Bauer Institut, Tonband-Mitschnitt des 1. Frankfurter Auschwitz-Prozesses, http://
www.auschwitz-prozess.de, abgerufen 5.1.2020; W. Renz, Auschwitz vor Gericht. Fritz Bauers Ver-
mächtnis und seine Missachtung, Hamburg 2018; I. Wojak, Fritz Bauer 1903–1968. Eine Biogra-
phie, München 2009; D.O. Pendas, Th e Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963–1965. Genocide, History, 















































56 Andreas Eichmüller 
Gesamtgeschehen zu isolieren und die Gerichte diese nur als Einzelfälle und 
nicht als Teil eines Ausrottungsplans gewürdigt hatten.
Mit dem Ausgang des Prozesses konnte Fritz Bauer allerdings nur zum Teil 
zufrieden sein. Das Gericht verurteilte lediglich sechs Angeklagte wegen Mordes 
(zu lebenslanger Haft ), die meisten hingegen nur wegen Beihilfe zum Mord zu 
zeitlich befristeten Haft strafen (zwischen dreieinhalb und 14 Jahren), drei An-
geklagte wurden freigesprochen. Anders als von Bauer beabsichtigt hatten die 
Richter nicht alle Angeklagten als Mittäter eines groß angelegten Massenmordes 
eingestuft . Ausschließlich diejenigen Angeklagten, die eigenhändig und eigen-
verantwortlich getötet hatten, waren wegen Mordes zur Höchststrafe verurteilt 
worden. Die übrigen, auch der mit weitreichenden Befehlsvollmachten ausge-
stattete Adjutant des Lagerkommandanten, nur als Gehilfen von Hitler, Himm-
ler und einigen anderen Hauptverantwortlichen. Die Rechtsprechung der west-
deutschen Justiz in NS-Prozessen, die für die Zuerkennung einer Täterschaft , 
den Beweis dafür verlangte, dass der Täter, selbst wenn er eigenhändig getötet 
hatte, die Tat auch als eigene gewollt hatte, war schon seit Beginn der 1960er Jah-
re häufi g angeprangert worden. Sie hatte in manchen Fällen dazu geführt, dass 
bei tausendfachen Morden Strafen unter fünf Jahren Haft  ausgesprochen wor-
den waren.11 Diese Rechtsprechung war 1966 auch Gegenstand einer sie kritisie-
renden sogenannten Königsteiner Entschließung des Deutschen Juristentags, die 
jedoch nur wenig an der Urteilspraxis änderte.
Nicht zuletzt solche rechtlichen Figuren und Auslegungen führten dazu, dass 
die kleine Welle an Prozessen in den 1960er Jahren die Gesamtbilanz der Straf-
verfolgung von NS-Verbrechen nur noch in begrenztem Maß verbessern konn-
te.12 Hinzu kamen die Verjährung aller vor 1945 begangenen Straft aten außer 
Mord im Mai 1960 und der wachsende zeitliche Abstand zu den Taten, der eine 
Ahndung erschwerte. Zeugen und Täter wurden immer älter, waren gesundheit-
lich nicht mehr in der Lage, Prozesse durchzustehen, oder verstarben.
Außerdem ließ die Ermittlungsintensität in den 1970er Jahren wieder nach. 
Und die Ablehnung derartiger Prozesse in der bundesdeutschen Bevölkerung 
wuchs sogar noch an. Hatten sich nach Meinungsumfragen 1965 gut die Hälf-
te (52%) der Befragten gegen eine Fortsetzung der strafrechtlichen Verfolgung 
von NS-Verbrechen ausgesprochen, so waren es 1978 fast zwei Drittel (65%).13 
11 Vgl. zur Beihilferechtsprechung und anderen entschuldenden Rechtskonstruktionen 
K. Freudiger, Die juristische Aufarbeitung von NS-Verbrechen, Tübingen 2002.
12 Seit 1960 erfolgten noch 554 rechtskräft ige Verteilungen. Diese entsprachen dann allerdings 
fast der Hälft e aller Verurteilungen wegen Tötungsverbrechen seit 1945. Die Höchststrafe, also 
lebenslange Haft , erhielten von den 554 Verurteilten jedoch nur 114, was aber wiederum fast zwei 
Drittel aller Höchststrafen waren, die westdeutsche Richter wegen NS-Verbrechen überhaupt ver-
hängten.
13 Vgl. E. Noelle, E.P.  Neumann (Hrsg.), Jahrbuch der öff entlichen Meinung 1965–1967, 
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Zahlreiche SS-Männer, die in Konzentrations- und Vernichtungslagern Dienst 
getan hatten, kamen immer noch genauso ungeschoren davon, wie Mitglieder 
von Erschießungskommandos oder führende Gestapobeamte. Ein besonders un-
schönes Kapitel stellt die faktische Strafb efreiung der eigenen Profession durch 
die bundesdeutschen Strafverfolger dar. Kein Richter und kein Staatsanwalt wur-
de wegen seiner Tätigkeit in der ordentlichen Justiz des nationalsozialistischen 
Staates rechtskräft ig verurteilt, auch nicht die Richter der von den Nationalsozi-
alisten geschaff enen Sondergerichte und des Volksgerichtshofs.14
Die bundesdeutsche Politik war Mitte der 1960er Jahre in der Frage der Fort-
setzung der strafrechtlichen Verfolgung von NS-Tätern gespalten. 1965 drohte 
aufgrund der geltenden Verjährungsfrist für Mord von 20 Jahren ein Ende der 
juristischen Aufarbeitung. Wie schon sein Amtskollege 1960, als man Totschlag 
hatte verjähren lassen, sprach sich Bundesjustizminister Ewald Bucher in dieser 
Situation gegen ein Eingreifen des Gesetzgebers aus. Nach heft iger Kritik aus 
dem Ausland und intensiven und kontroversen Debatten rang sich der Deutsche 
Bundestag jedoch dazu durch, den Beginn der Verjährungsfristen auf das Datum 
der Aufh ebung aller alliierten Vorbehalte zum 1. Januar 1950 festzusetzen und 
die Verjährung damit um vier Jahre hinauszuschieben.
Eine gewichtige Rolle in den Debatten spielten die in den Archiven osteu-
ropäischer Staaten zahlreich vorhandenen Akten aus der NS-Zeit. Diese hatten 
von den bundesdeutschen Ermittlern bis dahin noch kaum ausgewertet werden 
können. In ihnen wurden jedoch Hinweise auf viele bislang noch nicht bekann-
te NS-Verbrechen vermutet. Aufgrund des Kalten Krieges und der deutschen 
Teilung gestalteten sich die Rechtsbeziehungen nach Osteuropa sehr schwierig. 
Einerseits lehnte die Bundesregierung offi  zielle Kontakte insbesondere nach 
Ost-Berlin ab. Anderseits verweigerten die Ostblockstaaten  – abgesehen von 
Einzelfällen – lange Zeit eine Unterstützung der westdeutschen Justiz oder nutz-
ten wie die DDR die dort vorhandenen Akten vor allem zu Versuchen, mit der 
Off enlegung von NS-Belastungen bundesdeutsches Führungspersonal und da-
mit den westdeutschen Staat insgesamt zu delegitimieren. Nachdem die Bundes-
regierung 1964 zwecks rechtzeitiger Unterbrechung der Fristen vor Eintritt der 
Verjährung entsprechende Ansuchen ausgesendet hatte, kündigten die CSSR, 
die DDR und Polen an, sie würden Dokumentenmaterial über NS-Verbrechen 
zur Verfügung stellen oder Einsicht in ihre Akten gewähren. Am günstigsten ent-
wickelte sich dabei trotz mancher Irritationen die Zusammenarbeit mit Polen. 
14 Verurteilt wurden lediglich drei Richter bzw. Staatsanwälte wegen ihrer Mitwirkung an 
Standgerichtsurteilen zu Kriegsende. Zum Umgang mit NS-Justizverbrechen vgl. allgemein 
A. Hoeppel, NS-Justiz und Rechtsbeugung. Die strafr echtliche Ahndung deutscher Justizverbrechen 
nach 1945, Tübingen 2019; zum Volksgerichtshof A.  Eichmüller, Ausgebliebene Ahndung. Die 
Juristen des Volksgerichtshofs nach 1945, in: Stift ung Topographie des Terrors (Hg.), Der Volksge-















































58 Andreas Eichmüller 
Schon im Februar 1965 fuhr eine Delegation der Zentralen Stelle zwecks Sich-
tung von Akten zur Polnischen Hauptkommission nach Warschau.15
In der Folge wurde klar, dass die Fülle des Aktenmaterials und die sich da-
raus ergebenden Hinweise auf NS-Verbrechen auch nicht bis zum Eintritt der 
verschobenen Verjährung im Jahr 1969 in befriedigendem Maß ausgewertet 
werden konnten. Mit inspiriert von der UNO-Resolution über die Unverjähr-
barkeit von Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit aus 
dem Jahr 1968, brachte die SPD-geführte Bundesregierung 1969 in den Bun-
destag einen Gesetzentwurf zur völligen Aufh ebung der Verjährung für Mord 
ein. Dieser ließ sich jedoch politisch nicht durchsetzen. Beschlossen wurde al-
lerdings eine Verlängerung der Verjährungsfrist um zehn auf nunmehr 30 Jah-
re. 1979, als die Verjährung erneut anstand, hob der Bundestag die Frist dann 
mit relativ knapper Mehrheit ganz auf. Mord verjährt seitdem in der Bundes-
republik nicht.
Ende der 1970er Jahre hatte sich das gesellschaft liche und politische Klima 
auch hinsichtlich des Umgangs mit der NS-Vergangenheit stark verändert. Da-
für verantwortlich war nicht zuletzt die Ausstrahlung der vierteiligen US-ame-
rikanischen Serie „Holocaust“ im bundesdeutschen Fernsehen im Jahr 1978. Sie 
hatte vor allem in der jungen Generation die Empathie für die Opfer der NS-Ver-
brechen erheblich anwachsen lassen. Und so sprach sich nun in einer Meinungs-
umfrage auch eine Mehrheit der Bundesbürger für eine Fortsetzung der straf-
rechtlichen Ahnung von NS-Verbrechen aus.16 
Konterkariert wurde die Verlängerung und dann Aufh ebung der Verjäh-
rungsfristen durch eine Strafb efreiung für viele Beihilfetaten sozusagen durch die 
Hintertür. Schon länger hatte eine Gruppe von Politikern und Interessenvertre-
tern eine Amnestierung von Gehilfen bei NS-Verbrechen gefordert. 1968 sollte 
sie auf einem ungewöhnlichen Weg zu einem partiellen Erfolg kommen. Der 
Bundestag beschloss ohne Debatte und mit großer Mehrheit das „Einführungs-
gesetz zum Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten“, das an sich mit der Ahndung 
von NS-Verbrechen nichts zu tun hatte. Das Gesetz bestimmte allerdings, dass 
Gehilfen zwingend milder bestraft  werden mussten als die Täter, wenn ihnen 
eigene niedere Beweggründe nicht nachgewiesen werden konnten. Nach einer 
dann vom Bundesgerichtshof bestätigten Auslegung verringerte sich damit auch 
die an die Höhe der Strafandrohung gekoppelte Verjährungsfrist für Gehilfen, 
15 Vgl. A. Rückerl, NS-Verbrechen vor Gericht. Versuch einer Vergangenheitsbewältigung, Hei-
delberg 1982, S. 168 ff .; P. Gulińska-Jurgiel, Gemeinsame oder getrennte Wege? Kontakte zwischen 
Polen und Westdeutschland zur justiziellen Aufarbeitung von NS-Verbrechen bis zum Beginn der 
1970er-Jahre, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History 2019, 16, S. 300–
320.
16 Vgl. Emnid-Informationen Nr. 2, 1979, S. 10 ff .; F. Bösch, Zeitenwende 1979. Als die Welt 
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und das bedeutete, dass alle derartigen Taten, die in der NS-Zeit begangen wor-
den waren, bereits 1960 verjährt waren.17
Bei der vorherrschenden Rechtsprechung, den größten Teil der NS-Täter nur 
als Gehilfen zu verurteilen, beeinträchtigte dies die weitere Ahnung von NS-Ver-
brechen ganz erheblich. Von dieser Regelung profi tierten nicht nur „kleine“ 
Gehilfen, sondern auch sogenannte Schreibtischtäter wie etwa die Bediensteten 
des Reichssicherheitshauptamts. Die Auswirkungen dieses Gesetzes sollten aller-
dings auch nicht überschätzt werden, da sich an der allgemein milden Beurtei-
lung von NS-Verbrechen in der Bundesrepublik bis in die 1990er Jahre wenig 
änderte und Richter und Staatsanwälte in vielen Fällen auch andere Gründe ge-
funden hätten, die Täter nicht zu bestrafen.
Fazit
Aus heutiger Sicht stellt sich die Strafverfolgung von NS-Verbrechen in der Bun-
desrepublik trotz der lang andauernden Bemühungen als im Gesamten wenig 
gelungen und in manchen Punkten ganz gescheitert dar. Insbesondere gegenüber 
den Opfern der NS-Herrschaft  bleibt ein dauerhaft es eklatantes Gerechtigkeits-
defi zit, das sich in einen zumindest in den ersten Jahrzehnten wenig emphati-
schen Umgang mit den Leiden der vom NS-Regime verfolgten und malträtier-
ten Überlebenden einbettet.
Nach moralischen Maßstäben gemessen fällt das Urteil deshalb ziemlich 
eindeutig aus. Aus historischer Perspektive jedoch muss man diff erenzieren und 
nach Erklärungen suchen. Auch weil das Beispiel der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land nur so zur Erhellung der auch heute aktuellen Frage beitragen kann, mit 
welchen Problemen sich postdiktatorische Gesellschaft en bei der strafrechtli-
chen Aufarbeitung ihrer Vergangenheit konfrontiert sehen.18
Die Gründe für das insgesamt magere Ergebnis der strafrechtlichen Ahn-
dung waren vielfältig. Grundsätzlich ist festzuhalten, dass eine allen Gerech-
tigkeitserwägungen entsprechende und alle Untaten erfassende juristische 
Ahndung der millionenfachen Morde und anderen Verbrechen des NS-Regi-
mes von vorneherein kaum möglich war. Außerdem war eine rechtsstaatlich 
operierende Strafj ustiz mit all ihren gesetzlichen Garantien für Beschuldigte 
und Angeklagte nicht in der Lage, eine gesellschaft liche und moralische Ausei-
nandersetzung mit dem vergangenen NS-Unrecht zu ersetzen. Eine besondere 
17 Die Frage, ob diese Rechtsfolge von interessierten Kreisen im Bundesjustizministerium 
bewusst herbeigeführt oder zumindest sehenden Auges nicht verhindert wurde, hat schon mehrere 
Historiker und Juristen beschäft igt; vgl. zuletzt M. Görtemaker, C. Saff erling, Die Akte Rosenburg. 
Das Bundesministerium der Justiz und die NS-Zeit, München 2016, 400 ff .
18 Vgl. zum Beispiel S. Buckley-Zistel, T. Kater (Hrsg.), Nach Krieg, Gewalt und Repression. 
Vom schwierigen Umgang mit der Vergangenheit, Baden-Baden 2011; J. Elster, Closing the Books. 















































60 Andreas Eichmüller 
Schwierigkeit lag darin, ein von einer Massenbewegung zur Macht gebrachtes 
und sich breiter gesellschaft licher Unterstützung erfreuendes diktatorisches 
Unrechtsregime in ein demokratisches, freiheitliches und rechtsstaatliches po-
litisches System umzuformen. Wollte man die junge Demokratie stabilisieren, 
gab es kaum eine Alternative dazu, die meisten der zahlreichen ehemaligen 
Anhänger und Unterstützer des Nationalsozialismus in den neuen Staat zu in-
tegrieren und nur bei einem kleineren Teil Konsequenzen für deren Handeln 
in der Vergangenheit zu fordern. Wo man allerdings die Grenze bei dieser In-
tegrationspolitik ziehen wollte, war entscheidend. Und hier setzte sich in der 
frühen Bundesrepublik ein sehr großzügiger Kurs durch. Die Rahmenbedin-
gungen für eine juristische Ahndung von NS-Verbrechen waren deshalb fast 
von Beginn an wenig günstig. Weder die Politik noch die Bevölkerung waren 
mehrheitlich bis Ende der 1970er Jahre an einer breiteren Aufarbeitung der 
NS-Vergangenheit interessiert. Damit einhergehend behinderten personelle 
Kontinuitäten gerade auch in Justiz und Polizei die Ahndung und führten zu 
entschuldigenden Rechtskonstruktionen und milden Bestrafungen.
Hinzu kamen Probleme in der Rechtsprechung und der juristischen Praxis. 
Das seit 1950 für die Ahndung allein maßgebliche bundesdeutsche Strafrecht ist 
für eine adäquate Be- und Aburteilung der staatlich organisierten Massenverbre-
chen des NS-Staates nur bedingt geeignet. Zudem gestalteten sich die Ermittlun-
gen in vielen Fällen langwierig und beschwerlich, die Beweisführung schwierig, 
und es mangelte Richtern und Staatsanwälten zumindest in den ersten Jahren 
am notwendigen ermittlungstechnischen und historischen Wissen. Solches 
Wissen stellte gerade auch die Geschichtswissenschaft  lange Zeit nur sehr unzu-
reichend bereit. Im Gegenteil wurde die Justiz zum Vorreiter oder Initiator (Aus-
chwitz-Prozess) bei der Produktion und Verbreitung von historischem Wissen 
über NS-Verbrechen. Trotz aller Unzulänglichkeiten brachten die NS-Prozesse, 
die ein weites Spektrum der nationalsozialistischen Untaten abgedeckten, die 
Straft aten immer wieder ins Licht der Öff entlichkeit und trugen damit wesent-
lich dazu bei, die gesellschaft lichen Debatten über den richtigen Umgang mit der 
NS-Vergangenheit lebendig zu erhalten.
Letztlich fehlte es der bundesdeutschen Justiz wie auch der Politik aber an Er-
fahrungen und Vorbildern, wie man adäquat mit einem derart blutigen Erbe um-
gehen konnte. Erst in einem langsamen Lernprozess, der sich weit in die Gegen-
wart hinein ziehen sollte, setzte sich unterstützt vom Generationenwechsel die 
Einsicht durch, dass alte Verarbeitungsmuster wie Vergessen und Verschweigen 
angesichts des Ausmaßes der von Deutschen während der NS-Zeit begangenen 
Verbrechen nicht angemessen und darüber hinaus auch nicht geeignet waren, 
das deutsche Ansehen in der Welt wiederherzustellen, sondern dass im Gegenteil 
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ziehen, einen off ensiven Umgang mit der Vergangenheit und ein Erinnern an die 
Verbrechen verlangten. 
„Vieles hatte man sich vorgenommen. Vieles wurde nicht geschafft  . Aber es 
wurden Zeichen gesetzt. Ein Versuch nur – immerhin ein Versuch“. So bilanzier-
te der langjährige Leiter der Zentralen Stelle Adalbert Rückerl im Jahr 1984 die 
Arbeit seiner Behörde und die Bemühungen der bundesdeutschen Justiz um eine 
strafrechtliche Ahndung der nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen.19
Anhang
■ Todesstrafe/Lebenslange Haft
■ 10–20 Jahre Haft
■ 5 bis unter 10 Jahre Haft
■ 2 bis unter 5 Jahre Haft
■ 1 bis unter 2 Jahre Haft
■ 6 Monate bis unter 1 Jahr Haft
■ Bis 6 Monate Haft
■ Geldstrafe
Schaubild 1: Rechtskräft ige Verurteilungen wegen NS-Verbrechen in den 







■ Politische Gegner 1933/34
■ Reichskristallnacht
■ Sonstige
Schaubild 2: Rechtskräft ige Verurteilungen nach Verbrechenskomplexen








































































Schaubild 4: Anklagen und rechtskräft ige Verurteilungen wegen 
NS-Verbrechen pro Jahr 1951–1985
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64 Andreas Eichmüller 
Prosecution of Nationalist Socialist Crimes by the Criminal Law 
of the Federal Republic of Germany – balance and strategy 
Abstract 
Th e results of the West German punishment of National Socialist crimes are ambiguous. 
Long eff orts with 37,000 investigations against 175,000 accused face a meager result of 
almost 6700 convictions, including only 1154 for homicides. In view of the millions of 
murders committed by the Nazi regime and the hundreds of thousands of perpetrators, 
this outcome cannot satisfy, much less if the focus is on the aspect of justice towards the 
victims and their relatives. Th ere were many reasons for this disproportion. Last but not 
least, they refer to the fundamental problems of post-dictatorial societies in the transition 
to stable democratic and constitutional conditions.

















































Das Bundesministerium der Justiz 1949–1973 
und die NS-Zeit: Kontinuität und demokratischer 
Neuanfang – Ein historischer Rückblick
Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland wird zumeist als eine Erfolgsgeschichte be-
schrieben: politisch stabil, wirtschaft lich prosperierend und mit einer freiheit-
lich-demokratischen Grundordnung versehen, die ihresgleichen sucht. Und dies 
alles seit nunmehr über siebzig Jahren – trotz der moralischen Zerrüttung nach 
den Verbrechen des NS-Regimes, vor allem dem Holocaust, den materiellen 
Zerstörungen als Folge des verheerenden Krieges, der Notwendigkeit, Millionen 
Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene aus den ehemaligen deutschen Ostgebieten zu in-
tegrieren und schließlich nach 1989/90 die Umbrüche der Wiedervereinigung 
zu meistern.1 
Zweifellos ist der Neuaufb au nach dem Zivilisationsbruch, den das „Dritte 
Reich“ bedeutete, alles in allem gelungen. Die demokratischen Institutionen 
haben funktioniert, während die Hinterlassenschaft en des NS-Regimes immer 
mehr in den Hintergrund rückten. Aber diese vordergründige Erfolgsgeschichte 
hatte auch eine dunkle Kehrseite. Dies gilt für alle Bereiche der Gesellschaft : in 
der Wirtschaft  ebenso wie in der Politik, in Wissenschaft  und Kultur ebenso wie 
in der staatlichen Verwaltung und in den Medien – und natürlich auch in der 
Justiz. Überall war der Neubeginn nach 1945 mit einem hohen Maß an Kon-
tinuität verbunden, vor allem in personeller Hinsicht. Denn die alliierte Poli-
tik der „Entnazifi zierung“ erwies sich als schwierige bürokratische Prozedur, die 
schon bald an ihren eigenen Ansprüchen scheiterte. Da sie nicht nur die Elite, 
sondern die gesamte Bevölkerung auf ihre nationalsozialistische Belastung hin 
zu durchleuchten suchte, war die Aufgabe schlicht gigantisch: Etwa 8,5 Millio-
nen Deutsche, rund 10 Prozent der Bevölkerung, waren Mitglieder der NSDAP 
gewesen. Sehr viel mehr noch – insgesamt über 45 Millionen – hatten Organi-
sationen angehört, die von der NSDAP kontrolliert wurden.2 Und selbst jene, 
1 Siehe zum Beispiel E. Wolfrum, Die geglückte Demokratie. Geschichte der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, Stuttgart 2006.
2 Zahlenangaben nach: K.-D. Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands (Quellen und 
















































die keine direkten Verbindungen zu NS-Organisationen aufwiesen, waren von 
ihrem „Mittun“ und damit ihrer Mittäterschaft  und Mitverantwortung für die 
nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen nicht freizusprechen. Widerstand hatte es 
nur im Ausnahmefall gegeben. Zudem zeigten die meisten Deutschen kaum Ein-
sicht, geschweige denn Reue, wie der amerikanische Diplomat Robert Murphy 
seinem Außenminister Cordell Hull im Mai 1945 berichtete: Die Deutschen sei-
en „äußerst reuelos und von unbegreifl icher Ignoranz gegenüber den Taten ihrer 
Führer“. Nur wenige gäben zu, von den Konzentrationslagern und den SS-Gräu-
eltaten gewusst zu haben, und lehnten jede eigene Verantwortung dafür ab. Das 
einzige Verbrechen, das Deutschland in ihren Augen begangen habe, so Murphy, 
bestehe darin, den Krieg verloren zu haben.3 
Vor diesem Hintergrund konnte die Entnazifi zierung kaum gelingen. Bereits 
im Frühjahr 1946 sah die amerikanische Militärregierung deshalb keinen ande-
ren Ausweg, als ihre Durchführung – einschließlich der Verwaltung der Internie-
rungslager – auf deutsche Stellen zu übertragen.4 Das war die Geburtsstunde der 
sogenannten „Spruchkammern“, in denen die Deutschen nun selbst über ihre 
Verstrickung in das NS-Regime befi nden sollten. Aber konnte das gutgehen? 
Die Bilanz spricht für sich. Denn zonenübergreifend wurden nach Abschluss 
der Spruchkammerverfahren, die keine Strafurteile fällten, sondern nur der 
politischen Säuberung dienen sollten, lediglich 1,4 Prozent der Betroff enen als 
„Hauptschuldige“ und „Belastete“ eingestuft . Der Rest – 98,6 Prozent – galt als 
„entnazifi ziert“. Die Hälft e davon waren angeblich nur „Mitläufer“ gewesen, in 
35 Prozent der Fälle wurden die Verfahren ganz eingestellt, und nur 0,6 Prozent 
wurden als NS-Gegner anerkannt. Spätestens im Frühjahr 1951 war das Kapitel 
„Entnazifi zierung“ in Westdeutschland endgültig abgeschlossen. An seine Stelle 
trat eine „Schlussstrich-Mentalität“, die sich wiederum auf alle Bereiche der Ge-
sellschaft  erstreckte.5
Freispruch für die Nazi-Justiz?
Aber galt dies auch für die Justiz – insbesondere für das Bundesministerium der 
Justiz, das als „Verfassungsministerium“ zum Schutz der Verfassung gegründet 
worden war und damit doch eine ganz besondere Verantwortung trug? Dies war 
die Kernfrage, mit der sich das „Rosenburg-Projekt“ befasste, in dem von 2012 
3 Robert Murphy an Secretary of State, 1. Mai 1945, in: Foreign Relations of the United States: 
Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, vol. III, Washington, 
DC 1968, S. 937.
4 Siehe hierzu Gesetz Nr. 104 zur Befreiung von Nationalsozialismus und Militarismus vom 5. 
März 1946, in: Regierungsblatt für Württemberg-Baden 1946, S. 71 ff . Vgl. ebenfalls F. Ostler, Das 
Gesetz zur Befr eiung von Nationalsozialismus und Militarismus vom 5. März 1946 und sein Vollzug. 
Persönliche Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift  1996, S. 821–825.
5 Zahlenangaben nach: H.-J.  Ruhl (Hrsg.), Neubeginn und Restauration. Dokumente zur 
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bis 2016 die Entwicklung des BMJ mit Blick auf die NS-Zeit untersucht wurde.6 
Im Mittelpunkt der Arbeit stand also nicht die Justiz im „Dritten Reich“, die 
bereits gut erforscht ist, da sowohl über die Ära von Reichsjustizminister Franz 
Gürtner als auch über die Zeit seines Nachfolgers Otto Georg Th ierack umfang-
reiche Untersuchungen vorliegen.7 Vielmehr ging es bei der Rosenburg-Kom-
mission darum, wie man im Bundesministerium der Justiz nach 1949 mit der 
NS-Vergangenheit umging: Welche personellen und institutionellen Kontinui-
täten gab es? Wie tief war der Bruch 1945/49 wirklich? Und wie sah es mit den 
inhaltlichen Aspekten der Politik aus? Wurden auch diese, wenn man unterstellt, 
dass viele der handelnden Personen im BMJ schon vor 1945 aktiv gewesen wa-
ren, vom Gedankengut des Nationalsozialismus beeinfl usst? Und wenn ja, auf 
welche Weise? 
Bei der Beantwortung dieser Fragen konnte die Kommission an einige Un-
tersuchungen anknüpfen, die bereits die allgemeine Entwicklung der Justiz im 
Übergang vom „Dritten Reich“ zur Bundesrepublik beleuchtet hatten. Das 
BMJ selbst hatte sich an der Aufarbeitung des schwierigen Erbes der NS-Jus-
tiz schon 1989 mit der Ausstellung „Im Namen des Deutschen Volkes – Jus-
tiz und Nationalsozialismus“ beteiligt. Die Ausstellung war seinerzeit in der 
Staatsbibliothek Berlin an der Potsdamer Straße eröff net worden, war dann für 
zwei Jahrzehnte auf Wanderschaft  durch alle Bundesländer gegangen und in 43 
Städten zu sehen gewesen, meist in Gerichten und Justizgebäuden, bevor sie im 
Juni 2008 einen dauerhaft en Platz im Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin-Bran-
denburg in der Berliner Hardenbergstraße 31 am Bahnhof Zoo fand. Sie um-
fasst drei Abschnitte: die Justiz im Nationalsozialismus, ihre Vorgeschichte in 
der Weimarer Republik und den Umgang mit dieser Vergangenheit durch die 
westdeutsche Justiz nach 1945/49. Rund 2 000 Dokumente und Bilder sowie 
Begleittexte zu den einzelnen Th emenkreisen machen wichtige Aspekte der 
historischen und ideologischen Grundlagen der Justiz, der Einfl ussnahme der 
Partei auf die Justiz und der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Justiz, NSDAP und SS 
deutlich. Die Ausstellung zeigt, wie verhängnisvoll die Rolle der Justiz nicht 
nur im „Dritten Reich“ gewesen war, sondern welche Verbindungen es auch 
zur Justiz der Nachkriegszeit gab.8 
6 Vgl. M. Görtemaker, C. Saff erling, Die Akte Rosenburg. Das Bundesministerium der Justiz und 
die NS-Zeit, München 2016.
7 Zur Ära Gürtner siehe vor allem L. Gruchmann, Justiz im Dritten Reich 1933–1940. 
Anpassung und Unterwerfung in der Ära Gürtner, 3. Aufl ., München 2001. Vgl. auch E. Reitter, 
Franz Gürtner. Politische Biographie eines deutschen Juristen, Berlin 1976. Zur Ära Th ierack siehe bes. 
S. Schädler, „Justizkrise“ und „Justizreform“ im Nationalsozialismus. Das Reichsjustizministerium 
unter Reichsjustizminister Th ierack (1942–1945), Tübingen 2009.
8 Eine ähnliche Ausstellung folgte nach der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands, wiederum im 
Auft rag des BMJ, zum Th ema „Im Namen des Volkes? Über die Justiz im Staat der SED“. Sie ging 
auf eine Anregung von Richtern, Staatsanwälten und Bürgerrechtlern in den neuen Bundesländern 
















































Ingo Müller hatte darauf bereits 1987 in seiner rechtshistorischen Disserta-
tion Furchtbare Juristen. Die unbewältigte Vergangenheit unserer Justiz hingewie-
sen.9 Allerdings war sein Buch in juristischen Kreisen nur widerwillig zur Kennt-
nis genommen worden und hatte die akademische Karriere Müllers nachhaltig 
beschädigt, der deutlich machte, wie tief Juristen in die Verbrechen und den 
Massenmord des NS-Regimes verstrickt gewesen waren und welche personellen 
und sachlichen Kontinuitäten über die Zäsur von 1945/49 hinweg bestanden 
hatten. Inzwischen sind die Kernaussagen Müllers unstrittig und wurden durch 
zahlreiche Studien bestätigt. Hervorzuheben ist besonders der 1996 erstmals er-
schienene, vieldiskutierte Band Vergangenheitspolitik von Norbert Frei, der sich, 
ausgehend von grundlegenden Weichenstellungen in Parlament und Regierung, 
mit der mangelnden „Vergangenheitsbewältigung“ in der Bundesrepublik in den 
frühen 1950er Jahren beschäft igt und dabei auch dem Justizbereich umfangrei-
che Passagen widmet.10 Marc von Miquel setzte diese Überlegungen 2004 für die 
1960er Jahre fort und kam zu ähnlichen Ergebnissen.11 
Zu erwähnen ist in diesem Zusammenhang ferner der Publizist Jörg Fried-
rich, der in seinen Büchern Freispruch für die Nazi-Justiz und Die kalte Amnes-
tie – NS-Täter in der Bundesrepublik schon zwanzig Jahre zuvor trotz eines noch 
sehr begrenzten Materialzugangs auf skandalöses Verhalten von Richtern und 
Staatsanwälten, fragwürdige Urteile und eine kalkulierte Schlussstrich-Menta-
lität der Politik hingewiesen hatte. Bei aller materialbedingten Vorläufi gkeit sei-
ner Erkenntnisse ließen die publizistisch zugespitzten Ausführungen Friedrichs 
erahnen, welcher historische Klärungsbedarf hier noch bestand.12 Der Berliner 
Rechtssoziologe Hubert Rottleuthner schließlich, der 2010 anhand der Daten 
von über 34 000 Personen, die zwischen 1933 und 1964 im höheren Justizdienst 
tätig gewesen waren, die „Karrieren und Kontinuitäten deutscher Justizjuris-
ten vor und nach 1945“ untersuchte, vermochte dann auch fl ächendeckend zu 
beweisen, was inzwischen kaum noch ein Geheimnis war: dass Brüche in den 
den Missbrauch der Justiz ohne unabhängige Richter in der SED-Diktatur. Die Ausstellung 
wurde 1994 in Berlin eröff net und danach bis 1999 in zahlreichen Städten, vornehmlich in 
Ostdeutschland, aber auch in Braunschweig und Karlsruhe, gezeigt. Seither ist sie dauerhaft  in 
der Gedenkstätte Moritzplatz in Magdeburg zu sehen. Siehe hierzu Bundesministerium der Justiz 
(Hrsg.), Im Namen des Volkes? Über die Justiz im Staat der SED. Zwei Bände: Dokumentenband 
und Katalog, Leipzig 1996.
9 I. Müller, Furchtbare Juristen. Die unbewältigte Vergangenheit unserer Justiz, München 1987 
(7., überarb. Neuaufl ., Berlin 2014).
10 N. Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik. Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit, 
München 1996. 
11 M. von Miquel, Ahnden oder amnestieren? Westdeutsche Justiz und Vergangenheitspolitik in 
den sechziger Jahren, Göttingen 2004.
12 J.  Friedrich, Freispruch für die Nazi-Justiz. Die Urteile gegen NS-Richter seit 1948. Eine 
Dokumentation, Reinbek 1983 (überarb. u. erg. Ausg. Berlin 1998). Ders., Die kalte Amnestie. NS-
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Karrieren deutscher Juristen nach dem Ende des Nationalsozialismus eine Aus-
nahme darstellten und dass die meisten Juristen, auch wenn sie politisch belastet 
waren, ihre Laufb ahn nach Gründung der Bundesrepublik mehr oder weniger 
nahtlos fortsetzen konnten.13
Tatsächlich hat sich die deutsche Justiz in der Nachkriegszeit – mit Ausnah-
me des Nürnberger Juristenprozesses, der unter amerikanischer Federführung 
stattfand – der eigenen Strafverfolgung nahezu völlig entzogen.14 Dabei hatten 
Tausende von Richtern und Staatsanwälten an ordentlichen Gerichten, Sonder-
gerichten, Standgerichten oder am berüchtigten Volksgerichtshof bei der Durch-
setzung der nationalsozialistischen Ideologie geholfen und sich damit, direkt 
oder indirekt, an den Verbrechen des NS-Regimes beteiligt. Das methodische 
Handwerkszeug dafür war ihnen von zahlreichen Hochschullehrern und der am 
26. Juni 1933 in München gegründeten „Akademie für Deutsches Recht“ unter 
ihren Präsidenten Hans Frank (bis 1942) und Otto Th ierack (bis 1944) geliefert 
worden. Die Akademie hatte als wissenschaft liche Zentralstelle für die Umge-
staltung des deutschen Rechts im Sinne der nationalsozialistischen Weltanschau-
ung gewirkt und damit als Instrument der rechtswissenschaft lichen Gleichschal-
tung gedient.15 Das Reichsjustizministerium hatte dann die entsprechenden 
Gesetze und Verordnungen vorbereitet und akribisch über die Einhaltung der 
neuen Ideologie durch die Justiz gewacht. Eine ganze Generation von Juristen 
war nach Beendigung der Ausbildung und ihrem Eintritt in das Berufsleben in 
den 1930er Jahren in diesen Rahmen gezwängt worden und hatte sich teils aus 
Überzeugung, teils aus opportunistischem Karrierestreben der Partei und dem 
„Führer“ verschrieben. 
Dennoch gab es kaum Richter und Staatsanwälte, die in der Bundesrepu-
blik nach 1949 wegen Unrechtsurteilen im „Dritten Reich“ zur Rechenschaft  
gezogen wurden. Während man in der SBZ/DDR immerhin versuchte, belas-
tete Staatsanwälte auszutauschen und ehemalige Richter durch kurzfristig aus-
gebildete sogenannte „Volksrichter“ zu ersetzen – allerdings um den hohen Preis 
der juristischen Expertise und des Verlustes der politischen Unabhängigkeit –, 
kehrten in der Bundesrepublik zahllose Ju risten, die das NS-Regime mitgetragen 
hatten, weitgehend unbehelligt an ihre Schreibtische und in die Gerichte zu rück 
und reihten sich stillschwei gend in die neue rechtsstaatliche Ordnung ein, getra-
gen oft mals von dem Willen, einen Schleier des Schweigens über das Vergangene 
zu legen und das unbegreifl iche Aus maß der Verbrechen vergessen zu machen. 
13 H. Rottleuthner, Karrieren und Kontinuitäten deutscher Justizjuristen vor und nach 1945, 
Berlin 2010.
14 Zum Nürnberger Juristenprozess vgl. L.M. Peschel-Gutzeit (Hrsg.), Das Nürnberger Juristen-
Urteil von 1947. Historischer Zusammenhang und aktuelle Bezüge, Baden-Baden 1996.
15 Vgl. hierzu H.-R. Pichinot, Die Akademie für Deutsches Recht. Aufb au und Entwicklung einer 
















































Selbst wenn dadurch die Demokratie der Bundesrepublik nicht ernsthaft  gefähr-
det wurde, übten NS-belastete Juristen auf diese Weise in wichtigen staatlichen 
und gesellschaft lichen Positionen weiterhin Einfl uss aus und schützten sich im-
mer wieder gegenseitig vor dem Zugriff  der rechtsstaatlichen Justiz.16
Die Ergebnisse der Rosenburg-Kommission 
Zu welchen Ergebnissen ist die Rosenburg-Kommission nun im Hinblick auf 
die Situation im Bundesministerium der Justiz gekommen? Dazu zunächst eini-
ge Zahlen: Mit 67 planmäßigen Beamtenstellen war das BMJ bei seiner Errich-
tung 1949 das kleinste Bundesministerium, wobei allerdings nur 35 Personen 
als Abteilungsleiter, Unterabteilungsleiter oder Referatsleiter zum unmittelbaren 
Leitungspersonal zählten. Am Ende des Untersuchungszeitraums 1973 gab es 
zwar schon 250 Stellen, aber damit war das BMJ immer noch ein sehr kleines 
Haus.17 Insgesamt konzentrierte sich die Kommission auf 258 Personalakten, die 
das Leitungspersonal betreff en, das heißt die Abteilungsleiter, Unterabteilungs-
leiter und Referatsleiter. Bei der detaillierten Auswertung lag der Schwerpunkt 
auf den vor 1927 geborenen Mitarbeitern, insgesamt rund 170, die bei Kriegs-
ende 1945 mindestens 18 Jahre alt waren, ihre Schulzeit im NS-Staat absolviert 
hatten und in der Regel beim Arbeitsdienst und bei der Wehrmacht gewesen wa-
ren. Innerhalb dieser Gruppe galt das Hauptinteresse aber denjenigen Personen, 
die bereits im ersten Jahrzehnt des 20. Jahrhunderts geboren waren. Sie hatten 
ihre juristische Ausbildung vor dem Krieg abgeschlossen und waren schon im 
Nationalsozialismus als Juristen tätig gewesen, bevor sie nach 1945 in die Lan-
desjustizverwaltungen oder die alliierten Zonenverwaltungen und schließlich in 
das Bundesministerium der Justiz gelangten.18
Bei der Betrachtung dieser Personen konnten sämtliche Personalakten ein-
gesehen werden. Von Anfang an wurde den Kommissionsmitgliedern der unge-
hinderte Zugang zu diesen Akten zugesichert, die in der Tat sehr aussagekräft ig 
sind, weil die Akten nicht nur die Entwicklung in der Bundesrepublik abbilden, 
sondern im Regelfall bereits in der Weimarer Republik oder spätestens im „Drit-
ten Reich“ angelegt wurden. Nach 1945 wurden diese Akten häufi g von den 
Zonenverwaltungen übernommen und gelangten von dort in das Bundesminis-
terium der Justiz, wenn die Mitarbeiter hier eingestellt wurden. Sie sind deshalb 
besonders aussagekräft ig und wertvoll, weil es sich um authentische Dokumente 
16 C.  Lange, Die justizielle NS-Aufarbeitung  – Täter, Opfer, Justiz, in: Die Rosenburg. 
4. Symposium. Vorträge gehalten am 21. Oktober 2014 im Foyer der Bibliothek des Bundesgerichtshofs 
in Karlsruhe, Berlin 2015, S. 22 f.
17 Vgl. J. Schröder, Das Bundesministerium der Justiz und die Justizgesetzgebung 1949–1989, 
in: Bundesministerium der Justiz (Hrsg.), 40 Jahre Rechtspolitik im fr eiheitlichen Rechtsstaat, Bonn 
1989, S. 12, 26 f., 40.
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handelt und alle notwendigen Angaben enthalten, die für eine Untersuchung 
zur NS-Belastung und zur Kontinuität von Karriereverläufen unverzichtbar sind.
Auf das Ausmaß der NS-Belastung in der Frühzeit des BMJ lässt bereits ein 
Dokument schließen, das im Mai 1950 auf Anforderung des Bundeskanzleram-
tes erstellt wurde. Ausgangspunkt war ein Schreiben des Ministerialdirektors 
und späteren Staatssekretärs im Kanzleramt, Hans Globke, mit dem er alle Bun-
desminister bat, festzustellen, wie viele Angehörige der jeweiligen Ministerien 
früher Mitglied der NSDAP gewesen waren.19 Die Antwort des BMJ datiert 
vom 20. Mai 1950 und macht deutlich, wie hoch der an der Parteimitgliedschaft  
gemessene Belastungsgrad in der Phase des personellen Aufb aus im Bundesjus-
tizministerium war.20 So befanden sich unter den 48 Angehörigen des höheren 
Dienstes 19 ehemalige Parteigenossen. Im gehobenen Dienst standen 17 ehema-
lige Parteigenossen 21 Nicht-Mitgliedern gegenüber. Der Anteil früherer NSD-
AP-Mitglieder betrug somit im höheren Dienst rund 40 Prozent, im gehobenen 
Dienst fast 45 Prozent.21 
Im Vergleich mit den übrigen Bundesministerien waren dies durchschnittli-
che Werte. Legt man die Gesamtwerte für alle Bundesministerien einschließlich 
des Bundeskanzleramtes zugrunde, war der Anteil der früheren Parteimitglieder 
im höheren Dienst des BMJ sogar niedriger als im Durchschnitt (40:47 Pro-
zent), im gehobenen Dienst dagegen nahezu gleich (45:44 Prozent).22 Es wäre 
daher verfehlt anzunehmen, das BMJ stünde hinsichtlich der Durchsetzung mit 
ehemaligen Parteigenossen an der Spitze der Ministerien. Dennoch bleibt es eine 
Tatsache, dass knapp die Hälft e der Beamten und Angestellten des im Aufb au be-
fi ndlichen Justizministeriums der NSDAP angehört hatte. Die Erklärung dafür 
ist einfach: Als Bundesjustizminister Th omas Dehler (FDP) und Staatssekretär 
Walter Strauß (CDU) das neue Bundesjustizministerium 1949 errichteten, ta-
ten sie dies in Anlehnung an Strukturen des früheren Reichsjustizministeriums. 
Zugleich übernahmen sie zahlreiche Mitarbeiter, die teilweise schon vor 1933 im 
Justizdienst tätig gewesen waren, vielfach aber erst im „Dritten Reich“ Karriere 
gemacht hatten. Zahlenmäßig fi ndet sich die höchste NS-Belastung in der zwei-
ten Hälft e der 1950er Jahre. Während am Anfang noch versucht wurde, in der 
Führung der Abteilungen und Referate ein ungefähres Gleichgewicht zwischen 
Belasteten und Nicht-Belasteten zu halten, ging diese Balance aufgrund von Be-
förderungen und Neueinstellung von Belasteten zunehmend verloren. 
19 Der Staatssekretär des Innern im Bundeskanzleramt an sämtliche Bundesminister 
(gez. Dr. Globke), 8. Mai 1950, in: BArch B 136/5116. 
20 Der BMdJ an den Staatssekretär des Innern im Bundeskanzleramt, 20. Mai 1950, mit einer 
Übersicht zum Rundschreiben des Staatssekretärs des Innern im Bundeskanzleramt vom 8. Mai 
1950 – BK 1741/50 mit Stand vom 15.5.1950, in: BArch B 136/5116. 
21 Ebd. Im mittleren Dienst waren hingegen kaum ehemalige Parteimitglieder zu fi nden, unter 
den Mitarbeitern im einfachen Dienst gab es kein einziges ehemaliges NSDAP-Mitglied.
22 Zusammenstellung [des Bundeskanzleramts] der Mitglieder der früheren NSDAP für alle 
















































Dabei ist schwer nachzuvollziehen, dass es 1949 nicht 35 unbelastete Juristen 
in Deutschland gegeben haben soll, um die leitenden Positionen in diesem be-
sonders sensiblen Ministerium zu besetzen, in dem es um den Schutz von Recht 
und Verfassung ging. Off enbar hat man danach aber gar nicht gesucht – auch 
nicht unter den Emigranten. Bemerkenswert ist ferner, dass die Belastung in ei-
nigen Bereichen besonders hoch war. Dies gilt etwa für die Abteilung II (Straf-
recht), aber auch für die Abteilung III (Wirtschaft s- und Gesellschaft srecht). So 
wiesen 1957 in der Abteilung II alle Referatsleiter eine mehr oder weniger brau-
ne Vergangenheit auf – auch der Abteilungsleiter Josef Schafh eutle, der zwar kein 
Mitglied der NSDAP war, aber mehrfach seine Aufnahme beantragt hatte, unter 
anderem in einem persönlichen Schreiben an den damaligen Staatssekretär im 
Reichsjustizministerium, Roland Freisler. Seine Nicht-Mitgliedschaft  ist daher 
zu relativieren: Schafh eutle war kein Mitglied, aber nicht, weil er nicht wollte, 
sondern weil die Partei ihn nicht wollte  – wegen seines katholischen Hinter-
grundes, den er selbst in seinen Gesuchen um Aufnahme in die Partei allerdings 
stets bestritt. Anders ausgedrückt: In der Abteilung II waren 1957 sämtliche Per-
sonen auf der Leitungsebene auf die eine oder andere Weise in das NS-Regime 
verstrickt gewesen – ausnahmslos.23 Für die anderen Abteilungen gilt Ähnliches, 
auch wenn nicht alle Abteilungen in gleichem Maße belastet waren. Erst seit den 
1960er Jahren wurde die Belastung altersbedingt geringer. Wirklich frei von ehe-
maligen NSDAP-Angehörigen war das Ministerium aber erst mit der Pensionie-
rung der Unterabteilungsleiter Gerhard Marquordt und Rudolf Franta 1978 und 
von Abteilungsleiter Dr. Günther Schmidt-Räntsch 1986.24
Individuelle Schuld und Verantwortung
Für die Rosenburg-Kommission stellte dieser Befund allerdings nicht mehr als 
ein Zwischenergebnis dar. Denn die Mitgliedschaft  in NSDAP oder SA war 
zwar ein Hinweis auf Regimenähe, aber keineswegs ein Beweis für Denken oder 
gar Handeln im Sinne der NS-Ideologie. Hierzu musste auch das aktive Verhal-
ten der jeweiligen Personen im Einzelfall untersucht werden. Untersuchungs-
gegenstände der Rosenburg-Kommission waren deshalb ebenfalls die Kriterien 
und Maßstäbe, die unter Berücksichtigung des individuellen Handelns vor 1945 
bei der Einstellung sowie bei Beförderungen nach 1949 galten. Ausgangspunkt 
hierbei war der im Nürnberger Juristenprozess 1947 entwickelte Maßstab für das 
Verhalten von Ministerialbeamten, Richtern und Staatsanwälten. Dies betraf 
nicht nur die Übernahme von Juristen in den Dienst des BMJ, die als belastet gel-
ten mussten, sondern auch die inhaltliche Auseinandersetzung mit dem Unrecht 
23 Ebd., S. 316 ff . Zur Problematik Schafh eutle siehe vor allem S. 327 ff .
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der NS-Justiz, die Bereinigung der Gesetze von nationalsozialistischer Ideologie 
und die Strafverfolgung von NS-Tätern durch die deutsche Justiz.25 
Weitere Th emen der Untersuchung waren die Amnestierung von NS-Tätern 
und ihre vorzeitige Haft entlassung, durch die bis 1958 nahezu alle Verurteilten 
freikamen, sowie die Rolle, die das BMJ bei der Erarbeitung des Einführungs-
gesetzes zum Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz vom 24. Mai 1968 spielte. Denn da-
durch wurde die Beihilfestrafb arkeit in bestimmten Fallkonstellationen herabge-
setzt, was im Zusammenspiel mit der sogenannten Gehilfenrechtsprechung zur 
rückwirkenden Verjährung zahlloser nationalsozialistischer Gewaltverbrechen 
am 8. Mai 1960 führte. Ferner wurde der Frage nachgegangen, inwieweit das 
BMJ bei der verschleppten Rehabilitierung der Opfer der NS-Justiz mitwirk-
te  – etwa bei strafgerichtlichen Entscheidungen, bei Erbgesundheitsurteilen 
oder in der Militärjustiz −, so dass die Urteile des Volksgerichtshofs und der 
Standgerichte erst am 28. Mai 1998 bzw. 17. Mai 2002 durch Bundesgesetz 
pauschal aufgehoben wurden, Kriegsverratsfälle sogar erst im September 2009. 
Untersucht wurden auch die Haltung des BMJ zum Alliierten Kontrollrat, etwa 
zum Kontrollratsgesetz Nr. 1 vom 20. September 1945 über die Aufh ebung von 
insgesamt 24 Gesetzen, Verordnungen und Erlassen aus der Zeit des „Dritten 
Reiches“, sowie zu den Nürnberger Prozessen und ihren Urteilen, die in der 
Bundesrepublik bekanntlich weithin umstritten waren. Und schließlich widme-
te sich die Kommission ebenfalls der Haltung des Ministeriums zur Zentralen 
Rechtsschutzstelle, die bis 1953 im Geschäft sbereich des BMJ angesiedelt war, 
ehe sie in den Verantwortungsbereich des Auswärtigen Amtes wechselte, wo sie 
bis zu ihrer Aufl ösung 1968 deutsche Kriegsverbrecher vor Strafverfolgung im 
Ausland warnte und die Arbeit der Ludwigsburger Zentralstelle zur Aufk lärung 
von NS-Verbrechen erschwerte.26
Im Ergebnis ist festzustellen, dass viele führende Mitarbeiter des BMJ in den 
Ministerien des NS-Staates direkt an der Umsetzung des Führerwillens beteiligt 
gewesen waren. Andere hatten durch ihre Tätigkeit an Gerichten, etwa an den 
Sondergerichten des „Dritten Reiches“, an den Gerichten in den besetzten Ge-
bieten oder in der Militärgerichtsbarkeit, die verbrecherischen Gesetze, die im 
Reichsjustizministerium vorbereitet und auf den Weg gebracht worden waren, 
angewandt und damit ebenfalls schwere persönliche Schuld auf sich geladen. In 
keinem einzigen Fall gab es deswegen nach 1949 Disziplinarverfahren oder gar 
Entlassungen, obwohl schon seit Mitte der 1950er Jahre immer wieder Informa-
tionen über die NS-Belastung einzelner Mitarbeiter des Bundesjustizministeri-
ums an die Öff entlichkeit gelangten. In allen Fällen, in denen es solche Hinweise 
25 BGBl I 2007 Seite 2614 Art. 4 Gesetz zur Bereinigung des Besatzungsrechts § 1 (2).
26 Vgl. hierzu O. Schröm, A. Röpke, Stille Hilfe für braune Kameraden. Das geheime Netzwerk 
















































gab, wurden von der Ministeriumsspitze – dem Minister oder Staatssekretär 
Walter Strauß – Untersuchungen veranlasst. Sie endeten stets mit einem Gut-
achten von Josef Schafh eutle, in dem dieser erklärte, dass ein Fehlverhalten nicht 
vorliege und Konsequenzen daher nicht gezogen werden müssten.
Was personelle Kontinuität bedeutet, wird jedoch erst am Einzelfall wirk-
lich erkennbar. Nehmen wir etwa das Beispiel Franz Maßfeller. Vor 1945 war 
er im Reichsjustizministerium für Familien- und Rasserecht zuständig. Er nahm 
an den Folgebesprechungen zur Wannsee-Konferenz teil und war ein bekann-
ter Kommentator des Blutschutz- und Ehegesundheitsgesetzes von 1935. Dies 
führte jedoch nicht dazu, dass ihm die Einstellung im BMJ versagt blieb. Viel-
mehr stieg er hier zum Ministerialrat auf und leitete bis 1960 ausgerechnet das 
Referat für Familienrecht. Ein anderer Fall ist Eduard Dreher, vor 1945 Erster 
Staatsanwalt am Sondergericht Innsbruck, wo er zahlreiche Todesurteile wegen 
Nichtigkeiten erwirkte. Im BMJ wurde er nach 1949 ein hochrangiger Mitar-
beiter in der für das Strafrecht zuständigen Abteilung II und leitete viele Jahre 
lang die Kommission zur Großen Strafrechtsreform. Der schon genannte Josef 
Schafh eutle war vor 1945 im Reichsministerium der Justiz tätig, wo er an der 
Ausarbeitung des politischen Sonderstrafrechts beteiligt war, unter anderem bei 
der Verordnung über die Bildung von Sondergerichten und beim Gesetz über 
die Verhängung und den Vollzug der Todesstrafe sowie beim Gesetz zur Abwehr 
politischer Gewalttaten. Nach 1949 leitete er als Ministerialdirektor die Ab-
teilung II Strafrecht im BMJ. Ein viertes Beispiel ist Walter Roemer. Vor 1945 
war er Erster Staatsanwalt am Sondergericht München und dort unter anderem 
als Vollstreckungsstaatsanwalt an der Hinrichtung von belgischen und franzö-
sischen Widerstandskämpfern und Mitgliedern der „Weißen Rose“ beteiligt. 
Nach 1949 wurde er Ministerialdirektor und Abteilungsleiter für Öff entli-
ches Recht und Verfassungsrecht im BMJ. Max Merten war von 1942 bis 1944 
Kriegsverwaltungsrat beim Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht in Th essaloniki, wo er 
als Leiter der Abteilung „Verwaltung und Wirtschaft “ einer der Organisatoren 
der Ausplünderung und Deportation von mehr als 50 000 griechischen Juden 
war – also einer der größten deutschen Kriegsverbrecher. 1952 wurde er im BMJ 
Leiter des Referats „Zwangsvollstreckung“. Hans Gawlik war vor 1945 Staats-
anwalt am Sondergericht Breslau, nach 1945 zunächst Verteidiger des SD und 
einiger Einsatzgruppenführer in den Nürnberger Prozessen und wurde 1949 Lei-
ter der Zentralen Rechtsschutzstelle im BMJ. Ernst Kanter schließlich, der vor 
1945 als „Generalrichter“ im besetzten Dänemark eingesetzt war, wo er an 103 
Todesurteilen mitwirkte, arbeitete seit 1951 als Ministerialrat und ab 1954 als 
Ministerialreferent und Strafrechtsreferent im Bundesjustizministerium, bevor 
er 1958 zum Bundesgerichtshof versetzt wurde, wo er als Senatspräsident dem 
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Thomas Dehler und Walter Strauß
Die Frage, weshalb insbesondere die beiden Gründerväter des Ministeriums, 
Bundesjustizminister Th omas Dehler und sein Staatssekretär Walter Strauß, der-
art problematische Personen für das Ministerium auswählten und darauf verzich-
teten, gezielt Remigranten anzuwerben oder von vornherein nach unbelasteten 
Mitarbeitern zu suchen, ist nicht überzeugend zu beantworten. Sowohl Deh-
ler als auch Strauß waren persönlich gänzlich unbelastet. Dehler war mit einer 
Jüdin verheiratet, Strauß entstammte einem jüdischen Elternhaus. Beide waren 
im „Dritten Reich“ Diskriminierungen ausgesetzt gewesen. Strauß hatte die NS-
Zeit nur mit Mühe in Berlin-Wannsee überlebt. Seine Eltern waren in das KZ 
Th eresienstadt deportiert worden und dort an den Folgen der Haft  gestorben. 
Dennoch scheuten sich Dehler und Strauß nicht, hochgradig NS-belastete 
Mitarbeiter einzustellen. Sie handelten dabei nicht in Unkenntnis der Vergan-
genheit, sondern in vollem Wissen. Im Fall Dehlers ist dies besonders auff ällig, 
wie das Beispiel Willi Geiger zeigt, dem Dehler im „Dritten Reich“ als Verteidi-
ger am Sondergericht Bamberg gegenübergestanden hatte, wo Geiger als Staats-
anwalt fungierte. Dennoch machte Dehler ihn nach 1945 zunächst zu seinem 
persönlichen Referenten und betraute ihn danach sogar mit der Aufgabe, das 
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz zu entwerfen. Anschließend sorgte Dehler 
auch noch dafür, dass Geiger Richter sowohl am Bundesgerichtshof als auch am 
Bundesverfassungsgericht wurde. Geiger war damit der Einzige, der in der Bun-
desrepublik beide Positionen gleichzeitig bekleidete. 
Bei Strauß verhält es sich ähnlich. Auch er stellte in vollem Wissen um die 
Vergangenheit belastete Personen ein, wenn diese seinen Maßstäben genügten. 
Die wichtigsten Kriterien für Dehler wie für Strauß waren fachliche Kompetenz 
und ministerielle Erfahrung. Hinzu kamen persönliche Bekanntschaft en und 
in geringerem Maße politische Empfehlungen. Politische Belastungen wurden 
zwar, wie der Briefwechsel zwischen Dehler und Strauß zeigt, häufi g intern er-
örtert. Soweit sich erkennen lässt, führten sie aber nur selten dazu, einem ge-
wünschten Mitarbeiter die Einstellung zu versagen. Dehler wie Strauß ging es 
also in erster Linie um die Arbeitsfähigkeit des Ministeriums, die ihrer Meinung 
nach nur zu gewährleisten war, wenn seine Angehörigen über die nötige fachli-
che Eignung und über Erfahrung verfügten. In seiner Ansprache anlässlich der 
Amtsübergabe von Bundesjustizminister Hans-Joachim von Merkatz an seinen 
Nachfolger Fritz Schäff er im Oktober 1957 sprach Strauß sogar ausdrücklich 
von einem „Schatz an Erfahrungen“, den man „aus den vergangenen Jahrzehn-
ten, ungeachtet des dutzendjährigen Reiches“, in die Arbeit des Bundesministeri-
ums der Justiz mitgebracht habe.27 Wörtlich erklärte er: „Ein nicht unerheblicher 
27 Staatssekretär Dr. Strauß, Ansprache anlässlich der Amtsübergabe am 30. Oktober 1957, 
in: Ansprachen aus Anlaß von Amtsübergaben (Minister, Staatssekretäre) im Bundesministerium der 
















































Teil von uns ist früher schon in der reichsministeriellen Arbeit tätig gewesen, und 
ich glaube, wenn wir nicht diese Kollegen und ihre Erfahrungen gehabt hätten, 
wären wir nicht in der Lage gewesen, die Arbeit der vergangenen acht Jahre zu 
erfüllen.“28 
Bei anderen Gelegenheiten führte Strauß zudem häufi g das Bild des unpo-
litischen Beamten an, den es doch gerade im „Dritten Reich“ nicht gegeben 
hatte und den es auch danach nicht gab, weil Politiknähe und Politikberatung 
zum Wesen und zu den Kernaufgaben der Ministerialverwaltung gehören. Was 
Strauß meinte, war indessen etwas anderes: Er bezog sich auf die Tatsache, dass 
die handwerklichen Fähigkeiten der Juristen rasch an die jeweiligen politischen 
Gegebenheiten und Wünsche angepasst werden können und die juristische Tä-
tigkeit damit im Grunde vom jeweiligen Regime unabhängig ist. Zwar gilt diese 
Feststellung für viele Berufe. Doch Juristen erfüllen im staatlichen Gefüge eine 
zentrale Funktion, indem sie an der Formulierung von Gesetzen mitwirken und 
als Staatsanwälte oder Richter an deren Durchsetzung maßgeblich beteiligt sind. 
Sie sind damit Techniker der Macht und tragen zur Herrschaft ssicherung und 
Stabilisierung politischer Regime bei. Im „Dritten Reich“ war diese Instrumen-
talisierung der Juristen nahezu vollständig gelungen – ob aus innerer Überzeu-
gung, pragmatischem Karrierewillen oder unter Anpassungsdruck, wurde nach 
1949 oft  nicht mehr hinterfragt.
Es überrascht demnach nicht, dass Dehler und Strauß und auch die ihnen 
nachfolgenden Minister und Staatssekretäre bei der Auswahl der Mitarbeiter 
nach ministerieller Vorerfahrung suchten. Denn die juristischen Fertigkeiten, die 
im Bundesjustizministerium von den Beamten verlangt wurden, unterschieden 
sich in der Form kaum von denjenigen, die im Reichsjustizministerium für vor-
rangig gehalten worden waren. Zynisch könnte man sagen, dass es für den juris-
tischen „Handwerker“ gleichgültig ist, ob er ein Gesetz zum Verbot von Mische-
hen formuliert oder ein Gesetz zur Gleichstellung des nichtehelichen Kindes mit 
den ehelichen Kindern im Erbrecht. Tatsächlich haben manche Mitarbeiter auf 
der Rosenburg genau dies getan: Sie formulierten im „Dritten Reich“ das „Ge-
wohnheitsverbrechergesetz“ und bestimmten nun die Diskussion um die Straf-
rechtsreform. Sie wirkten an der Reform des Jugendstrafrechts 1943 mit und 
waren jetzt federführend bei der Reform des Jugendgerichtsgesetzes von 1953. 
Sie waren als Kriegsrichter in der Wehrmacht oder in der Kriegsgerichtsbarkeit 
des „Dritten Reiches“ tätig und planten nun ein neues Wehrstrafrecht für die 
Bundeswehr. Ähnliches galt im Bereich des Familienrechts, des Zwangsvollstre-
ckungsrechts oder dem Gesellschaft srecht der Unternehmen.
Ministerielle Erfahrung war demnach ein Schlüsselkriterium bei der Re-
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nachweisen. So waren schon 1949 27 Mitarbeiter des Bundesministeriums der 
Justiz ehemalige Mitarbeiter des Reichsjustizministeriums. Davon wurden et-
liche sofort in den Bundesdienst übernommen, andere kamen 1950 dazu, die 
übrigen bis 1955. Alle hatten selbstverständlich dem nationalsozialistischen 
Rechtswahrerbund angehört und waren – mit Ausnahme von Josef Schafh eut-
le, von dem bereits mehrfach die Rede war – auch Mitglieder der NSDAP ge-
wesen.29 Wenn zudem von Seiten des Ministeriums stets behauptet wurde, die 
fachliche Qualifi kation sei für die Aufnahme in den ministeriellen Dienst das 
ausschlaggebende Kriterium gewesen, so wird dies ebenfalls durch die Akten 
belegt. Von den 170 näher untersuchten Personen waren 155 Volljuristen, von 
denen 94 eine Examensnote von „vollbefriedigend“ bis „sehr gut“ im Staats-
examen nachweisen konnten. Wenn man bedenkt, dass in der Regel nur etwa 
15  Prozent der Examenskandidaten diese Noten erreichen, bedeutete dies, 
allein auf die Examensnote bezogen, eine bemerkenswerte Ansammlung von 
Spitzenjuristen. Nimmt man die Promotion als Gradmesser für Expertise hin-
zu, wird dieses Bild weiter bestätigt. So fanden sich unter den 155 Volljuristen 
insgesamt 90 promovierte Mitarbeiter sowie zwei weitere, denen ein Doktorti-
tel „honoris causa“ verliehen wurde.30
Wenig überraschend ist auch die Tatsache, dass die meisten Ministerialbe-
amten im BMJ eine konservative Einstellung aufwiesen, die häufi g auf Tradi-
tionen der alten Beamtenschaft  vor 1933 Bezug nahm und die NS-Diktatur 
als Phase eines „irregeleiteten“ Rechtsverständnisses begriff . So ließ sich in der 
Formulierung der neuen Gesetze „braunes“ Gedankengut auch kaum ausma-
chen. Dies wurde im Übrigen schon allein dadurch verhindert, dass die po-
litischen Rahmenbedingungen, unter denen die Bundesrepublik, zumal mit 
Beginn der europäischen Integration seit Anfang der 1950er Jahre und später 
in der NATO, Mitglied der westlichen Wertegemeinschaft  geworden war, eine 
Neuorientierung erzwangen. Wenn sich einzelne Anknüpfungspunkte an frü-
here Vorstellungen – etwa im Jugendstrafrecht – fanden, beruhten sie nicht 
nur auf der persönlichen NS-Erfahrung derjenigen, die nun an der Formulie-
rung der entsprechenden Gesetze in der Bundesrepublik mitwirkten, sondern 
entsprachen auch dem „Zeitgeist“ der 1950er Jahre. Denn dieser hatte sich 
hinsichtlich der Werteordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft  seit den 1930er 
Jahren kaum geändert und wich erst Mitte der 1960er Jahre neuen Gedanken, 
die sich dann auch in der Gesetzgebung bemerkbar machten. Dennoch sind 
in den 1950er Jahren Tendenzen erkennbar, etwa im Familienrecht oder im 
Jugendstrafrecht, die in die Zeit vor 1945 zurückweisen. 

















































Weit mehr noch lässt sich dies über die Verfolgung von NS-Tätern sagen, 
die von der deutschen Justiz geradezu verhindert wurde – begleitet und geför-
dert auch vom Bundesjustizministerium, das auf Drängen der Bundesregierung 
und unter dem Druck der Öff entlichkeit die Straff reiheitsgesetze von 1949 und 
1954 vorbereitete, nach denen bis 1958 praktisch alle NS-Straft äter freikamen 
bzw. von weiterer Strafverfolgung verschont blieben. Der Ulmer Einsatzgrup-
pen-Prozess 1958 und die Auschwitz-Prozesse in den 1960er Jahren sowie die 
jahrzehntelangen Verzögerungen bei der Aufh ebung der NS-Unrechtsurtei-
le sind Beispiele für die Schwierigkeiten im strafrechtlichen Umgang mit der 
NS-Vergangenheit. Zudem wurde die in mehreren Phasen diskutierte Frage der 
Verjährung durch die sogenannte „kalte Verjährung“ konterkariert, die mit dem 
schon erwähnten Einführungsgesetz zum Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz vom 10. 
Mai 1968 einherging, so dass auch Schwersttäter, gegen die bereits Strafverfah-
ren eingeleitet waren oder gegen die Verfahren hätten eingeleitet werden müssen, 
straff rei ausgingen. Bei all diesen Entwicklungen war das Bundesjustizministeri-
um – neben dem Bundesgerichtshof – maßgeblich beteiligt. Die Erklärung dafür 
liegt nicht nur in dem allgemeinen Bestreben der Bundesregierung, die alten Eli-
ten wieder zu verwenden, um den Übergang vom „Dritten Reich“ zur Bundesre-
publik technisch so reibungslos wie möglich verlaufen zu lassen, sondern auch an 
der personellen Zusammensetzung des BMJ. 
„Kommunikatives Beschweigen“ der Vergangenheit 
Vor diesem Hintergrund erscheint es erstaunlich, dass der Rechtsstaat in der 
Bundesrepublik trotzdem gut funktioniert hat. Dass dies so war, lässt sich nicht 
bestreiten. Daher ist zu fragen, ob die Wiederverwendung ehemaliger Funkti-
onseliten, so belastet sie im Einzelfall waren, nicht nur im BMJ, sondern in allen 
Bundesministerien und Behörden und darüber hinaus in weiten Teilen der Ge-
sellschaft  nicht unter Umständen sogar sinnvoll war, weil von ihnen nicht nur 
das Funktionieren des neuen Staates abhing, sondern weil damit auch eine Integ-
rationsleistung erbracht wurde, die anders als in der Weimarer Republik wesent-
lich zur inneren Stabilität der Bundesrepublik beitrug.
Bereits im Parlamentarischen Rat war dafür mit Artikel 131, der die Wie-
dereinstellung der ehemaligen Angehörigen des Öff entlichen Dienstes vorsah, 
die Basis geschaff en worden. Das heißt: Die Wiederverwendung der alten 
Funktionseliten war ein Grundprinzip der politisch-administrativen Gestal-
tung der Bundesrepublik. Diejenigen, die nach 1949 in der Rosenburg am 
Neuaufb au der deutschen Justiz mitwirkten, konnten sich dadurch der Illusion 
hingeben, in einer Welt zu leben, die nicht durch die Erinnerung an eine dunk-
le Vergangenheit beschwert war.31 Tatsächlich wurde auf der Rosenburg über 
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die Vergangenheit off enbar wenig oder gar nicht gesprochen, wie den schrift -
lichen Quellen zu entnehmen ist und wie auch Zeitzeugen bestätigen. Jeder 
wusste vom anderen, aber man behielt das Wissen für sich. Der Philosoph Her-
mann Lübbe hat deshalb von einem „kommunikativen Beschweigen“ der Ver-
gangenheit gesprochen.32 Diesen Vorgang gab es auch auf der Rosenburg. Dass 
dies so war, geschah nicht zufällig. Denn das „Beschweigen“ der Vergangenheit 
war ein Grundanliegen der deutschen Bevölkerung, die sich 1949 nicht als 
Täter, sondern als Opfer sah – als Opfer der alliierten Besatzungspolitik im 
Allgemeinen und der Politik der Entnazifi zierung im Besonderen. Daher sollte 
so schnell wie möglich ein Schlussstrich unter die Vergangenheit gezogen und 
diese dem Vergessen anheim gegeben werden. 
Doch dieser Weg hatte seinen Preis. So kamen nahezu alle Parteigänger des 
NS-Regimes, sogar diejenigen, die schlimmste Verbrechen begangen hatten, 
ohne oder mit nur geringen Strafen davon. An diesem Skandal wirkte, wenn 
man etwa das Einführungsgesetz von 1968 betrachtet, das Bundesjustizminis-
terium in Gestalt von Referatsleiter Eduard Dreher in der Abteilung II mit. 
Die von Hubert Rottleuthner 2001 gestellte Frage „Hat Dreher ‚gedreht‘?“ 
kann heute positiv beantwortet werden. Und auch in der Gesetzgebung zeigte 
sich vielfach altes Denken: im Staatsschutzrecht, bei der Reform des Jugend-
strafrechts, bei der Frage der Aufh ebung der Erbgesundheitsurteile oder den 
verbotenen Plänen alter Wehrmachtrichter zur Einführung einer neuen Wehr-
strafgerichtsbarkeit und nicht zuletzt beim sogenannten V-Buch, mit dem un-
ter Umgehung des Parlaments und unter Bruch der Verfassung eine Notstands-
regelung angestrebt wurde. 
Dabei gab es bereits früh erste Hinweise auf die Problematik, die sich damit 
verband. Das Nachrichtenmagazin Der Spiegel und die sogenannten „Braunbü-
cher“ der DDR veröff entlichten die Namen vieler Täter und benannten präzi-
se deren Taten.33 Gänzlich unbeachtet lassen, wie Staatssekretär Walter Strauß 
lange Zeit meinte, konnte man die Vergangenheit damit nicht mehr. Auf einer 
Konferenz der Justizminister des Bundes und der Länder im niedersächsischen 
Bad Harzburg wurde daher Anfang Oktober 1958 die Zentrale Stelle der Lan-
desjustizverwaltungen in Ludwigsburg gegründet, um vor allem im Ausland neu-
em Misstrauen in den demokratischen Aufb au der Bundesrepublik entgegenzu-
wirken. Strauß verfasste allerdings noch am 5. Dezember 1958 vorsorglich einen 
32 H.  Lübbe, Vom Parteigenossen zum Bundesbürger. Über beschwiegene und historisierte 
Vergangenheiten, München 2007, S. 32.
33 Siehe hierzu ausführlich A. Weinke, Die Verfolgung von NS-Tätern im geteilten Deutschland. 
Vergangenheitsbewältigungen 1949–1969 oder Eine deutsch-deutsche Beziehungsgeschichte im 
Kalten Krieg, Paderborn u.a. 2002, S. 76–100. Vgl. auch Miquel, Ahnden oder amnestieren?, S. 23–
81; sowie M. Lemke, Kampagnen gegen Bonn. Die Systemkrise der DDR und die West-Propaganda 
















































Vermerk über die Wiederverwendung von Richtern und Staatsanwälten der na-
tionalsozialistischen Zeit, in dem er erklärte, die Bundesjustizverwaltung habe 
„die Vorwürfe gegen die in ihrem Geschäft sbereich wiederverwendeten früheren 
Richter und Staatsanwälte geprüft “. Es bestehe „kein Anlass zu irgendwelchen 
Maßnahmen“.34
Diese Grundhaltung galt auch für den Umgang mit den Enthüllungen in der 
westdeutschen Presse und aus der DDR und die Behandlung gezielter Strafanzei-
gen gegen Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums. Diese lösten zwar interne Ermittlungen 
seitens der Abteilung Z, insbesondere durch das Personalreferat, aus, doch die 
Vorwürfe wurden durchweg verworfen. Eine wirkliche Prüfung fand gar nicht 
statt. Die betroff ene Person wurde lediglich um eine Stellungnahme gebeten, die 
von einem anderen Ministeriumsmitarbeiter zusammengefasst und ausgewertet 
wurde, der in der Regel selbst belastet war. Negative Konsequenzen ergaben sich 
aus diesen Vorwürfen kaum. Nur in einem Fall (Heinrich Ebersberg) wurde die 
betreff ende Person nicht befördert. Eine weitere Person (Max Merten) wurde 
gebeten, das Ministerium zu verlassen. Im Falle Eduard Drehers mag die NS-Ver-
gangenheit ein Hindernis bei seiner Nicht-Beförderung zum Abteilungsleiter 
gewesen sein; aktenkundig ist diese aber nicht.
Die „zweite Schuld der Deutschen“
Eine Veränderung trat erst allmählich ein. Dazu trugen unterschiedliche Ent-
wicklungen bei, etwa die Urauff ührung des Kinofi lms „Rosen für den Staats-
anwalt“ von Wolfgang Staudte mit Martin Held und Walter Giller in den 
Hauptrollen, in dem 1959 die Problematik der personellen Kontinuität im 
Bereich der Justiz aufgezeigt wurde.35 Fast zeitgleich wurde die vom Sozialisti-
schen Deutschen Studentenbund organisierte Wanderausstellung „Ungesühn-
te Nazijustiz“ eröff net.36 Und im juristischen Raum zeigten – ebenfalls fast 
34 W. Strauß, Vorsorglicher Vermerk zur Wiederverwendung von Richtern und Staatsanwälten 
der nationalsozialistischen Zeit, 5. Dezember 1958, in: BArch Koblenz B 141/50451 Angriff e gegen 
Angehörige der Bundesjustiz wegen ihrer früheren Amtstätigkeit (1933–1945), Materialband 2 
(Betr. Große Anfrage der Fraktion der SPD betr. Fragen der Justizpolitik), Bl. 29.
35 Der Film wurde 1960 gegen den Willen des Bundesinnenministers mit dem Bundesfi lmpreis 
ausgezeichnet. Vgl. Miquel, Ahnden oder amnestieren?, S. 50 f.
36 Siehe hierzu den hektographierten Ausstellungskatalog von W.  Koppel, Ungesühnte 
Nazijustiz. Hundert Urteile klagen ihre Richter an, Karlsruhe 1960. Vgl. ebenfalls G. Oy, 
C.  Schneider, Die Schärfe der Konkretion. Reinhard Strecker, 1968 und der Nationalsozialismus 
in der bundesdeutschen Historiografi e, 2., korr. Aufl ., Münster 2014; S.A. Glienke, Die Ausstellung 
„Ungesühnte Nazijustiz“ (1959–1962). Zur Geschichte der Aufarbeitung nationalsozialistischer 
Justizverbrechen, Baden-Baden 2008; Weinke, Die Verfolgung von NS-Tätern, S. 101–108; sowie 
M. Kohlstruck, Reinhard Strecker – „Darf man seinen Kindern wieder ein Leben in Deutschland 
zumuten?“, in: C. Fröhlich, M. Kohlstruck (Hrsg.), Engagierte Demokraten. Vergangenheitspolitik in 
kritischer Absicht, Münster 1999, S. 185–212. – Anlässlich seines 85. Geburtstags wurde Reinhard 
Strecker für seine Arbeit im Oktober 2015 mit dem Bundesverdienstkreuz ausgezeichnet. „Besser 
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zeitgleich – der Ulmer Einsatzgruppen-Prozess und danach der Eichmann-Pro-
zess in Jerusalem sowie die Auschwitz-Prozesse in Frankfurt am Main, wie groß 
das Problem tatsächlich war, dem man sich nun auch im Bundesjustizministe-
rium nicht länger verschließen konnte. 1965 geschah dann endlich, was schon 
1949 möglich gewesen wäre: die Einführung der Regelanfrage beim Berlin 
Document Center über die Mitgliedschaft  in der NSDAP. Bis 1965 hatte es 
eine solche Regelanfrage nicht gegeben. Erst jetzt, am 15. Februar 1965, sah 
sich Staatssekretär Dr. Arthur Bülow genötigt, dieses Instrument auch für das 
BMJ zu nutzen – allerdings nur bei Neueinstellungen und Beförderungen, 
nicht zur Überprüfung des gesamten Personals.
Mit dem Regierungswechsel zur Großen Koalition 1966 und der Ernennung 
Gustav Heinemanns zum Bundesjustizminister setzte sich dieser Wandel in der 
Beurteilung der NS-Belastung fort. Einen wichtigen Beitrag dazu leistete der 
hessische Generalstaatsanwalt Fritz Bauer, der 1960 mit eigenen Hinweisen die 
Ergreifung Adolf Eichmanns in Argentinien vorantrieb und mit den von ihm 
vorbereiteten drei Auschwitz-Prozessen von 1963 bis 1968 für große öff entli-
che Aufmerksamkeit weit über die Grenzen der Bundesrepublik hinaus sorgte.37 
Dass er seine Erkenntnisse über den Aufenthaltsort von Eichmann nicht den 
deutschen Behörden, sondern dem Leiter der Israel-Mission in Köln, Felix Elie-
ser Shinnar, übermittelte, spricht für sich, da die Versäumnisse der bundesrepub-
likanischen Justiz im Umgang mit NS-Tätern allzu off enkundig waren. 
Der deutsch-jüdische Publizist Ralph Giordano hat deshalb 1987 von einer 
„zweiten Schuld der Deutschen“ gesprochen.38 Diese Schuld wog umso schwe-
rer, als sie vor allem die Berufsgruppe der Juristen selbst betraf, die ihrer beson-
deren Verantwortung, von der eingangs die Rede war, nicht gerecht geworden 
war. Dabei hatte der ehemalige Reichsjustizminister der Weimarer Republik 
und Rechtsphilosoph Gustav Radbruch, der nach der Machtübernahme der 
NSDAP am 30. Januar 1933 als erster deutscher Professor aus dem Staatsdienst 
entlassen worden war, bereits 1946 einen Weg gewiesen, der hätte beschritten 
werden können  – wenn man nur gewollt hätte. Die „Radbruchsche Formel“ 
besagte, dass im Konfl ikt zwischen der Gerechtigkeit und der Rechtssicherheit 
eine Situation eintreten könne, in der „der Widerspruch des positiven Gesetzes 
zur Gerechtigkeit ein so unerträgliches Maß erreicht, dass das Gesetz als ‚unrich-
tiges Recht‘ der Gerechtigkeit zu weichen hat“.39 In Situationen aber, in denen 
Siehe „NS-Justiz-Aufk lärer Reinhard Strecker. Wider die Politik des Vergessens“, in: Tagespiegel 
online, 14. Oktober 2015.
37 Vgl. hierzu vor allem R. Steinke, Fritz Bauer oder Auschwitz vor Gericht. Mit einem Vorwort 
von Andreas Voßkuhle, München 2013, sowie I. Wojak, Fritz Bauer 1903–1968. Eine Biographie, 
München 2009.
38 R. Giordano, Die zweite Schuld oder Von der Last Deutscher zu sein, Hamburg 1987.

















































„Gerechtigkeit nicht einmal erstrebt“ werde, wie es off enbar im Nationalsozialis-
mus der Fall gewesen war, wenn also „die Gleichheit, die den Kern der Gerech-
tigkeit ausmacht, bei der Setzung positiven Rechts bewusst verleugnet“ werde, 
sei „das Gesetz nicht etwa nur ‚unrichtiges Recht‘“. Denn dann, so Radbruch, 
entbehre es „überhaupt der Rechtsnatur“.40 Diese Überlegung, wonach legalisti-
sches Unrecht nicht nur keine Anwendung fi nden darf, sondern – etwa als Ver-
brechen gegen die Menschlichkeit – sogar strafb ewehrt sein kann, bildete nach 
1945 die Grundlage der Nürnberger Prozesse. In der Bundesrepublik nach 1949 
wurde dieser Gedanke aber rasch wieder verdrängt. Stattdessen zog man sich auf 
eine Gesetzesauslegung zurück, die es ermöglichte, dass Straft äter, selbst wenn sie 
schwerste Verbrechen begangen hatten, straff rei davonkamen, weil ihr Unrecht 
legalistisch gedeckt gewesen war.
Der Blick in die Geschichte macht also deutlich, wie wichtig es ist, sich an 
diese Vorgänge zu erinnern und die jüngere deutsche Rechtsgeschichte mehr als 
bisher zu einem Th ema der juristischen Ausbildung zu machen. Gerade weil die 
jüngeren Generationen keine persönliche Erinnerung an die Diktatur mehr ha-
ben – weder an die nationalsozialistische noch an die kommunistische –, muss 
man sie damit konfrontieren. Dieser Auff assung waren auch die Mitglieder im 
Rechtsausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages, der sich im November 2016 mit 
den Erkenntnissen der „Akte Rosenburg“ befasste. Alle Fraktionen waren sich 
dort einig, dass angehende Juristen dazu angehalten werden müssten, nicht nur 
Rechtsanwendung zu lernen, sondern mehr als bisher auch über die rechtsethi-
schen Grundlagen ihres zukünft igen Berufs nachzudenken. Über die Frage, ob 
es dazu einer Ergänzung des Deutschen Richtergesetzes bedarf, mag man strei-
ten. Aber klar ist, dass Juristinnen und Juristen nicht nur Wissen benötigen, um 
ihren verantwortungsvollen Beruf auszuüben, sondern dass sie dabei auch ein 
Gewissen haben sollten. Sie sollten also nicht nur über handwerkliches Können 
verfügen, sondern auch eine ethische Grundhaltung besitzen, die für das Funk-
tionieren eines Rechtsstaates – gerade in schwierigen Zeiten – unverzichtbar ist.
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The Federal Ministry of Justice between 1949 and 1973 and the period 
of national socialism: continuation and a new democratic beginning -
a historical retrospection 
Abstract
Th ere is no such thing in history as “hour zero”. Th is was also the case in Germany aft er 
1945. Th e legacy of the Nazi past had long-term ramifi cations, not only in the fi eld of 
justice. A great deal of personal continuity existed in the courts of law, in the administra-
tion of justice in the Länder and in the Federal Ministry of Justice. Th is aff ected not only 
legislation and jurisprudence, but also the prosecution of Nazi crimes. Th e perpetrators 
of the most serious crimes oft en went unpunished. While admittedly this did not com-
promise the rule of law, it did hamper and delay the reckoning with the Nazi past, which 
has actually continued to date.
Keywords: free democratic system, war crimes, Nazi crimes, Nazi past, Nuremberg trial 
















































The Central Offi  ce between 
Politics and Criminal Law
Approaches by the Allies and in the Federal Republic
Th e international dimension of the crimes committed during the dictatorship 
in Germany since 1933 and during the Second World War from 1939 to 1945 
has led to many diff erent answers: by the Allies in the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg, by numerous foreign states that have punished the 
crimes committed on their territory, by the four occupying powers in Germa-
ny, and fi nally by the Federal Republic of Germany and the (former) German 
Democratic Republic. Th e international approach may be characterized by 
three attributes: Aft er the end of the war, special penal provisions are laid down 
retroactively, specifi cally tailored to state mass crimes, especially crimes against 
humanity. Only for these procedures, a special tribunal is set up, whose staff  
comes from the victorious powers. Th e process is based on a specially created 
procedural code partially restricting the rights of the defense.
Th ere are considerable reservations about this approach in Germany. 
Rather political is the argument of “victors’ justice” – meaning an unfair pro-
cedure by the winners against the losers. A substancial legal objection is that 
the Allied laws apply with retroactive eff ect to crimes committed before the 
rules were passed. In Germany, therefore, the accusation is raised loudly that 
the Allied procedure violates itself an elementary legal principle: “nulla poena 
sine lege”.
As a reaction to “Nuremberg“ but also to the experiences with the abuse 
of criminal law during the dictatorship, the (West-) German constitution up-
holds a  strict prohibition of retroactive penal law. Th ere was also a  political 
motto: “No special law for Nazi perpetrators“. Th is led to a solution that devi-
ated in all three points from the Allies:
(1) the applicable law,
(2) the competence of the general law enforcement authorities, and
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II. The Central Offi  ce between Politics and Criminal Law
1. Applicable law
No special legal basis has been established retroactively for dealing with NS 
crimes: neither crimes against humanity nor genocide. Consequently, Ger-
man courts can only pass judgements in accordance with the provisions of the 
German criminal code – applicable already during the “Th ird Reich”. We have 
to deal with the defi nitions in the code, established for individual acts with 
individual motives: distinguishing for example between murder, homicide in 
particularly aggravated circumstances and manslaughter. Up to now, we apply 
an individual criminal law – the “mass murders by state authority [were] an un-
precedented novelty in history […] to which the penal code was not tailored” 
(Federal Criminal Court, Bundesgerichtshof ).
Recourse to the general criminal law led to the application of the usual 
statutory limitations. Aft er the period of limitation, a crime may no longer be 
punished. For legal reasons, only NS crimes defi ned as murder can be prose-
cuted already since May 1960: a killing for pleasure or out of otherwise base 
motives, by stealth or cruelly. Th e imprescriptibility for murder is the result of 
a broad discussion in German Parliament in 1965, 1969, and 1979 that also 
refl ected the international development: the non-prescription of genocide and 
crimes against humanity. Here again, the German solution is not limited to 
Nazi crimes but applicable to any murder case.
Th ere is no room in criminal legislation for the concept that mere mem-
bership of an agency or unit participating in a crime provides prima facie evi-
dence of culpable conduct. Th at is why members of the national socialist party 
(NSDAP), the paramilitary organisations Schutzstaff el and Sturmabteilung 
(SS and SA), the Secret State Police (GeStaPo) or the armed forces cannot be 
punished only on the basis of that fact. Th e most diffi  cult legal question is: 
Where does personal responsibility begin when the state organizes crimes?
For a long time, the jurisdiction was prevalent: Not everyone who was some-
how integrated into Auschwitz concentration camp is responsible for everything 
that happened in the context of the extermination program. Rather, it must be 
determined how the individual’s behaviour concretely supported the murders.
Not until 2016, the Federal Criminal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) has clari-
fi ed where to draw the line for criminal responsibility in cases of mass crimes, 
organized or tolerated by the state with thousands being involved in the bu-
reaucracy: Today, it is suffi  cient for someone to have kept the murder machine 
running by performing his general duties in a certain function (for example, as 
a guard). Th is is why we could turn our attention to tracking down those who 
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2. Institutions
Th e judicial power is exercised mainly by the courts of the Länder – meaning 
a  decentralized system. Unlike acts of terrorism, there is no competence for 
federal institutions when it comes to Nazi crimes. Th e local public prosecutor’s 
offi  ces and criminal courts are primarily responsible only for crimes conduct-
ed in their district or for perpetrators resided in the respective area. However, 
most of the crimes had been committed outside Western Germany. Oft en, the 
victims did not know the names of the suspects or their whereabouts. Th us, in 
the beginning, no institution seemed competent to deal e.g. with Auschwitz.
Just as the number of procedures had decreased sharply in the mid-fi ft ies, 
the approach in the Federal Republic changed. By chance, there was the so 
called “task force trial“ (Einsatzgruppen-Prozess) in Ulm. For the public and 
for politicians two things became clear: Not all crimes had been investigated. 
And we can no longer leave it to chance to determine whether a crime is pros-
ecuted. An authority was and still is needed fi lling the considerable gap within 
the areas of judicial competence, an authority that would do some preparatory 
work in advance, push and bundle investigations of the public prosecutor’s of-
fi ces and provide support for them.
Th at is why the Ministers of Justice have founded the Central Offi  ce for 
the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes in Ludwigsburg. Th e task of the 
Central Offi  ce is to collect, to scrutinise and to evaluate the whole accessible 
material on NS crimes worldwide. Our main aim is searching for acts limited 
in s pace, time and committed by a certain group of culprits and to determine 
which persons involved into these atrocities can be still prosecuted. As soon as 
the Central Offi  ce has found the group of the perpetrators who are to be pros-
ecuted, the preliminary investigations are closed and the fi les are transferred 
to the prosecutor’s offi  ce in charge. Furthermore, the Central Offi  ce renders 
investigative assistance.
Unfortunately, the Central Offi  ce can neither obtain court decisions nor 
impose coercive measures – like a house search. Instead, we rely on the volun-
tary participation of witnesses, on publicly available sources and on the sup-
port of the police or from abroad by means of legal assistance.
Since 1959 we have seen investigations against about 120.000 defendants 
in Germany. Even if some of these proceedings have not been opened by the 
Central Offi  ce yet, they are in most cases indirectly connected with it.
3. Investigations and Procedures
Since our task is to prepare criminal proceedings, we try to fi nd the means of 
evidence allowed in German courts. A great deal of surprise has been voiced 















































88 Jens Rommel 
as the regards the furnishing of proof. Yet these are the same standards as those 
stipulated in any other criminal trial conducted along constitutional lines in 
order to produce enough evidence to convict someone.
In some of the early Nazi trials, the courts were able to base their verdicts 
on the most convincing proof possible in a criminal case, i.e. a confession by 
the accused. Since the 60ies, this has played no role at all until the recent trials 
of our days.
Another form of evidence usually lacking in Nazi trials – unlike other le-
gal proceedings against crimes of violence – is the local taking of evidence by 
a judge visiting the scene of the crime. In the overwhelming bulk of cases, a lo-
cal inspection was not possible during the Cold war – a fact that is even more 
important when we take into account that most crimes have been commit-
ted on the territory of Poland or the former Soviet Union. Nowadays, most 
scenes of the crimes are accessible – but they can no longer help to ascertain the 
true facts because of changes in property and vegetation. We try to integrate 
modern techniques: Th e conditions in a camp can be illustrated with a mod-
ern 3D-virtual reality-model of Auschwitz; thus, it can also be clarifi ed, what 
a defendant could see from his position.
Compared with other criminal trials, the obstacles encountered in Nazi 
cases are much greater because of the almost complete absence of ”neutral” 
witnesses. Most of the series of murders were carried out under conditions of 
great secrecy and with the virtual exclusion of third parties. Th e armchair cul-
prit, making his decisions on life or death for hundreds or thousands of peo-
ple far away from the actual scene of the crime, remained unknown by name 
and appearance to the victims. By contrast, the “physically involved culprits“, 
who were hardly ever individually named on documents relating to the crime 
because of their mostly subordinate duties and low rank, can as a rule only be 
convicted on the strength of witnesses’ testimony. Th e number of witnesses 
available for the Nazi trials has been decreasing since WW II. To the losses 
from death and illness must be added the reluctance and exhaustion of wit-
nesses from among the victims – especially those who have emigrated to North 
America or Israel. Experts have largely taken their place. Historians or mili-
tary historians, in particular, are teaching us about the state of research, general 
events, chains of command, or constraints in the dictatorship.
In addition to the experts, documents have been the most important ev-
idence, especially in the past for “armchair culprits”. Today, they also have 
gained signifi cance for the immediate helpers/aider/abettors on the crime 
scene, because each piece of the puzzle can give an indication to the general 
service of, for example, a guard in a concentration camp. Many documents have 
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war or have been inaccessible for decades in foreign archives. Staff  members 
of the Central Offi  ce who until 1964 were forbidden by the federal govern-
ment making trips to Eastern Europe, received permits in this period of the 
Cold War in the second half of the 60s and spent over several weeks in Polish 
and Czechoslovak archives as well in the Soviet Central Archives in Moscow. 
Aft er the changes in the former Eastern bloc, the Central Offi  ce has gained 
access to large parts of the archive material. Soon aft er German reunifi cation, 
the Central Offi  ce looked through the NS-Archive in the “Ministry of State 
Security”, access to which had been refused for so many years by the authorities 
of the German Democratic Republic. Since many years, the Central Offi  ce has 
been cooperating with similar authorities from abroad, which also deal with 
NS crimes, especially with the Commission for the Prosecution of the Crimes 
against the Polish nation.
Our main diffi  culty is the passage of time since the deeds. In more than two 
generations, the evidence has deteriorated in every way. Th e accused have also 
aged or died in the meantime. Nowadays, the defendants are between 92 and 
99 years of age. Our task is not to collect historical knowledge but to further 
criminal investigation: Th erefore, we can conduct proceedings only if the ac-
cused is still alive and as long as he is fi t to stand trial.
Importance
Despite all diffi  culties, we will continue our eff orts to investigate murder 
crimes of the Nazi-regime for some more years. Preliminary proceedings of 
public prosecutor’s offi  ces and single trials as the current Stutthof-case in Ham-
burg demonstrate the importance of these eff orts.
For survivors or members of family it is oft en very important and it remains 
a remembrance that such acts will be prosecuted until the end. Th is gives both 
sides the opportunity to tell their stories: both, the defendant and the victims 
(or their relatives) are heard by the current German state. We have to accept the 
fact, that the mass crimes of the former German state were only possible with 
the participation of thousands in the Nazi death machine and that they should 
therefore share responsibility.
“Too late, too lenient, too few” – that’s how we might sum up the reaction 
to national socialist crimes by means of criminal law. It is an arduous learning 
process within the judiciary and in the post-war society in Germany. Th e inves-
tigations and trials on national socialist crimes are only an attempt. Despite all 
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Abstract
Th e key note deals with the laborious learning process in German post-war justice and 
society. Unlike the Allies, the Federal Republic of Germany had not issued any spe-
cial criminal regulations for dealing with National Socialist crimes. Th is gave rise to 
considerable diffi  culties in the application of the national criminal law, which is tai-
lored for the assessment of individual guilt but reaches its limits with the assessment 
of state-organized mass crimes. Th e general rules on the jurisdiction of investigative 
authorities and courts have been found unsuitable for the mass crimes committed 
outside Germany. Since 1958, the Central Offi  ce of the state judicial administrations 
for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes has helped to remedy the situation. 
Signifi cant diffi  culties remained in proving facts, not only due to the behaviour of the 
perpetrators and the events of the war, but also due to constraints during the Cold War. 
Th e main diffi  culty today is the time since the deeds and the age of those involved.
Keywords: National Socialist crimes, German post-war justice, the Central Offi  ce for 



















































“Polish Death Camps” as an “Opinion” 




1. Th e issue discussed below in detail is focused on the recent German judgment 
of Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) further: “BGH” of 19th July 2018 
(IX ZB 10/18)1 and the preceding Polish judgment of the Court of Appeal (Sąd 
Apelacyjny, SA) in Cracow of 22nd December 2016.2 Both rulings are results of 
court civil proceedings against the German television station Zweites Deutsches 
Fernsehen (ZDF) initiated by a civil lawsuit of a Polish inhabitant, a former pris-
oner of the Konzentration Lager Auschwitz (ie. the German Nazi concentration 
1 BGH 19 Juli 2018, IX ZB 10/18, http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/
document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=pm&Datum=2018-8&nr=86838&linked=bes&Blank=1&fi 
le=dokument.pdf (accessed 20.01.2021), further: the judgment of German Court of 2018. Th e 
remedy (Anhörungsrüge) was examined by BGH 11 Oktober 2018 http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.
de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&sid=edd5d2bd1470278f2
e359680eff 737f7&nr=88961&pos=0&anz=3 (accessed 20.01.2021). See the fi rst comments: 
P.  Mostowik, E. Figura-Góralczyk, ‘Odmowa wykonania polskiego orzeczenia z  powodu ob-
cego ordre public. Glosa do Wyroku Niemieckiego Federalnego Sądu Najwyższego (Bundesge-
richtshof ) z  19 lipca 2018  r. (IX ZB 10/18)’, Problemy Współczesnego Prawa Międzynarodowe-
go, Europejskiego i  Porównawczego, 2019, vol.  XVII, pp.  294–307, https://europeistyka.uj.edu.
pl/documents/3458728/143239918/P.Mostowik%26E.Figura_PWPM+2019.pdf (accessed 
20.01.2021).
2 Sąd Apelacyjny w Krakowie 22 grudnia 2016 [Court of Appeal in Cracow 22 December 
2016], I  ACa 1080/16, http://orzeczenia.krakow.sa.gov.pl/content/$N/152000000000503_I_
ACa_001080_2016_Uz_2016-12-22_001 (accessed 20.01.2021), further: the judgment of Pol-
ish Court of 2016. Th e fi rst instance of the case was ruled by Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie 25 kwiet-

















































92 Piotr Mostowik, Edyta Figura-Góralczyk
camp located near the Polish town of Oświęcim during the World War II). Th e 
recognition of this judgment was not blocked by the state immunity, which 
sometimes happens to proceedings concerning this period.3
Th e demand concerned the prohibition to publish and spread in any way 
the following notion published in Internet by ZDF: “Polish concentration or 
extermination camp (and its translations into several languages) which had been 
used in the text published on the Internet website in order to describe German 
concentration camps and German camps located during World War II in the 
occupied Poland”, as well as the demand of order to publish the statement with 
the specifi c content of apology in various media.4
In the sentence of the judgment of Polish Court of 2016, the defendant was 
ordered to apologize the plaintiff  by publication on the Internet website (and 
maintain it for a period of one month), on the main page, in German, in the 
frame, in the bold font at its own expense of the following statement: “Zweites 
Deutsches Fernsehen, the publisher of the Internet portal, regrets the appearance 
on 15 July 2013 on the www.zdf.de portal in the article (…) the expression which 
is the untrue and falsifying history of the Polish nation, suggesting that the death 
camps of Majdanek and Auschwitz were built and run by Poles, and it apologizes 
Karol Tendera, who was imprisoned in a German concentration camp, for violat-
ing his personality rights, in particular his national identity (sense of belonging 
to the Polish nation) and his national dignity”.
Whereas the judgment of German Federal Court of Justice of 2018 – that 
de facto neutralized the obligation to express regret and offi  cially apologize for 
the historical falsehood – was pronounced in the course of the proceedings 
for the recognition and declaration of enforcement in Germany of the judg-
ment of another EU Member State, i.e. the judgment of the Polish court. Such 
a declaration of enforcement is usually granted almost automatically under the 
Brussels I Regulation5 according to the principle stipulated in articles 33 para 
3 See: S. Vrellis, ‘Th e World War II Distomo Massacre of Greek Civilians by German Armed 
Forces and the Right to Eff ective Judicial Protection’, in: Permanent Bureau of the HCCH (ed.), 
A Commitment to Private International Law: Essays in honour of Hans van Loon, Hague 2013, 
pp. 637–640.
4 See fi rst section of the grounds of the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie 25 kwietnia 2016, http://
orzeczenia.krakow.so.gov.pl/content/$N/152010000000503_I_C_000151_2014_Uz_2016-
04-25_001 (accessed 20.01.2021).
5 Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in civil and commercial matters, data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/44/2013-07-09, 
further: “Brussels I Regulation”. Instead of Brussels I Regulation to legal proceedings instituted, to 
authentic instruments formally drawn up or registered and to court settlements approved or con-
cluded on or aft er 10 January 2015 shall apply the Regulation 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
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1, 38 para 1 and 45 of this Regulation.6 One of the “only grounds” provides for 
in Article 34 Brussels I Regulation is so called public policy (orde public) clause 
which has the following wording: “A judgment shall not be recognised: 1. if 
such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member State 
in which recognition is sought”.7
In the presented case the exequatur (declaration of enforceability of the 
judgment obliging to abandon spreading the falsehood) was not granted in 
Germany. According to the sentence of the judgment of Bundesgerichtshof of 
19th July 2018 (IX ZB 10/18): “Th e applicant’s claim to issue an enforcement 
clause to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Cracow of 22nd December 
2016 is dismissed. Th e costs of the proceedings are borne by the applicant. 
Th e amount of costs is set at € 4,000”.8 
2. Th e subject matter of further remarks is several important legal issues regard-
ing this specifi c case of the protection of personality rights that arise in connec-
tion with the abovementioned circumstances. Further analysis includes also gen-
eral assessment of the court rulings from the perspective of “judicial cooperation 
in civil and commercial matters” within the European Union and of the interna-
tional law standards. Particularly important to the authors of the text is the issue 
of international private law and international civil procedure in cross-border cas-
es concerning infringement of personality rights.9
6 Article 33.1. “A judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised in the other Mem-
ber States without any special procedure being required.” Article 38.1. “A  judgment given in 
a Member State and enforceable in that State shall be enforced in another Member State when, 
on the application of any interested party, it has been declared enforceable there.” Article 45 1. 
“Th e court with which an appeal is lodged under Article 43 or Article 44 shall refuse or revoke 
a declaration of enforceability only on one of the grounds specifi ed in Articles 34 and 35. It shall 
give its decision without delay. 2. Under no circumstances may the foreign judgment be reviewed 
as to its substance.”
7 See more on the recognition provided for in Article 33 as the rule  – P.  Wautelet, in: 
U. Magnus, P. Mankowski (eds.), Brussels I Regulation, Sellier 2007, pp. 547–554. On the public 
order clause and refusal to recognize the foreign judgment under article 34 – see S. Franco, in: 
U. Magnus, P. Mankowski (eds.), Brussels, pp. 565–579.
8 “Der Antrag des Antragstellers, das Urteil des Appellationsgerichts Krakau, Polen, vom 
22. Dezember 2016 – IACa 1080/16 – mit der Vollstreckungsklausel zu versehen, wird abge-
wiesen. Der Antragsteller trägt die Kosten des Verfahrens. Der Wert des Verfahrens wird auf 
4.000 € festgesetzt.”
9 Th e subject matter of the case (the apology for violation of personality rights) is excluded 
from the scope of Regulation 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations (Rome II), data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2007/864/oj, further: “Rome II Regulation” – see 
A. Dickinson, Th e Rome II Regulation: Th e Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations Updat-
ing Supplement, Oxford Private International Law Series, Oxford 2008, pp. 238–240 – this causes 
only that the court ruling on the case applies the confl ict law rules of the forum (of the national 
origin), and not the rules unifi ed internationally. See also C.I. Nagy, ‘Th e Word is a Dangerous 
Weapon: Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Personality Rights in the EU Law – Missed and New 
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Th e court cases should in particular be seen from the perspective of the 
confl ict of law rules of private international law as well as norms on jurisdiction 
and, above all, the unifi ed in EU rules on the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments (international civil procedure). Th ese rules have recently 
been subject to the unifi cation process in the Member States.10 Th e uniform 
regional rules on national jurisdiction and mutual recognition of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters were the result of the entry into force of the 
1968 Brussels Convention11 and in the last years they emerged in provisions of 
secondary law of EU (called Brussels Regulations). Th e EU legal instruments, 
as well as the existing solutions of national law and international agreements, 
including those established under the auspices of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, allow – rather exceptionally – not to accept on own 
territory the eff ects of a judgment issued in another Member State.12
3. Th e more general context, i.e. the issues of falsifying the history of II World 
War and the Holocaust, as well as current political issues – although important 
from a broader perspective – do not in principle fall within the framework of 
these remarks. However it is worth mentioning that the territory of Poland 
during the II World War was occupied by Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. 
Th e last one at that time organized in this territory an extermination system 
of “concentration camps” (Konzentrationslager) and “annihilation camps” 
(Vernichtungslager).13 Th e second ones were in fact not camps but the areas 
of continual executions of transported victims. A huge number of the human 
victims of the camps, particularly in “death camps”, were persons of Jewish or-
igin. Th ey were both citizens of pre-war Poland and persons transported there 
from other European countries occupied by Nazi Germany and their allies.14 
10 See: Judicial cooperation in civil matters exists between EU countries in order to improve in-
teroperability between their judicial systems, https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_cooperation_in_
civil_matters-75-en.do (accessed 20.01.2021).
11 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and com-
mercial matters of 27.9.1968 (consolidated version), eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A41968A0927%2801%29 (accessed 20.01.2021).
12 Th e eff ects of considering the foreign laws as statuta odiosa are presented by I. Th oma, Die 
Europäisierung und die Vergemeinschaft ung des nationalen ordre public, Tübingen 2007, p. 4–16.
13 In fact the second term adopted in German (Vernichtungslager) and copied in other languag-
es is not precise, because there were in fact no camps but places of constant executions (the people 
were not accommodated but murdered immediately aft er arrival). Th e few becamped there persons 
were mainly voluntary or coerced executors.
14 Th e offi  cial Polish government report on war damages prepared in 1947 estimated Po-
land’s casualties of war at circa 5 million, including over 3 million Polish citizens of Jew na-
tionality and 2 million ethnic Poles. Additionally, millions of foreign Jews were also murdered 
at the Polish territory occupied by German Nazis, in particular in death camps like Treblinka 
or Birkenau. See also data presented in materials of United States Holocaust Memorial Muse-
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Additionally the German occupiers attempted but failed to organize a collab-
orative Polish government which would cooperate with the Nazis, which was 
a phenomenon and an exception on a European scale. It’s also worth mention-
ing that during the World War II only on the territory of occupied Poland 
there was a ban on help of the persecuted Jewish persons under the death pen-
alty.15 It seems that these are important reasons why a great deal of sensitivity 
can be observed in contemporary Poland in recent decades aimed at coun-
teracting the falsifi cation of history by using the word ‘Polish’ in context and 
connection to events related to crimes planned and organized by the invaders 
during the war on the territory of occupied Poland called “Generalgouverne-
ment for the occupied Polish territory” (Generalgouvernement für die besetzten 
polnischen Gebiete).16 Despite this the untrue expression “Polish death camps” 
was presented several times in mass media in the last decade17. Th anks to the 
sending of educational historical explanations to the authors of such unfortu-
nate statements, they were usually offi  cially corrected (e.g. by American NBC 
reporter).18
students/learning-materials-and-resources/poles-victims-of-the-nazi-era/polish-resistance-
and-conclusions (accessed 20.01.2021). See more: R.C. Lukas, Forgotten Holocaust: Poles Under 
German Occupation, 1939–44, Hippocrene Books, 2001, p. 31 et seq.; M. Gniazdowski, ‘Losses 
Infl icted on Poland by Germany during World War II. Assessments and Estimates—an Outline’, 
Th e Polish Quarterly of International Aff airs, 2007, no. 1, pp. 94–126, available in Central and 
Eastern European Online Library www.ceeol.com. See also catalogue of victims and losses at: 
http://www.aan.gov.pl/delegaturaRP/ (accessed 20.01.2021).
15 See for example the context of execution of the whole Polish Ulma family hiding the 
Jewish Family: https://muzeumulmow.pl/en/museum/history-of-the-ulma-family/ (accessed 
20.01.2021).
16 For example, an information campaign launched inter alia via Twitter: #GermanDeath-
Camps. An example of support from the World Jewish Congress may be the following message: 
https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/wjc-president-ronald-s-lauder-demands-msnbc-
retract-false-characterization-of-warsaw-ghetto-uprising-2-4-2019 (accessed 20.01.2021).
17 As far as the need and grounds – see: I. Lewandowska-Malec, ‘Względy aksjologiczne i tele-
ologiczne polityki historycznej w świetle problemu „polskich obozów śmierci”’, in: Prawda histo-
ryczna a odpowiedzialność prawna za jej negowanie lub zniekształcanie, eds. A. Radwan, M. Berent, 
Warszawa 2019, s. 69.
18 For example correction were made by the following media (FOX TV, Netfl ix): https://
twitter.com/foxandfriends/status/1031953153984540672?lang=en (accessed 20.01.2021), 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2152166/Obama-makes-Holocaust-gaffe-




history (accessed 20.01.2021). See also BBC news: Netfl ix to amend Devil Next Door series aft er 
Poland complaint, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50431823 (accessed 20.01.2021). 
See also: S. Topa, L. Obara, ‘Dobra osobiste a wypowiedzi o „polskich obozach”. Dlaczego nie-
prawdziwe wypowiedzi o obozach zagłady wywołują poczucie krzywdy?’, in: Prawda historyczna a 
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The judgment of Polish Court ordering to apologize 
for the publication of the expression “Polish concentration camps” 
which falsifi es a history
Th e discussed judgments have their origin in the publication on 15th July 2013 
on the website of ZDF announcement of the documentary fi lm “Verschollene 
Filmschätze 1945. Die Befreiung der Konzentrationslager”19 in which the ex-
pression “Polish extermination camps of Majdanek and Auschwitz” (polnische 
Vernichtungslager Majdanek und Auschwitz) was misused. Th e Polish Embassy 
in Germany intervened in this matter on 19th July 2013, which caused that on 
the same day ZDF corrected this wording in the following way: “German exter-
mination camps of Majdanek and Auschwitz on the Polish territory” (deutsche 
Vernichtungslager auf dem polnischem Gebiet Majdanek und Auschwitz).
Also on 19th July 2013 the plenipotentiary of Karol Tendera, a former pris-
oner of Auschwitz concentration camp during the World War II, sent a mes-
sage to ZDF in which he requested that the term “Polish extermination camps” 
should be removed from the website www.zdf.de and demanded to publish 
an apology in German and Polish language on the abovementioned portal 
and in the press, as well as to pay for the social organization the amount of 
50,000 PLN.
In the message of 31st July 2013 ZDF apologized individually Karol Tende-
ra for the expression “Polish extermination camps” and expressed regrets. Th en 
next messages were sent in August 2013 and the publisher indicated who bears 
the editorial responsibility for this mistake and the TV-station ARTE (which 
provided the wrong expression to ZDF) apologized for this situation.
Th e prisoner of German Nazi was not satisfi ed by this partial reaction and 
fi led a lawsuit against ZDF in 2014 to the District Court in Cracow. Karol Ten-
dera indicated violation of his personality rights. On the day before the fi rst hear-
ing at the District Court in Cracow, i.e. on 11th April 2016, ZDF posted on its 
Internet portal information that in July 2013 on their website, in the announce-
ment of the program, the false expression “Polish extermination camps” was mis-
takenly used, despite it concerned of course “German extermination camps in oc-
cupied Poland”. Th is information also included apology for mistake, but – what 
was important for the plaintiff  – it was not addressed directly to Karol Tendera.20 
19 Translation into English language: “Lost Movie Treasures of 1945. Liberation of concentra-
tion camp”.
20 Th e apologies had general character and the following wording: “As we have already stated, 
we regret this inattentive, untrue and incorrect wording and we apologize all those who feel hurt by 
it in their feelings.” (“Wie bereits seinerzeit zum Ausdruck gebracht, bedauern wir diese unachtsame, 
falsche und irrtümliche Formulierung und bitten alle Menschen, die sich dadurch in ihren Gefühlen 
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Th e court of the fi rst instance dismissed the lawsuit, not because of the merits but 
because of the specifi city of Polish extra-contractual obligations law.21 However 
the court of second instance changed this ruling. Court of Appeal in Cracow in 
the abovementioned judgment of 22nd December 2016 partially supported the 
plaintiff ’s lawsuit. When the case was in front of Court of Appeal in Cracow, 
Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich [Polish Ombudsman] joined the case and eff ec-
tively supported the plaintiff .22
Finally the Polish Court in judgment of 2016 ordered the defendant to apol-
ogize individually the plaintiff  in the following way defi ned in detail: by posting 
in German language, on the website www.zdf.de on the main page, in a frame, 
with the bold font, size of 14 points and on their own cost (and maintaining it for 
a period of one month) the following statement: “Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, 
the publisher of the Internet portal, regrets the appearance on 15 July 2013 on 
the www.zdf.de portal in the article ‘Verschollene Filmschtäze. 1945. Die Befrei-
ung der Konzentrationslager’ the expression which is the untrue and falsifying 
history of the Polish Nation, suggesting that the death camps of Majdanek and 
Auschwitz were built and run by Poles, and it apologizes Karol Tendera, who was 
imprisoned in a German concentration camp, for violating his personality rights, 
in particular his national identity (sense of belonging to the Polish Nation) and 
his national dignity”. Th e court stated that in this case there was an infringement 
of the personality rights23 of plaintiff  and the hitherto apology do not fulfi l the 
adequacy requirement in relation to the infringement. From the point of view 
of the court in order to fulfi l the adequacy requirement the apology should ful-
fi l among others two criteria: be personal and take place on the internet portal 
where the violation occurred.24
21 Th e Court accepted that the actions necessary to remove the eff ects of infringement of the 
plaintiff ’s personality rights were fulfi lled by the defendant. See justifi cation of the Sąd Okręgowy 
w  Krakowie 25 kwietnia 2016, orzeczenia.krakow.so.gov.pl/content/$N/152010000000503_I
_C_000151_2014_Uz_2016-04-25_001 (accessed 20.01.2021).
22 Th e Arguments of Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich [the Polish Ombudsman] in the fi le en-
titled: Naruszenie dóbr osobistych przez stosowanie określenia „polskie obozy śmierci” – argumenty 
prawne RPO, rpo.gov.pl.
23 Th e legitimacy of including the truth in the catalog of personality goods is indicated by 
J. Mazurkiewicz, ‘Do diabła z prawdą! Kłamstwo medialne jako naruszenie dobra osobistego praw-
dy’, in: M. Łaszewska-Hellriegel, M. Skibińska (eds.), Dobra osobiste w prawie cywilnym, prasowym 
i karnym, Acta Iuridica Lebusana, vol. 8, Zielona Góra 2018, p. 13.
24 ZDF fi led cassation complaint to Polish Supreme Court against the judgment of Court of 
Appeal in Cracow of 2016 and the defendant’s cassation complaint which has been accepted for ex-
amination (III CSK 156/17, 30.01.19, www.sn.pl.). Th e hearing was scheduled for 25th September 
2019. However, just before this date ZDF withdrew its cassation complaint. In fact the judgment 
of Polish Supreme Court would not aff ect the discussed issue of the enforcement in Germany of – 
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German orde public as the ground for refusing by Bundesgerichtshof 
(German Federal Court of Justice) to enforce the judgment of Polish Court
Th e judgment of Polish Court of 2016 was on the 22nd December 2016 en-
forceable and subject to enforcement in accordance with the Brussels I Reg-
ulation. Th erefore, ZDF published a statement on its website and maintained 
it for a period from 23rd December 2016 to 23rd January 2017. However, ac-
cording to the plaintiff , it was not in accordance with the details of the judg-
ment of the Polish Court. Th erefore, the actor fi led a motion for declaration of 
enforcement of this judgment in Germany, i.e. the country of residence (seat) 
of the defendant (ZDF).
Th e next stages of procedure took place in Germany aft er fi ling the motion 
of the declaration of enforcement of the judgment of Polish Court of 2016 (for 
granting the enforcement clause). Th e Regional Court in Mainz (Landesgericht 
Mainz) granted such a clause on 27th January 2017 but ZDF appealed against 
this judgment. Th e Higher Regional Court in Koblenz (Oberlandesgericht Ko-
blenz) also confi rmed the enforcement of the Polish judgment in Germany on 
11th January 2018. Th is court stated that: “Th e defendant, what he does not 
deny himself, confi rmed that he was using the phrase ‘Polish extermination 
camps’ which is an untrue fact. An incorrect statement of fact is not subject to 
the protection of the fundamental right under Art. 5 sec. 1 sentence 1 GG”.25 It 
is worth additional noting here that German substantive penal law forbids both 
the negation of the Holocaust and the approval, negation and underestimation 
of all acts committed in the period of the national-socialist regime in the sense 
of § 6 sec. 1 of German International Criminal Code (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch)26 
according to §  130 sec. 3 German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch).27 Th e 
Higher Regional Court in Koblenz ruled that the enforcement of a  Polish 
judgment in Germany would not imply a violation of the freedom of speech 
25 „Die Antragsgegnerin habe, was sie selbst nicht in Abrede stelle, mit der Formulierung ‘pol-
nische Vernichtungslager’ eine unrichtige Tatsache behauptet. Eine unrichtige Tatsachenbehaup-
tung unterfälle nicht dem Schutz des Grundrechts aus Art. 5 Abs. 1 Satz 1 GG” (BGH 19 Juli 
2018, footnote 1, p. 7). Bundesverfassungsgericht states that the denial of the Holocaust is not pro-
tected by freedom of thought and expression, guaranteed in Art. 5 sec. 1 of the German Constitu-
tion. See: BVerfG 13 April 1994, 1 BvR 23/94, openjur.de/u/183443.html (accessed 20.01.2021).
26 Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, www.gesetze-im-internet.de/vstgb/BJNR225410002.html (ac-
cessed 20.01.2021).
27 Strafgesetzbuch, www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/. Moreover according to German sub-
stantive law one of the conditions of applying §  130 para. 4 StGB is a  violation of the dignity 
of people who were victims of the national socialist regime. See more, opinion written by P. Ka-
pusta, Odpowiedzialność karna za negowanie zbrodni przeciwko ludzkości oraz naruszenie godno-
ści narodu w  systemach prawnych wybranych państw – Niemcy, Austria oraz Liechtenstein, Insty-
tut Wymiaru Sprawiedliwości, Warszawa 2018, pp.  4, 11–12, https://iws.gov.pl/wp-content/
uploads/2018/08/IWS_Kapusta-P._Odpowiedzialno%C5%9B%C4%87-karna-za-negowanie-
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as ZDF argued, because the term “Polish extermination camps” is a statement 
of a false fact which is excluded from the protection provided by art. 5 sec. 1 
sentence. 1 of the German Constitution. Th erefore the ascertainment of the 
infringement of the plaintiff ’s personality rights in the judgment of Court of 
Appeal in Cracow does not violate the German Constitution. 
Th e German defendant (ZDF) was unsatisfi ed with these judgments of Ger-
man courts and submitted the remedy in this case to Federal Court of Justice 
(Bundesgerichtshof) and applied for revocation of the abovementioned judg-
ments of the internal courts and refusal to declare the enforcement of the judg-
ment Polish Court. According to the abovementioned judgment of 19 July 2018 
Bundesgerichtshof dismissed the motion for the declaration of enforceability of 
the judgment of Polish Court of 22nd December 2016, referring to an obvious 
violation of German public order and “freedom of opinion” (Meinungsfr eiheit) 
which is the “constitutional right” (Grundrecht). 
Bundesgerichtshof stated in a generally formulated thesis in particular that: 
“Th e enforcement of a judgment by which the convicted television broadcast-
er is obliged to apologize for falsifi cation of history contained in a statement 
[Majdanek and Auschwitz Polish Extermination Camps] existing in the opin-
ion of the court of the sentencing State and for infringement of personality 
rights existing in this case in the opinion of the court of the sentencing State, 
clearly infringes the fundamental right to negative freedom of expression and 
German public policy”.28 
German Federal Court of Justice not only revoked the judgment of the 
Higher Regional Court in Koblenz (OLG Koblenz) of 11th January 2018 and 
the judgment of the Regional Court in Mainz (LG Mainz) of 27th January 
2017. Moreover, the court charged the applicant with the costs of proceedings 
in the amount of 4,000 Euro.29 BGH indicated as the legal basis for the ruling 
Art. 34 point 1 Brussels I and art. 5 sec. 1 of the German Constitution which 
are to be discussed in the following part.
The questionable grounds of judgment of Bundesgerichtshof
1. Th e detailed commentary on the grounds of the abovementioned judgments 
should begin from the issues of international private law and international civil 
28 “Die Vollstreckung eines Urteils, welches der verurteilten Fernsehanstalt aufgibt, eine nach 
Ansicht des Gerichts des Urteilsstaats in einer Äußerung [polnische Vernichtungslager Majdanek 
und Auschwitz – EFG PM] enthaltene Geschichtsverfälschung zu bedauern und sich für eine nach 
Ansicht des Gerichts des Urteilsstaats hierin zu sehende Persönlichkeitsrechtsverletzung zu ent-
schuldigen, verstößt off enkundig gegen das Grundrecht auf negative Meinungsfreiheit und gegen 
den deutschen ordre public.”
29 Th e amount of 4 thousand. € is a large sum from the Polish perspective, as it is 8 times more 
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proceedings. Th e provisions of international civil proceedings have been uni-
fi ed in Germany and Poland (in the EU). It resulted on the basis of Lugano 
Convention of 198830 and next the Brussels I Regulation that applied in this 
case as the lawsuit was fi led to the court on 2014 and what was confi rmed by 
the judgment of BGH. 
Private law cases concerning the infringement of personality rights fall within 
the scope of the Brussels I Regulation which has been applied in relation to the 
issue of recognition and declaration of enforcement of the discussed judgment of 
the Polish Court of 2016 in Germany. Brussels I Regulation provides as a rule – 
based on mutual trust between EU Member States – the principle of recognition 
and declaration of enforceability of judgments among these countries.31 On the 
basis of this normative act, as well as the Brussels I bis Regulation which replaced 
it, the “blocking” role may be exercised by the public order (orde public) clause. 
More specifi cally – by the possibility of non-enforcement of a foreign judgment 
if its eff ects would be incompatible with the fundamental principles of the legal 
order of the state in which the motion for the enforcement of a judgment from 
another country is fi led.32 Additionally, in this case BGH applied the German 
provisions of the Act on the recognition and enforcement33 and the provisions of 
the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung34).
However in relation to the confl ict-of-law rules concerning infringement of 
personality rights the unifi cation of the legal status in the region has not taken 
place. As to the applicable law, the legal status has not been harmonized in the Eu-
ropean Union under the “Rome II” Regulation. It is true that in the draft  of this 
Regulation the appropriate provisions have been found.35 But they were removed 
30 Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters; Offi  cial Journal of the European Union of 21.12.2007, data.europa.eu/eli/
convention/2007/712/oj (accessed 20.01.2021).
31 Compare e.g. relations between China and Japan on the basis of the case of Nanjing Mas-
sacre. See the judgment of Court in Tokio of 20th March 2015, Westlaw Japan (Ref. no.  2015 
WLJPCA 03208001). See also Q. He, Y. Wang, ‘Resolving the Dilemma of Judgment Reciprocity. 
From a Sino-Japanese Model to a Sino-Singaporean Model’, Yearbook of Private International Law, 
2017–2018, vol. 19, p. 90, footnote 39.
32 See M. Frigo, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments on Matters Relating to Personali-
ty Rights and the Recast Proposal of the Brussels I Regulation’, in: F. Pocar, I. Viarengo, F.C. Villata, 
Recasting Brussels I, Padova CEDAM, 2012, pp. 341–350.
33 Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsausführungsgesetz, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
avag_2001/ (accessed 20.01.2021). 
34 Zivilprozessordnung, www.gesetze-im-internet.de/zpo/ (accessed 20.01.2021).
35 See: A. Dickinson, Th e Rome II, pp. 23–61; P. Mankowski in: U. Magnus, P. Mankowski 
(eds.), Rome II Regulation, Verlag Dr Otto Schmidt, 2019, pp. 11–25. See also additional content 
at www.romeii.eu. See more D. Wallis, Rome II – A Parliamentary Tale, pp. 1–7; see more A. Scott, 
Th e Scope Of ‘Non-Contractual Obligations’, in: W. Binchy, J. Ahern, Th e Rome II Regulation on the 
Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations. A New International Litigation Regime, Martinus 















































101“Polish Death Camps” as an “Opinion” of which Expressing is Protected by German Law?  
at a later stage of legislative procedure.36 Th us the defamation and violation of 
personality rights have been excluded (exclusion but de facto – non-inclusion) 
from the scope of application of “Rome II” Regulation.37 Th is means that the 
courts of each EU Member State apply national confl ict-of-law rules concerning 
the personality rights.
2. From the point of view of BGH, the refusal of recognition and enforcement 
of the foreign judgment in Germany is justifi ed by the exception provided for in 
Article 45 sec. 1 sentence 1 in conj. with art. 34 point 1 of the Brussels I Regula-
tion due to the fact that the implementation of the judgment of Polish Court of 
2016 would obviously violate the orde public of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
BGH referred to the judgment of the German lower court instance (the Higher 
Regional Court in Koblenz) and questioned its thesis that the term “Polish exter-
mination camps” is a statement of a false fact that is excluded from the protection 
of freedom of speech and opinion, as stipulated in art. 5 section 1 sentence 1 of 
the German Constitution, and thus that the ascertainment in the judgment of 
Polish court of 2016 that there have been the violations of personality rights does 
not violate the German Constitution. BGH did not agree with this justifi cation, 
stating that the subject of the examination in the case of a declaration of enforce-
ment is not the question of examination of the falseness of the expression “Polish 
extermination camps” but of the statement which the defendant was obliged to 
pronounce according to the judgment of the Polish Court of 2016.
Bundesgerichtshof expressed this last thought in the following way: “On the 
contrary, the subject of the legal examination in the procedure of the declaration 
of enforcement is rather solely the declaration for which the court of the sen-
tencing state has sentenced the defendant. Th e defendant is sentenced to adopt 
and publish as its own the opinion that the Polish court has got from defendat’s 
statement. Th is clearly infringes the fundamental right of the defendant under 
Article 5 sec. 1 GG”.38 From the BGH’s point of view, the defendant was obliged 
36 A. Dickinson observed that “During the consultation process, representatives of the broad-
cast print media proved a powerful lobby group, with many openly advocating application of the 
so called ‘country of origin’ principle. Th ere was overt hostility from media representatives to the 
rules on defamation and privacy postulated by the Commission (…).” See: A. Dickinson, Th e Rome 
II, p. 234. Similarly P. Mankowski in: Rome II, pp. 115–116, stresses “It [Art. 6 of Commission’s 
Proposal COM 2003/427] almost immediately met fi erce opposition and received a  decided-
ly negative reception from broadcasters and newspapers throughout Europe. (…) Th e political 
instances were unable to agree on anything positively. Hence, they agreed to disagree and resorted 
to excluding the matter from the scope of Rome II Regulation.”
37 See A. Dickinson, Th e Rome II, pp. 234–224; P. Mankowski in: Rome II, pp. 11–25. On 
substantive scope of application – see also A. Halfmeier in: G.-P. Calliess (ed.), Rome Regulations: 
Commentary, Wolters Kluwer, 2nd ed., 2015, pp. 857–863.
38 “Gegenstand der rechtlichen Prüfung im Rahmen der Vollstreckbarkeitserklärung ist 
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to accept and submit in public as his own the statement that is an assessment 
(Bewertung) made by the Polish court what obviously violates the fundamental 
right resulting from art. 5 sec. 1 of the German Constitution.
3. It is partly necessary to agree with the formal arguments of this justifi cation. 
Bundesgerichtshof precisely states that in accordance with art. 45 sec. 1 sentence 
1 in conj. from art. 34 point 1 Brussels I, it is possible to refuse to recognize or 
enforce the judgment because of the national public order. In order to apply the 
public order clause, it is necessary that the eff ect of the application of foreign law 
in a specifi c case violates the basic principles of the law of the state of execution 
and the sense of justice (Gerechtigkeitsvorstellung) that takes eff ect in that state, to 
such a great extent that this violation precludes the statement of enforcement.39 
Moreover, Bundesgerichtshof rightly emphasized that in the light of the Brussels 
I Regulation, the violation of these basic principles must be manifest.40 
It is worth adding that the possibility of referring to this clause and the refusal 
to recognize or enforce a judgment due to its negative potential eff ects concerns 
essentially the substantive law issues. In the analysed case, the Bundesgerichtshof 
did not invoke any procedural issues against the quality of proceedings in Po-
land, but BHG referred to the merits of the court’s judgment and its consequenc-
es. Such a possibility is also provided for in the Brussels I Regulation, because the 
clause has also a substantive law side.41 But it must be seen as an exception to the 
principle that when declaring the enforcement of a foreign judgment, the court 
of the executing state does not carry out substantive law control.42
4. On the other hand, it is hard to agree with the arguments that do not refer 
to the merits (i.e. the expressing of “Polish death camps” and the question of 
correction of the statement and apology), but create a specifi c “redirect” argu-
mentation not on the claimant’s relationship with the defendant but directed 
de facto against the sentence of the Polish court judgment, and indirectly – as 
Antragsgegnerin verurteilt hat. Die Antragsgegnerin ist dazu verurteilt worden, die Bewertung, 
die ihre Erklärung durch das polnische Gericht erfahren hat, als eigene Meinung zu übernehmen 
und zu veröff entlichen. Dies verstößt off enkundig gegen das Grundrecht der Antragsgegnerin aus 
Art. 5 Abs. 1 GG.” (BGH 19 Juli 2018, footnote 1, p. 10).
39 BGH 19 Juli 2018, footnote 1, pp. 8–9.
40 BGH 19 Juli 2018, footnote 1, p. 9.
41 S. Francq, in: Brussels, p. 579 rightly indicates that it is not only procedural public policy 
(in particular, the infringement of the rights of the defense) but pp. 568–573 “substantive public 
policy”, that is de facto the substantive assessment, and more specifi cally its eff ects from the per-
spective of the fundamental principles of substantive law of the forum.
42 Additional arguments are presented by A. Nowicka, ‘Wykonywanie orzeczeń sądów pol-
skich w sprawach cywilnych w państwach członkowskich Unii Europejskiej, z uwzględnieniem 
ewentualności powołania się przez sądy zagraniczne na klauzulę porządku publicznego’, in: Prawda 
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it seems  – against his tenure. Th is happened by redirecting discourse from 
personality rights to the sentence of the Polish court judgment and applying 
a highly complicated and “sublime” interpretation of the principle of freedom 
of opinion, raised to the rank of “German public order”, as a result of which 
BGH refused to recognize and declare the Polish judgment enforceable in the 
territory of Germany as “obviously contradictory” to this order with reference 
to art. 34 point 1 Brussels I. 
From the point of view presented obiter dicta by Bundesgerichtshof, it is the 
judgment of the Polish Court of 2016 that violates the negative freedom of 
expressing opinion (negative Meinungsfr eiheit), i.e. the right not to have one’s 
own opinion, not pronouncing one’s opinion, to silence, and not being able to 
compel another person to express someone else’s opinion as one’s own. BGH 
states that the impossibility of examining whether a given statement (in this 
case the sentence of a judgment) expresses truth or falsehood (the impossibil-
ity of falsifying a given statement) makes it an opinion (Meinungsäußerung, 
Werturteil).43
Th e main objections are raised by this step of the Bundesgerichtshof’s argu-
mentation, which causes that correcting the statement of a false historical fact is 
changed into the category of “opinion” (Meinung), with which category of the 
freedom of speech and opinion is later bound, and then the protection of this 
principle in the German Constitution and its blocking eff ect on the execution 
of the Polish judgment. From the point of view of BGH the statement which 
content of was formulated by Court of Appeal in Cracow is the expressing of the 
opinion (Meinungsäußerung).44 In the grounds of the judgment BGH states that: 
“Th e description of a – also not coherently reproduced – program announce-
ment as a falsifi cation of history and as a violation of the personality rights of 
a former concentration camp prisoner is the result of a judgmental consideration, 
but not a fact whose truth could be verifi ed”.45 Bundesgerichtshof emphasizes also 
that the defendant would have to join the abovementioned opinion and make 
it public as its own , as it is excluded in this case to indicate that the statement 
results from the judgment of the Polish court.46
Th us, the negative freedom of expressing the defendant’s opinion would be vi-
olated if Polish judgment is enforced. At the same time, Bundesgerichtshof omits 
in this part of explanations that freedom of expression has its limits, resulting e.g. 
43 BGH 19 Juli 2018, footnote 1, pp. 10–11.
44 BGH 19 Juli 2018, footnote 1, p. 11.
45 “Die Umschreibung einer  – zudem nicht zusammenhängend wiedergegebenen  – Pro-
grammankündigung als Geschichtsverfälschung und als Verletzung des Persönlichkeitsrechts eines 
ehemaligen KZ-Häft lings ist das Ergebnis einer wertenden Betrachtung, nicht jedoch eine Tat-
sache, deren Wahrheitsgehalt überprüft  werden könnte.” (BGH 19 Juli 2018, footnote 1, p. 12).
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from the protection of the individual’s personality rights.47 However it refers to 
the case law of the German Constitutional Court according to which the change 
of opinion can not be demanded.48 In this case, the defendant would be forced 
to regret and apologize as part of joining the “opinion” (Meinung) of the Polish 
Court of 2016 regarding “Polish extermination camps”. It’s also worth mention-
ing that by comparing the judgment of Polish Court to the “opinion” in fact its 
sentence was evaluated by BGH. 
However it’s hard not to object to the fact that the adjective “Polish” is a de-
nial of facts, and not just expressing an “opinion”. But in the summary of this part 
Bundesgerichtshof draws the conclusion that this case “(…) concerns the question 
of whether the defendant can be obliged to take over a foreign opinion. If the ob-
ligation to express one’s own opinion violates the negative freedom of expression 
under Article 5 (1) of German Constitution, that is certainly the case with the 
obligation to publish a described assessment as one’s own opinion”.49 
5. In the following part BGH de facto assesses the relationship of the fault to 
the obligations imposed by the Polish court. Bundesgerichtshof claims that the 
erroneous expression “Polish” camps did not trigger sensation in 2013 and the 
defendant has not used once again such term any more, and that the wording 
was detached from the entire text of the announcement and the program itself. 
In the opinion of BGH, it is diffi  cult to suspect the defendant that using the 
abovementioned term he believed that the concentration camps of Majdanek 
and Auschwitz, located on the territory of the current Poland, were the work of 
Poles. Such a conclusion is only a valuation, subjective opinion of the Court of 
Appeal in Cracow which the defendant does not have to share and make pub-
lic as his own opinion, because it would violate the right to freedom of speech 
(freedom of expression and media freedom) guaranteed by Article 5 sec. 1 of the 
German Constitution.
47 However, BGH at the beginning of the discussion on art. 5 of the German Constitution 
among the limits of freedom of expression in accordance with Art. 5 sec. 2 of the German Consti-
tution lists the right to the protection of honor (Recht der persönlichen Ehre). (BGH 19 Juli 2018, 
footnote 1, p. 10). Regarding the protection of dignity in the German Constitution, see F. Rak-
iewicz, Poczucie tożsamości narodowej jako dobro osobiste. Studium cywilnoprawne, not published 
doctoral theses wrote under auspicies of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, 2017, p. 69, note 
263 and the literature given there.
48 E.g.: Bundesverfassungsgericht 02 Mai 2018, 1 BvR 666/17, ECLI:DE:BVerf-
G:2018:rk20180502.1bvr066617.
49 “Es geht um die Frage, ob die Antragsgegnerin zur Übernahme einer fremden Meinung ver-
pfl ichtet werden kann. Wenn schon die Pfl icht zur Abgabe einer eigenen Stellungnahme gegen 
die negative Meinungsfreiheit aus Art. 5 Abs. 1 GG verstößt, gilt dies erst recht für die Pfl icht, 
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In addition to the abovementioned argumentation, Bundesgerichtshof argues 
that the declaration of enforcement of the judgment of Court of Appeal in Cra-
cow violates the constitutional principle of proportionality (Verhältnismäßig-
keitsgrundsatz). BGH presents appropriate and adequate measures to restore the 
lawful state. It states that the obligation of the press or television to make the 
correction public is an infringement of their rights under Article 5 sec 1 of the 
German Constitution and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights,50 according to which the media decide how and what they inform.
It seems that at this point Bundesgerichtshof again de facto paid little atten-
tion to the important issue of the scope and “borders”, which were given by 
the international legislator to the notion of “freedom of speech”, “freedom of 
opinion” and “freedom of expression”.51 It is stressed that freedom of expres-
sion is of considerable importance but remains a conditional freedom. In par-
ticular, freedom of the press is of cardinal importance in a democratic society, 
but is not unlimited. Publishing some expressions or statements may render 
the person concerned civilly liable or even criminally punished in the case of 
defamation or insulting language.52
In the subsequent fragments Bundesgerichtshof continues the substan-
tive evaluation of the judgment of Polish Court of 2016 in the scope of the 
principle of proportionality. BGH states that the term “Polish concentra-
tion camps” (while erroneously referring to “concentration” camps, although 
the expression contained the word “extermination” or “death” camps, which 
is not a  synonym) could be seen only for four days on the website and 
50 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature in Rome on 4 November 1950, www.echr.coe.int/pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts, fur-
ther as ‘ECHR’. See about violation of personality rights such as national identity in judgments 
of Polish courts and European Court of Human Rights in: M. Brzozowska-Pasieka, ‘Legityma-
cja czynna osób fi zycznych i prawnych w sprawach o naruszenie prawa do tożsamości narodowej. 
Przegląd orzecznictwa polskiego z uwzględnieniem orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw 
Człowieka’, Monitor Prawniczy, 2019, no. 22, p. 1239 et.
51 It is worth to remind the wording of the Article 10 ECHR, which concerns the freedom of 
expression: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. Th is right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public au-
thority and regardless of frontiers. Th is Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing 
of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. Th e exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the pro-
tection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received 
in confi dence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
52 ECtHR, 29 March 2001, Th oma v. Luxembourg, Reports 2001-III. See: Introduction to 
the European Convention on Human Rights Th e rights guaranteed and the protection mechanism, 
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immediately aft er the intervention of the Polish Embassy has been corrected. 
BGH mentions also that it resulted from inaccurate translation and the de-
fendant made public on its website a statement to which he had been obliged 
by the judgment of Polish Court of 2016, in a  way that only the plaintiff  
considered to be incorrect. Additionally, Bundesgerichtshof indicates that the 
declaration of enforcement of this judgment would violate Article 5 sec. 1 of 
the German Constitution, because the ordered way of announcing the state-
ment (too long period of making the statement public, the size of the font, 
its thickness and the frame) is neither necessary nor rational to repair the 
infringement of the plaintiff ’s personality rights.
Th e latter arguments for the reasoning of Bundesgerichtshof judgment is in 
fact – generally excluded by Brussels I Regulation – the substantive review of the 
judgment of Polish Court of 2016. Th e evaluation regarding merits although – 
as BGH stated in the grounds of its judgment – the court of the executing State 
does not in principle have such powers in accordance with EU law. According 
to Article 45 para 2 Brussels I Regulation: “under no circumstances may the 
foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance”.53 Additionally under Article 
36 Brussels I Regulation: “Under no circumstances may a foreign judgment be 
reviewed as to its substance”.54 Of course, the application of the public order 
clause, which the Brussels I Regulation introduces, creates a certain opportuni-
ty to assess the judgment from the substantive law’s perspective of the state of 
enforcement. Article 34 (1) Brussels I Regulation states that “foreign judgment 
shall not be recognised if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public pol-
icy in the Member State in which recognition is sought.” Such formal reason-
ing – regardless of whether it raises doubts – could be undoubtedly presented 
by Bundesgerichtshof regarding the broad approach to freedom of expression 
and the “assessment” for which the wording of the sentence of the Polish judg-
ment was treated. Although the substantive perspective of such ruling may be 
evaluated as questionable.
6. Th e application of the orde public clause means in fact that the local court takes 
into account substantive rules of legis fori that express the fundamental principles 
of a certain state. Th ey can be interpreted not only from national constitutions 
and prescriptions, but also from international conventions and EU law (ie. from 
all legal sources in a given system of law). Th e local court compares with them the 
substantive eff ect of a foreign judgment. Since there are no EU principles of sub-
stantive private law (and we should rather not aim at them in the face of current 
extreme diff erences of Member States e.g. concerning property law and family 
53 See: K. Kerameus, in: Brussels I, pp. 667–669.
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law). Th ere is no EU substantive law standard on personality rights that could be 
a pattern to the application of the clause and which misuse could be raised as part 
of EU legislative measures.55 A diff erent approach could cause that also in other 
cases concerning the refusal of recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment 
based on a clause (eg. refusal of recognition in Poland of a foreign judgment on 
the civil status and fi liation of a child from persons of the same sex, possible in 
some Member States), EU institutions and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union would feel competent to assess whether the national understanding of ba-
sic principles of legal order (orde public) is in line with EU law, despite of the fact 
that there is neither EU substantive private law nor it can be adopted due to the 
lack of European Union’s competence. At the same time, however, one can get 
the impression that the essence of the matter is not only substantive private law 
and that the issue of freedom of speech, freedom of expression and falsifi cation of 
reporting of history can also be seen in an area other than “judicial cooperation in 
civil and commercial matters” (that means “technical” confl ict-of-law rules and 
international civil procedure) and than in the area of uniform EU substantive 
legal standards. Aft er all, restrictions on media freedom are the domain of public 
law, and this in turn is (should be) the core of the European Union’s activity. 
According to Art. 2 Treaty on European Union, a preamble to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and its Article 1 European Union 
law is based, among others, on the value of protecting the human dignity.56 
One might wonder whether the discussed German judgment should not be 
accused of an infringement of the Brussels I Regulation but of other more gener-
al principles of international public law, including United Nations and Council 
of Europe standards.57 A part of doctrine expressed even the view that at least in 
the area of non-violation of human dignity Art. 1 of the Charter of Fundamental 
55 S. Francq, in: Brussels I, p. 579. Th e reference about the role of ECJ in shaping the “Com-
munity (union) orde public”. However, this observation can not be overestimated and referred 
to this case because there is no EU competence in the scope of substantive law, and therefore the 
ECJ will not have the opportunity and competence to create such standards when interpreting 
EU provisions. It is worth mentioning that in the case of Krombach concerned other problem, 
namely not controlling of jurisdiction by way of extending the clause provision. See however Euro-
pean Parliament resolution on remembrance of the Holocaust, anti-semitism and racism from 27th 
January 2005, P6_TA(2005)0018, www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2005-0018+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (accessed 20.01.2021).
56 See more F. Rakiewicz, Poczucie tożsamości (PhD thesis available in library of Law Faculty 
of University of Poznań), p. 69; F. Rakiewicz, ‘Poczucie tożsamości narodowej jako dobro osobiste 
w świetle polskiego prawa cywilnego. Część druga’, Studia Prawa Prywatnego, 2011, 3–4, p. 89. 
See also A. Radwan, ‘Między negacjonizmem a dyfamacją. Ustawodawca jako moderator dyskusji 
o przeszłości’, in: Prawda historyczna a odpowiedzialność…, op. cit., p. 111.
57 See legal instruments of public international law relevant to the protection of personality 
rights in: F. Rakiewicz, Poczucie tożsamości (not published PhD thesis), p. 23, note 26 and the lit-
erature given there. See about private enforcement in personality rights protection in A. Radwan, 
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Rights of the European Union will cause horizontal eff ects, i.e. it will aff ect the 
sphere of civil law relations.58 Th e European Parliament has recognized the his-
torical truth about the Holocaust as deserving of protection.59 A similar need was 
noticed at the UN forum.60 Th e UN forum would also be an appropriate place 
to express the position that the extermination camps organized by Germany is 
a fact (such as the Holocaust), and speaking diff erently (e.g. Polish extermina-
tion camps) is not expressing opinions (and exercising freedom of expression and 
freedom of speech) ), but indirectly negating history. Also the legislation of the 
Council of Europe seems to be appropriate forum to question the abovemen-
tioned understanding of German public order. Mr. Karol Tendera not only did 
not get him due (more broadly – Polish Nation) satisfaction, but he was also 
“punished” with legal costs in the amount of EUR 4,000. Additionally, the future 
practical eff ect of the BGH’s judgment in Germany may be that the broadcasters 
there will feel more free to express similar “opinions” about “Polish death camps”. 
One can even express the view that the law of Council of Europe precludes 
such understanding of freedom of expression and freedom of speech, and that 
grounds presented by Bundesgerichtshof in 2018 are contrary to the ECHR, in 
particular the limits of Art.  10 ECHR.  Th e Convention certainly introduces 
restrictions on the exercise of the freedom provided for in Article 10 sec 1. by 
imposing obligations in sec. 2, consisting of the duty to practice reliable journal-
ism61. Th e principle which results form those provisions is that the media should 
not use the opportunity to declare the false statements as legal. In fact to such 
eff ects leads lack of enforcement of the judgment of Polish Court of 2016 on 
German territory.
Final remarks
1. Th e commented Bundesgerichtshof’s judgement of 2018 presents a completely 
diff erent interpretation of German law than the rulings of lower instances (ie. 
Landesgericht Mainz and Oberlandesgericht Koblenz). It concerns primarily the 
58 See L. Bosek, ‘Ochrona godności człowieka w prawie Unii Europejskiej a konstytucyjne gra-
nice przekazywania kompetencji państwa’, Przegląd Sejmowy, 2008, no. 2, pp. 66 et seq.
59 European Parliament resolution on remembrance of the Holocaust, anti-semitism and 
racism from 27th January 2005, P6_TA(2005)0018, www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2005-0018+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (accessed 
20.01.2021).
60 Resolution of General Assembly of 26 October 2005, Holocaust remembrance, Sixtieth ses-
sion, Agenda item 72, A/60/L.12, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/60/L.12 
(accessed 20.01.2021).
61 See more, L. Garlicki, in: L. Garlicki (ed.), Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podsta-
wowych Wolności. Komentarz do artykułów 1–18, vol. 1, Warszawa 2010, pp. 599 et seq; L. Garlicki, 
‘Wolność wypowiedzi dziennikarza – przywileje i odpowiedzialność’, Europejski Przegląd Sądowy, 
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enforcement of foreign judgments in the mode of EU law (rules on “judicial co-
operation in civil and commercial matters”). In the Brussels I Regulation, as in 
most of legal instruments in the fi eld of international law private law and inter-
national civil procedure, orde public clause is stipulated. Th is exceptional legal 
institution allows not to recognize or enforce (although the general principle of 
the normative act is diff erent) a foreign judgment, if it could give eff ect that is 
manifestly contradictory to local, fundamental principles of the given legal sys-
tem. Bearing this in mind, there is the formal possibility of applying public order 
clause in Germany, because it is expressly provided for in the provisions of EU 
law. As discussed above, the doctrine emphasizes the need for strict interpreta-
tion of the provisions on the clause.62 It is postulated de lege ferenda that even the 
remaining requirements necessary for the mutual recognition and enforcement 
of judgments between Member States should be restricted.63 However, there can 
be no doubt that under current rules of “judicial co-operation in civil and com-
mercial matters” every Member State has the possibility to refuse to recognize 
or enforce a foreign judgment because of the contradiction of its eff ects with the 
fundamental principles of local legal order, including procedural or substantive 
ones. Th e jurisprudence and doctrine accurately notes that such a possibility is 
necessary, and the legal system in which such an institution would not be provid-
ed for would be like “a vehicle without brakes”.64
Th e need for the existence of such an exceptional clause, even for use in re-
lations between Member States of one international organization, is justifi ed by 
progressive diff erences in legal systems (e.g. in family matters – growing in recent 
years), and the necessity to safeguard the legal order of a given state against the 
adverse consequences of a foreign judgment that may be in future issued on the 
basis of foreign law in a form that cannot be predicted (and thus acceptable in 
advance through the lack of such a mechanism).Th e clause is expressly provid-
ed for in the Brussels I Regulation in Article 34 (1). Th e clause may be applied 
62 See more S. Francq, in: Brussels I, p. 568 narrow interpretation, the infringement should be 
manifest.
63 For even easier “fl ow” of the eff ects of judgments between EU countries than it is in the Brus-
sels I Regulation, and thus the narrow scope of application of the clause and such direction of EU 
legislative works – see A. Frąckowiak-Adamska, ‘Time for a European “full faith and credit clause”’, 
Common Market Law Review, 2015, 52, Issue 1, pp. 191–218. Th e discussed judgment is however 
the proof of a reverse tendency, i.e. that the Member States generally need the “safety valve” or “de-
fensive shield”. A separate issue is whether the conditions for the application of the clause occurred 
in the discussed case what was questioned above.
64 See: K. Siehr, ‘Kollisionen des Kollisionsrechts’, in: D. Baetge, J. v. Hein, M. v. Hinden (eds.), 
Die richtige Ordnung. Festschrift  für Jan Kropholler zum 70. Geburtstag, Die richtige Ordnung. Fest-
schrift  für Jan Kropholler zum 70. Geburtstag, Tübingen 2008, p. 223; see also H.J. Sonnenberger, 
‘Wandlungen und Perspektiven des familienrechtlichen ordre public’, in: R.  Freitag, S.  Leible, 
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and – additionally – substantive civil law is outside the scope of EU and CJEU 
competences. In particular, the civil liability for defamation and infringement 
of personality rights is diff erently regulated in EU Member States. Formally, 
therefore, it is diffi  cult to accuse the BGH’s judgment of directly aff ecting EU 
law. It can be assumed that the decision of BGH cannot be accused of violating 
EU “judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters” which includes the 
technical issues of applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments, and also contains a provision expressly allowing not to recognize or 
enforce a judgment from another Member State. 
2. Incidentally, it should be noted that proceedings in the case resolved by the 
discussed judgments cannot be concerned by  – appearing in the internation-
al forum in 2018 – allegations against judicial reforms in Poland, because the 
judgment of the Polish Court comes from 2016. Th e questioned changes came 
into force in the middle of the year 2018, and the judgment of the Polish Court 
comes from the proceedings which fi nished in December 2016.
3. However, objections to Bundesgerichtshof judgment of 2018 may arise above 
all from the reasoning that led to the application of the public order clause and 
the refusal to enforce the judgment of Polish Court of 2016 on the infringe-
ment of personality rights. Th ere is also some controversies on basis of merit 
(substantive law) over the abovementioned national understanding of freedom 
of expression and, consequently, the implied recognition of historical falsifi ca-
tion (of “Polish death camps”) as an opinion. Certainly, it is not easy to agree 
with the arguments of BGH, which recognizes the content of the judgment 
of the Polish Court of 2016 for “opinion” (Meinungsäußerung, Werturteil). 
Th e notion of opinion adopted by BGH means that any correction ordered 
by a foreign court could not be put into the press or television, because such 
information is by nature not falsifi able, and consequently each of them would 
violate the freedom of speech.
4. It could be added that, if for example the massacre committed in 1937 in Nan-
jing by Japanese invaders were now called “Chinese crimes”, with remark that this 
regards current geographical location, the demand for correction and apology 
would not give rise to doubts similar to those presented in the justifi cation of the 
commented judgment.65
Additional doubts may also arise from the fact that the plaintiff , whom the 
court of another EU Member State considered to be right, was charged with costs 
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of €4,000 for an application of declaration of enforcement in another Member 
State. Probably a possibility to reduce or waive such costs (which – taking into 
account the enforceable judgement from another EU state and the claimant’s 
person  – are disproportionate) could be interpreted from the international 
standards and the German procedural rules.
5. Summarizing, taking into consideration the international law, the Bundes-
gerichtshof judgment of 2018 can be evaluated as correct only for some some 
formal legal reasons. It provokes to critical comments, at least as far as its fair-
ness, substantive aspects, including the EU cooperation in civil matters, and 
the principles of Council of Europe are concerned. Th e commented judgment 
defi nitely raises doubts from the perspective of international law, including the 
achievements of the United Nations and Council of Europe system (including 
the limits of freedoms), and may raise doubts from perspective of European 
Union (including the costs on the access to justice). Th e issues of the content 
of publications in the media and falsifying history and restrictions on freedom 
of speech are not of “pure” private law character, that are in principle beyond 
competences of EU institutions. It seems that they are partly (at least – indi-
rectly) concerned by EU provisions of public law character. Th e important role 
of international agreements in the fi eld of human rights protection concluded 
by EU Member States, also before the accession and with third states, should 
be taken into consideration.66 It is also possible to present the thesis that the 
discussed approach makes ineffi  cient access to justice in European Union and 
generates unnecessary costs. Additionally Bundesgerichtshof presented a ques-
tionable (even from the perspective German courts of 1st and 2nd instance) un-
derstanding of freedom of expression and speech, without taking into consid-
eration its limits provided in Art. 10 para 2 ECHR.
Postscriptum to “Polish Death Camps” as an “Opinion” 
of which Expressing is Protected by German Law? 
Questionable Bundesgerichtshof’s Judgment of 19.7.2018
Th e case law from 2016-2018 discussed in the text is related to two events that 
took place at the beginning of 2021. Th ey require more detailed presentation, 
but at this point it is worth to inform about them.
Firstly. another proceeding, also concerning the expression of ‘Polish camps’, 
before Appeal Court in Warsaw has been recently suspended because of the 
66 On the international treaties with third parties versus EU legal system – see: T. Hartley, Th e 
Foundations of European Union Law, 8th  edition, Oxford 2014, pp.  193–200. Declaration that 
Article 65 of Treaty on European Union does not limit the application of the constitutional rules 
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preliminary question to CJEU67. Th is question concerns the grounds of jurisdic-
tion of Polish courts in cases concerning violation of personality rights by means 
of an online publication. In opinion of ECJ Advocate General Bobek delivered on 
23 February 2021 the jurisdiction of Polish courts was confi rmed in such cases68.
Secondly, in recent judgment of Court of Appeal in Cracow of 2021, the 
same defendant – ZDF and additionally UFA Fiction (both the producers of 
the TV series) have  been obliged to apology World Union of Home Army Sol-
diers for infringement of personal rights by identifying the Polish partisan unit in 
the above-mentioned series as a part of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa)69. Th e 
apology should be broadcasted in Polish public tv channel and in three German 
tv channels, where the series was shown, and presented on the internet websites 
of defendants. Th is judgment of 2021, in general similar to abovementioned 
judgment of 2016, was based on the infringement of personality rights and in-
cludes the duty to offi  cially apologize for this infringement.
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Abstract
Th e article covers the analysis of the judgment of German Supreme Court (Bundesgeri-
chtshof), further: BGH of 19 July 2018 (IX ZB 10/18). BGH dismissed the motion for 
the declaration of enforcement of the judgment of Polish Court of Appeal in Cracow 
of 22nd December 2016 by invoking German public order clause. Th e case concerned 
infringement of personality rights of the former prisoner of the Auschwitz concentra-
tion camp during World War II by the publication on 15th July 2013 on the website of 
Zweites Deutches Fernsehen the announcement of the documentary fi lm “Verschollene 















































115“Polish Death Camps” as an “Opinion” of which Expressing is Protected by German Law?  
“Polish extermination camps of Majdanek and Auschwitz” was incorrectly used instead 
of the expression “Nazi (or German) extermination camps of Majdanek and Auschwitz”. 
Th e basis for the analysed judgment of BGH was the obvious violation of German public 
order under Article 34 (1) and Article 45 (1) Brussels I EU Regulation and “freedom of 
opinion” which is the constitutional right regulated in Article 5 Sec. 1 Sentence 1 of the 
German Constitution. Th e analysis concerns the evaluation of the judgment of BGH 
from the perspective of private international law and additionally from the point of view 
of public international law. 
Keywords: limits of freedom of expression, infringement of personality rights, ordre 

















































“Polish camps…” in the context of amendment 
of the Law on the Institute of National Remembrance – 
Commission of Prosecution of Crimes Against 
the Polish Nation of 26 January 2018
The “Polish camps…” issue
Th e Second World War was a  disgraceful period of world history. Poland 
played a unique role in this confl ict as it was the fi rst country to be attacked 
by Nazi Germany and then for almost six years occupied by the Th ird Ger-
man Reich. Poland suff ered the greatest material and population losses per 
the number of people inhabiting countries fi ghting against Hitler’s Germany 
and its coalition members.1 As historians point out, around 6 million Polish 
citizens of various nationalities died as a result of the Second World War, of 
whom only around 644,000 were war casualties; the remainder were victims 
of extermination operations.2 Over one million Polish nationals are estimat-
ed to have been exterminated in concentration camps. 9 concentration camps 
were in operation in the occupied Poland: Auschwitz-Birkenau, Bełżec, Groß-
Rosen, Kulmhof, Majdanek, Sobibor, Stutthof, Treblinka, and Warszawa. Be-
sides, over 60 concentration camps operated in territories occupied by the Nazi 
Germans in 20 countries. Located in Reich-occupied Poland, the above death 
camps are among the most readily recognisable death camps in operation dur-
ing Th e Second World War. Th eir uniqueness lies in the fact that they claimed 
the highest death toll in history. Th e creators of this death machine, which 
claimed millions of victims of diff erent nationalities, were functionaries of the 
Th ird German Reich. It is worth emphasising at this point that the only ele-
ment connecting these camps with Poland was their location on the territory 
of occupied Poland. 
1 J. Fajkowski, J. Religa, Zbrodnie hitlerowskie na wsi polskiej 1939–1945, Warszawa 1981, p. 5.
2 See e.g.  W. Grabowski, ‘Raport. Straty ludzkie poniesione przez Polskę w latach 1939–1945’, 
in: T.  Szarota, W. Materski, Polska 1939–1945. Straty osobowe i ofi ary represji pod dwiema okupa-
















































117“Polish camps…” in the context of amendment of the Law on the Institute
Numerous foreign media publications, as well as statements by leading for-
eign politicians, repeatedly used so-called defective codes of memory3 such as 
e.g.: “Polish death camps”, “Polish concentration camps”, “Polish Holocaust”, 
“polnische Vernichtungslager”, “polnische Häuser des Todes”, “lager polacco”, “cam-
po di sterminio polacco”, etc.4 Th e phrases were published by reputable world 
media outlets, such as e.g. Th e New York Times,5 Th e Guardian,6 ABC News 
and CBS News,7 Corriere della Sera8 and Der Spiegel.9 Th e term “Polish death 
camp” was on 29 May 2012 used by US President B. Obama during the cere-
mony of a posthumous decoration of J. Karski with the Presidential Medal of 
Freedom.10
Trying to establish when the above defective codes of memory were used for 
the fi rst time, one should take a step back and return to the Second World War. 
In October 1944, the US Collier’s weekly published an article titled “Polish 
death camp”.11 Th e phrase appeared in the text written by the emissary of the 
Government of the Polish Underground State, J. R. Kozielewski, also known 
as J. Karski. Originally, the article was to be titled “In the Belzec Death Camp”, 
yet ultimately the title was changed by the editors of the weekly. 
3 A. Nowak-Far, ‘Wstęp: Wadliwe kody pamięci we współczesnym świecie’, in: A. Nowak-Far, 
Ł. Zamęcki (eds.), Wadliwe kody pamięci. Zniekształcenie pamięci o zbrodniach międzynarodowych 
w dyskursie publicznym, Warszawa 2015, pp. 9–15.
4 See  e.g.: ‘Amerykańscy dziennikarze o „polskich obozach”’, Nasz Dziennik, 18–19.04.2009, 
no.  91 (341 2), http://stary.naszdziennik.pl/index.php?typ=sw&dat=20090418&id=sw23.txt 
(accessed 18.10.2019); ‘Włoska agencja prasowa napisała o Auschwitz “polski obóz”’, Polskie Ra-
dio, 20.10.2013, https://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/960053,Wloska-agencja-prasowa-
napisala-o-Auschwitz-polski-oboz (accessed 27.10.2019); ‘Niemcy przepraszają. Za „polski obóz 
zagłady”’, Polskie Radio, 19.02.2013, https://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/785009,Niemcy-
przepraszaja-Za-polski-oboz-zaglady (accessed 27.10.2019).
5  N. Siegal, ‘Beyond Anne Frank: Th e Dutch Tell Th eir Full Holocaust Story’, Th e New York 
Times, 17.07.2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/18/world/europe/beyond-anne-frank-
the-dutch-tell-their-full-holocaust-story.html?_r=0 (accessed 28.10.2019).
6 ‘Th ree suspected former Auschwitz guards arrested in Germany’, Th e Guardian, 20.02.2014, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/20/germany-auschwitz-guards-arrests-raids (ac-
cessed 28.10.2019). 
7 ‘„Polskie obozy śmierci” w  amerykańskich telewizjach’, TVN 24, 17.04.2009, https://
tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/polskie-obozy-smierci-w-amerykanskich-telewizjach,92719.
html?h=1f3a (accessed 2.11.2019).
8  P. Di Stefano, ‘A Sobibór il ciondolo di Karoline la nuova Anna Frank’, Corriere della Sera, 
19.01.2017, https://www.corriere.it/esteri/17_gennaio_20/a-sobibor-ciondolo-karoline-nuova-
anna-frank-51dd1630-de82-11e6-93cd-d08bed2f6059.shtml (accessed 2.11.2019).
9 G. Bönisch, A.  Frohn, ‘“Schweinhunde” willkomen’, Der Spiegel, 13/2006, 27.03.2006, 
https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46421511.html (accessed 2.11.2019).
10 ‘Obama o  Karskim i  „polskim obozie śmierci”’, TVN24, 30.05.2012, https://tvn24.pl/
wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/obama-o-karskim-i-polskim-obozie-smierci,254518.html?h=1b40 (ac-
cessed 2.11.2019).
11 J. Karski, ‘Polish Death Camps. In the Nazi slaughter pens, a patriot witnessed mass torture 
















































118 Adam Strzelec 
Photo no. 1. Hand-written change of the title on the typescript of J. Karski’s article. 
Crowell-Collier Publishing Company. Manuscripts and Archives Division. Th e New 
York Public Library. Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations.12
Th e article was one of the chapters of J. Karski’s books Courier fr om Poland: 
Th e Story of a Secret State, scheduled to be published in November 1944. Today 
we can only conjecture that the reason the title of the article was changed was 
that the editors of Collier’s weekly were afraid that the title originally used by 
J. Karski, “In the Belzec Death Camp”, would not rivet the attention of Amer-
ican readers, most of whom were unfamiliar with the location of the town of 
Bełżec. It is diffi  cult to say whether attracting the readers’ attention was to 
show the world the tragedy of the Nazi death camps operating in occupied 
Poland, or whether it was to boost the promotion of the book, to be published 
less than a month aft er the article. It can be assumed that the editor’s use of the 
phrase “Polish death camp” in the title of the J. Karski article was only intend-
ed to indicate the geographical aspect and it is diffi  cult to see it as attributing 
responsibility for its creation or operation to Poles. Th is is confi rmed by the 
content of the aforementioned article, in which J. Karski describes the func-
tioning of the Nazi death camp in Bełżec, which was merely located on the 
territory of Poland occupied by the Th ird Reich. Th is seemingly harmless edi-
torial procedure at the time triggered a snowball eff ect. Apart from the positive 
aspect, which was to reveal the fact that the Nazi death camps were operating 
on Polish soil, there was also a negative aspect, namely media outlets all over 
the world have since 1944 repeatedly used the phrases “Polish death camps, 
Polish extermination camps” or other similar terms. 
In the majority of cases whenever defective codes of memory emerged 
in public space, the Polish diplomatic service intervened immediately. Since 
2008, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Aff airs (hereaft er: MFA) has intervened 
about 1,400 times in such cases. For example, in 2017 the largest number of 
interventions took place in the United Kingdom (43), the United States (42) 

















































119“Polish camps…” in the context of amendment of the Law on the Institute
and Germany (32). Individual incidents were also reported in the media in 
New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Qatar, Colombia, and Algeria.13 Be-
tween 2009 and 2014, there were around 100 interventions annually. As of 
2015, however, a marked increase of MFA interventions has occurred, reach-
ing around 250 annually. So far, the actions of the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs 
and of the diplomatic service have mostly proved successful. Polish diplomatic 
missions demanded corrections and the use of the correct expression “German 
(Nazi) concentration camps or death camps”. In addition, the Ministry of For-
eign Aff airs is conducting on going monitoring of reports from foreign mass 
media and the list of incorrect phrases monitored includes over 20 records.14
Legislative action 
In recent years, there have been several attempts in Poland to penalise the use of 
the phrase “Polish camp…”. 
In 2006, the Law of 18 October 2006 on the Disclosure of Information on 
Documents of State Security Agencies from 1944–1990 and their Contents (so-
called Lustration, or Vetting Law)15 introduces into the Criminal Code (here-
inaft er CC)16 two new provisions, which entered into force on 15 March 2007. 
Art. 132a CC Anyone who publicly accuses the Polish nation of participat-
ing in, organising or being responsible for communist or Nazi crimes shall be 
subject to a penalty of imprisonment of up to 3 years.
Art. 112 subsection 1a CC Regardless of the regulations in force at the place 
where the off ence was committed, the Polish Criminal Law shall apply to a Polish 
citizen and a foreigner in the event of an off ence of slander of the Polish Nation.
Th is amendment aroused much controversy among many representa-
tives of the doctrine of criminal law. Still at the stage of draft ing the law, the 
Legislative Department of the Senate Offi  ce recommended deleting Article 
132a CC (then Article 55a of the Law on the Institute of National Remem-
brance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, 
hereinaft er referred to as the IPN Law), stating in its opinion of 31 July 2006 
that “Th is provision seems to be in contradiction with the principle that the 
criminal law provision should be precise and clear, and should unambiguously 
13 T.  Żółciak, ‘Czas odkłamać polską historię. Tak MSZ interweniuje na słowa „polscy 
naziści” czy „polskie Gestapo”’, Gazetaprawna.pl, 24.01.2018, https://www.gazetaprawna.
pl/artykuly/1099657,inrwencje-msz-w-sprawie-wadliwych-kodow-pamieci.html (accessed 
23.10.2019).
14 As for the interventions of the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, see:  https://www.msz.gov.
pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/niemieckie_obozy_koncentracyjne/interwencje_msz (accessed 
24.10.2019).
15 Journal of Laws, no. 218, item 1592.
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identify the characteristics of an off ence. Th e phrase ‘the Polish nation’ is vague 
in nature and applying it in criminal law as a constituent of an off ence will re-
quire a law enforcement authority to investigate the intentions of the perpetra-
tor of the act, and it may not be possible in practice to decide whether slander 
concerns the entire nation or only certain Polish nationals”.17
L. Gardocki observed that Art. 132a CC may raise doubts as to whether 
due to its ambiguity it does not violate the nullum crimen sine lege principle, 
i.e. is at variance with Art. 42 section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Poland.18 He is moreover of the opinion that such an accusation can only 
be avoided by a  very strict interpretation of the provision, i.e. referring to 
a situation where slander concerns the Polish Nation as a whole, i.e. not indi-
vidual persons of Polish nationality or groups of such persons.19 Importantly, 
the above comments are still valid in light of the 2018 amendment of the Insti-
tute of National Remembrance Law. 
Th e Ombudsman questioned the compatibility of Article 132a CC and 
Article 112(1a) CC with the Polish Constitution. Th e Constitutional Court, 
having recognised the Ombudsman’s motion, in its judgment of 19 Septem-
ber 2008 found Article 112(1a) CC and Article 132a CC to be inconsistent 
with Article 7 and Article 121(2) in conjunction with Article 118(1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Th e substantive basis for the Court’s 
annulment of the contested provisions was the defectiveness of the legislative 
process.20 In the opinion of the Ombudsman, Art. 132a CC unjustifi ably con-
strained the constitutional freedoms of expressing views and of conducting 
research. Furthermore, its impact might have limited the debate on Poland’s 
history.21 In the opinion of the then Ombudsman J. Kochanowski, “according 
to the general and widely accepted knowledge of the facts of the past, repre-
sentatives of the Polish nation did take part in communist crimes and Nazi 
crimes (…). Facts from Poland’s most recent history should be subject to schol-
arly evaluation by historians rather than to the evaluation of prosecutors”.22 
17 J. Wyrembak, Opinia Biura Analiz Sejmowych do ustawy o ujawnianiu informacji o doku-
mentach organów bezpieczeństwa państwa z lat 1944–1990 oraz treści tych dokumentów, Warszawa, 
31.07.2006, p. 9, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 26.10.2019).
18  Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws of 16 July 1997, 
no. 78, item 483).
19 L. Gardocki, Prawo karne, 13th ed., Warszawa 2007, p. 224. 
20  Judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court of 19 September 2008 (K 5/07, Journal of 
Laws, no. 173, item 1080), OTK-A 2008/7/124.
21 ‘Prawnicy o  sposobie reakcji na zwroty typu „polski obóz”’, 8.05.2015, Gazeta. Dziennik 
Polonii w Kanadzie, https://gazetagazeta.com/2015/05/prawnicy-o-sposobie-reakcji-na-zwroty-
typu-polski-oboz/#prettyPhoto (accessed 23.10.2019).
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On 30 September 2008, roughly one and a  half years upon their entry into 
force, Art. 132a CC and Art. 112(1a) CC ceased to apply.
Another attempt took place in 2013. A  law draft ed by deputies on 
the amendment of the IPN law and of the Criminal Code was submitted to 
the  Sejm.23 Already at fi rst sight, the contents of the draft  legislation raised 
serious doubts as to the off ences to be punishable. Th e draft  Art. 55b of the 
Institute of National Remembrance Law had the following wording: “Who-
ever publicly uses the words ‘Polish death camps’, ‘Polish extermination camps’, 
‘Polish concentration camps’ or others that apply the adjective ‘Polish’ with 
respect to Nazi German concentration camps and extermination centres shall 
be subject to a  fi ne, restriction of liberty or imprisonment of up to 5 years. 
Th e sentence shall be made public”. Taking into account the content of the pro-
vision, it can be stated that the use of the phrase “Poland created concentration 
camps” or “death camps created by Poles”, did not meet the requirements of the 
provision, as these phrases did not use the phrases “Polish death camps”, “Pol-
ish extermination camps”, “Polish concentration camps” or any other phrases 
containing the adjective “Polish” with respect to Nazi German concentration 
camps and extermination centres. Th e draft  was not adopted. 
Th e last attempt was made in 2016. Due to the increase in the number of in-
cidents involving the use of defective codes of memory in the public space, the 
Polish Government started work on the introduction of new types of punish-
able off ences, providing for criminal sanctions for the use of the phrase “Polish 
death camps” or similar ones. Th e law of 26 January 2018 on the amendment 
of the Law on the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the 
Prosecution of Crimes against the  Polish Nation, the Law on War Graves and 
Cemeteries, the Law on Museums and the Law on Responsibility of Collective 
Entities for Criminal Off ences entered into force on 1 March 2018.24 Th e new 
legislation introduced two criminal provisions:
Art. 55a. 1. Who publicly and in contravention of the facts attributes to the 
Polish Nation or the Polish State responsibility for or complicity in the Nazi 
crimes committed by the Th ird German Reich as defi ned in Article 6 of the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to the International 
Agreement on the Prosecution and Punishment of the Principal War Criminals 
of the European Axis, signed in London on 8 August 1945 ( Journal of Laws 
of 1947, item 367), or for other off ences constituting crimes against peace, hu-
manity or war crimes, or otherwise grossly diminishing the responsibility of 
23  Draft  law on the amendment of the Law on the National Remembrance Institute – Com-
mission for the Prosecution of Crimes Against the Polish Nation and on the amendment of the 
Criminal Code, Sejm of the Republic of Poland of the 7th term, 15 October 2013, Sejm doc. 
no. 1958, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl (accessed 26.10.2019).
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the real perpetrators of those crimes, shall be liable to a fi ne or to imprisonment 
for up to 3 years. Th e sentence shall be made public. 
2. If the perpetrator of the off ence referred to in paragraph 1 acts uninten-
tionally, he shall be liable to a fi ne or to the penalty of restriction of liberty. 
3. Th e perpetrator of the punishable act referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 
above has not committed an off ence if the punishable act was committed in 
the course of his artistic activity or research. 
Art. 55b. Irrespective of the provisions in force at the place where the pro-
hibited act was committed, this Law shall apply to a Polish citizen and a for-
eigner who have committed the off ences referred to in Art. 55 and Art. 55a.
Th e authors of the regulations did not avoid the mistakes present in Article 
132a CC, adopted in 2006. Furthermore, in both cases (similarly to the 2013 
draft ) the authors of these regulations represented the same political option. 
Th e amendment of the Institute of National Remembrance Law was signed by 
the President of the Republic of Poland on 6 February 2018, and on 14 Feb-
ruary 2018 the President of the Republic of Poland submitted a motion to the 
Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of that law by way of 
follow-up audit. However, the Constitutional Court did not manage to issue 
a decision on the motion. Due to reactions evoked in the world by the provi-
sions of Article 55a and Article 55b added to the Institute of National Remem-
brance Law, they were repealed as of 17 July 2018 as a result of the adoption of 
the government draft  amendment of the Institute of National Remembrance 
Law.25 However, in view of experience to date, it is very likely that similar crim-
inal law regulations will continue to be debated in Parliament in the future. 
Due to the deletion of Art. 55a and Art. 55b of the Institute of National Re-
membrance Law, a detailed analysis of the structure of these provisions seems 
unnecessary at present.26 Only some major issues raising doubts as to the regu-
lation adopted in Art. 55a of the Institute of National Remembrance Law are 
indicated. 
Art.  55a of the Institute of National Remembrance Law sets out a  com-
mon off ence of an inconsequential nature. Th e formal nature of the off ence 
presupposes that there need not be an eff ect in order to meet the constituent 
elements of this type of punishable act in the form of a general feeling that the 
25 Law of 27 June 2018 on the on the amendment of the Law on the National Remembrance 
Institute  – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes Against the Polish Nation and on the 
amendment of the law on the liability of collective entities for punishable off ences ( Journal of 
Laws 2018, item 1277).
26 A detailed analysis of the characteristics of a punishable off ence as set out under Art. 55a sec-
tion 1 and 2 of the Law on the Institute of National Remembrance was carried out by e.g.:  C. Kłak, 
‘Odpowiedzialność karna z art. 55a ust. 1 i 2 ustawy o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej – Komisji 
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Polish Nation or the Polish State is responsible or complicit in the crimes un-
der Art. 55a of the Institute of National Remembrance Law.27 
Some doubts may arise when trying to identify a legal interest protected by 
this provision. It does not pose any major diffi  culties to indicate that the object 
of protection of the off ence of attributing responsibility for the crimes referred 
to in Article 55a of the Institute of National Remembrance Law to the Polish 
Nation or the Polish State is the good name (as well as honour, dignity and re-
spect) of the Polish Nation and the Polish State. Th is is furthermore confi rmed 
by the material scope of this Law as defi ned in Article 1(2a) of the Institute of 
National Remembrance Law. Assuming that the object of protection under 
Article 55a of the Institute of National Remembrance Law and Article 133 
CC are identical,28 we may follow W. Kulesza’s observation that in both cases 
the object of protection is “Polish national dignity”.29 As the doctrine points 
out, the behaviours directed against the “Polish State” infl uence the shaping 
of the position of the “Polish State” as an organization of the “Polish Nation”, 
while the protection of the good name of the “Polish Nation” serves to protect 
the position of the “Polish State” among other Nations.30
It may be problematic to indicate the object of protection if the perpetrator 
“in another way (than by attributing liability – AS) drastically reduces the lia-
bility of the actual perpetrators of these crimes”. Th e object of protection here 
is not the good name of the “Polish Nation” or the “Polish State”. As C. Kłak 
indicates, Art. 55a(1) of the Institute of National Remembrance Law was in 
this way wrongly edited, not linking this off ence type with the protection of 
the good name of the “Polish Nation” or the “Polish State”, which transcends 
the material scope set out under Art. 1 of the Institute of National Remem-
brance Law.31 As a result, the IPN Law included a provision which goes beyond 
the material scope of this law. 
Th e use of the statement “the Germans did not set up concentration camps 
on Polish soil” may be regarded as blatantly diminishing the liability of the ac-
tual perpetrators of the crimes, although the sentence does not unambiguously 
27 Ibid., p. 174.
28 Although Article 133 of the Criminal Code uses the term “Republic of Poland” and Article 
55a of the Institute of National Remembrance Law uses the term “the Polish State”, their interpre-
tation leads to the conclusion that the Republic of Poland – in accordance with Article 1 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland – is the name of the Polish State, which is a common good 
of all citizens – see: ibid., p. 182; P. Kar das, ‘Komentarz do art. 133 k.k.’, in: W. Wróbel, A. Zoll 
(eds.), Kodeks karny. Cześć szczególna, t. II, cz. I: Komentarz do art. 117-211a, 5th ed., LEX 2017.
29 W.  Kulesza, ‘Polska godność narodowa w świetle prawa karnego’, Czasopismo Prawno-Histo-
ryczne, 2018, vol. LXX, Issue 1, p. 154–157.
30  T. Bojarski, ‘Komentarz do art. 132a k.k.’, in: T. Bojarski (ed.), Kodeks karny. Komentarz, 
7th ed., LEX 2016.
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imply that the author of these words intended to attribute liability for their cre-
ation to the “Polish Nation” or the “Polish State”. Omission in the commented 
section of the provision of Art. 55a of the Institute of National Remembrance 
Law of the object of protection as the “Polish Nation” or the “Polish State” 
along with the option of extending the application of this provision under 
Art. 55b of the Institute of National Remembrance Law to off ences commit-
ted outside of Poland (exclusion of the requirement of double jeopardy32) re-
sults in too broad a scope of responsibility. Is an inhabitant of a foreign coun-
try supposed to be aware that saying the words “the Germans did not set up 
concentration camps on Polish territory” they are liable for committing an 
off ence under the Polish IPN Law? In such a case, it can be assumed that there 
is a circumstance excluding the guilt referred to in Article 30 CC (so-called 
error of law). According to this provision, “Who commits a prohibited act in 
the justifi ed unawareness of its unlawfulness does not commit an off ence; if 
the off ender’s error is unjustifi ed, the court may apply extraordinary mitigating 
measures”. A person who acts in error of law shall not be liable for the off ence. 
Th e highly discretionary phrase “blatantly diminishing” is also controversial.
Another doubt concerns the interpretation of the term “Polish Nation” 
used in the provision under scrutiny. Th is phrase appears in the preamble to 
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, referring to “all 
citizens of the Republic of Poland”; in the preamble of the Institute of National 
Remembrance Law “With a view to preserving the memory of the enormity 
of the victims, losses and damage suff ered by the Polish Nation during and af-
ter the Second World War […]” and in Art. 1(1a) of the Institute of National 
Remembrance Law “committed against persons of Polish nationality or Pol-
ish citizens of other nationalities”. Th e doctrine rightly points out (pointing to 
Art. 133 CC) that the term “Polish Nation” from the perspective of the Con-
stitution of the Republic of Poland should be fi rst of all linked to citizenship. 
In line with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the nation is made up 
of all citizens of the Republic of Poland, irrespective of religion, race, national-
ity, etc. Th e term ‘the nation’ used in the Constitution of the Republic of Po-
land departs from the ethnic or sociological aspect and is clearly linked to the 
legal criterion of citizenship of the Republic of Poland”.33 A. Marek observes 
32 In order to hold a perpetrator who has committed an act prohibited by the Polish Criminal 
Law outside the territory of Poland criminally liable, such an act must, as a rule, also be deemed as 
prohibited by the law in force at the place where it was committed (see Art. 111 § 1 of the Crim-
inal Code). However, criminal law provides for exceptions to this rule (e.g. Article 111 § 3 of the 
Criminal Code). One such exception was also contained in Article 55b of the Institute of National 
Remembrance Law. According to this provision, Art. 55a of the above law applied irrespective of 
whether the off ence committed by the perpetrator abroad was prohibited by law at the location of 
its commission.
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that the term “nation” will cover not only the citizens of the Republic of Po-
land living within its borders but also the citizens of the Republic of Poland 
living abroad. It assumes that “preservation of citizenship is proof of a  sense 
of belonging not only to a nation in an ethnic sense, but also to its collective 
organisation, i.e. the Republic of Poland”.34
In the doctrine, one can also fi nd a divergent position, according to which the 
concept of the “Polish Nation” is understood as all persons of Polish nationality 
as well as all citizens of the Republic of Poland. As N. Kłączyńska indicates, it 
seems justifi ed from an axiological point of view to use the term “Polish Nation” 
to include all persons, including those living in exile, who feel belonging to the 
“Polish Nation” even if they do not have Polish citizenship (Polish Diaspora).35
By analogy to Art.  133 CC, we should assume that the perpetrator of 
a punishable off ence set out under Art. 55a of the Institute of National Re-
membrance Law must refer to the “Polish Nation” or the “Polish State” as 
a whole rather than to individuals or their groups.36 Th e action of perpetrating 
an off ence under Art. 55a of the Institute of National Remembrance Law with 
respect to a particular person or a particular group of people (other than meet-
ing the criterion of the Polish Nation or the Polish State as a whole) does not 
meet the criteria of this type of an off ence. 
Th e criterion of “attribution” defi ning the action of perpetrating an off ence 
indicates that the meeting of the criteria for an off ence may take place by ac-
tion (or action combined with negligence).37 Th e attribution will therefore take 
place when it appears from any form of the perpetrator’s communication that the 
“Polish Nation” or the “Polish State” participated in the commission of a given 
crime, in a situation where historical fi ndings do not justify the formulation of 
such a claim.38 Th e attribution may take place both when objectively untrue fac-
tual circumstances are presented and when only assessment is made which has 
no backing by historical facts.39 From the point of view of meeting the criteria of 
the off ence under discussion, it will not be suffi  cient to merely raise doubts about 
the conduct of the “Polish Nation” or the “Polish State” with respect to the crime 
under Art. 55a of the Institute of National Remembrance Law. 
Is the mere use of the word “Polish” to refer to a death camp, an extermi-
nation camp or a concentration camp suffi  cient to indicate the off ence type 
34  A. Marek, Kodeks karny. Komentarz, 4th ed., Warszawa 2007, p. 296.
35  N. Kłączyńska, ‘Komentarz do art. 133 k.k.’, in: J. Giezek (ed.), Kodeks karny. Część szczegól-
na. Komentarz, LEX 2014.
36 Ibid.; see also:  judgement of a Regional Court in Elbląg of 22.07.2015, II K 67/15, LEX 
no. 2125732.
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referred to in Article 55a of the Institute of National Remembrance Law? It 
seems that the use of the adjective does not a proiori have to equal the attribu-
tion of liability for the crime to the “Polish Nation” or the “Polish State”. Given 
most of the cases of use in the public domain of the term “Polish camp…”, one 
may conclude that the author intended not so much to attribute liability for 
their operation to the Polish Nation or the Polish State, but that they were 
rather a sign of a lack of competence or a slip of the tongue. Oft entimes, the 
use of the adjective “Polish” with respect to a camp was only meant to indicate 
its geographical location. Following the intervention of the Polish diplomat-
ic services, the authors corrected texts containing defective codes of memory 
and, in most cases, expressed regret for having used them. In order to meet the 
criteria of this type of off ence, the perpetrator must therefore use this phrase in 
such a way that he can be unequivocally attributed to the act of attributing to 
the “Polish Nation” or the “Polish State” of a crime set out under Article 55a of 
the IPN Law, e.g. “it was Poles who organised and ran death camps on Polish 
territory”. In this case, it can be assumed that the intention of the author of the 
words was to attribute, contrary to historical fi ndings, responsibility for the 
organisation and administration of death camps operating on Polish territory 
to the Polish State or Nation. Slander will be public when the circumstances 
presented by the perpetrator may reach the awareness of an unspecifi ed num-
ber of people (e.g. street, media, books, assembly).40
C. Kłak indicates that the feature “in contravention of the facts” denotes 
objectively untrue formulation of allegations of liability or complicity of the 
“Polish Nation” or the “Polish State” for the crimes indicated under Art. 55a 
of the Institute of National Remembrance Law.41 In a situation when with re-
spect to the act alleged to the “Polish Nation” or the “Polish State” there is no 
complete knowledge about the event being the object of the allegation, the cri-
teria of the type of off ence under Art. 55a of the Institute of National Remem-
brance Law have not been met (e.g. lack of historical research or unambiguous 
result of such research). Th us, a public statement e.g. in the press that the Polish 
State created or operated “death camps” is contrary to historical facts which are 
known and have not been credibly challenged. Th erefore, it must be assumed 
that slander occurred in contravention of the facts.42
Importantly, apart from the deliberate type of the off ence under Art. 55a(1) 
of the Institute of National Remembrance Law, section 2 envisages also its 
non-deliberate type. An unintentional off ence occurs when the off ender, 
without having had any intention of committing it, commits it nevertheless 
40 P. Kardas, ‘Komentarz do art. 133 k.k. …’, op. cit., LEX 2017.
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as a result of failure to observe the precaution required under the circumstanc-
es, even though the possibility of committing the criminal act was foreseen 
or could have been foreseen. Th e solution adopted in Article 55a(2) of the 
Institute of National Remembrance Law should be critically assessed. It may be 
problematic to establish the precautionary rules required of the off ender under 
the circumstances (e.g. when the off ender refers to information published by 
a reputable journal, which information turns out to be counterfactual). 
Art.  55a(3) of the Institute of National Remembrance Law contains 
a countertype, according to which the perpetrator of a punishable act under 
Art. 55a(1) and (2) of the Institute of National Remembrance Law does not 
commit an off ence if they have performed the act as part of their artistic activi-
ty or research. An analogous provision is contained in Art. 256 § 3 CC. As the 
legislator did not determine any statutory criteria of the “artistic activity or re-
search”, doubts may arise as to what can be understood by them. Z. Ćwiąkalski 
indicates that this countertype can only be invoked by those who are actually 
involved in it, and thus does not apply to those who, under pretext of artistic 
activity or research, wish to present a warped image of history.43 W. Kulesza 
casts in doubt the validity of the countertype under Art. 256 § 3 CC and ob-
serves that the person who really describes certain historical events for artistic 
or scholarly purposes does not commit a punishable off ence at all as such activ-
ity is void of criminal intent.44
Legal impact assessment and fi nal conclusions
Any action aimed at ending the falsifi cation of history by using the terms “Pol-
ish concentration camp”, “Polish death camp” or other similarly defective code 
of memory in public space deserves praise. So far, attempts to use criminal law 
to combat these terms have proved ineff ective. Th e originators of these changes 
were each time representatives of a single political option, which, it seems, on 
the basis of the directions of changes to date, sees the highest eff ectiveness of 
legal regulations in criminal law. 
Regrettably, the eff ect of the 2018 amendment of the Institute of Nation-
al Remembrance Law was exactly opposite to that intended. Th e adoption of 
the provisions triggered an international debate. Th e penal provisions added 
to the Institute of National Remembrance Law stirred much controversy e.g. 
43 Z.   Ćwiąkalski, ‘Komentarz do art. 256 k.k.’, in: W. Wróbel, A. Zoll (eds.), Kodeks karny. 
Cześć szczególna…, op. cit.
44 W.  Kulesza, ‘Pochwalanie faszyzmu i komunizmu w świetle prawa karnego (uwagi de lege 
praevia, lata et ferenda)’, in: A. Michalska-Warias, I. Nowikowski, J. Piórkowska-Flieger (eds.), Teo-
retyczne i praktyczne problemy współczesnego prawa karnego. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Profe-
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in the USA and Israel.45 Poland was accused of wanting to deny or diminish the 
participation of Poland or Poles in the Holocaust by introducing these regula-
tions. Th ese allegations were groundless, because the intention of the legislator 
was not to deny the participation of Poland and Poles in the Holocaust or oth-
er crimes referred to in Article 55a of the Institute of National Remembrance 
Law. As a  result, the new regulations caused a  diplomatic crisis, particularly 
between Poland and Israel. 
As a result of discussions on the amendment of the Institute of National Re-
membrance Law, the frequency of use of the phrase “Polish death camps” and 
other similar terms increased. Currently, the phrase “Polish camps…” has been so 
strongly rooted in international discourse that it is to be expected to continue, 
and it may take many years of eff ort to rectify this state of aff airs. Although the 
penal provisions of the Institute of National Remembrance Law themselves have 
been repealed, they have left  behind a negative eff ect in the form of popularising 
phrases such as “Polish death camps” or “Polish concentration camps” and weak-
ening Poland’s position in international relations. 
Using the commonly available online tool Google Trends,46 statistics have 
been compiled on the number of worldwide Google searches of phrases such 
as: “polish death camp”, “polish death camps”, “polish concentration camp” and 
“polish concentration camps” between 2004 and 2019.47
Th e above graph shows that the greatest interest in searching for these phrases 
took place in 2005, 2012 and 2018. Th e evident deviations coincide with events 
in public space. January 2005 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation 
of the Auschwitz concentration camp, so texts containing the terms “Polish con-
centration camps” and other similar terms appeared in international press. Th e 
increase visible in 2012 was the result of the use by US President B. Obama of 
the phrase “Polish death camp” in his speech in May 2012 in honour of J. Karski 
at the White House during the ceremony of posthumously decorating the Polish 
hero with the highest civilian US distinction – the Presidential Medal of Free-
dom.48 Th e spike observed in 2018 stems directly from the introduction into the 
Institute of National Remembrance Law of Art. 55a and 55b. Th e above fl awed 
codes of memory appear most frequently in the United Kingdom, the United 
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States, Germany, Canada, and Australia. Between 2009 and 2014, the Ministry 
of Foreign Aff airs intervened around 100 times a year. Since 2015, there has been 
a signifi cant increase in the interventions of the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, the 
annual number of which is around 250.49
Google Trends        |      Porównaj 
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Cały świat 2004 – dziś Wszystko Wyszukiwarka Google
Graph no. 1. Comparison of phrases “polish death camp” (colour blue), “polish 
death camps” (colour red), “polish concentration camp” (yellow) and “polish 
concentration camps” (green) searched through the Google web browser 
between 2004 and 2019 worldwide. Th e numbers represent the individual 
interests during online searches for the highest point in the chart. Th e value 
100 means the highest popularity of the phrase. Th e value 50 means that the 
popularity of the phrase was twice smaller. Th e value 0 indicated that there is 
not enough data for a given phrase.50 Own elaboration.
Th e negative aspect of the 2018 amendment the Institute of National Re-
membrance Law is furthermore indicated by the number of faulty codes of mem-
ory which appeared in domestic and foreign publications. Th e data of the Sen-
tiOne report published by Gazeta.pl51 indicates that between 1 January 2016 and 
19 February 2018, the phrase “Polish death camps” appeared in various online 
articles ca. 7,000 times (it was used in 982 various international publications), 
over 4,600 times of which between 1 January and 19 February 2018, while the 
phrase “Polish concentration camps” was used times almost 1,900 times between 
1 January and 19 February 2018, including 272 times in international media.52






51 A company monitoring the Internet.
52 K.  Świsłowski, Ustawa o  IPN więcej szkodzi, niż pomaga? Od dawna nie pisano tak dużo 
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Th e above amendments of the laws from 2006, 2018 and the draft  law of 
2013 exemplify populist activities. Th e law is created not to actually safeguard 
a given legal interest, but to gain the support of the voters. It must be borne 
in mind that the severity of penalties does not deter the majority of perpetra-
tors from committing crimes and does not signifi cantly reduce the number of 
crimes. Th e narrative of the authors of the legislation under scrutiny, who hold 
that the only eff ective way of responding to faulty codes of memory is to penal-
ise their use, is sheer penal populism.53
Given the criminal law principle of ultima ratio, we should assume that the 
instruments of criminal law should not be used when observance of legal pro-
visions may be enforced by means other than sanctions of social policy.54 As to 
the reactions of the Polish State to the fl awed codes of memory emerging in the 
public domain to date, it must be said that these actions are suffi  cient and there 
is no justifi cation for resorting to criminal law instruments. Diplomatic action 
which is taken as soon as the defective memory codes are detected is eff ec-
tive and leads to the revision of the defective texts. Furthermore, in most cases, 
those publishing texts falsifying history regret that they have used a phrase that 
is harmful to the Polish Nation or the Polish State. 
In addition to diplomatic eff orts, persons claiming the infringement of 
their legal rights as a result of the use of defective codes of memory may seek 
redress before a civil court. In a fi nal judgment of 22 December 2016, the Ap-
pellate Court in Krakow found that the term “Polish death camps” violated the 
personal interest of former Auschwitz prisoner Karol T. and that this violation 
was unlawful.55
Th e use of the adjective “Polish” in relation to death camps, concentration 
camps, etc. seems to result, in most cases, from the users’ ignorance rather than 
from the desire to hold Poland to account for these camps’ operation (although 
such situations certainly do occur). Th e use of the term “Polish camp…” does 
not have to assume a connection with the Polish State or Nation in organisa-
tional or functional terms. In many cases, it is an unfortunate mental shortcut 
aimed only at indicating the geographical location of a given camp.56
osci/7,114883,23045656,ustawa-o-ipn-dala-paliwo-polskim-obozom-setki-publikacji.html (ac-
cessed 2.11.2019).
53 J.  Widacki, ‘Zamiast wstępu. Czym jest i do czego służy populizm penalny’, in: J. Widacki 
(ed.), Populizm penalny, Kraków 2017, pp. 7–14.
54  W. Wróbel, A. Zoll, Polskie prawo karne. Część ogólna, 2nd ed., Kraków 2012, p. 83.
55 Judgement of the Appellate Court in Krakow of 22 December 2016 (fi le no.  I  ACa 
1080/16), LEX no. 2202552.
56 A. Wójcik, Ustawa o IPN porażką. Za „polskie obozy śmierci” nadal nie będzie można karać – dr 
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A similar view was expressed in 2013 by the Warsaw Public Prosecutor’s 
Offi  ce, which refused to initiate criminal proceedings in connection with the 
publication of the phrase “Polish extermination camps” in the German news-
paper Rheinische Post in August 2013. It was established that, on the same day, 
the newspaper apologised for this phrase, considering it a mistake and deeming 
it “unacceptable”. Th e public prosecutor’s offi  ce did not see that the intention 
of the authors was to insult the Polish nation (Article 133 CC), as stated in the 
notice. Th e phrase “Polish extermination camps”, although very unfortunate, 
was not intended to indicate that such camps were established by Poles, but 
only that they were located on Polish soil; the above was part of the justifi -
cation for refusing to investigate. In the justifi cation, the public prosecutor’s 
offi  ce also stressed that in similar cases the relevant institutions, such as the 
Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, must react by requesting corrections.57
During the slightly more than 4 months of Art. 55a of the Institute of Na-
tional Remembrance Law being in force, over 80 notifi cations were fi led with 
the prosecution authority on the off ence under the above provision, yet not 
a single proceeding was instituted.58
Th e problem of “Polish camps…” has been and will continue to exist in the 
public domain. Its extent is currently infl uenced by the development of tech-
nology, which contributes to the speed of information transfer. In the past, the 
dissemination of the printed word was limited by many factors. Today, we deal 
with “electronic”, “virtual” words which spread at a rapid pace via the Internet 
and are available from almost anywhere in the world. In the age of globalisation 
and digitisation, online tools can be eff ective in combating defective codes of 
memory. One may indicate moreover the Truth About Camps website run by 
the Institute of National Remembrance. Th is educational website in Polish, 
English, German, Italian, French, Bulgarian, Slovak, and Ukrainian contains 
basic information on the death and concentration camps set up by the Th ird 
German Reich in occupied Poland during the Second World War.59
A free application called Remember, in operation since February 2016, co-
operates with the most popular text editors. Its role is to detect and highlight 
as incorrect the phrase “Polish death camps” in edited texts, at the same time 
proposing the correct term.60
57 ‘Prokuratura: określenie “polskie obozy zagłady” nie znieważa narodu polskiego’, TVN24, 
13.12.2013, https://tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/prokuratura-okreslenie-polskie-obozy-
zaglady-nie-zniewaza-narodu-polskiego,379407.html?h=2894 (accessed 29.10.2019).
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Experience to date indicates that the only eff ective tool in the fi ght against 
the falsifi cation of history is global education, i.e. showing the historical truth 
about Poland’s role in the Second World War and the Holocaust, as well as the 
activities of the concentration and extermination camps set up and administered 
by Nazi Germans in occupied Poland. Attempts to educate by means of crim-
inal sanctions cannot produce the intended results. Before another idea is put 
forward to introduce criminal liability for falsifying the history of the Second 
World War, it is worthwhile for the potential authors of these regulations to no-
tice that the history of Poland has recently been rewritten. Th is rewriting is not 
being done by foreign media or politicians, but by certain Polish political options 
which, by falsifying history, are trying to diminish the merits of their opponents 
in the fi ght for political position in the country. 
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Art. 55a and 55b of the amendment to the Law on the Institute of National Remem-
brance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation of 2018, 
were the Polish government’s response to the terms “Polish camps”, “Polish death camps”, 
“Polish concentration camps” or other similar phrases. Th e article attempts to determine 
the genesis of the appearance of the phrase “Polish camps …” in public space, showing the 
history of the latest Polish legal regulations providing for criminal liability for the use of 
such terms, and also analyses whether these regulations aff ected a decrease in the frequen-
cy of using defective memory codes in public space. Due to the loss of Art. 55a of the Law 
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been carried out, but the most important problems that could be raised by this interpre-
tation were signalled. Th e dogmatic, historical and legal methods were conducted in the 
study. Th e considerations made lead to the conclusion that the relevant provision raises 
numerous doubts as to its interpretation and its appearance in the Polish legal system 
triggered an eff ect contrary to the intended one. Moreover, it led to the consolidation 
of these phrases in the public domain and adversely aff ected the image of Poland on the 
international arena. In the summary, it was stressed that education is the most eff ective 
method of fi ghting against defective codes of memory.
Keywords: Polish death camps, Polish concentration camps, criminal liability, amend-

















































Protection of the Reputation of the Republic of Poland 
and the Polish Nation in the Law on the Institute 
of National Remembrance
Introduction
Th e law of 26 January 20181 introduced into Polish law special civil law protec-
tion of the good name of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation. Th e 
amendment added Chapter 6c to the Law on the Institute of National Remem-
brance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation 
(hereinaft er: IPN Law)2: “Protection of the good name of the Republic of Po-
land and the Polish Nation”, set out in Art. 53o–53q. At the same time, Article 
1 (2a) of the IPN Law extended the subject matter of this Law to include the 
protection of the good name of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation. 
Th e above regulation deserves a more detailed analysis, as it is an unusual case 
of applying civil law institutions to protect public interests. At the same time, as 
will be shown below, the manner in which this protection is regulated raises nu-
merous concerns as to its subjective and objective scope and the civil protection 
measures of the “wronged party”.
First of all, the new provisions do not regulate on their own the prerequisites 
for protecting the good name of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation, 
but only mandate the application of the relevant provisions of the Civil Code 
(hereinaft er CC)3 concerning the protection of personal interests. However, they 
do indicate in a detailed manner who has active mandate in cases concerning the 
protection of the good name of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation. 
In the legislative process, the legislator stressed the intention to modify the pro-
tection of the good name of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation with 
a view to a more intense use of civil law instruments and meant to limit the use of 
1 Law of 26 January 2018 amending the Law on the Institute of National Remembrance – 
Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, the Law on War Graves 
and Cemeteries, the Law on Museums and the Law on Responsibility of Collective Entities for 
Criminal Off ences ( Journal of Laws of 2018, item 369).
2 Law of 18 December 1998 on the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for 
the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation (Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1882).















































137Protection of the Reputation of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation
criminal law instruments (a result of the latter being deemed at variance with the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland4). Th e new provisions aim at “creating 
eff ective legal instruments allowing the Polish authorities to pursue a persistent 
and consistent historical policy, counteracting the falsifi cation of Polish history 
and protecting the good name of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation”.5 
Th is chapter does not consider the adequacy of the tools chosen by the legislator 
to achieve the above objective. However, an attempt will be made to analyse the 
scope of application of the introduced provisions in light of the earlier doctrine 
and case law on the protection of personal rights in civil law. 
In particular, the above regulation, due to its referential character, requires 
the defi nition of the material and subjective scope of the protection provided 
for therein, as well as the relation to the provisions on personal rights under the 
Civil Code. Th e determination of whose good name is to be protected under this 
procedure raises the biggest concerns, as both the Republic of Poland and the 
Polish Nation do not have the status of a civil law entity. Moreover, the place and 
manner of regulating this issue also indicate that the intention of the legislator 
was to protect public interest rather than the individual interests of specifi c civil 
law entities. A question thus arises whether the instruments introduced into the 
IPN Law are fi t for the intended purpose. Noteworthy in this context is the legis-
lator’s use, on the grounds of civil law regulations, of formulations typical of pub-
lic law, i.e. the Polish Nation and the Republic of Poland. Until then, good name, 
dignity and respect for the Polish Nation and the Republic of Poland had been 
protected under criminal law in Art. 133 CC6 and under the misdemeanours law 
in Art. 49 (1) CM.7 Th e penalised off ences indicated in these provisions violate 
public order and the welfare of society as a whole. At the same time, criminal law 
doctrine stresses that the penalisation of said acts cannot eliminate the liberties 
protected under Art. 9 and Art. 10 Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.8 Everyone has the right to both publicly 
4 Document no. 2663, p. 2, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki8ka.nsf/0/4788B9F601808D0FC
12582B9002257F3/%24File/2663.pdf (accessed: 19.01.2021).
5 Document no. 806, p. 2, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki8ka.nsf/0/EA4AD50371FF6D17C
12580250039936A/%24File/806.pdf (accessed: 19.01.2021).
6 Law of 6 June 1997 – Criminal Code (Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1950, as amended). 
Art. 133 CC. Whoever publicly insults the Polish Nation or the Republic of Poland shall be sub-
ject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to 3 years.
7 Law of 20 May 1971 – Code of Misdemeanours ( Journal of Laws of 2019, item 821, as 
amended). Art. 49 CM. 1. Anyone who, in a public place, demonstrates disrespect for the Polish 
Nation, the Republic of Poland or its constitutional authorities, shall be subject to the penalty of 
arrest or fi ne. 2. the same penalty shall be imposed on anyone who violates the provisions on the 
emblem, colours and anthem of the Republic of Poland.
8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms drawn up in 
Rome on 4 November 1950, subsequently amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5 and 8 and supplement-















































138 Agnieszka Kubiak Cyrul
express their views on a country’s policies, history and to publicly express criti-
cism in this regard.9 Balancing out these colliding values must be made in relation 
to a particular factual state.10 Furthermore, civil law protects legal entities in this 
respect. Both the civil law doctrine and case law concerning matters of protect-
ing personal interests regards a sense of national identity to be a personal right11 
and grants it protection under civil law. Regrettably, this matter was completely 
omitted in the justifi cation of the draft  law. 
The objective of introducing Chapter 6c into the IPN Law
Th e introduction of the Chapter 6c into the IPN Law was a direct reaction to 
the use of phrases such as “Polish death camps”, “Polish extermination camps” 
or “Polish concentration camps” by Polish and foreign media. Th e justifi cation 
of the draft  law emphasised that diplomatic interventions in such cases did not 
produce completely satisfactory results. References to the provisions on the 
protection of personal rights, compensation of property damage under general 
principles as well as the publication of corrigenda under press law were consid-
ered ineff ective, either.12
Attention should be paid to the extensive arguments presented in the explan-
atory memorandum of the draft  law against the possibility of eff ective use of the 
concept of personal rights in cases of this type. Doubts were stressed as to the 
existence of personal rights of the State Treasury and discrepancies were pointed 
out as to the catalogue of personal rights of legal persons and the scope of claims 
for infringement of their personal rights. Despite this critical assessment, the 
model of protection of personal rights under the Civil Code was used by the leg-
islator to construct the responsibility specifi ed in Chapter 6c of the IPN Law. Ac-
cording to the legislator, the solution to the problems related to the application 
of regulations on personal rights to entities using the term “Polish concentration 
camps” in the communications media is to recognise that the Republic of Poland 
9 P. Hofmański, A. Sakowicz, ‘Komentarz do art. 133’, in: M. Filar (ed.), Kodeks karny. Komen-
tarz [online], Warszawa 2016. System Informacji Prawnej LEX (accessed: 19.01.2020).
10 Th e same constraints must apply likewise to the protection of the reputation of the Republic 
of Poland and the Polish Nation, as set out under the IPN Law.
11 See F. Rakiewicz, Poczucie tożsamości narodowej jako dobro osobiste w świetle polskiego prawa 
cywilnego [online]. Part One. STPP 2011, no. 2, p. 91f. Part Two. STPP 2011, no. 3, p. 67f. Part 
Th ree. STPP 2012, no. 1, p. 57f. LEGALIS (accessed: 19.01.2020). J. Skrzypczak, ‘Protection of 
the reputation of the Polish Nation and the Republic of Poland’ [online], Środkowoeuropejskie Stu-
dia Polityczne 2019, no. 3, pp. 61–78 (accessed: 19.01.2020). M. Brzozowska-Pasieka, ‘Legityma-
cja czynna osób fi zycznych i prawnych w sprawach o naruszenie prawa do tożsamości narodowej. 
Przegląd orzecznictwa polskiego z uwzględnieniem orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw 
Człowieka’ [online], MOP 2019, no. 22, pp. 1239–1243. LEGALIS (accessed: 19.01.2020).
















































139Protection of the Reputation of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation
and the Polish Nation have personal rights analogous to those of legal persons. 
In this context, the justifi cation makes it clear that “the Republic of Poland” is 
the name of the Polish State which according to Art. 1 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland13 is the good of all citizens, while the “Polish Nation” under 
the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland are “all citizens of 
the Republic of Poland”. Th is matter is of major importance from the perspective 
of pursuing claims, since the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation have no 
legal personality14. For this reason, provision was made, allowing bringing an ac-
tion for the protection of the good name of the Republic of Poland or the Polish 
Nation by non-governmental organisations within the scope of their statutory 
tasks and by the Institute of National Remembrance.
Th e justifi cation also indicated the confl icting legal problems associated with 
the pursuit of claims arising from violations of the good name of the Republic 
of Poland and the Polish Nation by foreign media. In particular, it was consid-
ered advisable to introduce an obligation to apply the principles of protection 
of the good name of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation as defi ned in 
Chapter 6c of the IPN Law, regardless of the applicable law (so-called manda-
tory provisions). According to the legislator, this regulation is to ensure that the 
Polish provisions concerning the protection of the good name of the Republic of 
Poland and the Polish Nation will apply in each and every case, regardless of what 
law is applicable under Private International Law.15
In addition to the issue of applicable law, the question of national jurisdiction 
was also raised. In the case of foreign publications and statements, it is necessary 
to determine which court has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. Th e explanato-
ry memorandum of the draft  law stressed that the jurisdiction of courts in such 
cases for entities residing or established in the EU is determined according to the 
principles set out in EU law.16 However, if an entity infringing the good name 
of the Republic of Poland or the Polish Nation has no residence or registered 
offi  ce in any of the EU Member States, the issue of jurisdiction is regulated by 
the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinaft er CCP).17 As a result, Polish courts “will 
13 Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws no. 78, item 483 
as amended).
14 Łętowska E., Nowelizacja ustawy o IPN: pozostają przepisy o odpowiedzialności cywilnej 
(in:) Archiwum Osiatyńskiego, https://archiwumosiatynskiego.pl/wpis-w-debacie/nowelizacja-
ustawy-o-ipn-pozostaja-przepisy-o-odpowiedzialnosci-cywilnej (accessed: 19.01.2020).
15 Law of 4 February 2011 – International private law (Journal of Laws of 2015, item 1792).
16 Regulation (EU) no. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 De-
cember 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and com-
mercial matters (OJEU L of 2012 no. 351, p. 1, as amended).
17 Law of 17 November 1964 – Code of Civil Procedure ( Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1460, 
as amended). See Art. 1103 CCP: “Cases brought before the courts shall lie within national juris-
















































140 Agnieszka Kubiak Cyrul
have jurisdiction over such cases or, when according to the general idea of the reg-
ulation (Art. 4 (1) of Regulation no. 1215/2012) – the defendant (the infringer) 
will have their place of residence/registered offi  ce in the Republic of Poland, or 
if – pursuant to the provisions of the Regulation on special jurisdiction in mat-
ters of torts (Article 7(2) of Regulation no. 1215/2012) – an ‘event causing dam-
age’ will take place in the Republic of Poland (i.e. e.g. in the case of press-related 
off ences, when information detrimental to the good name of the Republic of 
Poland or the Polish Nation is disseminated also in the Republic of Poland and 
will have negative consequences here)”.18 When Art. 1103 CCP applies, decisive 
for domestic jurisdiction will be the place of residence, domicile or the registered 
offi  ce of the defendant in the Republic of Poland. 
Despite the rationale for the introduction of the regulation in question set 
out in the explanatory memorandum, the interpretation of the already existing 
provisions of Chapter 6c of the IPN Law raises numerous doubts. Th ey con-
cern issues of fundamental importance for the application of these provisions, 
in particular: Who is the wronged party, i.e. whose personal rights are protect-
ed? How to determine whether there has been an illegal violation of personal 
rights? Who has active legitimacy? What is the status of non-governmental 
organisations and the IPN? Whether all claims specifi ed in Article 24 of the 
Civil Code can be the subject of legal action? and fi nally How to eff ectively sue 
foreign entities in this respect? 
Construction of civil law protection of the good name of the Republic 
of Poland and the Polish Nation in the IPN Law – analysis of Art. 53o–53q 
of the IPN Law
Pursuant to Article 53o of the IPN Law, the provisions of the Civil Code on the 
protection of personal rights apply to the protection of the good name of the Re-
public of Poland and the Polish Nation.19 However, the practical application of 
this simple reference structure requires an answer to the fundamental question: 
whose good name is to be protected in this way. Th e reference to the Repub-
lic of Poland and the Polish Nation should be regarded as fl awed since they are 
18 Document no. 806, p. 11, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki8ka.nsf/0/EA4AD50371FF6D17
C12580250039936A/%24File/806.pdf (accessed: 19.01.2021).
19 Supreme Court jurisprudence recognises that “proper application means, fi rst, that the 
law recognises the existence of the personal interests of a legal person and, second, that the auto-
matic application of the rules on the protection of those interests is excluded on account of the 
diff erences resulting from the structural and functional distinctiveness of natural persons and 
legal persons and, third, that the rule is comprehensive in nature and does not prejudge which 
interests of the legal person are protected” (Supreme Court judgement of 5 April 2013 III CSK 
















































141Protection of the Reputation of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation
not civil law entities. Claims for violating the good name are closely related to 
the wronged party and therefore the application of Article 24 of the Civil Code 
requires an objective individualisation of the violation of personal rights. Th is 
means that an average recipient of sound mind of an incriminating statement 
should be able to attribute the allegation contained therein to a specifi c entity. 
In the case in question, in order to determine who the intended addressee 
of this regulation was, one can only refer to the Polish Constitution. According 
to the contents of the preamble, the concept of the Polish nation encompasses 
all citizens.20 It can be considered that the identifi cation of members of the 
Polish nation takes place using the legal criterion, which is the possession of 
citizenship of the Republic of Poland. Similarly, in accordance with Article 1 of 
the Polish Constitution, “Th e Republic of Poland shall be the common good 
of all its citizens”. As a result, the Polish state, which is the political emanation 
of the Polish nation, is a legal interest under Article 53o of the IPN Law. On 
this basis, however, we cannot consider that we are dealing with an organisa-
tional unit whose legal interests can be identifi ed and protected under civil law. 
Rather, it should be recognised that the addressee of this regulation is a diff er-
ent type of community of a large size, whose participants are united by the fact 
of having Polish citizenship. However, it is a vague set which, in the opinion 
of the addressee, does not indicate a particular participant. In the general per-
ception, a statement such as “Poles are thieves” does not justify the automatic 
recognition that it concerns a specifi c, individually defi ned natural person or 
every single Pole, even though the statement undoubtedly exceeds the limits of 
admissible criticism.21 A question thus arises whether a statement with defam-
atory accusations against such a generally defi ned community (the Republic of 
Poland and the Polish Nation) violate someone’s good name, and when should 
the violation be considered to have occurred? Is it suffi  cient to subjectively 
convince an individual who feels aff ected by such a statement, or must the vio-
lation of a personal interest be objective in nature?
Th e relevant case law has established the view that it is possible to infringe 
personal rights by making a  statement concerning a  particular community or 
group of persons. However, in such a case, a member of the group may demand 
protection of their personal rights if the circumstances in which the action took 
place allow the addressees to identify that person as belonging to that group.22 
20 See: “[…] the Polish Nation – all citizens of the Republic, Both those who believe in God as 
the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, As well as those not sharing such faith but respecting 
those universal values as arising from other sources, equal in rights and obligations towards the 
common good – Poland […]”.
21 More on this topic: J. Barta, R. Markiewicz, ‘Dobre imię zbiorowości’, in: J. Barta, R. Mar-
kiewicz (eds.), Media a dobra osobiste, Warszawa 2009, p. 55f.















































142 Agnieszka Kubiak Cyrul
If the content of the publication refers to a  group whose composition is un-
known, the “wronged party” entitled to make the claims provided for in Article 
24 of the Civil Code cannot be identifi ed. It is further assumed that the assess-
ment of whether a breach of good repute has occurred cannot be made according 
to the criterion of the individual sensitivity of the person concerned. It is neces-
sary to apply objective criteria for assessing whether an incriminating statement 
actually applied to a particular person.23 
However, both the doctrine and case law allow a departure from the prin-
ciple of individualisation of the infringement of the good name if a statement 
is especially negative and touches on questions especially socially sensitive.24 
In such a  case, defaming a  group or community may also infringe the good 
name of its members and those identifying with it, even if the statement itself is 
not addressed at a specifi c individual. Th is is precisely the emotional charge of 
statements denying crimes against humanity or those attributing Nazi crimes 
to Poles. Th is was clearly highlighted by the Appellate Court in Warsaw, whose 
ruling pointed out that “Defaming a community who signifi cantly impacted 
the development of a person’s personality is a form of denigrating their dignity. 
(…) Th erefore, any allegations to the eff ect that Poles are responsible or co-re-
sponsible for the Holocaust, that they killed the Jews during the Second World 
War and confi scated their property then, in the opinion of the appellate court 
touch upon the area of national heritage and as a consequence, as grossly untrue 
and detrimental, may result in an unlawful violation of (pose a risk to) legally 
protected personal rights of Polish nationals. Th ey may signifi cantly impact 
one’s sense of national dignity, destroying the legitimate, fact-based conviction 
that Poland was a victim of the warfare initiated and conducted by the Ger-
mans and Polish citizens, also of Jewish extraction, and bore the far-reaching, 
oft en atrocious and irreversible consequences of these actions”.25 At the same 
time, the Appellate Court recalled that even in such drastic cases recognition 
of infringement of personal rights calls for objective assessment criteria that 
involve “typical feelings of an average individual, an opinion of sound-thinking 
and disinterested individuals. Such assessment must take into account a wid-
er social context and only with this in view establish whether a given action 
had the nature of infringement of a  personal right in common opinion”.26 
23 See Supreme Court judgement – Civil Chamber, of 11 March 1997 III CKN 33/97. Le-
galis. Supreme Court judgement – Civil Chamber, of 29 September 2010 V CSK 19/10. Legalis.
24 See M. Jabczuga-Kurek, ‘Legitymacja czynna członka zbiorowości w nietypowych sprawach 
o ochronę czci i dobrego imienia’, [in:] Usus magister est Optimus. Rozprawy prawnicze ofi arowane 
Profesorowi Andrzejowi Kubasowi, Warszawa 2016, pp. 67–77.
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Importantly, an objective test should moreover take into consideration the val-
ues related to free public debate and freedom of research. 
However, there is no need, in order to achieve this objective, to introduce 
a specifi c legal basis for the protection of the good name of the Republic of 
Poland and the Polish Nation. Firstly, it is generally recognised in doctrine and 
case law that in civil law relations it is the State Treasury that epitomises the 
Polish State, so it is surprising to create equivalent structures for very specif-
ic purposes.27 Th e State Treasury has legal personality pursuant to Article 33 
of the Civil Code, thanks to which the Polish State may participate in civil 
law relation, also with regard to the protection of personal rights.28 In light of 
the justifi cation of the draft  law, the omission of the construction of the State 
Treasury can be seen as deliberate. For the purposes of this regulation, an at-
tempt was made in the justifi cation to attribute to the Republic of Poland and 
the Polish Nation personal rights analogous to those of legal persons. In this 
way, the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation were recognised as a kind 
of civil law entities with respect to the protection of their good name. Th ere is 
no doubt that, given the normative concept of legal persons under Polish law, 
subjectivity in civil law cannot be the result of a presumption. Th erefore, the 
solution adopted in Article 53o of the IPN Law should be seen as negative29. 
It complicates the identifi cation of individual interests of the subject of the 
protected right in light of the provisions on the protection of personal rights; 
it is actually in confl ict with the developed concept of assessing statements con-
cerning a given community from the perspective of these provisions. 
Th e possibility of recognising the good name of the Republic of Poland and 
the Polish Nation as a personal right within the meaning of Article 23 of the 
Civil Code raises similar doubts. It should be stressed that the construction of 
civil law protection of personal rights of legal persons is already an institution 
with well-established premises of application, which are commonly accepted 
in doctrine and case law.30 Th e personal rights held by each legal person are 
27 See A. Kubiak Cyrul, ‘Komentarz do art. 34 KC’, in: M. Załucki (ed.), Kodeks cywilny. Ko-
mentarz, Warszawa 2019, p. 83f.
28 However, its organisational structure is not similar to that of other legal entities. It corre-
sponds to the tasks of the state carried out by state agendas.
29 See also: B. Lackoroński, ‘Komentarz do art. 53o’, in: K. Osajda (ed.), Ustawa o Instytucie Pa-
mięci Narodowej – Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu. Komentarz [online], 
Warszawa 2020, LEGALIS (accessed: 19.01.2020); R. Guzik, Komentarz do ustawy o Instytucie 
Pamięci Narodowej – w zakresie zmian wprowadzonych ustawami z dnia 26 stycznia 2018 r. oraz 
z dnia 27 czerwca 2018 r. [online], System Informacji Prawnej LEX, Warszawa 2019 (accessed: 
19.01.2020).
30 See M. Pazdan, ‘Komentarz do art. 43 KC’, in: K. Pietrzykowski (ed.), Komentarz KC, vol. 1, 
Warszawa 2018, art.  43, Nt: 1; P.  Sobolewski, ‘Komentarz do art.  43 KC’, in: K.  Osajda (ed.), 
Komentarz KC, Warszawa 2018, Nt: 1; G. Gorczyński, ‘Komentarz do art. 43 KC’, in: M. Fras, 















































144 Agnieszka Kubiak Cyrul
non-economic rights of an absolute nature and their protection is based on 
the principle of presumption of illegality and the objective nature of the in-
fringement. Th eir identifi cation should take into account the specifi c design, 
objectives pursued and functioning of the entity in question. In the case of le-
gal persons, it is agreed that personal rights are non-economic rights by which 
a  legal person can function in accordance with their scope of activities.31 In 
light of the provision under Chapter 6c of the IPN Law, it is diffi  cult to recog-
nise that this type of subjective right is held by the Polish Nation or the Repub-
lic of Poland. How can one determine the sphere of personal interests subject 
to protection and to indicate the scope of the attendant standard prohibiting 
third parties from interference and creation of threats? When assessing wheth-
er there has been a  violation of personal interests, one should be guided by 
objective assessments accepted in society, which is also diffi  cult in the case of 
a violation of the good name of the Polish Nation or the Republic of Poland, 
because it requires the application of an external assessment criterion. Impor-
tantly, regulations on personal rights are intended to protect the individual 
interests of civil law entities rather than the public interest.
A good name, or reputation, is one of the most frequently infringed per-
sonal rights of legal persons. Th e good name of a legal person may be violated 
if such person is accused of improper conduct, in circumstances which may 
result in the loss of the trust necessary to achieve the objectives pursued by 
it in the course of its business.32 Th is is most oft en the result of publication 
of false information, unjustifi ed negative assessments or manipulation of true 
information in order to create a false and negative perception of the subject in 
the recipients of such information. In this context, recognition that the good 
name of the “individual”, of which all citizens of the Republic of Poland are 
the personal substrate, has been violated requires the use of too many general-
izations. It is up to the wronged party to prove that there has been a threat or 
violation of a particular personal right. It is diffi  cult to apply this mechanism 
when the victim is identifi ed in the way specifi ed in Article 53o of the IPN 
Law. Empowering an independent institution, an organisational unit which is 
part of the state structure, i.e. the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), 
to decide whether, for example, an infringement of a good name has occurred, 
is a solution which is foreign to the private law system. How is a court expected 
to verify whether a threat or violation of the good name of the Polish Nation 
has actually occurred? In particular, how to demonstrate that as a result of this 
31 See Supreme Court judgement of 14.11.1986, II CR 295/86, OSNCP 1988, no. 2–3, item 
40; Supreme Court judgement of 11.8.2016, I CSK 419/15, Legalis and M. Pazdan, ‘Komentarz 
do art. 43 KC’…, op. cit., art. 43, Nt: 4; G. Gorczyński, ‘Komentarz do art. 43 KC’…, op. cit., NB: 5.
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event, the Polish Nation has suff ered legally signifi cant damage, which could 
be remedied under the provisions on the protection of personal rights?
It should also be emphasised that Article 53o of the Institute of Nation-
al Remembrance (IPN) Law may be the basis of an action not only in the case 
of publication of statements concerning “Polish death camps”, but also in any 
case in which the IPN or an authorised non-governmental organisation deems 
a given statement to be detrimental to the good name of the Polish Nation or 
the Republic of Poland, regardless of whether it concerns past or current events. 
Th e above gives rise to serious concerns. Th e construction of the protection of 
personal rights in civil law is based on the presumption of unlawfulness. It is for 
the defendant to demonstrate that his action was not unlawful. Th is mechanism 
may “freeze” public debate, as its participants will refrain from actively partici-
pating and exercising their freedom of expression for fear of lawsuits. Th e open-
ing up of the possibility of transferring a discussion on Polish history or current 
policy to a courtroom, when a court will have to decide whether, for example, the 
scientifi c fi ndings of historians showing the wickedness of members of the Polish 
Nation are true and whether their dissemination violates the good name of the 
Polish Nation, should also be a matter of concern. Undoubtedly, the construc-
tion of the protection of the good name of the Polish Nation set out in Article 
53o of the Law on the Institute of National Remembrance in this respect may 
interfere with the exercise of freedoms protected by, among others, Articles  9 
and 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as well as Articles 54 and 73 of the Polish Constitution. 
Th e scope of claims which can be made on the basis of Article 53o of the 
IPN Law raises further doubts. In principle, in the case of violation of the good 
name of a legal person, the scope of claims is defi ned in Article 24 CC in con-
junction with Article 43 CC.33 Th e protection measures to which the wronged 
party is entitled include claims of a non-pecuniary nature: a demand for the 
cessation of acts jeopardising or infringing personal rights, a demand for the 
removal of the eff ects of the infringement, and claims of a pecuniary nature: 
a demand for monetary compensation or the payment of a sum of money by 
the off ender for a specifi ed social purpose. Moreover, on the basis of Article 
189 of the CCP, it is generally accepted to fi le a claim for determination. Im-
portantly, Art. 24 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies, which states that 
if a violation of personal rights results in property damage, the wronged party 
may demand that it be repaired on general principles.
Th e most controversial issue is the admissibility of a legal person claiming fi -
nancial compensation for infringement of their personal rights. Th e assessment 
33 See A.  Kubiak Cyrul, ‘Komentarz do art.  43 KC’, in: M.  Załucki (ed.), Kodeks cywilny. 
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of the legitimacy of a claim for monetary compensation and the payment of 
a sum of money for an indicated social purpose is made on the basis of Article 
448 CC. Both case law and literature generally accept the admissibility of ap-
plication of Article 448 CC as the basis for awarding monetary compensation 
to a legal person in the case of infringement of their personal rights; however, 
dissenting opinions can also be heard.34 Th is requires recognition that a legal 
person may suff er non-pecuniary damage as a result of an infringement of per-
sonal rights. In addition, in the case of an award of compensation or an ap-
propriate sum of money for a social purpose, it is diffi  cult to consider that the 
claim only has a compensatory function. In the case of legal persons anchored 
in public law, the award of compensation will also serve the functions of grant-
ing satisfaction, sanctioning, preventing, and educating.35 However, compen-
sation for the violation of the good name of the Republic of Poland and the 
Polish Nation does not fall within the scope of the case law to date. Pursuant 
to Article 53o of the IPN Law, the State Treasury is entitled to compensation, 
even though it is not an entity whose reputation is protected under this pro-
vision. Undoubtedly, this will not constitute compensation for the civil law 
entity for the violation of their individual interests. In the case of an award, it 
will rather be a repressive measure or an educational instrument. Th e fact that 
it is not possible to customise the damage to be compensated in this way may 
give rise to fears of arbitrary assessments by those entitled to bring an action.
Conclusions
Th e regulations on the protection of the good name of the Polish Nation or 
the Republic of Poland have been in force since 1 March 2018. However, so 
far there have been no rulings issued on their basis. At the same time, the 
protection off ered by civil law of the sense of national identity as a personal 
interest is increasingly accepted, both in the legal doctrine36 and in case law.37 
34 See Supreme Court judgement of 13.1.2012, I  CSK 790/10, Legalis; Warsaw Appel-
late Court judgement of 6.9.2013 I ACa 456/13, Legalis; Warsaw Appellate Court judgement 
of 1.8.2013, VI ACa 902/12, Legalis, Krakow Appellate Court judgement of 28.9.1999, I ACa 
464/99, Legalis; Warsaw Appellate Court judgement of 9.2.2007, VI ACa 960/06, OSA 2009, 
no. 5, item 16; and G. Gorczyński, ‘Komentarz do art. 43 KC’…, op. cit., NB: 31 and the relevant 
literature quoted there.
35 See Supreme Court judgement of 24.9.2008, II CSK 126/08, OSNC-ZD 2009, no.  B, 
item 58.
36 See J. Panowicz-Lipska, ‘Komentarz do art. 23’, in: M. Gutowski (ed.), Kodeks cywilny, vol. I: 
Komentarz do art. 1–352, Warszawa 2018, Nt. 17.
37 Suffi  ce it to mention a fragment of the Warsaw Appellate Court judgement of 20 January 
2020, V ACa 569/19: “…national identity (sense of belonging to a nation) and national dignity 
(pride of belonging to a nation) are part of a generally and socially accepted set of values which may 
constitute an important element of a person’s state of consciousness and aff ections and, if they are 
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It is therefore necessary to propose the revocation of the provisions of the IPN 
Law under discussion, which in their current wording will not contribute to 
eliminating critical statements made abroad about the Polish Nation or the 
Republic of Poland. In Poland, in turn, they may constitute a constraint on 
the public debate and the freedom of research. A transfer of historical disputes 
to a courtroom will by no means further knowledge of the truth and will not 
lead to the reconciliation of the parties. 
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Abstract 
In 2018, the Law on the Institute of National Remembrance introduced special pro-
tection of the good name of the Republic of Poland and the Polish Nation. Th is regu-
lation deserves a more detailed analysis, because it is an unusual case of application of 
civil law institutions to protect public interests. At the same time, the manner in which 
this protection is regulated raises numerous concerns as to its subjective and objective 
scope and the civil protection measures of the “wronged party”. Analysis of the forego-
ing leads to the conclusion that the provisions in their current form will not contribute 
to the elimination of critical statements expressed abroad against the Polish Nation or 
the Republic of Poland, while in Poland they may both constrain the public debate and 
the freedom of research.
Keywords: protection of the reputation of the Republic of Poland and the Polish 


















































Constitutional courts vs. jurisprudence of international 
tribunals in a question of just compensation for the losses 
incurred as a result of international crimes1 
Introduction
In connection with the o ngoing process of judicialisation, courts, including 
international tribunals, are playing an increasingly important role in shaping 
not only international but also domestic relations.2 However, the infl uence of 
international tribunals depends not only on the content of international agree-
ments, which constitute the basis for their functioning and on the number of 
parties to such agreements, but also on the solutions of national constitutional 
law. International courts tend to agree that in the event of a confl ict between 
a rule of international law and a rule of national law, the rule of internation-
al law takes precedence, while Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties lays down that “A party may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justifi cation for its failure to perform a treaty”.3 On the other 
hand, however, it is the national constitutional law that determines the place 
of international law in the national legal order and, indirectly, the eff ectiveness 
of judgements of international courts. E. Denza believes that the adoption of 
a monistic or dualistic theory in a given national legal system is of secondary 
importance for determining the relationship between international law and 
national law. Th e rules of national constitutional law are of fundamental im-
portance for the determination of this relationship.4 On the other hand, na-
tional constitutional law is subject to interpretation by the national constitu-
tional court. As a rule, the latter is reluctant to give up the monopoly of having 
1 Th is article was written as part of research project no.  WPAiSM/DS/17/2017-KON, fi -
nanced from funds for statutory activity of Faculty of Law, Administration and International Rela-
tions of Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University.
2 Cf. A. v. Bogdandy, I. Venzke, ‘Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Law-
makers’, German Law Journal, 2011, p. 979.
3 E. Denza, ‘Th e Relationship between international and national law’, in: M.D. Evans (ed.), 
International Law, Oxford 2010, p. 413, cf. K. Culver, M. Guidice, ‘Not a system but an Order’, 
in: J. Dickson, P. Eleft heriadis (eds.), Philosphical Foundations of EU law, Oxford 2012, p. 56 ff . 















































150 Magdalena Bainczyk 
the fi nal say in legal disputes, very oft en of signifi cant political importance, in 
a given country. Th erefore, the reception of international tribunals in the juris-
prudence of national constitutional courts has a signifi cant impact on the ac-
tual position of international tribunals in multi-tiered legal systems. Th e paper 
will focus on the verifi cation of the above thesis by referring to examples of the 
jurisprudence of constitutional courts, with a special reference to the Italian 
and German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC).
Admittedly, the inclusion of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(hereinaft er referred to as CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinaft er referred to as ECHR) alongside international courts of a universal 
nature may give rise to doubts, due to the specifi c relationship between, respec-
tively, EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms and national constitutional law. Despite the unique position of the 
European Courts in both relevant literature and the case law of the constitution-
al courts, the European international courts are taken into account together with 
the international courts, especially when it comes to the constitutional restric-
tions on the application of legal rules originating from another legal system in 
the national legal order. An example of such an approach is the thesis contained 
in the judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court of 22 October 2014, which 
will be the subject of a more detailed analysis below. In this judgment, the Con-
stitutional Court stated: “As was upheld several times by this Court, there is no 
doubt that the fundamental principles of the constitutional order and inalienable 
human rights constitute a ‘limit to the introduction (…) of generally recognized 
rules of international law, to which the Italian legal order conforms under Arti-
cle 10, para. 1 of the Constitution’ ( Judgment no. 48/1979 and no. 73/2011) 
and serve as ‘counter-limits’ [controlimiti] to the entry of European Union law (ex 
plurimis: Judgments no. 183/1973, no. 170/1984, no. 232/1989, no. 168/1991, 
no.  284/2007), as well as limits to the entry of the Law of Execution of the 
Lateran Pacts and the Concordat ( Judgments no. 18/1982, no. 32, no. 31 and 
no. 30/1971).”5 Th e aforementioned similarity of conditions for the reception 
of legal rules originating in legal systems which are “foreign” with respect to the 
national system and also to the case of law of international courts, which provide 
interpretations of these rules, is oft en backed up by a close relationship between 
constitutional provisions concerning the position of international law and the 
position of EU law in the domestic legal order. We should mention here Art. 10 
and Art. 11 of the Italian Constitution,6 Art. 23 and Art. 25 of the Basic Law for 
5 Th e Italian Constitutional Court, Judgement of 22 October 2014, fi le no.  238/2014, 
para. 3.2., https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/
S238_2013_en.pdf  (accessed 15.10.2018).
6 Constitution of the Italian Republic of 22 December 1947, Art. 10. Th e Italian legal system 
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the Federal Republic of Germany7 (hereinaft er referred to as BL). Th e constitu-
tional principle of openness to international law is the basis for the development 
of the principle of openness of the law towards EU law or the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, which takes place also in Po lish constitutional law.8
Th e relationship between the European constitutional courts and the 
CJEU and the ECHR is the subject of the most extensive case law of the con-
stitutional courts of European countries. Th e above-mentioned jurisprudence 
of national constitutional courts, including the constitutional basis for the 
application of European la w and CJEU and ECHR rulings, respectively, are 
among the best explored and described relations between constitutional courts 
and international courts, within the framework of the so-called European con-
stitutional law.9 Th e CJEU and its extensive case law play a special role, given 
the level of development of the EU legal system. However, despite the princi-
ple of the precedence of EU law over the national law of the Member States, as 
developed in the CJEU jurisprudence,10 some Member States generally neither 
give absolute precedence to EU law over national law, nor accept uncondition-
ally the CJEU jurisprudence.11
Germany’s FCC has since the early 1970s developed a doctrine of limitations 
to the process of European integration, resulting from the inviolability of the 
constitutional identity of the state, which in the initial phase focused on guar-
anteeing a  level of respect for fundamental rights which would correspond to 
the level of protection defi ned on the basis of BL provisions. Another precursor 
of the above restrictions was, in addition to Germany’s FCC, the Constitutional 
an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement 
of international disputes. Italy agrees, on conditions of equality with other States, to the limitations 
of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. 
Italy promotes and encourages international organisations furthering such ends; https://www.
senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf (accessed 15.10.2018).
7 Th e Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 May 1949, Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bundesgesetzblatt (German Federal Journal of Laws, hereinaft er as 
BGBI.), BGBl. p. 1, as amended. Th e last the amendment(s) to the Act by the by Article 1 of 
the Act of 29 September 2020 (BGBl. I, p. 2048). Art. 23.1. With a view to establishing a united 
Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European 
Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to 
the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a  level of protection of basic rights essentially 
comparable to that aff orded by this Basic Law; https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/ 
(accessed 15.12.2020).
8 M. Bainczyk, Polski i niemiecki Trybunał Konstytucyjny wobec członkostwa państwa w Unii 
Europejskiej, Wrocław 2017, p.  263 nn., https://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/Content/79679/
Polski_i_niemiecki_Trybunal_Konstytucyjny.pdf (accessed 15.12.2020).
9 A.v. Hatje, P.-M. Müller-Graff  (eds.), Enzyklopädie Europarecht, Bd. 1: Europäisches Organi-
sations- und Verfassungsrecht, Baden-Baden 2014.
10 P. Craig, G. de Búrca (eds.), EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford 2008, p. 346.
11 K. Culver, M. Guidice, ‘Not a system’…, op. cit., p. 57; M. Bainczyk, Polski i niemiecki Try-















































152 Magdalena Bainczyk 
Court of Italy, which in its Frontini decision formulated the controlimiti doc-
trine, which lift s the precedence of EU law if its rule violates the core of Italy’s 
Constitution, i.e. human rights.12 Th is doctrine was consistently developed in 
later years.
Since the 1990s to date, to protect the inviolable constitutional identity, Ger-
many’s FCC has developed the doctrine of the democracy rule, seen as the re-
tention of decision-making competence in matters of prime importance for the 
state by the national parliament, i.e. the Bundestag.13 In 2005, in a judgment con-
cerning the accession treaty, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal made a creative 
reception of the doctrine of limiting the eff ectiveness of EU law in the national 
legal order, due to the possible contradiction of these rules with the superior rules 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.14
Within this trend to limit the eff ectiveness of norms of EU law violating the 
constitutional identity of the Federal Republic of Germany we can also invoke 
the FCC’s decision of 6 July 2010,15 where Germany’s FCC allowed the applica-
tion of the ultra vires doctrine to CJEU decisions. In the case at hand, the FCC 
referenced the judgement of CJEU, where the latter allowed a direct application 
of a directive in a horizontal relation before the deadline for its implementation.16 
Th e FCC observed that its review of ultra vires is exceptional and can take place 
12 Th e Italian Constitutional Court, Judgement of 18 December 1973, fi le no.  183/1973: 
F.C. Mayer, M. Wendel, ‘§ 4 Die Verfassungsrechtlichen Grundlagen des Europarechts’, in: A. Hat-
je, P.-Ch. Müller-Graff , Enzyklopädie Europarecht, Bd. 1: Europäisches Organisations- und Verfas-
sungsrecht, Baden-Baden 2014, no. 220 ff ; A. Kustra, Przepisy i normy integracyjne w konstytucjach 
wybranych państw członkowskich UE, Toruń 2009, p. 156 ff .
13 M. Bainczyk, Polski i niemiecki Trybunał…, op. cit., p. 322.
14 Judgement of the Polish Constitutional Court of  24 November 20 05, fi le no.   K 18/04, 
thesis 11 “Given its supreme legal force (Article 8(1)), the Constitution enjoys precedence of 
binding force and precedence of application within the territory of the Republic of Poland. Th e 
precedence over statutes of the application of international agreements which were ratifi ed on the 
basis of a statutory authorisation or consent granted (in accordance with Article 90(3)) via the 
procedure of a nationwide referendum, as guaranteed by Article 91(2) of the Constitution, in no 
way signifi es an analogous precedence of these agreements over the Constitution.”; thesis 14 “Th e 
principle of interpreting domestic law in a manner that is “favourable to European law”, as formu-
lated within the Constitutional Tribunal’s jurisprudence, has its limits. In no event may it lead to 
results contradicting the explicit wording of constitutional norms or being irreconcilable with the 
minimum guarantee functions realised by the Constitution. In particular, the norms of the Con-
stitution within the fi eld of individual rights and freedoms indicate a minimum and unsurpassable 
threshold which may not be lowered or questioned as a result of the introduction of Community 
provisions.”, translation in: Studia i Materiały Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, vol. LI, ‘Selected rulings 
of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal concerning the Law of the European Union (2002–2014)’, 
Warszawa 2014.
15 Th e German Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 6 July 2010, Honeywell, fi le no. BvR 
2661/106; M. Bainczyk, ‘Pomiędzy otwartością a kontrolą ultra vires – orzeczenie niemieckiego 
Bundesverfassungsgericht dotyczące skutków wyroku TS w sprawie Mangold II’, Europejski Prze-
gląd Sądowy, 2013, no. 5, p. 33 ff ; M. Bainczyk, Pol ski i niemiecki Trybunał…, op. cit., p. 216 ff .
16 Judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 22 November 2005, case 















































153Constitutional courts vs. jurisprudence of international tribunals
in case of a qualifi ed violation of the principle of competence entrusted to an EU 
institution. Th at concept means that the infringement by an EU institution of 
the division of competences is obvious and the contested act results in structur-
al changes in the division of competences between the Member States and the 
EU. Th erefore, the judgment raises doubts from the point of view of the principle 
of delegated competences and being bound by a law, implied by the rule of law 
principle.17 Th e above doctrine of the FCC is further developed in the FCC’s 
decision of 5 Mai 2020,18 which has been directly addressed also to the decision 
of the CJEU,19 recognised by the FCC as ultra vires.
Germany’s FCC adopted moreover a  restrictive approach to the use of 
ECHR’s decisions, stating e.g. that while the principles of being bound by the 
law under Art. 29 para. 3 of BL includes the recognition, within methodologi-
cally permissible interpretation, the laws of the European Human Rights Char-
ter and the decisions of the ECHR, both a  lack of reference to the decisions 
of the ECHR and an automatic “enforcement” of such a decision, which would 
infringe a higher law, might violate the fundamental rights due to the rule of law 
principle.20 Having regard to ECHR rulings, the German state authorities should 
take into account their impact on the national legal order. Th is applies in particu-
lar to the national law subsystem, in which diff erent legal positions protected by 
fundamental rights must be balanced.21 
Th e following analysis will address not only to the relationship between the 
constitutional courts and CJEU and ECHR, described well in the doctrine, but 
the relationship between the constitutional courts and the case law of the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) against the background of the solutions adopted 
by the constitutional courts in relation to the European courts, and in particu-
lar whether parallel solutions exist in this respect. First, the author will briefl y 
17 Order of FCC Honeywell, theses 58–62.
18 Th e German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of of 05 May 2020, fi le no. 2 BvR 
859/15, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2020:rs20200505.2bvr085915.
19  Th e Court of Justice of European Union, Judgment of 11 December 2018, Weiss et al., 
C-493/17, EU:C:2018:1000.
20 Cf. Th e Italian Constitutional Court, Judgment of 26 March 2015, fi le no. 49/2015, para. 
7, whereby “it would be mistaken […] to conclude that the ECHR has turned national legal oper-
ators, including fi rst and foremost the ordinary courts, into passive recipients of an interpretative 
command issued elsewhere in the form of a court ruling, irrespective of the conditions that gave 
rise to it”.
21 Th e German Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 14 October 2004, fi le no.  2 BvR 
1481/04, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2004:rs20041014.2bvr148104, theses 47 and 57 in reference to the 
Judgement of the European Court of Human Rights of 26 February 2004, Görgülü v. Germany, 
no.  74969/01; M.  Bainczyk, ‘Stosowanie Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka i  Podstawo-
wych Wolności przez organy władzy publicznej Republiki Federalnej Niemiec. Studium przypad-
ku’, Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe, 2013, no. 2, pp. 25–43; M. Bainczyk, ‘Wpływ Europej-
skiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka na interpretację praw podstawowych w RFN’, Krakowskie Studia 















































154 Magdalena Bainczyk 
analyse the legal nature of the ICJ case law, then its status in the system of na-
tional constitutional law and possible limitations on the basis of selected judicial 
decisions. What is relevant in the context of the volume, the abovementioned 
case law both of the ICJ and constitutional court relates to the question of just 
compensation for the losses incurred as a  result of international crimes of the   
Th ird Reich during the World War II.
ICJ’s judgements from the point of view of international law
One can distinguish three principal aspects of ICJ’s judgements from the per-
spective of international law. Firstly, in line with Art. 59 of the Statute of ICJ, 
the decision of this Court is eff ective only inter partes, i.e. has no binding force 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case. Th e judgment 
therefore has legal eff ects, but on an international level between the parties to 
a particular dispute. Th e enforcement of the judgment rests with the parties to 
the dispute, who are obliged to do so under Article 94(1) of the UN Charter.22 
If one of the parties fails to execute the judgment, the other party may apply 
the sanctions permitted under international law under the principle of self-
help and, on the basis of Article 94(2) of the UN Charter, request the Security 
Council to take steps to give eff ect to the judgment.23 
Secondly, under Art.  38 para. 1 letter d of the ICJ Statute, they are not 
sources of law, but are subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
ICJ’s judgements may be invoked fi rst of all to justify the occurrence of binding 
legal practice.24 
Th irdly, the general nature of the legal norms referred to the interpretations 
of the ICJ, the nature of international disputes, the manner of formulating de-
cisions on the basis of the chain novel25 construction, and the increasing role 
of international courts might imply the use of the stare decisis principle in ref-
erence to ICJ’s judgements, and thus their law-making character, yet relevant 
literature indicates the unequivocal wording of Art. 59 of the ICJ Statute,26 
22 G. Cataldi, ‘Th e Implementation of the ICJ’s Decision in the Jurisdictional Immunities of 
the State case in the Italian Domestic Order: What Balance should be made between Fundamental 
Human Rights and International Obligations?’, ESIL Refl ections, 2013, vol. 2, issue 2, p. 2.
23 M Schröder, ‘7. Abschnitt. Verantwortlichkeit, Völkerstrafrecht, Streitbeilegung und Sank-
tionen’, in: W. Graf Vitzthum (ed.), Völkerrecht, Berlin 2007, p. 628. As to the procedure under 
Art. 94 section 2 of the Charter of the UN; A. Tanzi, ‘Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of 
the International Court of Justice and the Law of the United Nations’, European Journal of Interna-
tional Law, 1995, no. 6, pp. 539–572.
24 W. Graf Vitzthum, ‘III. Die Rechtsquellen des Völkerrechts’, in: W. Graf Vitzthum (ed.), 
Völkerrecht, Berlin 2007, p. 69 ff .
25 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge 1986, p. 228 ff .
26 H. Th irlway, Th e Sources of International Law, Oxford 2014, p. 120; J. Klabbers, Internation-















































155Constitutional courts vs. jurisprudence of international tribunals
while the Court itself stated that “It is not a question of holding [the parties 
to the current case] to decisions reached by the Court in previous cases. Th e 
real question is whether, in his case, there is cause not to follow the reason-
ing and conclusions of earlier cases.”27 On the other hand, the interpretation 
of the doctrine indicates that the judgements are treated as precedents. Th e 
above dilemma concerning the eff ects of ICJ’s judgements inter partes versus 
erga omnes resembles in fact the disputes concerning the legal ramifi cations of 
CJEU’s judgements.28
From the perspective of this article, it is fi rst of all vital that the parties are 
bound by ICJ’s judgements and that these judgements are recognised by the 
constitutional court of a given state, which moreover recognise in their case 
law that the ICJ’s judgements are subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law.
ICJ’s judgement in Italian law in light of the judgment 
of the Constitutional Court of Italy of 22 October 2014
A key provision for the determination of the status of international law in Italian 
constitutional law is Art. 10 para. 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Italy,29 
under which Italy’s legal system is compatible with generally adopted principles 
of international law. Th e above provision transforms generally adopted norms 
of international law seen as norms of common law. On the other hand, it is 
disputable whether they gain the status of norms of constitutional law or only 
have priority over statutes.30 Th e following judgment adopts their constitutional 
status. As already indicated, Article 10 of the Italian Constitution is to be read 
in conjunction with Article 11 of the Constitution, which forms the basis for 
Italy’s participation, on the basis of sovereign equality, in the activities of the in-
ternational community with a view to ensuring peace and justice between peo-
ples, which may lead to a reduction in the sovereignty of the state.31 Of prime 
importance for the determination of the status of norms of international law is 
27 Th e International Court of Justice, Judgement of 11 June 1998, Land and Maritime Bound-
ary between Cameroon and Nigeria, 1998 ICJ Rep 275, para. 28.
28 Cf. Art. 267 TFEU; U. Karpenstein, ‘Vorabentscheidungsverfahren’, in: E. Grabitz, M. Hilf, 
M. Nettesheim (eds.), Das Recht der Europäischen Union, 64rd ed., München 2018, para. 104–106.
29  Article 10 [International Law] (1) Th e legal system of Italy conforms to the generally recog-
nized principles of international law.
30 P. Kunig, ‘2. Abschnitt. Völkerrecht und staatliches Recht’, in: W. Graf Vitzthum (ed.), Völk-
errecht, Berlin 2007, p. 107.
31 Art. 11. Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples 
and as a means for the settlement of international disputes. Italy agrees, on conditions of equality 
with other States, to the limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring 
peace and justice among the Nations. Italy shall promote and encourage international organisa-















































156 Magdalena Bainczyk 
also Art. 117, under which they have precedence over domestic law.32 One of 
the most interesting decisions of the Constitutional Court of Italy concerning 
the relation between Italian constitutional law and international law, in particular 
concerning ICJ’s judgements, is a decision of 22 October 2014.33 It concerns the 
enforcement of ICJ’s judgement of 3 February 2012, issued in the case Germany 
v. Italy, Greece intervening.34 In 2008, the Federal Republic of Germany began 
a procedure against Italy in the International Court of Justice, claiming that Italy 
had violated international law, in particular jurisdiction immunity of the Federal 
Republic of Germany before Italian courts. Th e violation in question consisted in 
allowing civil cases aiming at receipt of compensation by natural persons for the 
losses incurred as a result of international crimes of the Th ird Reich during World 
War II. Furthermore, the infringement of international immunity was to involve 
commencement of enforcement from a property belonging to Germany, located 
in Italy, i.e. the Villa Viagoni, and enforcement in Italy of rulings of Greek courts, 
granting compensation to Greek citizens because of the mass murder committed 
by German troops in the Greek town of Distomo in 1944. 
Importantly, the rulings of both Italian and Greek courts35 were adopted 
due to the consistent policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. minimis-
ing payments of compensation to natural persons, not German nationals, for 
the losses incurred due to the illegal action of the Th ird Reich during World 
War II.36 H.G. Hockerts observes that 90% of the victims of the criminal activ-
ity of the Th ird Reich were not German citizens, while aft er World War II only 
10% of the amount for compensation was disbursed to this group of people.37 
For example, by the end of 2019, 48.454 billion euro were paid to German 
citizens or former German citizens under only one federal compensation law 
(German Bundesentschädigungsgesetz, BEG).38 Polish citizens are estimated 
32 Art. 117 Legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance 
with the Constitution and with the constraints deriving from EU-legislation and international 
obligations.
33 Cf. note 4.
34 https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/143 (accessed 4.08.2018).
35 Th e Italian Court of Cassation, Judgment of 11March 2004, fi le no. 5044/2004 Ferrini, Th e 
Italian Court of Cassation, Judgment of 13 January 2009, fi le no. 1072/2008 Milde; Th e Greek 
Supreme Court (Areios Pagos), Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Judgment of 
4 Mai 2000, no. 11/2007.
36 M. Bainczyk, ‘Asymetria odszkodowań dla obywateli Polski za szkody poniesione w II woj-
nie światowej w stosunku do odszkodowań wypłaconych obywatelom innych państw’, Przegląd 
Zachodni, 2019, no 1, p. 83 ff .; K.H. Roth, H. Rübner, Wyparte. Odroczone. Odrzucone. Niemiecki 
dług reparacyjny wobec Polski i Europy, Poznań 2020, p. 259 ff .
37  H.G. Hockerts, ‘Die Entschädigung für NS-Verfolgte in West- und Ost-Europa. 
Eine einführende Skizze’, in: H.G. Hockerts, C.  Moisel, T.  Winstel (eds.), Grenzen der 
Wiedergutmachung, Göttingen 2006, pp. 7–8.
38 Bundesministerium der Finanzen- Referat V B 4, Bundesministerium der Finanzen- Referat 















































157Constitutional courts vs. jurisprudence of international tribunals
to have received from Germany compensation in the amount of 1.429 billion 
euro, with a vast majority of this money paid aft er 2000.39
Citizens of the occupied states did not receive compensation under Ger-
man law, in particular the above compensation law (BEG) of 1953, which was 
based on the territorial criterion, i.e. granted compensation to persons living 
in the Federal Republic of Germany. Some of the victims were granted little 
compensation under bilateral international agreements, concluded in fact 
by Germany under the pressure of international opinion.40 Since no further 
compensation could be obtained under both international law and German 
law, and the legal remedies brought in such cases before German courts were 
ineff ective,41 the victims brought actions for damages before national courts, 
respectively Greek and Italian courts, which did violate the principle of State 
immunity before national courts, yet gave priority to the principle of respect 
for human rights and awarded compensation to citizens who had suff ered as 
a result of the German occupation.42
A similar case in Poland is the case of W.N., a Polish citizen, who suff ered 
severe injuries as a result of the massacre of the Polish population in the village 
of Szczecyn in 1944.43 However, unlike the Greek and Italian courts, the Polish 
Supreme Court, by virtue of a decision of 29 October 201044 ruled that at the 
present stage of development of international law, the German state is eligible 
to jurisdiction immunity in matters related to compensation for illegal action 
carried out by German armed forces during World War II in the territory of 
Poland.45
ber 2019, https://www.bundesfi nanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Th emen/
Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Vermoegensrecht_und_Entschaedigungen/leistungen-oeffentlichen-
hand-wiedergutmachung.pdf ?__blob=publicationFile&v=8 (accessed 07.02.2021) .
39 J. Sułek, ‘Od odszkodowań indywidualnych do pomocy humanitarnej i  świadczeń fi nan-
sowych. Bilans wypłat z Niemiec z lat 1991–2011 dla ofi ar nazizmu w Polsce’, in: W.M. Góralski 
(ed.), Przełom i wyzwanie. XX lat polsko-niemieckiego traktatu o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej 
współpracy, Warszawa 2011, p. 582.
40 K.H. Roth, H. Rübner, Reparationsschuld. Hypotheken der deutschen Besatzungsherrschaft  in 
Griechenland und Europa, Berlin 2017, p. 106 ff .
41 M. Bainczyk, ‘Raporty Służb Naukowych Bundestagu w sprawie reparacji wojennych dla 
Polski i  odszkodowań dla polskich obywateli’, IZ Policy Papers, no.  26, p.  34 ff ., https://www.
iz.poznan.pl/plik,pobierz,2721,ea91761886de622fcde600b1b566318e/IZ%20Policy%20
Papers%2026.pdf (accessed 7.10.2018).
42  G. Cataldi, ‘Th e Implementation of the ICJ’s’…, op. cit., p. 1.
43 D. Brewing, W cieniu Auschwitz. Niemieckie masakry polskiej ludności cywilnej 1939–1945, 
Poznań 2019, pp. 10–13, in German D. Brewing, Im Schatten von Auschwitz: deutsche Massaker an 
polnischen Zivilisten 1939–1945, Darmstadt 2016.
44 File no.  IV CSK 465/09, cf. the Italian Supreme Court – Civil Section, the Ferrini case 
(2004).
45 M. Wasiński, ‘Immunitet państwa a jurysdykcja terytorialna (na tle orzeczenia SN w sprawie 
Natoniewski v. RFN)’, Państwo i Prawo, 2012, no. 10, p. 72 ff .; M. Kałduński, ‘State Immunity and 















































158 Magdalena Bainczyk 
A similar position was taken by the ICJ in its judgement of 3 February 2012, 
stating that the Italian Republic had violated its obligation to respect the immu-
nity which the Federal Republic of Germany enjoyed under international law by 
allowing civil claims to be brought against it based on violations of international 
humanitarian law committed by the German Reich between 1943 and 1945, by 
taking measures of constraint against Villa Vigoni, by declaring enforceable in It-
aly the decisions of Greek courts based on violations of international humanitar-
ian law committed in Greece by the German Reich,46 Th e ICJ called upon Italy 
to ‘ensure that the decisions of its courts and those of other judicial authorities 
infringing [upon Germany’s immunity] cease to have eff ect’,47 On 21 Decem-
ber 2012, the Italian Parliament passed Law no. 5 which stipulates in its Article 
3 that Italian judges are obliged to decline jurisdiction in pending proceedings 
when the ICJ has ordered Italy to do so.48 
Aft er the ICJ’s judgement, a domestic court in Florence fi led a motion to the 
Constitutional Court of Italy to review the compatibility with Art. 2449 in con-
junction with Art. 250 of the Italian Constitution of the norms which oblige it to 
refuse to hold three judicial proceedings aiming at receipt of compensation by 
Italian citizens for the losses resulting from illegal actions of the Th ird Reich dur-
ing World War II due to the immunity of the state in the interpretation adopted 
by the ICJ of 3 February 2012.
Th e Constitutional Court of Italy stated in the ruling of 22 October 2014 
that the motion is to review the compatibility of the rule of international law 
related to state immunity, as interpreted by the ICJ, with the fundamental 
principles of the Italian Constitution: the right to due process under Art. 24 
of the Italian Constitution in conjunction with Art.  2 of this Constitution, 
enshrining the rule of respect for fundamental rights. As the Constitution-
al Court of Italy moreover observed, in this case we deal with the refl ection 
on norms which have the same importance as the constitution.51 Th e fun-
damental principles of constitutional order and the inalienable rights of the 
Law, 2010, p. 235 ff .; R. Nowosielski, ‘State Immunity and the Right of Access to Court. Th e 
Natoniewski Case before the Polish Courts’, Polish Yearbook on International Law, 2010, p. 263 ff .
46 E. Olas, ‘Immunitet jurysdykcyjny państwa (uwagi na tle wyroku MTS)’, Państwo i Prawo, 
2013, no. 12, p. 73 ff .
47 ICJ, judgement of 3 February 2012, Germany v. Italy, Greece intervening, para. 139.
48 G. Cataldi, ‘Th e Implementation of the ICJ’s’…, op. cit., p. 3.
49 Art. 24 of the Italian Constitution All persons are entitled to take judicial action to protect 
their individual rights and legitimate interests. (…) 
50 Art. 2 of the Italian Constitution Th e Republic recognises and guarantees the inviolable 
rights of the person, as an individual and in the social groups within which human personality is 
developed. Th e Republic requires that the fundamental duties of political, economic and social 
solidarity be fulfi lled.
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individual, the characteristic and indispensable elements of this order not sub-
ject to amendment under Art. 138 and Art. 139 of the Italian Constitution, 
constitute limitations for the principles of international law in the meaning of 
Art. 10 para. 1 of the Italian Constitution.52 Should the rule of international 
law be incompatible with the fundamental principles and inviolable rights of 
constitutional order, the principle will not become part of Italian legal order 
and will not be applied as a result.
Th e Constitutional Court of Italy in its earlier case law53 recognised that the 
fundamental right to judicial protection may be limited due to the application 
of state immunity, but the limitation of this right, qualifi ed as an inviolable el-
ement of constitutional legal order, must be justifi ed by the protection of jus-
tifi able public interest. In the present case, the ICJ recognised the principle of 
state immunity as an absolute principle, with the result that the protection of 
the right to justice of victims of war crimes is completely excluded. According 
to the Italian court, however, there is no general interest in the constitutional 
order which would justify such a  far-reaching restriction of the fundamental 
rights of those persons. Th e Constitutional Court of Italy indicated moreover 
that the immunity applies to the typical activities of state authority rather than 
illegal actions which violate the fundamental rights. “Th erefore, in an institu-
tional context characterized by the centrality of human rights, emphasized by 
the receptiveness of the constitutional order to external sources ( Judgment 
no. 349/347), the denial of judicial protection of fundamental rights of the vic-
tims of the crimes at issue (now dating back in time), determines the completely 
disproportionate sacrifi ce of two supreme principles of the Constitution. Th ey 
are indeed sacrifi ced in order to pursue the goal of non-interference with the 
exercise of the governmental powers of the State even when, as in the present 
case, state actions can be considered war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
in breach of inviolable human rights, and as such are excluded from the law-
ful exercise of governmental powers.”54 In light of the above, the Constitutional 
Court answered the fi rst question from the Florence national court as follows: 
“Insofar as the international law of immunity of States from the civil jurisdic-
tion of other States includes acts considered jure imperii that violated interna-
tional law and fundamental human rights, the Court is obliged to declare that, 
to the extent that international law extends immunity to actions for damages 
caused by such serious violations, the referral of Article 10, para. 1 of the Con-
stitution does not operate. Consequently, insofar as the law of immunity from 
52 Idem., para. 3.2.
53 Th e Italian Constitutional Court, Judgement of 2 February 1982, fi le no.  18/1982; 
Th e Italian Constitutional Court, Judgement of 15 July 1992, fi le no. 329/1992.
















































160 Magdalena Bainczyk 
jurisdiction of States confl icts with the aforementioned fundamental principles 
[of the Constitution], it has not entered the Italian legal order and, therefore, 
does not have any eff ect therein.” In the light of the foregoing, a customary rule 
of international law is not incorporated into national law at all if it violates fun-
damental principles and constitutional rights, as was the case with the principle 
of the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state in the case at hand.55
Th e second question referred by the national court of Florence concerned 
the Italian Republic being bound by Art. 94 para. 1 of the UN Charter. Th e 
Constitutional Court of Italy observed that the limitation of state sovereignty 
under Art. 11 of the Italian Constitution by the ICJ is constitutional if nei-
ther the principles nor constitutionally protected rights are violated. Th e above 
confl ict occurs between the law expressing consent to a state being bound by 
the UN Charter, and Art. 2 and Art. 24 of the Constitution, to the extent the 
ICJ’s ruling of 3 February 2012 obliged the Italia state, and thus Italian judges, 
to refuse enforce jurisdiction as to compensation claims for the losses incurred 
as a result of crimes against humanity, which is an obvious violation of the right 
to the judicial protection of fundamental rights.56 
Th e Constitutional Court of Italy moreover found the incompatibility of 
Art. 3 of Law no. 5/2013 with Art. 24 in conjunction with Art. 2 of the Ital-
ian Constitution, by which Italy authorized the accession and the full execu-
tion of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Th eir 
Property, adopted in New York on 2 December 2004. Art. 3 was adopted, as 
the Parliamentary proceedings prove, in order to ensure explicitly and imme-
diately respect of the ICJ Judgement of 3 February 2012. Th e given provision 
specifi cally regulates the obligation of the Italian State to comply with all of 
the rulings by which the ICJ excluded certain conducts of a foreign State from 
civil jurisdiction. It requires that the judge declares ex offi  cio at any stage of 
the proceeding their lack of jurisdiction, and also provides for an additional 
ground for the revision of fi nal judgments when they confl ict with the ruling 
of the ICJ. As such, the impugned law also derogates from the what has been 
explicitly established in the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Im-
munities of States and their Property. Th is is confi rmed by the interpretative 
declaration deposited by the Italian government at the time of the accession, 
which explicitly excludes the application of the Convention and its limitations 
to the rule of immunity in case of damages or injuries caused by the activity of 
armed forces in the territory of the State of the court seized.57
55 Critically as to the answer to the fi rst question; C. Pinelli, ‘Decision no 238/2014: between 
fi ction and constitutional principles’, Questions of International Law, 2015, p. 35, 39.
56 Th e Italian Constitutional Court, Judgement no. 238, 2014, para 4.1.
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Importantly, the above ruling clearly recognises the incompatibility of the 
principle of state immunity in the interpretation of the ICJ in its judgement 
of 3 February 2012 in a particular factual state and the obligation of enforcing 
this ruling by the Italian state, which arises both from Art. 94 para. 1 of the UN 
Charter and from a specifi c provision of the law concerning the UN Convention 
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Th eir Property with inviolable norms 
of the Italian Constitution, establishing the respect for the fundamental rights. 
Importantly, the Constitutional Court of Italy applied in this case a construct 
recognisable from its jurisprudence, concerning the application of Communi-
ty law, where it clearly indicated the norms of the Italian Constitution as refer-
ence norms of the so-called “counterlimits doctrine” (dottrina dei controlimiti).58 
Art. 2 of Italy’s Constitution is an inviolable rule, and the standard of fundamen-
tal rights protection cannot be lowered as a result of application of a rule of EU 
law, a ruling of the CJEU, a provision of international law, and a ruling by the 
ICJ. Characteristically, the ruling under discussion contains numerous references 
to the case law of the Constitutional Court of Italy concerning limitations on the 
use of EC/EU law in the Italian legal system. In this respect, then, we can speak 
about parallel limitations applied in the case of EU and international law.59
Conditional openness of the German legal order 
to international law in the light of the case law of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court (FCC)
Th e Basic Law of Germany makes no specifi c provision concerning the eff ec-
tiveness of ICJ judgments in the German legal system. On the other hand, 
the wording of the preamble and a  number of the provisions60 helped for-
mulate the principle of the BL’s favourable treatment of international law 
(Völkerrechtsfr eundlichkeit).61 Th is principle applies also to the case law of inter-
national courts, not only with the inter partes eff ect. Th e FCC defi ned this prin-
ciple in the context of rulings of the ECHR as follows: “(…) for against the back-
ground that the decisions of international courts have at least a de facto eff ect as 
precedents, the Basic Law is intended, where possible, to avoid confl icts between 
58 G. Boggero, ‘Th e Legal Implications of Sentenza no.  238/2014 by Italy’s Constitutional 
Court for Italian Municipal Judges: Is Overcoming the ‘Triepelian Approach’ Possible?’, Zeitschrift  
für ausländisches öff entliches Recht, 2016, no. 76, p. 204.
59 G. Cataldi, ‘Th e Implementation of the ICJ’s’…, op. cit., p. 5 ff .
60 Preamble of the BL “(…) Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal 
partner in a united Europe, the German people”, cf. Art. 1 para. 2, Art. 9 para. 2, Art. 23–25, Art. 59 
para. 2 of the BL, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0017
61 K. Vogel, Die Verfassungsentscheidung des Grundgesetzes für eine internationale Zusammen-
arbeit, Tübingen 1964; M.  Herdegen, ‘Präambel’, in: T.  Maunz, G. Dürig (eds.), Grundgesetz-
















































162 Magdalena Bainczyk 
the obligations of the Federal Republic of Germany under international law and 
national law. Th e openness to international law of the Basic Law is thus the ex-
pression of an understanding of sovereignty which is not only in confl ict with an 
integration into international and supranational contexts and their further devel-
opment, but actively presumes and expects them. Against this background, even 
the ‘last word’ of the German constitution is not opposed to an international and 
European dialogue of courts, but is the normative basis for this.”62 Th erefore, this 
principle does not take absolute precedence over other constitutional principles, 
as the constitution as such is the reference point for the reception of international 
law. Its eff ectiveness is limited by the so-called eternity clause under Art. 79 para. 
3 of the BL, which lists the unchanging principles of the German Basic Law, and 
in particular the principles of respect for human dignity and fundamental rights, 
democracy based on the sovereignty of the nation, the separation of powers, as 
well as the rule of law.63
Fundamental for the determination of the place of international law in the 
German legal order is Article 25 of the BL, which states that the general rules of 
international law shall be an integral part of federal law and they shall take prece-
dence over the laws. Moreover Article 9 para. 2 of the BL applies to international 
agreements which, in the light of doctrine, have the status of federal laws, and any 
collisions with later enacted German federal laws should be decided on the basis 
of the principle of friendly approach towards international law.64 
Taking into account, fi rst of all, the principle of friendly approach towards in-
ternational law, German authorities should both execute the obligations arising 
from the ICJ judgment and take into account in their case law its judgments as 
a source of knowledge of law. However, it should be remembered that in the case 
of a confl ict between a provision of international law and German constitutional 
law, if a friendly interpretation cannot be made, the rule of German constitution-
al law will have priority, and in particular the norms qualifi ed in the German legal 
order as unchangeable norms. 
Th e FCC has developed this doctrine primarily in relation to Community/
Union law, but it also has a universal dimension, as refl ected in the FCC’s judg-
ment on the Lisbon Treaty.65 In this judgement the FCC observed that “Th e Ba-
sic Law strives to integrate Germany into the legal community of peaceful and 
62 Th e German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 4 May 2011, fi le no. 2 BvR 2365/09, 
740/10, 2333/08, 1 152/10, para. 89 c.; ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2011:rs20110504.2bvr236509; 
M. Bainczyk, Wpływ Europejskiej Konwencji…, op. cit., p. 44 ff .
63 M. Bainczyk, Polski i niemiecki Trybunał…, op. cit., p. 165 ff .
64 M.  Nettesheim, ‘Art.  59 GG’, in: T.  Maunz, G. Dürig (eds.), Grundgesetz-Kommentar…, 
op. cit., para. 186–187.
















































163Constitutional courts vs. jurisprudence of international tribunals
free states but does not waive the sovereignty contained in the last instance 
in the German constitution as a  right of the people to take constitutive deci-
sions concerning fundamental questions as its own identity. Th ere is therefore 
no contradiction to the aim of openness to international law if the legislature, 
exceptionally, does not comply with international treaty law – accepting, howev-
er, corresponding consequences in international relations – provided this is the 
only way in which a violation of fundamental principles of the constitution can 
be averted.”66 In the above, the FCC accepted, despite the openness of the BL 
to international law, the exceptional non-application of a rule of international 
treaty law if it is contrary to fundamental constitutional principles, supporting its 
ruling with arguments included in the CJEU ruling in the Kadi case.67 Analysing 
compatibility of the regulation issued in connection with the implementation in 
the EU Member States of the UN Security Council resolution, the CJEU did 
not recognise the unconditional primacy of international law over the EU legal 
system, observing that “the obligations imposed by an international agreement 
cannot have the eff ect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC 
Treaty, which include the principle that all Community acts must respect fun-
damental rights, that respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness which 
it is for the Court to review in the framework of the complete system of legal 
remedies established by the Treaty.”68
Th e above doctrine of the FCC is further developed, e.g. in reference to the 
use in the Federal Republic of Germany of the European Human Rights Charter 
as interpreted by the ECHR. As to precautionary measures, the FCC observed 
that “Limits to an interpretation that is open to international law follow from 
the Basic Law. In the fi rst instance, such an interpretation may not result in the 
protection of fundamental rights under the Basic Law being restricted; this is 
also excluded by the European Convention on Human Rights itself (…). Th e pos-
sibilities of interpretation in a manner open to the Convention end where it no 
longer appears justifi able according to the recognised methods of interpretation 
of statutes and of the constitution.”69
66 Th e German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 30 June 2009, fi le no. 2 BvE 2/08, 
ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2009:es20090630.2bve000208, para. 340.
67 M. Bainczyk, ‘Key European Communities and European Union Treaties and accord in the 
case law of the German and the Polish Constitutional Tribunals’, Krakowskie Studia Międzynaro-
dowe, 2017, no. 4, p. 13 ff .
68 CJEU, Judgement of 3 September 2008 in joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P 
(Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Al Barakaat International Foundation), ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, para. 285; 
W. Czapliński, ‘Glosa do wyroku TS z dnia 3 września 2008 r., C-402/05 i C-415/05. Prawo UE 
a prawo międzynarodowe’, Europejski Przegląd Sądowy, 2010, no. 4, p. 38 ff .
69 Th e German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 4 May 2011, fi le no.  2 BvR 















































164 Magdalena Bainczyk 
In a commentary to the BL, M. Nettesheim notes that, where a German pub-
lic authority is obliged to take power in Germany and that obligation is derived 
from an act of foreign authority which may lead to a violation of fundamental 
rights, that authority is bound by an obligation to respect fundamental constitu-
tional rights under Art. 1 para. 3 of the BL.70
Th e above argumentation concerning the possibility of not applying a rule of 
international law in case of its contradiction with the rule of national constitu-
tional law, both in the above-mentioned judgments of the FCC and in the Ger-
man doctrine, is very similar to the argumentation applied by the Italian Con-
stitutional Court in its judgment of 2014. However, this does not change the 
fact that in 2006 the FCC did not apply its own, extensively developed doctrine 
of respect for fundamental rights and reached completely diff erent conclusions 
from those adopted by the Italian Constitutional Court as regards the right to 
compensation for damages suff ered by natural persons as a result of violations of 
international law by soldiers of the Th ird Reich during the Second World War. 
In a decision issued in 2006, the FCC71 did not accept for recognition constitu-
tional complaints of four Greek citizens whose parents had been murdered by SS 
troops in 1944 in Distomo; the complaints concerned the rulings of the German 
state court, a higher state court and of the Supreme Court of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany which dismissed claims for compensation of the plaintiff s and 
did not take into consideration the ruling of the Greek Livadeia court of 30 Oc-
tober 1997, which granted such compensation to the Greek citizens. Th e latter 
claimed in the constitutional complaints lodged with the FCC that the rulings 
of the German courts had violated a number of human rights as guaranteed by 
the BL, the right to personal development under Art. 2 para. 1 of the BL in line 
with the principles of respect for human dignity under Art. 1 para. 1 of the BL 
and with the right to personal inviolability under Art. 2 para. 2 of the BL, and 
the right to equal treatment under Art. 3 para. 1 of the BL. Th e FCC moreover 
observed that the activities of the SS troops were under the authority of the Th ird 
Reich and is subject to jurisdiction immunity.72 
Moreover, the ratio decidendi included less or more bizarre legal constructs 
or evaluations. One of them stipulated that the accountability of the state for the 
unlawful activities of its offi  cials under §  839f Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) 
is excluded due to § 7 of the law on the accountability of the Reich for its offi  -
cials of 22 May 1910,73 which required reciprocity between Germany and the 
country of origin of the claimant. Such reciprocity in the recognition of claims 
70 M. Nettesheim, ‘Art. 59 GG’…, op. cit., para. 225.
71  Th e German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 15 January 2006, fi le no. 2 BvR 
1476/03, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2006:rk20060215.2bvr147603. 
72 Ibid., para. 18.
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for compensation from the treasury was only established between Greece and 
Germany aft er the Second World War.74 Taking into account the above reason-
ing and the German courts’ assessment of the actions of the SS as a mere act of 
the authority of the state, it may well be the case that Greece guaranteed such 
reciprocity only in 1957. Otherwise, it could theoretically have been held liable 
for the damage suff ered by Th ird Reich offi  cers in connection with the occupa-
tion of Greece. Even more controversial arguments concern the assessment of SS 
actions as not related to National Socialist unlawfulness (NS-Unrecht) and thus 
not subject to compensation under the provisions on compensation for Nation-
al Socialist unlawfulness.75 Th is statement is important because the concept of 
National Socialist injustice was used in the German policy of dividing victims 
in order to assign them to diff erent categories and diff erentiate their legal status, 
which also led to the payment of diff erentiated benefi ts.76 Th e FCC did not fi nd 
an infringement of the law to equal treatment under Art. 3 para. 1 of the BL since 
“(…) the legislator is not prevented from making a distinction between a gener-
al plight of persons aff ected by the war, although diffi  cult and connected with 
the infringement of international law and the victims which were in a particular 
manner subject to ideologically-based persecution.”77
Conditional openness of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland 
to international law?
Th e above considerations concerning the limitation of the application of a rule 
of international law in the domestic legal order due to its incompatibility with 
fundamental constitutional principles is of signifi cant importance from the 
perspective of Poland, in particular in the context of the motion submitted 
by a group of Members of the Polish Parliament to the Polish Constitutional 
Court in October 2017.78 Th e object of the request is not to examine the com-
patibility of a rule of international law with the Constitution of the Republic 
74 Th e German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 15 January 2006, fi le no. 2 BvR 
1476/03, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2006:rk20060215.2bvr147603, para. 24.
75 Ibid., para. 26. 
76 K.H. Roth, ‘Die neue Reparationsdebatte in Polen’, IZ Policy Paper, 27 (II), p. 18, https://
www.iz.poznan.pl/plik,pobierz,2906,b6b738155e8a93f7a8944ed39a2d4bcf/IZ%20Policy%20
Papers%2027%20DE.pdf (accessed 20.11.2018), cf. ICJ’s judgement of 3 February 2012, issued 
in the case Germany v. Italy, Greece intervening thesis 99 “Th e Court considers that it is a matter 
of surprise – and regret – that Germany decided to deny compensation to a group of victims on the 
ground that they had been entitled to a status which, at the relevant time, Germany had refused to 
recognize, particularly since those victims had thereby been denied the legal protection to which 
that status entitled them.”
77 Th e German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 15 January 2006, fi le no. 2 BvR 
1476/03, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2006:rk20060215.2bvr147603, para. 30.
















































166 Magdalena Bainczyk 
of Poland, but the compatibility of the provisions of the national law, as inter-
preted in accordance with the understanding of the rule of international law on 
State immunity adopted by the ICJ in the judgment of 3 February 2012, which 
was challenged in the judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court of 2014. 
In October 2017, a group of Members of Polish Parliament requested that the 
compatibility of Article 1103(2) of the Law of 17 November 1964 – Code of 
Civil Procedure (hereinaft er referred to as CCP)79 be reviewed to the extent it 
excludes obligations of compensation due from a foreign state on account of 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, because of the recognition 
by the adjudicating court of state jurisdiction immunity in such cases under 
Art. 9, Art. 21 para. l, Art. 30 and Art. 45 para. l of the Constitution of the 
Republic of P oland of 1997. Th e motion likewise questioned the compatibility 
of Art. 1113 of CCP80 in that it allows the recognition of state immunity for 
the protection of foreign states against being brought before a  Polish court 
for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity under Art. 9, Art. 30 
and Art. 45 para. l of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997. In 
the justifi cation of the motion, the group of MPs indicated e.g. that the “the 
exclusion of obligations to compensate a foreign State for war crimes, genocide 
and crimes against humanity, on the ground that a court adjudicating on the 
existence of the jurisdictional immunity of the State in such cases violates hu-
man dignity. It favours the foreign State, even though its acts grossly interfere 
with fundamental human rights derived from human dignity; at the same time, 
it leaves the victims of those acts without any guarantee; it interferes with the 
essence of the dignity expressed in Article 30 of the Constitution of the Re-
public of Poland”. Furthermore, the group of MPs stressed that “in Poland, due 
to its tragic history, a number of social groups fi nd themselves in a situation 
where the exclusion of the chance to claim a foreign state in Poland will pre-
clude any possibility of acquiring compensation for the war crimes, genocide 
and crimes against humanity committed against them and their ancestors”.81 
79 Law of 17 November 1964 (Journal of Laws of 2016, item 1822 as amended). Art. 11037 of 
the CCP. Matters resolved in the process, other than those mentioned in Articles 11031 – 11036, 
belong to the national jurisdiction, even when: 1) the obligations arise from a legal action that has 
been taken or is or was to be made in the Republic of Poland, 2) the obligations do not arise from 
a legal action that has been taken or is or was to be made in the Republic of Poland.
80 Art. 1113 of the CCP. Judicial Immunity. Th e Court ex offi  cio takes judicial immunity into 
consideration in every state of the case. If the existence of immunity is identifi ed, the Court rejects 
the application or request. Recognition of the case in violation of judicial immunity renders the 
proceedings null and void. If the person against whom or with the participation of whom a case 
is instituted acquired judicial immunity in the course of the proceedings, the Court shall dismiss 
the proceeding.
81 Motion of a group of deputies to Polish Sejm of the 8th term of 26 October 2017, fi le sig-
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Th e preparation of the motion took into account both the ruling of the ICJ 
and the case of law of Greek and Italian courts regarding State immunity.82
Th e provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure challenged in the motion do 
not directly establish the jurisdictional immunity of the State in the aforemen-
tioned scope, but such meaning was given to these provisions in the case law of 
the Polish courts, in particular in the decision of the Supreme Court of 29 Oc-
tober 2010.83 Th e applicants referred to Article 9 (principle of friendly approach 
towards international law), Article 21 para. 1 (protection of property and suc-
cession of property), Article 30 (principle of respect for dignity) and Article 45 
para. 1 (right to a court) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. It seems, 
however, that in this case, Art. 30 and Art. 45 para. 1 of the Constitution is of 
fundamental importance. In this respect, the model of control would be simi-
lar to the model used by the Italian Constitutional Court. It is therefore crucial 
whether the Polish Constitutional Tribunal adopts an interpretation similar to 
the one adopted in the above judgment of 2014, which is essentially shared by 
Polish Parliament in the position expressed in the proceedings before the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal.84
Arguments in the motion concerning Article 9 of the Constitution as a mod-
el of control for the discussed provisions raise doubts, which were also refl ected 
in the position of the Sejm of 26 July 2018.85 Th is provision should be referred to 
in the explanatory memorandum to the ruling on the motion of Members of Par-
liament to examine the constitutionality of the aforementioned provisions of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, as Article 9 of the Constitution contains a comprehen-
sive obligation for Poland to comply with international law, including common 
international law and international court rulings.86 Importantly, the obligation 
under Art. 9 of the Polish Constitution is far broader than the content of the 
obligation of the state under Art. 10 of Italy’s Constitution and under Art. 25 of 
the German BL. 
At the same time, the Polish Constitutional Court has since 2005 developed 
82 100 posłów PiS złożyło wniosek do Trybunału. Chodzi o odszkodowania za zbrodnie wo-
jenne, http://www.tvn24.pl (accessed 10.11.2018).
83 File signature IV CSK 465/09; M. Stürner, ‘Immunitet państwa w sprawach o odszkodowa-
nie z tytułu zbrodni wojennych. Glosa do postanowienia Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 29 października 
2010 r. (IV CSK 465/09)’, Polski Proces Cywilny, 2011, vol. 3, p. 154 ff .; W. Czapliński, ‘Postano-
wienie Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna z dnia 29 października 2010 r., IV CSK 465/09’, Orzecz-
nictwo Sądów Polskich, 2011, vol. 7, no. 82.
84 Position of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 26 July 2018 regarding the motion of 
a group of deputies to Polish Sejm of the 8th term of 26 October 2017 (fi le signature K 12/14), 
p. 37.
85 Ibid., p. 20 ff .
86 A.  Wasilkowski, ‘Przestrzegania prawa międzynarodowego (art.  9 Konstytucji RP)’, in: 
K. Wójtowicz (ed.), Otwarcie Konstytucji RP na prawo międzynarodowe i procesy integracyjne, War-















































168 Magdalena Bainczyk 
the doctrine of supremacy of Constitutional provisions in case of the collision of 
its norms with a rule arising from another legal system.87 To date, the doctrine 
has been used primarily in reference to the standards of EU law, but it seems 
that the principle of respect for constitutional identity, formulated in the rul-
ing of the Constitutional Court concerning the Lisbon Treaty may, and in fact 
should be applied to norms of international law. In the above ruling, the Polish 
Constitutional Court observed that “Constitutional identity is then the notion 
delimiting the scope ‘of exclusion from competence of transfer of (…) hard core 
matters, fundamental for the foundations of the state’s political system”, whose 
transfer would not be possible under Art. 90 of the Constitution. Notwithstand-
ing the diffi  culties in establishing a detailed catalogue of non-transferable com-
petences, the following should be included among the subjects covered by the 
absolute prohibition of transfer: provisions laying down the general principles 
of the Constitution and provisions concerning the rights of individuals desig-
nating the identity of the State, including in particular the obligation of assuring 
protection of human dignity and constitutional rights [Author’s emphasis], the 
principle of statehood, the principle of democracy, the principle of the rule of 
law (…).”88 In this respect one can furnish arguments ad maiorem ad minus, since 
membership in the EU as an international organisation of supra-national charac-
ter implies far-reaching obligations of the state, including the transferability au-
thority competences under Art. 90 para. 1 of the Constitution, other than in the 
case of being bound by a rule of customary international law, i.e. the principles of 
constitutional identity should be preserved also with respect to the use of norms 
of common international law and with respect to the enforcement of ICJ rulings. 
Unfortunately the Polish Constitutional Court has not taken any position yet.
Discussion 
Constitutional courts, wishing to preserve the constitutional identity of a state, 
apply limitations resulting from constitutional provisions considered inviola-
ble or fundamental with regard to the application of rules of EU law, but also 
international law, including judgments of the ICJ. It should be noted that the 
doctrine of limitations in relation to EU law and international law in the case 
of Italy and Germany is being developed in parallel. In the case of the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal, the doctrine of limitations resulting primarily from 
the interpretation of Article 8 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland 
has so far been applied primarily in relation to EU law. However, in connection 
87 M. Bainczyk, Polski i niemiecki Trybunał…, op. cit., p. 153 ff .
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with the request to examine the constitutionality of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, which is the basis for excluding the possibility of seeking compensa-
tion from a foreign state for damages resulting from war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity, a question arises about the application of the doctrine 
of limitations, including the principle of respect for human dignity and consti-
tutional rights in relation to the application of the rule of international law and 
possible judgment of the ICJ.
On the other hand, however, as the examples of Greece and Italy demon-
strate, the application of such restrictions does not necessarily mean the practical 
implementation of the constitutional rights of individuals, and therefore in the 
specifi c case of the enforcement of national court rulings and the payment of 
compensation from a foreign state for damage suff ered as a result of international 
crimes. Such judgments, like the judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court, 
in addition to their symbolic aspect, may constitute a form of pressure,89 includ-
ing on the ICJ, for respect for human rights to become a real determinant of the 
actions of both international organisations and states, including European states, 
especially as the demand for political settlement of compensation included in the 
grounds for the ICJ judgment has not yet been implemented.90
Th e second important element in the aforementioned judgment is the dis-
similar approach to the protection of human rights in relation to the conse-
quences of international crimes by the ICJ, but also by the European internation-
al courts – ECHR91 and CJEU92, the FCC of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and of the Italian Constitutional Court. In particular, the jurisprudence of the 
German FCC concerning the issue of compensation for the victims of the Th ird 
Reich may arouse controversy in the context of Article 1 of the BL. Th is provi-
sion was supposed to be expressive of a strong disconnection from the policies 
pursued by the Th ird Reich93 and became the basis for the development of a very 
extensive doctrine of fundamental rights protection. Th is doctrine, however, 
89 Cf. Judgement of the ECHR of 16 June 2009, Grosz v. France, fi le no. 14717/06.
90 ICJ’s judgement of 3 February 2012, issued in the case Germany v. Italy, Greece interven-
ing, thesis 104 “It considers however that the claims arising from the treatment of the Italian 
military internees referred to in paragraph 99, together with other claims of Italian nationals 
which have allegedly not been settled – and which formed the basis for the Italian proceedings – 
could be the subject of further negotiation involving the two States concerned, with a view to 
resolving the issue”.
91 Judgement of the ECHR of 12 December 2002, Kalogeropoulou et al. v. Greece and Germa-
ny, fi le no. 59021/00; M.A. Nowicki, Wokół Konwencji Europejskiej. Komentarz do Europejskiej 
Konwencji Praw Człowieka, Warszawa 2013, p. 547.
92 Judgement of the CJEU of 15 February 2007, case C-292/05, Eirini Lechouritou and Others 
v Dimosio tis Omospondiakis Dimokratias tis Germanias, ECLI:EU:C:2007:102.
93 M. Herdegen, ‘Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG’, in: T. Maunz, G. Dürig (eds.), Grundgesetz-Kommentar…, 















































170 Magdalena Bainczyk 
applies selectively, in particular with regard to the settling of old scores with the 
past in criminal law94 and in material terms.95
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Abstract 
In connection with the ongoing process of judicialisation, courts, including international 
tribunals, are playing an increasingly important role in shaping contemporary domestic 
and international relations. However, the infl uence of international tribunals depends 
not only on the content of international agreements, which constitute the basis for their 
functioning and on the number of parties to such agreements, but also on the solutions of 















































173Constitutional courts vs. jurisprudence of international tribunals
the place of international law in the national legal order, and indirectly the eff ectiveness 
of decisions of international courts. On the other hand, national constitutional law is 
subject to interpretation by the national constitutional court. As a rule, the latter is re-
luctant to give up the monopoly of having the fi nal say in legal disputes, very oft en with 
a signifi cant political dimension, in a given country. Th erefore, the reception of interna-
tional tribunals in the jurisprudence of national constitutional courts has a signifi cant 
impact on the actual importance of international tribunals in multi-tiered legal systems. 
Th e paper will focus on the verifi cation of the above thesis by referring to examples of 
the jurisprudence of constitutional courts, with a special reference to the German Con-
stitutional Court, the Italian and Polish Constitutional Court. What is relevant in the 
context of the volume, the abovementioned case law both of the ICJ and constitutional 
court relates to the question of just compensation for the losses incurred as a result of 
international crimes of the Th ird Reich during the World War II.


















































Starvation as an international crime
Hunger as a physiological state can be caused by a natural disaster (e.g. drought), 
state activity, illness, or deliberate human behaviour. Th e following article refers 
to the factual states related to the second option and therefore resulting from 
action or omission of state bodies. Unfortunately, humankind has sometimes 
witnessed such situations; representatives of state authorities have infl icted hun-
ger on hundreds, thousands or even millions of people, in extreme cases leading 
to death, including genocide. In the 20th century, it was enough to mention the 
Holodomor (Great Famine in Ukraine) in 1932–1933, the famine plan (Backe 
Plan) drawn up by the Th ird Reich in 1941, the Great Famine in China in 1958–
1962, or the famine in North Korea in 1995–1999. In recent years, the imag-
es and accounts from Venezuela (2014–2019) showed the world that the local 
government’s policy has led to the malnutrition of around 3.7 million people.1 
Despite diff erences in the number of deaths and the degree of starvation, there is 
one common element in these factual states, i.e. the state is the “perpetrator”. Th is 
is, in fact, because the state as a fundamental body of public international law is 
the principal guarantor of food security and the right to food.2 While humanity 
is capable of providing enough food to itself,3 apart from extreme and sudden 
cases of natural disasters, states and their representatives are primarily responsible 
for famine disasters. 
1 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of 
Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Human Rights Council, forty-fi rst session 
24 June–12 July, 5.07.2019, A/HRC/41/18, par. 15; FAO, ‘Panorama de la Seguridad Alimentaria 
y Nutricional en América Latina y el Caribe, 2018’, http://www.fao.org/3/CA2127ES/ca2127es.
pdf (accessed 20.01.2020). 
2 See T. Srogosz, Międzynarodowe prawo żywnościowe, Warszawa 2020, p. 31; idem, ‘Prawo do 
(odpowiedniej) żywności w prawie międzynarodowym publicznym’, in: I. Kraśnicka (ed.), Prawo 
międzynarodowe. Teoria i praktyka, Warszawa 2020, pp. 193–206. 
3 UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Mr. Jean Ziegler indicated that “we could 
feed 12 billion human beings properly, providing food equivalent to 2,700 calories a day” (Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights. Right to Food. Report by the Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Food, Mr. Jean Ziegler, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights reso-
lution 2001/25, Commission on Human Rights, 10.01.2002, E/CN.4/2002/58, p. 10, http://















































175Starvation as an international crime
In view of the above, a question arises whether starvation is a crime of law of 
nations? If so, what are the grounds for this liability under international law, in-
cluding whether it involved genocide through starvation, so-called mass starva-
tion, or whether it causes malnutrition of a part of the population? Finally, does 
international law regulate possible crimes comprehensively and consistently, or 
are changes needed to take into account, for example, situations of not only de-
liberate but also reckless state policies leading to famine, by introducing a classifi -
cation of so-called famine crimes? Is this a crime against humanity, a war crime or 
perhaps genocide? Is it a crime that only concerns international armed confl icts 
or also non-international armed confl icts? Th e answers to the above questions 
are essential in view of the question of possible liability under international law 
for causing famine in recent years in Venezuela, North Korea, Syria, or Yemen. 
Th ey should, as a matter of priority, be based on the existing rules of international 
criminal and humanitarian law, from the Geneva Conventions to the Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. 
Geneva law
Th e origins of international criminal law, including the regulation of internation-
al crimes, are inextricably linked to the development of international humani-
tarian law, including the humanitarian protection of prisoners of war and civil-
ians. Th e regulations on the international liability of individuals and states for 
international crimes were preceded by eff orts by the international community 
to improve the fate of the wounded and prisoners of war and civilians in armed 
confl icts. Th e right to food was fi rst mentioned in Geneva law. Article 11 of the 
Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 19294 introduces 
an obligation to retain food rations at the level corresponding to the quantity 
and quality of rations in military units and garrisons. Collective food disciplinary 
measures were prohibited. Th e 1949 Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War defi ned minimum food rations in captivity,5 while the Convention for 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War established that food sup-
plies for the civilian population in the occupied territory should be “adequate”.6 
4 Convention relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre, Genève, 27.07.1929, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/dih-traites/INTRO/305?OpenDocument (accessed 20.01.2020). 
5 “Th e basic daily food rations shall be suffi  cient in quantity, quality and variety to keep prison-
ers of war in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional defi ciencies. 
Account shall also be taken of the habitual diet of the prisoners (…)”; Geneva Convention relative 
to the treatment of prisoners of war, Geneva, 12.08.1949, UNTS, vol. 75, p. 135, https://treaties.
un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280159839 (accessed 20.01.2020), Art. 26.
6 “To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of 
ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the 
necessary foodstuff s, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory 















































176 Tomasz Srogosz 
Th e 1977 Additional Protocols introduced an explicit ban on the starvation of 
civilians during military activities (as a method of warfare).7
Geneva law, on the one hand, provides a benchmark for the interpretation of 
international crimes related to starvation, setting minimum standards for feed-
ing during (international and non-international) armed confl icts. On the other 
hand, it has introduced into international law, including international criminal 
law, the concept of starvation, as confi rmed by Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Statute 
of the International Criminal Court.8 It should be remembered that Geneva law, 
which related to international humanitarian law rather than international crim-
inal law, introduced a ban on starving civilians, but not in the context of an in-
ternational crime. As indicated earlier, it was a point of reference for the parallel 
development of Nuremberg law, as confi rmed by the defi nition of war crimes in 
Article 8(2) of the ICC Statute, referring to the Geneva Conventions and to the 
“laws and customs applicable to international armed confl icts”. In international 
humanitarian law, therefore, starvation is a prohibited method (means) of war-
fare, while in international criminal law, it is an international crime, the evolution 
of which harks back to aft er 1945 and the Nuremberg trials.
The Nuremberg trials and the Tokyo trials
Although one of the greatest famine disasters in history caused by deliberate ac-
tion on the part of the state authorities took place in Ukraine before the Second 
World War (the Holodomor), the international community saw the possibility 
of pursuing international criminal liability for starving the population only af-
ter 1945, as a result of the devastating extermination policy of the Th ird Reich. 
One of the offi  cers of the Th ird Reich who was to be tried by the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg was H. Backe (Minister for Food and Agricul-
ture). He was not charged in the so-called ministers’ trial, because on 6 April 
1947, for fear of being transported to the Soviet Union, he committed suicide in 
of war, Geneva, 12.08.1949, UNTS, vol.  75, p.  287; https://treaties.un.org/pages/showdetails.
aspx?objid=0800000280158b1a (accessed 20.01.2020), Art. 55. 
7 “Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited. It is prohibited to attack, de-
stroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such 
as foodstuff s, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuff s, crops, livestock, drinking water 
installations (…)”; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relat-
ing to the protection of victims of international armed confl icts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8.06.1977, 
UNTS, vol. 1125, p. 3; https://treaties.un.org/pages/showdetails.aspxobjid=08000002800f3586 
(accessed 20.01.2020), Art.  54; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed confl icts (Protocol 
II), Geneva, 8.06.1977, UNTS, vol.  1125, p.  609, https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.
aspx?objid=08000002800f3cb8 (accessed 20.01.2020), Art. 14. 
8 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Rome, 17.07.1998, UNTS, vol. 2187, 















































177Starvation as an international crime
a Nuremberg prison. Earlier, on 21 February and 14 March 1947, he had been 
interrogated. His name is primarily linked to the so-called Hunger Plan, which 
was implemented by the Th ird Reich in the wake of the invasion of the Sovi-
et Union in 1941. Although Backe was not indicted, his so-called Hungerplan 
(der Backe-Plan) should be seen as an example of an international crime con-
sisting in the starvation of civilians and POWs. Der Backe-Plan was developed 
under the supervision of H. Göring as part of a comprehensive Oldenburg Plan, 
envisaging economic exploitation and devastation of Eastern territories. Th e 
Oldenburg Plan was approved upon Hitler’s orders at a confi dential meeting on 
1 March 1941. It assumed the confi scation of raw materials and equipment lo-
cated in factories in the Soviet Union and their transfer to the Th ird Reich and 
the destruction of all those that were to remain on site. Within the framework 
of the Oldenburg Plan, H. Backe was to design a plan for the starvation of the 
population inhabiting the areas occupied upon the invasion of the Soviet Union 
and for the confi scation of food for the German army and German society. Der 
Hungerplan was a result of the work of a specially designated commission, who 
envisaged the death of a few million people. Th e objective was twofold: to feed 
the Germans and to exterminate other nationalities east of the River Vistula.9 
Around four million people are estimated to have suff ered from hunger during 
the German occupation, including, above all, prisoners of war, Russians, Ukrain-
ians, Belarusians, and Jews. Th e most stringent conditions were applied to Red 
Army soldiers imprisoned in German camps; around 3 million prisoners of war 
died of starvation between 1941 and 1945.10 Fortunately, the Backe Plan was not 
implemented on a comparable scale with respect to civilians. Importantly, starva-
tion as a method of warfare was applied not only in the Soviet Union occupied 
by the Th ird Reich; the echo of der Hungerplan reverberated, e.g. in H. Frank’s 
General Government.11
Th e fate of millions of people subject to starvation and dying because of it 
as a result of the Backe Plan did not escape the attention of the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, particularly in connection with the indict-
ment of Göring and Frank. Th e Tribunal invoked Article 6(b) (war crimes) 
and (c) (crimes against humanity) of the IMT Charter,12 according to which 
violations of the laws and customs of war, including inter alia the murder or 
9 More on the topic see J. Kay, ‘Germany’s Staatssekretäre, Mass Starvation and the Meeting of 
2 May 1941’, Journal of Contemporary History, 2006, vol. 41 (4), pp. 685–700. 
10 See T.  Snyder, Skrwawione ziemie: Europa między Hitlerem a  Stalinem, Warszawa 2011, 
p. 204. 
11 See S. Schwaneberg, ‘Eksploatacja gospodarcza Generalnego Gubernatorstwa przez Rzeszę 
Niemiecką w latach 1939–1945’, Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość, 2009, no. 1, p. 135–139. 

















































178 Tomasz Srogosz 
ill-treatment of civilians and prisoners of war, are classifi ed as war crimes. In 
contrast, murder, extermination and other inhumane treatment of civilians are 
classifi ed as crimes against humanity. At the same time, the Tribunal noted 
that some of the war crimes were recognised under international law before 
the Second World War on the basis of Geneva law, in particular under Articles 
2–4 of the 1929 Convention, referring to the humane treatment of prisoners 
of war.13 Th e Tribunal indicated the inhumane treatment of Soviet POWs as 
a result of systematic plans to murder. Th e POWs in the camps were starving, 
and many of them died as a result (they were starved, and in many cases left  to 
die). Th e Tribunal moreover invoked a letter of A. Rosenberg to W. Keitel.14 
Th e judgment also discusses, as part of the crime against humanity, the treat-
ment of civilians, including in concentration camps, in particular, by providing 
inadequate amounts of food. It points out that in the occupied territories, on 
Göring’s orders, there was a policy of confi scating natural resources, raw ma-
terials, equipment or food for the benefi t of the Th ird Reich, which inter alia 
led to famine.15 Some of the activities of the German authorities on Polish soil 
took place without the participation of Governor-General H. Frank, but there 
is no doubt that he was “a willing and knowing participant in the use of terror-
ism in Poland; in the economic exploitation of Poland in a way which led to 
the death by starvation of a large number of people”.16
Th is leads to the conclusion that, during the Nuremberg trials, starvation 
was treated both as a  war crime against prisoners of war and civilians and 
a crime against humanity in the form of extermination. In the Tokyo trial, the 
equivalent of Article 6(b) and (c) of the IMT Charter covering these crimes 
was Article 5(b) and (c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East.17 During the trial, attention was drawn above all to atroci-
ties against prisoners held in Japanese camps, which atrocities qualifi ed as war 
crimes. Th e inhumane treatment consisted inter alia in the gradual reduction 
of food rations, which could not exceed 420 g of rice in 1942, according to top-
down instructions, and 390 g of rice per day in 1944. Nevertheless, regulations 
13 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment of 1 October 1946, (in:) Th e 
Trial of German Major War Criminals. Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal 
sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22 (22nd August, 1946 to 1st October, 1946), https://
crimeofaggression.info/documents/6/1946_Nuremberg_Judgement.pdf (accessed 21.01.2020), 
p. 467. 
14 Ibid., pp. 450–452. 
15 Ibid., p. 457–458, 498. 
16 Ibid., p. 498. 
17 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo 19.01.1946, “Trea-
ties and Other International Agreement of the United States of America 1976–1949. Multilat-
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in this regard turned out to be fi ctional because the principle was actually in-
troduced in the camps where such minimum rations were off ered to prison-
ers able to work, while the others were denied them. In addition, the camp 
commanders ignored the instructions and did not even provide the prisoners 
able to work with these minimum rations. In 1943, further guidelines were 
introduced under which those prisoners who did not take a special oath of alle-
giance to the Japanese Government were to be kept under special surveillance, 
in fact involving immobilisation for a few days without water, food or sanitary 
facilities, oft en in full sunshine. Th is was intended to induce them to sign the 
above oath. Th is policy resulted in constant malnutrition among the Allied 
POWs and an increasing number of famine victims.18
Raphael Lemkin’s idea and the 1948 Convention
Th e Nuremberg trials made the international community aware that starva-
tion can be an instrument of state policy aimed at exterminating national or 
ethnic groups. Der Hungerplan was not the fi rst time that civilians were in-
tentionally starved on a large scale. A decade earlier, tragic events took place 
in Ukraine (so-called Holodomor in 1932–1933). R.  Lemkin, the author of 
the concept of genocide, was an indirect witness to these events. Twenty years 
aft er the Great Hunger, he wrote an article about it, entitled ‘Soviet Genocide 
in the Ukraine.’19 Th e Lemkin concept was not included into the defi nition of 
international crimes in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal and 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. However, 
it was referred to in the Nuremberg indictment, where the term “genocide” 
was used for the fi rst time (probably because Lemkin was an advisor to Judge 
R. Jackson).20 Th e notion and criminal sanctioning of genocide was addressed 
in the 1948 Convention,21 to which R. Lemkin contributed a lot. 
According to the Convention defi nition, genocide means any of the fol-
lowing acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: a) killing members of the group; 
b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) delib-
erately infl icting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
18 International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment of 4 November 1948, in: 
J. Pritchard, S.M. Zaide, D.C. Watt (eds.), Th e Tokyo War Crimes Trial, vol. 22, New York 1981, 
pp. 688–698; https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8bef6f/pdf (accessed 19.01.2019). 
19 R. Lemkin, ‘Soviet Genocide in the Ukraine’, in: L.Y. Luciuk (ed.), Holodomor: Refl ections on 
the Great Famine of 1932–1933 in Soviet Ukraine, Kingston 2008. 
20 K. Wierczyńska, Pojęcie ludobójstwa w kontekście orzecznictwa międzynarodowych trybuna-
łów karnych ad hoc, Warszawa 2010, p. 25. 
21 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Paris 9.12.1948, 















































180 Tomasz Srogosz 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended 
to prevent births within the group; e) forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group (Art.  II). Th e defi nition, then, covered three of the 
eight fi elds of life addressed by Lemkin,22 i.e. economic, physical and biolog-
ical, the fi rst two being connected with the crime of starvation. Genocide in 
the economic sphere is about destroying the basis of the economic existence 
of a  national, ethnic, racial or religious group, while genocide in the physi-
cal sphere can consist of racial discrimination in nutrition or the creation of 
life-threatening conditions. Th ese two categories are included in Article II(c) 
of the Convention. It should be borne in mind that the crime of genocide in-
volving the deliberate creation of living conditions for members of a group cal-
culated to cause their physical destruction in whole or in part may occur both 
in war and in peace. 
Th e 1948 Convention amended the catalogue of international crimes. While 
during the Nuremberg trials der Hungerplan and the crimes committed by Frank 
and Göring were treated as war crimes and crimes against humanity, upon the 
adoption of the 1948 Convention they should be seen rather as genocide, de-
fi ned there. Th is also concerns the Great Famine in the Ukraine between 1932 
and 1933, which the Appellate Court in Kiev and part of the international com-
munity recognised on 13 January 2010 as the crime of genocide. Th e Ukrainian 
court closed the proceedings because of the death of the perpetrators (Stalin, 
Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Kosiora, Chubar, Katavevich), concluding 
that they had committed genocide under the 1948 Convention. Th e court estab-
lished that the facts of the case prove that the criminal activities of the persons in-
dicated by the investigators were directed against the very existence of part of the 
Ukrainian national group. Th e factual evidence gathered and verifi ed confi rmed 
that the living conditions imposed on the Ukrainian national group were aimed 
at its partial physical destruction through the Holodomor in Ukraine, which re-
sulted in the extermination of 3,941,000 people. It was proved that the char-
acteristics of the Holodomor meet the criteria set out in the 1948 Convention. 
Th e Court stated that the perpetrators listed in the resolution were found guilty 
of masterminding the genocide of part of the Ukrainian ethnic group by creating 
living conditions designed to destroy it through the Holodomor between 1932 
and 1933.23 Th e resolution of the Ukrainian court was not the only such act. 
Th e Holodomor was declared a crime of genocide by the state authorities of other 
22 R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government – 
Proposals for Redress, Washington 1944, p. 82f; R. Lemkin divides genocide into political, social, 
cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral; see K. Wierczyńska, Pojęcie…, op. 
cit., pp. 13–15. 
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countries (Poland,24 the United States,25 Estonia, Australia, Canada, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Paraguay, Peru, Slovakia, Georgia, Argentina, Colombia, Czechia, 
Ecuador, Latvia, Portugal) and the European Parliament.26 
The path to the International Criminal Court 
Th e Nuremberg trials and the subsequent Nuremberg principles and the concept 
of genocide no doubt had a decisive impact on the development of international 
criminal law as to the prevention and penalisation of international crimes. Half 
a century aft er the adoption of the 1948 Convention, the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court in 1998 was approved without any changes. Although the 
ICC Statute draws to a large extent on the legacy of Nuremberg law and the 1948 
Convention, we must note the signifi cant evolution that occurred since 1948, 
above all in the area of human rights protection. Th e year 1948 did not go down 
in history just as the year of preventing and penalising the crime of genocide. Th e 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted one day aft er the Convention 
(10 December 1948)27 ushered in an unprecedented expansion of human rights, 
which determined the approach of the international community to many issues, 
international crimes included. Th e latter began to be seen in the context of hu-
man rights violations, not necessarily a point of reference in the Nuremberg and 
24 Resolution of the Polish Senate of 16 March 2006 on the anniversary of the Great Famine 
in Ukraine, MP, no. 21, item 234: “Th e Senate of the Republic of Poland would like to recall that 
the Great Famine of the Holodomor was deliberately provoked by the tyrannical Bolshevik regime 
ruling the Soviet Union, and was intended to weaken and destroy the Ukrainian nation, thus sup-
pressing its aspirations for freedom and rebuilding its own independent state; (…) in view of the 
above, the Senate of the Republic of Poland expresses its solidarity with the Ukrainian position 
that the Great Famine of 1932–1933 should be considered a crime of genocide and that the main 
culprits as well as the individual perpetrators responsible for these crimes should be identifi ed”. 
25 Interestingly, the US Senate in its resolution of 14 March 2018 on the Great Famine in 
Ukraine referred to Raphael Lemkin’s legacy: “Whereas Raphael Lemkin, who devoted his life 
to the development of legal concepts and norms for containing mass atrocities and whose tireless 
advocacy swayed the United Nations in 1948 to adopt the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, authored an essay in 1953 entitled, ‘Soviet Genocide in 
[the] Ukraine,’ which highlighted the ‘classic example of Soviet genocide,’ characterizing it ‘not 
simply a case of mass murder [, but as] a case of genocide, of destruction, not of individuals only, 
but of a culture and a nation”. Paragraph 3 of the US Senate resolution read: “recognizes the fi nd-
ings of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine as submitted to Congress on April 22, 1988, 
including that ‘Joseph Stalin and those around him committed genocide against the Ukrainians 
in 1932–1933’”; https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-115sres435ats/pdf/BILLS-
115sres435ats.pdf (accessed 21.01.2020). 
26 European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2008 on the commemoration of the artifi cial 
famine in Ukraine from 1932 to 1933, OJEU, 21.01.2010/C15/E16; the European Parliament 
considers the Holodomor to be a crime against humanity and also invokes the 1948 Convention. 
27 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217 of the UN General Assembly 
















































182 Tomasz Srogosz 
Tokyo trials. Th ese rights might have been referred to only tangentially, as the 
rights of prisoners of war and civilians during armed confl icts.
Th e codifi cation of the crime of genocide and the development of interna-
tional human rights law aft er the Second World War has contributed to a change 
in the view of the functions of the state. Confi rmed in the UDHR and subse-
quently in the Human Rights Covenants,28 the right to food29 made the state 
the principal guarantor of food security.30 Th e famine artifi cially caused by 
states like North Korea became an object of interest not only for international 
criminal courts, as before, but also for international bodies dealing with human 
rights protection. It is telling that while the pre-war Great Famine in Ukraine 
was treated solely as an international crime (genocide), similar contemporary 
situations are no longer regarded as crimes of international law, but also as hu-
man rights violations.31 Th e international crime of starvation is seen as a grave 
violation of the right to food. We deal, therefore with a twofold approach in the 
evolution of international law on combating hunger in peace. On the one hand, 
28 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York, 16.12.1966, 
UNTS, vol.  993, p.  3; entered into force on 3.01.1976, entered into force on 18.06.1977 
(ICESCR); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York 16.12.1966, UNTS, 
vol. 999, p. 171, entered into force on 23.03.1976, entered into force on 18.06.1977 (ICCPR). 
29 Th ere are three tiers of the right to food. Th e fi rst one, which includes the right to life as the 
fi rst generation right (Article 3 of the PDPC and Article 6 of the ICCPR), includes the citizen’s 
right to food and imposes a positive obligation on the state of taking all necessary steps to pro-
vide the population with food sources to the extent necessary to preserve life (preventing loss of 
life). Th e second, under the obligation of the fundamental socio-economic right to food, i.e. the 
second generation right (Article 11 of the ICESCR), obliges states to take all steps to protect the 
population from hunger or malnutrition (right to freedom from hunger). Th e third tier, i.e. the 
socio-economic right to food, beyond the fundamental obligation, is connected with the state’s ob-
ligation to raise the standard of living, the implementation of which depends on the socio-cultural 
environment (see T. Srogosz, Międzynarodowe…, op. cit., pp. 1–38). 
30 Th e concept of food security was clarifi ed at the World Food Summit in 1996 and relates to 
physical, economic and social access to quantitatively adequate, safe and nutritious food to meet 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (Rome Declaration on World 
Food Security, World Food Summit 13–17 November 1996; http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/
w3613e00.htm (accessed 22.02.2020). 
31 See Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea, A/HCR/25/63, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/coidprk/pages/repor
toft hecommissionofi nquirydprk.aspx (accessed 22.02.2020): “Th e rights to food, freedom from 
hunger and to life in the context of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cannot be reduced 
to a narrow discussion of food shortages and access to a commodity. Th e State has used food as 
a means of control over the population. It has prioritized those whom the authorities believe to 
be crucial in maintaining the regime over those deemed expendable (…) Th e commission found 
evidence of systematic, widespread and grave violations of the right to food in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea. While acknowledging the impact of factors beyond State control over 
the food situation, the commission fi nds that decisions, actions and omissions by the State and its 
leadership caused the death of at least hundreds of thousands of people and infl icted permanent 
physical and psychological injuries on those who survived (…) Th e commission is concerned that 
structural issues, including laws and policies that violate the right to adequate food and freedom 















































183Starvation as an international crime
the international criminal tribunals established at the end of the 20th century 
continue the legacy of Nuremberg law in relation to war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide. On the other hand, we must note the general accept-
ance of the concept of the responsibility of protection, which in a way crowns 
the legal and human achievements of the international community in the second 
half of the 20th century.32 According to this concept, it is the state that is obliged 
to meet the fundamental needs of the population, including nutrition, within 
the so-called humanitarian security.33 Th is trend is conducive to a refl ection on 
extending the scope of international crimes, for example by the actions of state 
authorities, which recklessly lead to a food crisis and hunger among the popula-
tion34 (e.g. a question arises about the personal liability of principal offi  cials of the 
Venezuelan state in connection with the crises continuing since 2014, referred to 
later on in this text). 
While the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (Art. 2–5)35 and of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(Art. 2–4)36 reiterated the defi nitions and the catalogue of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide enshrined in the ICC Charter, the ICC Statute 
provides a more detailed and comprehensive list of such acts (Art. 5–8). Th e ca-
suistry of the ICC Statute provided for the fi rst literal reference to the starvation 
of population in an international instrument defi ning international crimes. Un-
der Art. 7(2)(b), extermination as a crime against humanity consists, e.g. in the 
deliberate creation of such living conditions as inter alia deprivation of access 
to food, with the intent to destroy part of the population.37 War crimes include 
deliberate starvation of civilians as a  method of warfare by depriving them of 
32 See Th e Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Responsibility, Ottawa 2001, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf 
(accessed 22.02.2020); Resolution of the UN General Assembly A/RES/60/1 of 16 September 
2005, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, http://undocs.org/A/RES/60/1 (accessed 
22.02.2020), sections 138–139.
33 Ibid., p. 15. 
34 See D.  Marcus, ‘Famine Crimes in International Law’, American Journal of International 
Law, 2003, vol. 97. 
35 Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, https://
www.icty.org/x/fi le/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf (accessed 23.02.2020). 
36 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ictr_
EF.pdf (accessed 23.02.2020). 
37 “‘Extermination’ includes the intentional infl iction of conditions of life, inter alia the depri-
vation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a popu-
lation”. Th e essential element of extermination is not the death of a specifi c group of people; the re-
sult is the creation of living conditions, including deprivation of access to food, designed to destroy 
part of the population, which must be distinguished from starvation, which is the result of a war 
crime as provided for in Article 8(2)(b xxv). While starvation means depriving civilians of “ade-
quate” food in terms of quantity and quality, or, in the case of prisoners of war, minimum rations as 
referred to in Geneva law, extermination includes (during armed confl icts or at the time of peace) 















































184 Tomasz Srogosz 
objects indispensable to their survival – Art. 8(2) (b) (xxv).38 Th e crime against 
humanity as defi ned in Article 7(1)(k) may also be mentioned and also consid-
ered in the context of intentional (deliberate but not reckless) starvation of the 
population,39 although the notion of extermination prevailed earlier in reference 
to all artifi cial famine disasters. 
However, does not the excessive casuistry of the ICC Statue make its provi-
sions weaker than the general terms of Nuremberg law? Th e criticism concerns 
two aspects. Firstly, in Article 8(2)(a-d) on international confl icts, starvation of 
civilians is listed as a war crime, while in Article 8(2)(e) on non-international 
confl icts, this crime is no longer present. Secondly, the development of inter-
national human rights law and the concept of the responsibility to protect may 
lead to the conclusion that the concept of extermination contained in the ICC 
Statute may prove insuffi  cient, with the result that some, for example, reckless 
actions by state authorities leading to starvation will never be judged from the 
perspective of international liability. 
Based on the literal wording of the ICC Statute, we can say that the war 
crime involving deliberate starvation of civilians may only be committed during 
an international confl ict,40 while a similar act committed during a non-interna-
tional confl ict is no longer an international crime. It is hard to judge whether 
the foregoing loophole is a deliberate action on the part of the statute draft ers 
or simply an oversight. It is an excellent example of the disadvantage of exces-
sive casuistry in trying to create an exhaustive catalogue of crimes. It makes it 
necessary to supplement this catalogue by applying the procedure for amending 
the Statute provided for in Article 121 of the Statute. Interestingly, this possi-
bility was used by the States Parties in 2010, resulting in the addition of sub-
sections xiii-xv to Article 8(2)(e). Regrettably, these provisions do not address 
starvation but the use of poisons, including gases and certain types of projectiles 
causing excessive suff ering. Actually, the amendments to Article 8(2)(c) consist-
ed of copying the analogous regulations from Article 8(2)(a)(xvii-xix) relating 
38 “Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of ob-
jects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for un-
der the Geneva Conventions”. 
39 “For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of the following acts 
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian popula-
tion, with knowledge of the attack: (…) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally 
causing great suff ering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health”. 
40 It should be stressed that starvation, as part of a war crime, does not require proof of the 
eff ect of the death of a human being or a specifi c group of people; the eff ect here is already star-
vation, i.e. deprivation of food rations as provided for under Geneva law (see K. Dörmann, ‘War 
Crimes under the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court with a Special Focus on the Ne-
















































185Starvation as an international crime
to international confl icts.41 Th e catalogue of war crimes that can be committed 
during a  non-international confl ict remains inconsistent with humanitarian 
law, the starting point for international criminal law; specifi cally, this applies 
to the ban on starvation as a means of warfare introduced by the 1977 Addi-
tional Protocol to the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Confl icts. Th is inconsistency was noted in 2018 by 
Swiss representatives to the Working Party on the Amendment of the ICC 
Statute, who proposed the inclusion of the crime of starvation in Article 8(2)
(e). Th e Swiss request was supported by many delegations, who pointed to the 
need to rectify an inaccuracy that had arisen at the interface between interna-
tional and non-international confl icts. Reference was made to the customary 
nature of the crime of starvation in non-international armed confl icts and to 
UN Security Council Resolution 2417/2018, which treats starvation of civil-
ians as a war crime, making no distinction to types of confl ict.42 Some argued 
that since the prohibition of starvation is customary, there is no need to amend 
Article 8(2)(e). In response, the Swiss representatives rightly pointed out that 
the penalisation of war crimes as defi ned in the ICC Statute is, aft er all, based 
on the well-known criminal law principle of nullum crimen sine lege. Th is brief 
discussion aptly illustrates the weakness of the ICC Statute compared with 
Nuremberg law. Since starvation was defi ned as a war crime in relation to inter-
national armed confl icts, the logical line of reasoning of a defender of a poten-
tial participant in a non-international armed confl ict would be that this cannot 
possibly constitute a war crime in his case, because despite the customary na-
ture of the crime, the principle of nullum crimen sine lege prevails. As a result, 
the working group adopted a resolution recommending that the Assembly of 
States Parties amend the ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(e), by adding a sub-para-
graph defi ning the starvation of civilians.43
Responsibility to protect
Another aspect related to the critique of the ICC Statute concerns the exces-
sively narrow defi nition of starvation as an international crime, referring to 
the provisions of Nuremberg law and Geneva law from the latter half of the 
41 Resolution RC/Res.5. Amendments to Article 8 of the Rome Statute, 10.06.2010, https://
asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.5-ENG.pdf (accessed 27.02.2020). 
42 “Underlining that using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare may constitute a war 
crime”  – Resolution 2417 (2018) adopted by the Security Council at its 8267th meeting, on 
24 May 2018, S/RES/2417(2018), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2417 (accessed 27.02.2020). 
43 “Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a  method of warfare by depriving them of 
objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies”, Report of the 

















































186 Tomasz Srogosz 
20th c., but without developing the concept of the responsibility to protect and 
the attendant role of the state as the primary guarantor of the right to food. 
Nuremberg law and Geneva law do not take account of the new developments 
of the 21st century in international relations and subsequently in international 
law. Th e growing importance of humanitarian security, including food security, 
a result of the evolution of human rights, has led to changes in the perception 
of sovereignty and the functions of the state. It is stressed that the concept of 
human rights has given rise to additional demands and expectations in relation 
to the way states treat their own citizens, and sovereignty involves a dual respon-
sibility. Externally, this responsibility involves respect for the sovereignty of oth-
er states, while internally, it consists in respect for the dignity and fundamental 
rights of all people in a state.44 States, including the high-ranking offi  cials, are no 
longer seen only in terms of international security, as aft er 1945, when shadowing 
the birth of the UN were the Nuremberg trials, and R. Lemkin’s concept was 
gaining momentum. Th e evolution outlined above, the foundations of which 
were laid as early as 1948 in the UDHR, has changed the perception of famine 
disasters caused by states. Until very recently, the international community was 
only interested in cases of starvation, which clearly met the criteria of genocide 
or crimes against humanity, and therefore consisted in the deliberate creation of 
conditions designed to destroy (such as the Holodomor). At the end of the 20th 
century, attention was drawn to the disaster of famine, which would not neces-
sarily be caused deliberately, although the issue of culpability could certainly be 
seen as controversial here. Th e report of the Special Commission appointed by 
the UN Human Rights Council to investigate human rights violations in North 
Korea emphasises that the exercise of the right to adequate food entails the ob-
ligation for the state to implement appropriate policies aimed at avoiding mal-
nutrition and hunger. Th e Commission identifi ed the famine in North Korea as 
a complex problem, arising not only from the deliberate activities of the author-
ities consisting in so-called Songbun (segregation of the population infl uencing 
the food rations received) but also from the misguided agricultural policy. In 
the Commission’s view, North Korea had violated its population’s right to food 
not only through deliberate policy but also through the failure to implement: a/ 
the positive obligation to take all measures to provide the population with food 
sources that are suffi  cient to preserve life (the citizen’s right to food) and b/ the 
obligation to take all measures to protect the population from hunger or malnu-
trition (a fundamental obligation under the socio-economic right to food). In 
its conclusions, the Commission stated that “crimes against humanity have been 
committed against a starving population; these crimes are the result of decisions 
and policies that violate the universal human right to food; they were taken with 















































187Starvation as an international crime
the aim of maintaining the existing political system, in the full knowledge that 
they could exacerbate hunger and entail deaths”. Th e last sentence is especially 
noteworthy: “Th ey were taken for purposes of sustaining the present political 
system, in full awareness that they would exacerbate starvation and contribute 
to related deaths.”45 Analysis of the above sentence may justify a conclusion that 
the Commission need not have taken into account intent, set out under Art. 6 
(genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to…) and Art. 7 
of the ICC Statute (extermination includes the intentional infl iction…), assum-
ing in these provisions the form of the dolus directus.46 Rather, the Committee’s 
fi ndings point to a culpability that ranges between recklessness and potential in-
tent. Th is trend stems from the evolution of the international legal order from 
a  state-centred to an anthropocentric one linked to the expansion of human 
rights. Th e international community is now responding not only in a situation 
of evident and deliberate mass starvation, comparable to that of the Holodomor, 
but is also taking on the responsibility for civil protection when reckless action 
by the authorities does not necessarily result in starvation with fatalities. For this 
reason, we must note the proposals to revise the current treaty acquis on famine 
crimes, the aim of which is to prevent crimes from being concealed under the veil 
of the centuries-old “myth” of natural famine.47
Famine crimes?
D. Marcus distinguishes four degrees relating to the authorities’ faminogenic be-
haviour, depending on the commitment and motivation of senior state offi  cials. 
Th e fourth degree (the least severe) covers situations where a corrupt government 
leads to a  food crisis and is unable to meet the basic needs of the population, 
which results in a famine. Th e third degree concerns authoritarian governments 
which turn a blind eye to the problem of food shortages yet have the appropriate 
means to respond. Th eir behaviour is characterised by indiff erence and does not 
always involve awareness (mens rea), for which there is international responsibil-
ity. Th e second degree is already linked to recklessness48 and government policy 
45 Report of the detailed fi ndings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Dem-
ocratic People’s Republic of Korea, 7.02.2014, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, https://www.ohchr.org/en/
hrbodies/hrc/coidprk/pages/reportoft hecommissionofi nquirydprk.aspx (accessed 23.02.2020), 
pp. 144–209, 333. 
46 See T. Iwanek, Zbrodnia ludobójstwa i zbrodnie przeciwko ludzkości w prawie międzynarodo-
wym, Warszawa 2015, p. 237.
47 D. Marcus, Famine…, op. cit., p. 280. 
48 Th is is an Anglo-Saxon form of recklessness in that the perpetrator deliberately does not 
aim to establish the actual state of aff airs and the related possibility of committing a prohibited 
act (this is so-called wilful blindness); see S. Frankowski, Wina i kara w angielskim prawie karnym, 
Warszawa 1976, p. 113. Th e above concept of so-called conscious unintentionality (recklessness) 















































188 Tomasz Srogosz 
leading to hunger. Finally, the most stringent form of famine crimes (of the fi rst 
degree) covers a deliberate policy, where hunger is used as a tool of extermina-
tion of selected populations. D. Marcus proposes to consider the fi rst and second 
degree actions as international crimes.49 Importantly, D.  Marcus’s four-degree 
catalogue of faminogenic behaviour, where the fi rst and second degrees concern 
international crimes, does not mean that the state always meets international ob-
ligations of the right to food by taking action defi ned as the fourth or third de-
gree. In these cases, there is a violation of the right to adequate food, but without 
the consequences of international criminal responsibility.
In view of the above, we should consider whether the codifi ed and inter-
nationally recognised catalogue of international crimes is currently suffi  cient 
and does not need to be supplemented, for example with new categories of so-
called famine crimes. Th e signifi cance of this question is evident in the context 
of the established concept of responsibility for protection, the content of the 
right to food and the recent famine in Venezuela or the crisis in North Korea. 
Th e latter has been described above, while the former, continuing from 2014, is 
the most serious economic collapse of recent decades. Th e background was the 
sharp fall in the price of oil, the staple of the Venezuelan economy. Th e crisis 
has resulted in growing shortages of food supplies. In 2017, hunger and malnu-
trition aff ected around 75% of the country’s population, while around 90% of 
the population found themselves in poverty. Th e food crisis was primarily due 
to Venezuela’s previous dependence on food imports.50 Th e report of the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights emphasises that the economic collapse 
and the violation of socio-economic rights, including the right to food (the 
number of hungry and undernourished people is estimated at around 3.7 mil-
lion) are caused by misguided economic policy, a crisis in state institutions and 
corruption. In the Commissioner’s view, the government has not shown that 
it has exhausted all the available resources to ensure the progressive exercise of 
the right to food, nor that it has sought international support to make up for 
the shortfall. Th e economic and social policies adopted in recent decades have 
undermined food production and distribution systems, increasing the num-
ber of people dependent on food aid programmes. Furthermore, the report 
points out that the Venezuelan government introduced in 2016 a special food 
of recklessness and in the Anglo-Saxon system in the form of wilful blindness) and intent in the 
form of the so-called potential intention (see M. Kowalewska-Łukuć, Zamiar ewentualny w świetle 
psychologii, Poznań 2015, pp. 135–137). 
49 D. Marcus, Famine…, op. cit., pp. 246–247. 
50 See T. Srogosz, Międzynarodowe…, op. cit., p. 50; ‘Zoos are forced to slaughter animals to 

















































189Starvation as an international crime
distribution programme (CLAP  – Local Committees for Supply and Food 
Distribution), which did not cover the entire population because not all peo-
ple were on the government’s list of benefi ciaries.51 
Th e famine situations described above were caused by states. Th e pattern 
was similar and boiled down to socio-economic policies that violated the 
right to adequate food and even the right to life.52 Evident in these policies 
is the discrimination of specifi c social groups (Songbun and CLAP), yet we 
cannot speak here about acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a  national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Th e allegation of gen-
ocide should, therefore, be regarded as incorrect. Th e same can be said of the 
charge of crimes against humanity. Th e condition for accountability is to prove 
a “systematic attack against civilians”, including extermination. However, this 
boils down to deliberately creating conditions designed to destroy parts of the 
population (acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (…) ex-
termination (…) includes the intentional infl iction of conditions of life, (…) 
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population). Even if we 
agreed that the crime involves potential intent53 (although such a position is 
untenable given the literal interpretation of Article 8(1) and (2)(b) of the ICC 
Statute, which refers to a deliberate attack on civilians; moreover, “designing” 
or “calculating” living conditions so as to lead to the destruction of the popula-
tion requires deliberate and planned action54), the situations in Venezuela and 
51 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on situation of hu-
man rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 5.07.2019, A/HRC/41/18, https://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/VE/A_HRC_41_18.docx (accessed 24.01.2020). 
52 A more distant famine caused by reckless state policy was the Great Famine in China be-
tween 1958 and 1962, caused by collectivisation leading to the collapse of agricultural production; 
it is estimated to have claimed between 42 and 60 million deaths (see F. Dikötter, Wielki Głód. 
Tragiczne skutki polityki Mao 1958–1962, Wołowiec 2013). 
53 See Art. 30(2b) of the ICC Statute – “In relation to a consequence, that person (…) is 
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events”; however, we should bear in mind that 
the ICC is inconsistent in the interpretation of Art. 30 of the Statute, allowing once for a broad 
interpretation and indicating the possibility of commitment of an international crime even 
in conscious unintentionality, and thus also with a potential intention (Prosecutor v. Luban-
ga, ICC PT.  Ch., Decision on the Confi rmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, 
29.01.2007, https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.aspx?uri=266175 (accessed 25.02.2020), 
par. 352ff ), and on another occasion limiting intention under Art. 30 of the ICC Statute solely 
to the dolus directus (Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC PT. Ch., Decision Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15.06.2009, https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/record.
aspx?uri=699541 (accessed 25.02.2020), par. 360); the doctrine highlights that prevailing in 
the current ICC practice is a restrictive interpretation of intent (M.E. Badar, S. Porro, ‘Article 
30.2 (b)’, in: M. Klamberg (ed.), Commentary on the Law of the International Criminal Court, 
Brussels 2017, p. 319). 
54 Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, ICC PT.  Ch. I, Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Appli-















































190 Tomasz Srogosz 
North Korea could hardly be included in the category of crimes under Art. 8 
(1) and (2) of the ICC Statute. No doubt, they diff er from the crimes which 
impacted the origins of the notion of genocide and crimes against humanity 
(Holodomor and der Hungerplan). Th ey did not have the clear aim of starving 
the population to death through planned policies. Indeed, Stalin and Göring 
used hunger as a means of fi ghting against nations and ethnic groups; in the 
case of the Soviet Union, it was used against a social group (so-called kulaks). 
Th is perception of starvation as an international crime is still valid today and is 
refl ected in the casuistic regulations of the ICC Statute, still embedded in the 
realities of the Nuremberg trials and the 1953 article by R. Lemkin. Th ere is 
a no broader reference to the violation of the right to food, the cause of which 
may be, as in the case of the famine in North Korea and Venezuela, a reckless 
(deliberately unintentional) state policy (second degree of faminogenic behav-
iour in D. Marcus’ classifi cation). 
Th e statement of the special commission established by the UN Human 
Rights Council might provide an argument in favour of treating the famine 
in North Korea as a crime against humanity (in addition, crimes against hu-
manity have been committed against starving populations; these crimes have 
their source in decisions and policies violating the universal human right to 
food; they were taken for purposes of sustaining the present political system, in 
full awareness that they would exacerbate starvation and contribute to related 
death55). However, it should be remembered that the author of these words was 
not an international court or the UN Security Council, but a commission set 
up by a subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly. Secondly, the commis-
sion does not refer to concepts laid down in Nuremberg law and codifi ed in the 
ICC Statute, but to violations of the right to food. Th irdly, in the commission’s 
statement, perhaps unconsciously, a structure resembling wilful blindness ap-
pears; as has been said earlier, it is not supported by the existing treaty defi ni-
tions of international crimes. 
Nevertheless, the commission’s statement may serve as a  good indicator 
for the development of regulations relating to so-called famine crimes. At this 
stage of the development of human rights, there is no doubt that extending 
the catalogue of international crimes to include the second category of fam-
ine crimes (according to D.  Marcus’ classifi cation) is necessary and obvious. 
Th e best solution is to amend the ICC Statute, because the custom that was 
the cornerstone of the concept of genocide even aft er the Second World War, 
12.07.2010, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-02/05-01/09-94 (accessed 
25.02.2020), par. 33; M. Gillet, ‘Extermination’, in: M. Klamberg (ed.), Commentary…, op. cit., 
p. 40. 















































191Starvation as an international crime
is now unthinkable because of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, fi rmly 
anchored in international criminal law. 
One might wonder whether to go further than D. Marcus’ proposal. Since 
the violation of the right to adequate food is a tort committed by the state as 
a subject of international law, should not individual liability be introduced for 
the fourth and third category of famine crimes? Aft er all, the concept of respon-
sibility to protect has changed the perception of the state in international law. It 
is the main guarantor of human rights, and its role is to meet the basic needs of 
the population. From this perspective, a corrupt power, or one that turns a blind 
eye to the problems of feeding the population, should be treated in the same way 
as one that pursues a reckless or deliberate policy that results in famine. 
In conclusion, the following proposals can be made: 1. add to Article 8(2)
(e) (on non-international armed confl icts) a sub-paragraph defi ning starvation 
of civilians; 2. add the criterion of recklessness to Articles 30, 7(2)(b) and 7(1)
(k), which recklessness would consist in deliberate negligence; 3. alternatively, 
create a new category of famine crimes (under the ICC Statute or under a sepa-
rate framework convention on international food law56) which involves starving 
civilians as a result of reckless policies of state authorities (including corruption 
or refusal of external aid). 
Bibliography 
Badar M.E., Porro S., ‘Article 30.2 (b)’, in: M. Klamberg (ed.), Commentary on the Law of 
the International Criminal Court, Brussels 2017.
Dikötter F., Wielki Głód. Tragiczne skutki polityki Mao 1958–1962, Wołowiec 2013. 
Dörmann K., ‘War Crimes under the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court 
with a Special Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of Crimes’, Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law, 2003, vol. 7, pp. 388–389. 
Frankowski S., Wina i kara w angielskim prawie karnym, Warszawa 1976.
Gillet M., ‘Extermination’, in: M. Klamberg (ed.), Commentary on the Law of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Brussels 2017.
Iwanek T., Zbrodnia ludobójstwa i zbrodnie przeciwko ludzkości w prawie międzynarodo-
wym, Warszawa 2015.
Kay J., ‘Germany’s Staatssekretäre, Mass Starvation and the Meeting of 2 May 1941’, Jour-
nal of Contemporary History, 2006, vol. 41 (4), pp. 685–700. 
Kowalewska-Łukuć M., Zamiar ewentualny w świetle psychologii, Poznań 2015.
Lemkin R., Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation – Analysis of Government – 
Proposals for Redress, Washington 1944.
Lemkin R., ‘Soviet Genocide in the Ukraine’, in: L.Y. Luciuk (ed.), Holodomor: Refl ec-
tions on the Great Famine of 1932–1933 in Soviet Ukraine, Kingston 2008.















































192 Tomasz Srogosz 
Marcus D., ‘Famine Crimes in International Law’, American Journal of International 
Law, 2003, vol. 97. 
Pritchard J., Zaide S.M., Watt D.C. (eds.), Th e Tokyo War Crimes Trial, vol. 22, New York 
1981.
Schwaneberg S., ‘Eksploatacja gospodarcza Generalnego Gubernatorstwa przez Rzeszę 
Niemiecką w latach 1939–1945’, Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość, 2009, no. 1, p. 135–139. 
Snyder T., Skrwawione ziemie: Europa między Hitlerem a Stalinem, Warszawa 2011.
Srogosz T., Międzynarodowe prawo żywnościowe, Warszawa 2020.
Srogosz T., ‘Prawo do (odpowiedniej) żywności w prawie międzynarodowym publicz-
nym’, in: I. Kraśnicka (ed.), Prawo międzynarodowe. Teoria i  praktyka, Warszawa 
2020, pp. 193–206. 
Wierczyńska K., Pojęcie ludobójstwa w kontekście orzecznictwa międzynarodowych trybu-
nałów karnych ad hoc, Warszawa 2010.
Abstract 
Famine has been usually seen as a natural disaster. Meanwhile, cases of extermination 
of populations by state authorities are known in history, during war or peace. Hence it 
is important to answer the questions: is starvation a  international crime? what are its 
constituent elements? does international law exhaustively regulate this crime? Answer is 
possible aft er discussing a genesis of crime based on the Geneva c onventions on protec-
tion of prisoners of war and civilians, and then analyzing a development of international 
law of human rights and the responsibility to protect. Th e statute of ICC is a result of 
development of nuremberg laws and humanitariam law, which requires changes because 
of necessity to abolish a gap between norms of war crimes in international confl icts and 
non-international confl icts and because of necessity to conform to international law 
of human rights and responsibility to protect. Considering the situations of hunger in 
North Korea or Venezuela, it may be fi rst proposed to add to the ICC statute the form of 
recklessness of starvation, or, secondly, to establish a category of famine crimes (under the 
ICC statute or separate convention), taking into account a starvation of civilians due to 
reckless public policy (including corruption, or a refusal to aid from abroad). 
Keywords: public international law, international crime, starvation, war crime, geno-

















































Evolution of the statute of limitations of crimes 
under international law in international law
Explanation of the term “crimes under international law”
Th e analysis of the issue of the statute of limitations of crimes under internation-
al law in international law requires prior clarifi cation of the term “crimes under 
international law”, since not every international crimes are crimes under interna-
tional law. At the begin it should be remarked that in the area of the naming of 
crimes of international character a terminological chaos exists.
On the international forum various names are used. In the opinion of the au-
thor of this paper, accurate and proposed in this elaboration is the view according 
to which the term “international crimes”1 is a parent term to the term “crimes 
under international law”,2 which should be descriptively explained as crimes di-
rectly criminalized by international law3 or crimes that involve direct criminal 
responsibility under international law.4 Today only crimes being subject to the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court are recognized as crimes under 
international law.5 Th ese crimes include: the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. In the English-language litera-
ture crimes under international law are also called “core crimes”6 or “international 
crimes in the narrow sense”.7
Other international crimes (international crimes being not crimes under 
international law) can be referred to as ordinary international delicts. In the 
1 See A. Aust, Handbook of International Law, New York 2010, p. 250 (“Th ere is no agreed 
defi nition of ‘international crime’, but it is a convenient term for those crimes that are of con-
cern to every State because of their corrosive eff ect on international society or their particularly 
appalling nature.”).
2 See this term in: G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, Th e Hague 2005, p. 25.
3 So R. Cryer, ‘International Criminal Law’, in: M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law, New 
York 2010, p. 752.
4 G. Werle, Principles…, op. cit., p. 25.
5 Compare: ibid. 
6 See, e.g.: ibid.; R.S. Clark, ‘Treaty crimes’, in: W.A. Schabas (ed.), Th e Cambridge Compan-
ion to International Criminal Law, Cambridge 2016, p. 214. Compare: A. Cassese, International 
Criminal Law, New York 2003, p. 110; R. Cryer, H. Friman, D. Robinson, E. Wilmshusrt, An 
Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, Cambridge 2009, p. 2.
















































literature, other international crimes are also called “treaty-based crimes” or “trea-
ty crimes”.8 Th ey include, for example, narcotics traffi  cking, acts of terrorism, tor-
ture, and counterfeiting of money.9 Th e basis for prosecution and punishment of 
other international crimes is not international law, but domestic legislation. In 
such cases international law, in particular international agreements, merely obli-
gate states to declare certain off ences criminal.10
In the literature, a  view is also presented that international crimes include 
crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, aggression, torture (as distinct 
from torture as one of the categories of crimes against humanity or war crimes) 
and international terrorism. By contrast, the notion of international crimes does 
not embrace other classes of criminal off ences, such as piracy, traffi  c in persons, or 
exploitation of prostitution, unlawful arms trade and money laundering.11
It should be mentioned about an opposite opinion on the term “interna-
tional crimes”. According to that opinion, the term “international crimes” re-
fers to those “off ences over which international courts or tribunals have been 
given jurisdiction under general international law” and an international crime 
may be defi ned as “an off ence which is created by international law itself, with-
out requiring an intervention of domestic law”.12
Th e author, being Polish, would also like to mention about literature of 
her country. Similarly to the English-language literature, it is a  chaos in the 
Polish-language literature. Many researchers, even those specializing in inter-
national law or criminal law, are oft en imprecise and use – for example during 
academic conferences – various terms. In the Polish literature the Latin term de-
licta iuris gentium is commonly used to describe crimes of international charac-
ter.13 It embraces not only very serious crimes like, for example, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, but also less serious crimes like, for example, narcotics 
traffi  cking.14 In Poland, the term “przestępstwa traktatowe” (“treaty crimes/of-
fences”) is also used. Among crimes of international character the most serious 
crimes of international importance are distinguished. Th is descriptive term has 
been used in the translation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
8 See e.g.: R.S. Clark, Treaty crimes…, op. cit., p. 214.
9 See e.g.: A. Cassese, International Criminal Law…, op. cit., p. 110.
10 Compare: R. Cryer, H. Friman, D. Robinson, E. Wilmshusrt, An Introduction…, op. cit., 
p. 2, 58; A. Aust, Handbook…, op. cit., p. 250.
11 So A. Cassese (revised by A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, L. Baig, M. Fan, Ch. Gosnell, and A. Whit-
ing), Cassese’s International Criminal Law, Oxford 2008, p. 21.
12 R. Cryer, H. Friman, D. Robinson, E. Wilmshusrt, An Introduction…, op. cit., p. 2, 5.
13 L. Gardocki, Prawo karne, Warszawa 2017, p. 44; T. Bojarski, Polskie prawo karne. Zarys 
części ogólnej, Warszawa 2003, p. 68; T. Bojarski, in: T. Bojarski (ed.), Kodeks karny. Komentarz, 
Warszawa 2016, p. 289; J. Warylewski, Prawo karne. Część ogólna, Warszawa 2017, p. 208; N. Kłą-
czyńska, in: J. Giezek (ed.), Kodeks karny. Część ogólna. Komentarz, Warszawa 2012, p. 664.















































195Evolution of the statute of limitations of crimes
Court into the Polish language.15 Th e term “zbrodnie międzynarodowe” is also 
oft en used in Poland.16 In the literal translation it means “international crimes”. 
However, in the opinion of the author of this paper, aft er the ratifi cation of the 
Rome Statute the Polish term “zbrodnie międzynarodowe” should be used in 
the meaning of the term “crimes under international law”. In other words, the 
term “zbrodnie międzynarodowe” should be reserved for crimes being subject 
to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.
Subject and temporal scope of the analysis of the statute of limitations
Bearing in mind the above, it should be clearly stated that the subject of the 
analysis in this elaboration is the international-law development of the statute 
of limitations of the following crimes: the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. Th e analysis will focus on 
the evolution of the institution of the criminal-law statute of limitations in 
international law and not on the historical outline of penalization and the issue 
of the statute of limitations of particular crimes. Beginnings and the current 
legal existence of the statute of limitations will be shown. A diff erence in the 
way of the regulation of the statute of limitations, which occurred over the 
years, will be indicated.
As to international crimes being not crimes under international law it is 
worth mentioning at this place that international law in no way regulates their 
statute of limitations. It is the responsibility of individual states to regulate the 
statute of limitations for these crimes. It depends on individual states whether 
or not they exclude these crimes from falling under the statute of limitations.
Genesis of the statute of limitations in international law
Research of literature on international law leads to the conclusion that on the 
international forum, they began to talk about criminal-law statute of limita-
tions only aft er the Second World War. Th is was done in the context of the 
functioning of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. Th e Charter 
of this Tribunal was an appendix to the Agreement for the prosecution and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis (called the “Lon-
don Agreement”), signed by the four so-called Great Powers (the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, 
15 See Art. 5 of the Rome Statute in the Polish language, Journal of Laws of 2001, no. 98, 
item 1065.
16 See, e.g.: M. Królikowski, P. Wiliński, J. Izydorczyk, Podstawy prawa karnego międzynarodo-
















































France, and the Soviet Union) on 8 August 1945 in London.17 In the Charter 
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity were defi ned for 
the fi rst time in the history. Either the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal or 
the London Agreement have not referred to the issue of the statute of lim-
itations of these crimes. Similarly, the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East18 has not regulated the statute of limitations of crimes 
being under the jurisdiction of the Tokyo Tribunal.
Th e above does not mean that criminal-law statute of limitations did not 
exist under international law. Admittedly, the Charter of the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal (and the Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal) has not contained a provision 
on the statute of limitations of crimes being subject of the jurisdiction of this 
Tribunal, but in the literature a view is accepted that it was so-called “quali-
fi ed silence”, meaning a rejection of the admissibility of falling of these crimes 
under the statute of limitations.19 It should be mentioned that violation of 
international peace and the laws of war, as well as off ences against humanity 
have been rightly recognized as crimes that have long existed in customary 
international law.
Similarly, in the opinion of the author of this paper, it should be rec-
ognized that the exclusion of crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity – being the most serious delicta iuris gentium – from falling 
under the statute of limitations have existed in customary international law 
since time immemorial (for a very long time). Th e sources of the unlimited 
in time punishability of the most serious crimes being concern to the inter-
national community should be seen in the law of nature, in the very essence 
of the humanity and in the right of nations for peaceful coexistence.20 In the 
opinion of the author, the exclusion from the statute of limitations occurred 
with the very appearance of the fi rst acts constituting crimes against peace, 





19 See, e.g.: A. Sakowicz, in: M. Królikowski, R. Zawłocki (eds.), Kodeks karny. Część ogólna, 
t. II: Komentarz do artykułów 32–116, Warszawa 2010, pp. 833–834; R. Koper, K. Sychta, J. Za-
grodnik, ‘Karnomaterialne aspekty instytucji przedawnienia – zagadnienia wybrane’, in: Z. Ćwią-
kalski, G. Artymiak (eds.), Współzależność prawa karnego materialnego i  procesowego, Warszawa 
2009, p. 222. See also C. Van den Wyngaert, J. Dugard, ‘Non–Applicability of Statute of Lim-
itations’, in: A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, J. Johnes (eds.), Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, vol. I, New York 2002, pp. 876–879.
20 Th is view about sources of norms excluding the statute of limitations I already expressed in: 
















































197Evolution of the statute of limitations of crimes
Statute of limitations in international conventions
Th e fi rst legal act of international law expressis verbis concerning the problem 
of the statute of limitations was the Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Th is Con-
vention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 26 No-
vember 1968 in New York and entered into force on 11 November 1970.21 It 
is worth emphasising that Poland was the initiator of the establishment of this 
Convention.22 Poland was also the fi rst state that signed (on 16 December 1968) 
and ratifi ed (on 14 February 1969) this Convention.23
Th e extent of the regulation of this Convention includes: a) war crimes as 
they are defi ned in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (particu-
larly the “grave breaches” enumerated in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 for the protection of war victims; b) crimes against humanity whether 
committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are defi ned in the Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal, and – not mentioned in the title of the 
convention – the crime of genocide as defi ned in the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, even if such acts do not 
constitute a violation of the domestic law of the country in which they were com-
mitted (Art. 1 of the Convention).
Article 1 of the Convention states that these crimes are not subject to stat-
utory limitation regardless of the date of their commission. Th is provision was 
not of constitutive character since it did not create the exclusion of these crimes 
from the statute of limitations, but only declared it.24 Th e Convention itself 
indicates such an interpretation by pointing out in its preamble that the regu-
lation in question expresses a confi rmation in international law of the rule of 
non-applicability of the statutory limitation to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. A relevant section of the preamble states: “Noting that none of the 
solemn declarations, instruments or conventions relating to the prosecution 
and punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity made provision 
for a period of limitation, (…) Recognizing that it is necessary and timely to 
affi  rm in international law, through this Convention, the principle that there is 
no period of limitation for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and to se-
cure its universal application”.
21 https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.27_
convention%20statutory%20limitations%20warcrimes.pdf (accessed 4.11.2019).
22 L. Kubicki, in: I. Andrejew (ed.), System prawa karnego. O przestępstwach w szczególności, 
vol. IV, part I, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1985, p. 172.
23 https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
6&chapter=4&lang=en (accessed 4.11.2019).
24 K. Banasik, ‘Karnoprawne normy przedawnienia w prawie międzynarodowym’, Prokuratura 
















































At this place it is worth mentioning about one more convention. It is not an 
international convention, but an European convention (created on the forum of 
the Council of Europe), which expressis verbis relates to the statute of limitations. 
It is about the European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitation to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes of 25 January 1974, 
adopted in Strasburg.25 Article 1 of the Convention obliges the contracting 
states to adopt any necessary measures to ensure that statutory limitation shall 
not apply to the prosecution of the following off ences, or to the enforcement of 
the sentences imposed for such off ences, in so far as they are punishable under its 
domestic law: 1. the crimes against humanity specifi ed in the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted on 9 December 
1948; 2. (a) the certain war crimes specifi ed in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
(b) any comparable violations of the laws of war having eff ect at the time when 
this Convention enters into force and of customs of war existing at that time, 
which are not already provided for in the above-mentioned provisions of the Ge-
neva Conventions, when the specifi c violation under consideration is of a par-
ticularly grave character by reason either of its factual and intentional elements 
or of the extent of its foreseeable consequences; 3. any other violation of a rule 
or custom of international law which may hereaft er be established and which the 
contracting state concerned considers as being of a comparable nature to those 
referred to in paragraphs 1 or 2 of this article.
According to Article 2 paragraph 1, the Convention applies to off ences com-
mitted aft er its entry into force in respect of the contracting state concerned. Ar-
ticle 2 paragraph 2 of the Convention states that it applies also to off ences com-
mitted before such entry into force in those cases where the statutory limitation 
period had not expired at that time.
As of the end of December 1999, the Convention was ratifi ed only by the 
Netherlands (on 25 November 1981) and signed by France (on 25 January 
1974), Belgium and Romania. Article 3 paragraph 2 of the convention re-
quired three ratifi cations for the entry of the Convention into force. Th e Con-
vention entered into force on 27 June 2003, aft er it had been ratifi ed by Roma-
nia (on 8 June 2000) and Belgium (on 26 March 2003). As of November 2019, 
only eight states are parties to the convention.26 By the way, it can be noted that 
France, although the fi rst signatory, has not ratifi ed the Convention to date. 
Poland has not even signed the Convention. Th is is, however, justifi ed, having 



















































199Evolution of the statute of limitations of crimes
1968. It can be concluded that the signifi cance of this European convention is 
only symbolic.
Statute of limitations in the statutes of international criminal tribunals
Th e fi rst of contemporary international criminal tribunals was the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the ICTY). It was estab-
lished by the Security Council of the United Nations in the resolution of 25 
May 1993. Th e Statute of the ICTY was an appendix to this resolution.27 In 
accordance with its Statute, the Tribunal had authority to prosecute and try 
individuals on four categories of off ences: grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
conventions (Art. 2 of the ICTY Statute), violations of the laws or customs of 
war (Art. 3 of the ICTY Statute), genocide (Art. 4 of the ICTY Statute) and 
crimes against humanity (Art. 5 of the ICTY Statute). Th e ICTY was estab-
lished not as a permanent tribunal, but as a temporary (ad hoc) institution.28 
It had the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia since 1991 (Art. 1 of the ICTY Statute). Its Statute did not contained 
a provision on the statute of limitations.
Th e second of the contemporary international tribunals, established also as 
an ad hoc tribunal,29 was the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the 
ICTR). It was established by the Security Council of the United Nations in 
the resolution of 8 November 1994.30 Th e Statute of the ICTR,31 based on the 
Statute of the ICTY, was an appendix to this resolution. In accordance with 
its Statute, the Tribunal had jurisdiction over genocide (Art. 2 of the ICTR 
Statute), crimes against humanity (Art. 3 of the ICTR Statute) and violations 
of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol 
II (Art.  4 of the ICTR Statute), committed in the territory of Rwanda and 
Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory 
of neighboring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (Art. 1 
of the ICTR Statute). Th e Statute of this Tribunal also contained no provision 
concerning the statute of limitations.
27 https://www.icty.org/x/fi le/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf (accessed 
4.11.2019).
28 Compare: G. Sluiter, ‘Ad hoc international criminal tribunals (Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Le-
one)’, in: W.A. Schabas (ed.), Th e Cambridge Companion…, op. cit., p. 117; A. Henriksen, Internation-
al Law, Oxford 2017, pp. 309–311; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law…, op. cit., pp. 335–336.
29 Compare: G. Sluiter, ‘Ad hoc international criminal tribunals’…, op. cit., p. 117; A. Cassese, 
International Criminal Law…, op. cit., pp. 335–336.
30 https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/fi les/legal-library/941108_res955_en.pdf (ac-
cessed 4.11.2019).

















































Th e creation of a permanent international criminal court was of great sig-
nifi cance for the development of international criminal law. Th ere is a wide-
ly accepted opinion that this event made a “change of epoch (age)” and was 
“the beginning of a new era” in international criminal law.32 K. Annan, who at 
that time was the Secretary-General of the United Nations, accurately assessed 
the signifi cance of this step with following words: “Th e establishment of the 
court is (…) a gift  of hope to future generations, and a giant step forward in 
the march towards universal human rights and the rule of law”.33 It is about 
the International Criminal Court (the ICC) which was established under the 
Rome Statute, being an international agreement of 17 July 1998, agreed in 
Rome during the diplomatic conference of the United Nations.34 In accord-
ance with Art.  5 of the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC shall be 
limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international communi-
ty as a whole. Th e ICC has jurisdiction with respect to the following crimes: 
the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime 
of aggression.35
Article 29 of the ICC Statute states: “Th e crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court shall not be subject to any statute of limitations”. It should be 
explained that they are subject to neither limitation on prosecution nor limita-
tion on enforcement of punishment. Th e exclusion of any statute of limitations 
has been made distinctly.
During the preparatory works on the Statute there were no protests from 
the  vast majority of delegates against the exclusion of the statute of limi-
tations for the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. However, an op-
posite opinion to this issue was expressed by, for example, the delegates of 
China and Japan.36 China agreed to express its opinion only in the footnote 
32 See, e.g.: J. Kugler, in: H.-H. Hühne, R. Esser, M. Gerding (eds.), Völkerstrafr echt, Osnabrück 
2007, p. 57; K. Ambos, ‘Th e Legal Basis of the International Criminal Court. An analysis of the 
Rome Statute’, in: L. Arbour, A. Eser, K. Ambos, A. Sanders (eds.), Th e Prosecutor of a Permanent 
International Criminal Court, Freiburg im Breisgau 1998, p. 40.
33 Cited in: K. Ambos, ‘Der neue Internationale Strafgerichtshof – Ein Überblick’, Neue Ju-
ristische Wochenschrift , 1998, 51, p. 3746. K. Annan said the same in a letter of 31 August 1998 
to Professor Bassiouni: “Th e adoption of the Rome Statute of an International Criminal Court 
marks a giant step forward in the march towards universal human rights and the rule of law.” (see 
M.C. Bassiouni, Th e Legislative History of the International Criminal Court, vol. 1: Introduction, 
Analysis, and Integrated Text of the Statute, Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
New York 2005, p. xiii).
34 https://www.icc-cpi.int/resourcelibrary/offi  cial-journal/rome-statute.aspx (accessed 
4.11.2019).
35 On the scope and mutual relationship of crimes against peace and the crime of aggression see 
K. Banasik, ‘Od zbrodni przeciwko pokojowi do zbrodni agresji’, Palestra, 2012, no. 5–6, pp. 101–
109.
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in the working group report. Japan changed its mind during the conference, 
however maintained that a long elapse of time should be taken into account 
as a mitigating factor.37
Th e above-cited provision of the Rome Statute, which excludes the crimes 
falling under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court from the stat-
ute of limitations, has a declarative character. It only confi rms the universal prin-
ciple rooted in international criminal law for a long time. Th e argument in favour 
of this interpretation is that the relevant provision of the convention adopted 
30 years earlier was of a declarative character.38
Conclusions
Th e analysis of the issue of the statute of limitations in international law has 
clearly shown that the statute of limitations in international law has evolved over 
the years. Th e above-made analysis leads to the conclusion that in international 
law a transition from silent to distinct exclusion of the statute of limitations of 
crimes under international law occurred. Initially, the exclusion of the statute of 
limitations of the most serious delicta iuris gentium had a silent character. A land-
mark event in this issue was the adoption of the Convention on the Non-Appli-
cability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1968. Criminal-law norms 
on the limitation period of punishability have been expressis verbis written in 
two conventions devoted to the problem of the statute of limitations, i.e. in the 
above-mentioned convention of the United Nations of 1968 and in the Con-
vention of the Council of Europe of 1974 on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitation to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes.
In the opinion of the author of this paper, the creation of the International 
Criminal Court in 1998 should be recognized as a next landmark event in the 
issue of the regulation of the statute of limitations. Th e Statute of this Court 
was the fi rst legal act being a basis for the functioning of an international crim-
inal tribunal and containing a  provision on the statute of limitations. Th is 
provision confi rmed the exclusion of crimes under international law from the 
institution of the statute of limitations. Course of works on the Rome Statute 
showed that in the contemporary world the exclusion of crimes under interna-
tional law from falling under the statute of limitations is commonly accepted 
by the international community.
37 P. Saland, ‘International Criminal Law Principles’, in: R.S. Lee (ed.), Th e International Crim-
inal Court. Th e Making of the Rome Statute. Issues, Negotiations, Results, Th e Hague 1999, p. 204.
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Abstract
Th e aim of this paper is the analysis of the evolution of the statute of limitations 
of crimes under international law in international law. Crimes under international law 
are subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and include: the 
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. 
Th e analysis is focusing on the evolution of the institution of the criminal-law statute 
of limitations under international law and not on the historical outline of penaliza-
tion and the statute of limitations of particular crimes. Th e author mainly uses the for-
mal-dogmatic research method. Th e author begins by explaining the terms “interna-
tional crimes” and “crimes under international law”. Th en she proceeds to the genesis of 
the statute of limitations in international law. In the next parts she deals with the statute 
of limitations in international conventions and in the statutes of international criminal 
tribunals. She fi nishes her elaboration by giving some conclusions. She concludes by 
stating, among other things, that the analysis of the issue of the statute of limitations 
in international law has clearly shown that the statute of limitations in international 
law has evolved over the years. In international law, a transition from silent to distinct 
exclusion of the statute of limitations of crimes under international law occurred.
Keywords: statute of limitations, evolution of statute of limitations in international 


















































Scope of Exclusion of the Statute of Limitations 
on Criminal Responsibility under Article 105(1) 
of the Polish Criminal Code in the context 
of State Liability for Crimes of International Law
An international crime is defi ned in the literature in two ways: as a punishable 
off ence imputable to an individual on the basis of fault, the commission of which 
off ence directly contravenes the standards of international law and as an off ence 
against international law imputable to the state as a form of delictum iuris gen-
tium, giving rise to the international responsibility of the state, either in the now 
abandoned form of the so-called international crime of the state or as the more 
modern concept of serious violations of the peremptory standards of internation-
al law1. Th e outline of international jurisdiction and the catalogue of crimes of 
international law was defi ned in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles2, which applies 
this category to everything that violates the laws and customs of war (Article 
228), as well as everything that shatters international morals and the seriousness 
of treaties (Article 227). Th is scope was subsequently extended by Article 6 of the 
Statute of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg3, which identifi ed 
1 See on this matter T. Iwanek, Zbrodnia ludobójstwa i zbrodnie przeciwko ludzkości w prawie 
międzynarodowym, LEX 2015; M. Gąska, A. Ciupiński, Międzynarodowe prawo humanitarne kon-
fl iktów zbrojnych. Wybrane problemy, Warszawa 2001, p. 104; E. Dynia, Przestępstwa prawa mię-
dzynarodowego. Odpowiedzialność prawnomiędzynarodowa jednostki, Warszawa 1999; K. Lankosz, 
‘Penalizacja w międzynarodowym prawie publicznym czynów osób winnych najpoważniejszych 
zbrodni wagi międzynarodowej’, in: K. Baran, A. Zoll, J. Stelmach, J. Halberda (eds.), Dziedzictwo 
prawne XX wieku. Księga pamiątkowa z okazji 150-lecia Towarzystwa Biblioteki Słuchaczów Prawa 
Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2001, p. 247.
2 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles 
on 28 June 1919, Protocol for the deposit of ratifi cation of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles 
on 28 June 1919, Journal of Laws 1920, no. 35, item 200.
3 Act of 2 June 1947 on the ratifi cation of Poland’s accession to the Agreement on the Prose-
cution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, signed in London on 
8 August 1945, Journal of Laws 1947, no. 48, 247; International Agreement on the Prosecution 
and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, signed in London on 8 August 
1945, Journal of Laws 1947, no. 63, 367; cf. also the Charter of the United Nations, the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice and the Agreement establishing the United Nations Preparatory 
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the following types of crimes of international law: crimes against peace4, war 
crimes5 and crimes against humanity6.
Th e concept of the state has been variously defi ned over the centuries during 
investigations on legal theory. It has been seen as a structure used by a society 
which, on the basis of the norms it lays down and with the help of an adminis-
trative apparatus created for this purpose, organises the activities of individuals 
and groups; as a form of organisation of a social group which has chosen a lead-
ing sovereign authority to control a  certain territory through it; as a  political 
union in which authority uses instruments for “control over people” (M. We-
ber); a “territorial corporation equipped with direct, self-contained superiority”, 
which is moreover characterised by its legal personality (G. Jellinek), sometimes 
emphasizing its role as a  structure set up to protect individual rights. In turn, 
G.W.F. Hegel saw the state as an “actualization of the ethical idea”, while H. Kels-
en perceived it as a normative structure, its form being legal order and its bodies 
both institutions with a ruling empire and human beings – citizens.7
Th e above inevitably leads to the conclusion that fi rst the human person and 
then the state are behind not only a crime of international law, but also behind 
every act, understood as a  manifestation of a  person’s decision of will. Faced 
with an individual’s negatively assessed actions, the state can resort to a range of 
measures, the most drastic of which, used only when less radical measures fail to 
produce the intended protective eff ect, is criminal responsibility. Th e basis for 
accusations against the state, resulting in its liability, but of a diff erent nature than 
that of a criminal one, may be an incorrect construction, and even less so the lack 
of measures intended to prevent an individual from behaving in a manner detri-
mental to rights protected by law.8 One of such measures in criminal material law 
skie, Warszawa 1948; E. Socha, ‘Wpływ procesu norymberskiego na prawo międzynarodowe w za-
kresie ścigania i karania zbrodni ludobójstwa’, WPP, 2007, no. 2.
4 Under Art. VI (a) of the 1945 Agreement, crimes against peace include planning, prepa-
ration, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment 
of any of the foregoing.
5 Under Art. VI (b) of the 1945 Agreement, war crimes are: violations of the laws or customs 
of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation 
to Wave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder 
or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public 
or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justifi ed by 
military necessity;
6 Under Art. VI (c) of the 1945 Agreement, crimes against humanity include murder, extermi-
nation, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian popula-
tion, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution 
of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in viola-
tion of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
7 https://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/panstwo;3953945.html (accessed 31.01.2020).
8 See on this matter an interesting elaboration by A. Gubrynowicz, ‘Ludobójstwo a immunitet 
















































is the institution under Art. 105 § 1 of the Polish Criminal Code9 (hereinaft er 
CC), excluding the possibility of applying the statute of limitation with regard to 
crimes against peace, humanity and war crimes. 
Th e mere fact that the above acts are punishable and the fact that they are not 
subject to statutory limitation because of their gravity does not in principle raise 
doubts and does not require further argumentation. Th e norms prohibiting this 
type of actions and then applying to prosecution and punishment invoke a threat 
to the essence of humanity, an absolute right, whose protection is universally ac-
cepted in the international community. Th e realisation of the characteristics of 
the types of crimes against peace or humanity in particular leads to the annihila-
tion of humanity, the human race in the broad sense of its existence.10 Th e crimes 
covered by these categories undermine the inalienable rights of human beings: 
their lives, freedom, physical integrity, health and dignity. Th ese crimes are inhu-
mane acts which, by their scope and seriousness, transcend the limits of tolerance 
on the part of the international community, because it is no longer individuals, 
but humanity as a whole who are the victims.11
A statute of limitation consists in an absolute repeal (by law) of the crimi-
nal responsibility for off ences aft er the statutory period, without however taking 
away the nature of the off ence.12 It is not an expected right, i.e. an entitlement of 
the off ender to expect that, aft er a certain period of time, their off ence will cease 
to be punishable.13
Not disregarding the vast majority of arguments and views espoused by e.g. 
J. Czabański and M. Warchoł,14 who assume that a statute of limitation is more 
of a  trial than a material institution, as the underlying rationale for its use are 
evidentiary diffi  culties and a  risk of an error rather than the pointlessness of 
państwu z tytułu zbrodni ludobójstwa’, Kwartalnik Krajowej Szkoły Sądownictwa i Prokuratury, 
2019, issue 2, and M. Królikowski, Odpowiedzialność karna jednostki za sprawstwo zbrodni między-
narodowej, Warszawa 2011.
9 Law of 6 June 1997, Criminal Code, i.e. Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1950 as amended.
10 L. Gardocki, in: ed. L. Gardocki, M. Bojarski (eds.), System prawa karnego, vol. 8: Przestęp-
stwa przeciwko państwu i dobrom zbiorowym, Warszawa 2013; L. Gardocki, ‘Nowelizacja przepisów 
o przestępstwach przeciwko pokojowi, przeciwko ludzkości i przestępstw wojennych’, CzPKiNP, 
2011, no. 15.
11 Judgment of the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court of 4 September 1998 in 
the case Prosecutor v. J. Kambanda, ICTR-97-23-S, § 14–15.
12 K. Marszał, Przedawnienie w prawie karnym, Warszawa 1972, p. 5; I. Andrejew, Polskie pra-
wo karne w zarysie, Warszawa 1989, p. 316; M. Cieślak, Polskie prawo karne. Zarys systemowego 
ujęcia, Warszawa 1994, p. 482; A. Zoll, K. Buchała, Polskie prawo karne, Warszawa 1995, p. 478.
13 See judgement of the Appellate Court in Katowice of 12 March 2008, II AKa 356/07, 
LEX no. 447045; decision of the judgement of the 2 July 2002, II KK 143/02, LEX no. 55526; 
Z. Ćwiąkalski, in: L.K. Paprzycki (ed.), System prawa karnego, vol. 4: Nauka o przestępstwie. Wyłą-
czenie i ograniczenie odpowiedzialności karnej, Warszawa 2013, p. 755.
14 J. Czabański, M. Warchoł, ‘Przerwa i zawieszenie biegu przedawnienia – uwagi de lege feren-
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punishing the perpetrator, we should in this respect opt for the views espoused 
by A. Zoll and W. Wróbel, who stress the material character of this institution.15 
Th e expiry of the statute of limitation renders obsolete the achievement of pun-
ishment objectives (Art. 53 CC)16, since aft er such a long time it is hard to talk 
about the achievement of the aim of prevention and education, which a sanction 
is supposed to off er to the person sentenced, or about the needs concerning the 
development of the legal awareness of the general public,17 especially if the perpe-
trator, through his life and functioning in the community, has proved that these 
objectives have actually been achieved in relation to him.18 However, in the case 
of the aforementioned categories of punishable acts, such as, in particular, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, it remains doubtful whether the expiry of 
even the longest possible limitation periods will in fact render the achievement 
of punishment objectives obsolete here.19 For all these reasons, a waiver of the 
statute of limitation has been adopted in the international order with respect to 
these categories of crimes. Th is is what the Polish legislator did in Article 43 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and in Art. 105 § 1 CC. However, 
due to the vast and varied scope of the regulation, this solution is not free from 
concerns and interpretation problems. Similar problems can also be encountered 
in other regulations and their analysis shows a diff erent juridical understanding 
of the relevant terms.20
15 W. Wróbel, A. Zoll, Polskie prawo karne. Część ogólna, Kraków 2010, p. 577; see also Z. Ćwią-
kalski, in: L.K. Paprzycki (ed.), System prawa karnego…, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 749; A. Zoll, K. Buchała, 
Polskie prawo karne, Warszawa 1995, p. 85; R. Grupiński, ‘Zmiana przepisów o przedawnieniu 
karalności w świetle zasady lex retro non agit’, in: A. Szwarc (ed.), Rozważania o prawie karnym. 
Księga pamiątkowa z okazji siedemdziesięciolecia urodzin Profesora Aleksandra Ratajczaka, Poznań 
1999, p. 127; W. Świda, Prawo karne, Warszawa 1986, p. 325; Z. Papierkowski, ‘Kolizja przepisów 
ustawowych według projektu k.k.’, PiP, 1956, issue 8–9, p. 421; J. Śliwowski, Prawo karne, Warsza-
wa 1979, p. 45; J. Makarewicz, Kodeks karny z komentarzem, Lwów 1932, p. 57; and the decision of 
the Supreme Court of 11 March 1935, Zb.O. 1935, item 450; resolution of a panel of 7 judges of 
the Supreme Court of 13 October 1967, VI KZP 31/67, OSNKW 1967, no. 12, item 123, p. 3f.; 
judgement of the Supreme Court of 31 May 1977, II KR 106/77, OSNKW 1977, no. 9, item 106, 
p. 42; resolution of the Supreme Court of 7 June 2002, I KZP 15/2002, BISN 2002, no. 6; judge-
ment of the Supreme Court of 10 March 2004, II KK 338/03, OSNwSK 2004/1/521.
16 Vide the justifi cation of the draft  Criminal Code of 1997. 
17 Z. Ćwiąkalski, in: L.K. Paprzycki (ed.), System prawa karnego…, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 750.
18 Judgement of the Supreme Court of 10.03.2004, II KK 338/03, OSNwSK 2004/1/521.
19 J. Giezek (ed.), Kodeks karny. Część ogólna. Komentarz, Warszawa 2007, p. 660.
20 Resolutions of a panel of seven judges of the Supreme Court of 13 May 1992, I KZP 39/91, 
OSNKW 1992, issues 7–8, item 45; decision of the Supreme Court of 4 December 2001, II KKN 
175/99, OSNKW 2002, issues 5–6, item 47; decision of the Supreme Court of 28 November 
2012, V KK 168/12, LEX no. 1235905; decision of the Supreme Court of 30 January 2013, IV 
KO 79/12, LEX no.  1277778; decision of the Supreme Court of 4 December 2001, II KKN 
175/99, OSNKW 2002, issues 5–6, item 47; decision of the Appellate Court in Lublin of 13 Sep-
tember 2011, II AKz 393/11, LEX no. 1108590; decision of the Supreme Court of 21 August 

















































Historically, the general principle of non-application of the statute of lim-
itations to war crimes and crimes against humanity is enshrined in the Con-
vention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
on 26 November 1968 (hereinaft er the 1968 Convention),21 to which Poland 
acceded on 11 November 1970.22 In the Polish system, however, provisions ex-
cluding the limitation period for these categories of crimes appeared earlier, in 
the Act of 22 April 1964 on the waiver of statutory limitation for the perpetra-
tors of the gravest Nazi crimes committed during the Second World War.23 Th e 
Criminal Code of 1932 did not contain such regulations.24 A provision cov-
ering the exclusion of the limitation period for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity (Article 109) was introduced as late as in the Criminal Code of 19 
April 1969.25 Th e law of 6 June 1997, i.e. Provisions introducing the Crimi-
nal Code26 (hereinaft er prov. intro. CC) retained the binding character of the 
following laws: of 22 April 1964 on the waiver of statutory limitation with 
respect to perpetrators of Nazi crimes from the Second World War27 (Art. 4 (2) 
prov. intro. CC), of 6 April 1984 on Central Commission for the Investigation 
of Crimes against the Polish Nation – Institute of National Remembrance28 
(Art. 4 (3) prov. intro. CC) and Art. 1 (1) of the decree of 31 August 1944 
on the scope of punishment for the fascist Nazi criminals guilty of homicides 
and torture of civilians and prisoners and for the traitors of the Polish Nation29 
(Art.  5 §  1 (3) prov. intro. CC). Th e Criminal Code of 1997 was amended 
by Art.  105 §  1 CC, which waived the application of the provisions under 
Art. 101–103 with respect to crimes against peace, humanity and war crimes.30 
Th is regulation raised concerns since the very start.31
Th e defi nition of the scope of off ences exempt from the statute of limita-
tion adopted in Article 105 CC corresponds in principle to the title of Chap-
ter  XVI. Th e only diff erence is that the limitation period for crimes against 
21 https://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/onz/1968b.html (accessed 31.01.2020).
22 Journal of Laws of 1970, no. 26, item 208.
23 Journal of Laws of 1964, no. 15, item 86. 
24 Journal of Laws of 1932, no. 60, item 571 as amended.
25 Journal of Laws of 1969, no. 13, item 94 as amended.
26 Journal of Laws of 1997, no. 88, item 554 as amended.
27 Journal of Laws of 1964, no. 15, item 86.
28 Journal of Laws of 1984, no. 21, item 98.
29 Journal of Laws of 1946, no. 69, item 377.
30 Journal of Laws of 1997, no. 88, item 553 (original text).
31 A. Zoll, in: K. Buchała, A. Zoll, Kodeks karny. Część ogólna, Kraków 1998, p. 600; L. Kubic-
ki, ‘Nowa kodyfi kacja karna a Konstytucja RP’, PiP, 1998, no. 9–10, p. 32; M. Kalitowski, Z. Sien-
kiewicz, J. Szumski, L. Tyszkiewicz, A. Wąsek, Kodeks karny, Warszawa 2010, p. 321; E. Bieńkow-
ska, B. Kunicka-Michalska, G. Rejman, J. Wojciechowska, Kodeks karny. Część ogólna. Komentarz, 
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peace, humanity and war crimes is waived and the title of the chapter covers 
crimes against peace, humanity and war crimes. Indeed, Chapter XVI also de-
scribes off ences of various kinds and scope of characteristics (Art. 119 § 1 and 2, 
Art. 121 § 1 and 2, Art. 125 § 1, and Art. 126 § 1 and 2), which raises doubts 
as to the scope of exemption under Art. 105 CC.32 Th ese doubts concern at 
least three areas: the legislative technique used in the construction of Article 
105 § 1 CC, the content of Article 43 of the Constitution and the wording 
of international treaties, including in particular Article 29 in conjunction with 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 
1998,33 ratifi ed by Poland on 12 November 2001,34 which entered into force on 
1 July 2002 (hereinaft er ICC Statute).35 
First, attention should be paid to the scope of exemption of the statute 
of  limitation under Art.  43 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. 
Pursuant to this provision, in addition to the foregoing categories (war crimes 
and crimes against humanity), statute of limitation cannot be waived with 
respect to crimes against peace, which are in turn subject to waiver under 
Art. 105 CC.36 Formulating the specifi c principle under Art. 43, the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Poland does not contain a general principle stipulating 
statutory limitation of criminal responsibility and execution of penalties,37 nor 
can such principle be derived from the principle of the rule of law.38 Th is state 
of aff airs, in particular the introduction into the Constitution of the Republic 
of Poland of specifi c provisions waiving the statute of limitation may actually 
32 See on this matter e.g. S. Tarapata, A. Zoll, in: W. Wróbel, A. Zoll (eds.), Kodeks karny. Część 
ogólna, vol. I, part II: Komentarz do Art. 53–116, WK, 2016, komentarz do Art. 105; K. Banasik, 
‘Karnoprawne normy przedawnienia w prawie międzynarodowym’, Prok. i Pr., 2011, no. 7–8.
33 Journal of Laws of 2003, no. 78, item 708.
34 Ibid.
35 Article 29 Th e crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to any statute 
of limitations. Article 5 Th e jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole. Th e Court has jurisdiction in accordance with 
this Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) Th e crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against 
humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) Th e crime of aggression.
36 Th ere are two groups of views on this issue in literature, the fi rst being that the war crimes 
listed in Article 43 of the Polish Constitution include crimes against peace, e.g. A. Zoll, ‘Nowa 
kodyfi kacja karna w  świetle Konstytucji’, Czasopismo Prawa Karnego i  Nauk Penalnych, 1997, 
no. 2, p. 105; and the opposite view, claiming that war crimes and crimes against peace are, both in 
domestic law and in international legal instruments, diff erent categories, e.g. K. Banasik, ‘Karno-
prawne normy…’ op. cit., p. 63.
37 See e.g. A. Zoll, ‘Nowa kodyfi kacja karna’…, op. cit., p. 106. See also the decision of the 
Supreme Court of 7 June 2002, I KZP 15/2002, OSNKW 2002, no. 5–6, item 47; where the 
Supreme Court indicated directly that there is no constitutional principle of statute of limita-
tion of off ences and there is no “right to be subject to the statute of limitation or the protect-
ed prospect of this right”. See also the decision of the Supreme Court of 13 May 1999, I KZP 
15/99, OSNKW 1999, no. 7–8, item 39.
















































imply that in the remaining scope all statutory regulations modifying this in-
stitution to the detriment of the perpetrator of an off ence are excluded.39 Th is 
conclusion could be legitimised if it were at the same time derived from an-
other assumption, namely the guarantee character of the provision in Art. 43 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland as to the perpetrator and their 
situation. In this respect it should be stressed that Art. 43 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Poland is part of Chapter II titled Th e fr eedoms, rights and 
obligations of man and the citizen, which no doubt indicates its nature of a guar-
antee. Still, it is hard to accept that a norm excluding the possibility of a statute 
of limitation is a guarantee for the perpetrator. In this respect, it is understood 
that this is about guarantees for citizens to extend the possibility of holding the 
perpetrators of these categories of crimes to account.40 Not following up on the 
above due to the limited framework of this study, it should be stated that apart 
from the indicated scope, the Constitution leaves the legislator’s freedom to 
shape the institution of the statute of limitations in a direction consistent with 
criminal policy (the purposefulness of punishment).41 However, this does not 
mean full freedom in this area. Given that the statute of limitations is bound 
to the advisability of punishment, limits are set e.g. by the principle of pro-
portionality (Art. 31 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland), which 
constrains the admissibility of a criminal sanction on grounds of necessity.42
In reference to the scope of waiver of the statute of limitation of criminal 
responsibility under Art. 43 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, we 
39 Such a position, based on Article 44 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, seems 
to be adopted by A. Wąsek, who states that the silence of the Constitution on the admissibility of 
extending the limitation period or repealing the eff ects of the limitation period in cases other than 
those regulated in that provision is of a qualifi ed nature, that is to say, it expresses a contrario the 
prohibition of such changes. In the opinion of A. Wąsek, Articles 43 and 44 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Poland limit the criminal legislator in the discretionary shaping of the institution 
of the statute of limitations for this type of crimes. A. Wąsek, ‘W gąszczu problematyki przedaw-
nienia w prawie karnym’, in: P. Hofmański, K. Zgryzek (eds.), Współczesne problemy procesu karnego 
i wymiaru sprawiedliwości. Księga ku czci Profesora Kazimierza Marszała, Katowice 2003.
40 See A. Zoll, ‘Nowa kodyfi kacja karna’…, op. cit., p. 97; K. Banasik, ‘Karnoprawne normy…’ 
op. cit., p. 63, see also the decision of the Supreme Court of 7 June 2002, I KZP 15/2002, OSNKW 
2002, no. 5–6, item 47.
41 A. Zoll, ‘Nowa kodyfi kacja karna’…, op. cit., decision of the Supreme Court of 2 July 2002, 
II KK 143/02, LEX no. 55526; Z. Ćwiąkalski, in: L.K. Paprzycki (ed.), System prawa karnego…, 
op. cit., vol. 4, p. 773.
42 W. Wróbel, Zmiana normatywna i zasady intertemporalne w prawie karnym, Kraków 2003; 
P. Tuleja (ed.), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Komentarz, WKP 2019; R. Pawlik, ‘Konsty-
tucyjne podstawy i zakres prawa karania – zagadnienia wybrane z perspektywy odpowiedzialności 
za przestępstwo i wykroczenie’, in: M. Grzybowski (ed.), Państwo demokratyczne, prawne i socjal-
ne: księga jubileuszowa dedykowana profesorowi Zbigniewowi Antoniemu Maciągowi, vol. 3: Studia 
prawne, 2014; eadem, ‘Wybrane zagadnienia granic kryminalizacji i ich ewolucja na przykładzie 
prowadzenia pojazdu w stanie nietrzeźwości lub pod wpływem środka odurzającego’, in: Idee no-















































211Scope of Exclusion of the Statute of Limitations on Criminal Responsibility under Article 105(1)
should fi rst indicate the aforementioned Convention of 26 November 1968, 
which entered into force in Poland on 11 November 1970. Pursuant to its 
Art. I, no statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of 
the date of their commission: a) War crimes as they are defi ned in the Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, of 8 August 1945 and con-
fi rmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations, particularly the “grave breaches” 
enumerated in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of 
war victims; and b) Crimes against humanity whether committed in time of war 
or in time of peace as they are defi ned in the Charter of the International Mil-
itary Tribunal, Nürnberg, of 8 August 1945 and confi rmed by resolutions 3 (I) 
of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, eviction by armed attack or occupation and inhuman acts 
resulting from the policy of apartheid , and the crime of genocide as defi ned in 
the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Gen-
ocide, even if such acts do not violate the domestic law of the country in which 
they were committed. Pursuant to Art. IV, the States Parties to the Convention 
undertake to adopt, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, 
any legislative or other measures necessary to ensure that statutory or other limi-
tations shall not apply to the prosecution and punishment of the crimes referred 
to in articles I and II of this Convention and that, where they exist, such limi-
tations shall be abolished. In light of the above, the provision of Art. 43 of the 
Polish Constitution confi rms the obligations assumed and binding on Poland 
aft er its ratifi cation of the aforementioned Convention of 26 November 1968.43 
With regard to the scope referred to in Article 43, it is worth pointing out that, 
although it is true that constitutional concepts have an autonomous meaning, in 
this case it can be assumed that the legislator did not intend to defi ne the con-
cepts used diff erently from how they are defi ned in international law, since the 
aforementioned Convention of 26 November 1968 at the time of adopting the 
Constitution in 1997 was an element of the law in force in the Republic of Po-
land.44 Importantly, it should be borne in mind that the 1952 Constitution, in 
force until 1997, did not contain a similar provision, which was however part of 
the aforementioned Art. 109 CC of 1969, which entered into force on 1 January 
1970, although de facto the Convention of 26 November 1968 was ratifi ed by 
Poland and entered into force only on 11 November 1970.
Summing up the above considerations, it should be stressed that the Consti-
tution of the Republic of Poland in its Article 43 provides for a certain minimum 
standard for excluding the possibility of statutory limitation and, at the same 

















































time, an obligation for the legislator to introduce a non-applicability of statu-
tory limitation for war crimes and crimes against humanity. A wider scope of 
the exclusion, however, due to the material nature of the institution of statute of 
limitations, is left  to the legislator, who does so in Article 105 § 1 CC. 
Th e above statement, however, also raises another question and another 
concern. Namely, how to interpret the scope of the exemption resulting from 
Article 105 § 1 of the CC in this situation (paying attention to Article 7 of the 
CC). With the assumptions made above, the scope of the exclusion of statu-
tory limitation on punishment for war crimes and crimes against humanity is 
determined by the Convention of 26 November 1968 and Article 43 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland, and only in the remaining scope is 
it possible to interpret it in accordance with legal statutory defi nitions con-
tained, for example, in Article 7 CC. Th is means that each time, by excluding 
on the basis of Article 105 § 1 of the CC the possibility of statutory limitation 
for war crimes and crimes against humanity, it should be examined whether 
a specifi c act falls within the minimum standard set out in Article 43 of the 
Constitution as a consequence of the ratifi cation of the Convention of 26 No-
vember 1968, and then the statute of limitations for criminal responsibility 
would be excluded.
Another problem of interpretation arises when comparing Article 105 § 1 
of the CC with Article 29 of the ICC Statute, according to which crimes un-
der the jurisdiction of the Court are not time-barred, while under Article 5 
of the ICC Statute it is limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community and includes: the crime of genocide; crimes against 
humanity; war crimes, and the crime of aggression.45 
Under Art.  91 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, aft er 
promulgation in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland, a ratifi ed inter-
national agreement constitutes part of the domestic legal order and is applied 
directly, unless its application depends on the enactment of a statute. Under 
Art. 91 (2) of the Constitution, an international agreement ratifi ed upon prior 
consent granted by statute has precedence over statutes if such an agreement 
cannot be reconciled with the provisions of such statutes. If an agreement rat-
ifi ed by the Republic of Poland and establishing an international organization 
so provides, the laws established by it are applied directly and have precedence 
in the event of a confl ict of laws.46 
45 On the latter, see an interesting text by S. Głogowska, ‘Zbrodnia agresji – kolejne wyzwanie 
dla Międzynarodowego trybunału Karnego’, Kwartalnik Krajowej Szkoły Sądownictwa i Prokura-
tury, 2019, issue 4.
46 In its decision of 23 May 2014, the Supreme Court assumed that the ICC Statute is part of 
the domestic legal order, which is directly implied by Art. 91 (1) of the Constitution of the Repub-
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Th e preamble of the ICC Statute and its Art. 1 clearly state that the Court 
is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions and the jurisdiction and 
functioning of the Court is governed by the provisions of this Statute. Th e com-
plementarity involves supplementation or complementation of the cognition of 
national courts,47 not as modifi cation, alteration or transformation of the prin-
ciples applicable in proceedings regulated withing the domestic legal order of 
individual states. Th e principle of complementarity means that national criminal 
courts have priority in the exercise of jurisdiction over the off ences covered by the 
ICC Statute. However, should a State be unwilling or unable to conduct criminal 
proceedings, the Court may assume jurisdiction in such a case.48 Th e evolution 
of the relation between national criminal law and international criminal law con-
sists in the internationalisation of internal systems that regulate the responsibility 
for international crimes in individual countries, while at the same time aligning 
international law with national legal systems on the principles of the compromise 
reached between the latter two,49 a case in point being especially the ICC.
Th e complementary nature of ICC jurisdiction is primarily an expression of 
respect for the primacy of the state legal order, illustrating respect for state sov-
ereignty in international relations.50 Historically, criminal law was an expres-
sion of the sovereign competence of individual states and was one of the major 
state prerogatives, which does not mean that the system of national criminal 
law operated in a vacuum.51 Questions posed for a long time included: “Why 
47 https://sjp.pl/komplementarny (accessed 31.01.2020).
48 Article 17. 1. (a) Th e case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has juris-
diction over it unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution.
49 M.  Rogacka-Rzewnicka, ‘Wzajemne relacje między jurysdykcją krajową a  jurysdykcją’, 
Prok. i Pr., 2009, 6; R. Pawlik, ‘Identity of Criminal Law at the Time of European Integration 
Based on the Example of Poland – Some Comments’, Societas et Iurisprudentia, 2015, 1; R. Paw-
lik, Z.M. Dymińska, ‘Th e space of validity the Polish Criminal Code Act from the perspective of 
European integration – Th e international context (1)’, in: Národná a medzinárodná bezpečnosť, 
Liptovský Mikuláš 2015, http://www.aos.sk/struktura/katedry/kbo/NMB2015/Zbornik_
NMB_2015.pdf (accessed 12.02.2021).
50 Contemporary reality shows that legal systems are in the phase between a monistic and du-
alistic concept, i.e. a phase leading to a pluralistic order, in which the participation of transnational 
common, identical and axiologically related legal regulations is important. Th is means that the 
principle of complementarity as the basis for determining the competent jurisdiction for crimes of 
international law is not an element of sanctioning diff erences, but only a means of emphasising the 
primacy of national jurisdiction, M. Rogacka-Rzewnicka, ‘Wzajemne relacje…’, op. cit.
51 See e.g. W. Wróbel, A. Zoll, Polskie prawo karne…, op. cit., p. 69ff .; and an interesting mono-
graph: C. Nowak, Wpływ procesów globalizacyjnych na polskie prawo karne, Warszawa 2014; idem, 
‘O pojęciu transnarodowego prawa karnego’, PiP, 2012, issue 12, pp. 3–14; moreover H. Kelsen, 
Principles of International Law, New York 1952, p. 190–194; H. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souve-
ränität und die Th eorie des Völkerrechts, Tübingen 1960; H. Kruger, G. Erler, Zum Problem der 
Souveränität, Karlsruhe 1957; U. Schliesky, Souveränität und Legitimität von Herschgewalt, Tübin-
gen 2004; J. Helios, W. Jedlecka, Suwerenność w dobie procesów integracyjnych i globalizacyjnych, 
















































do we have the right to punish?” “What should be punished?”, and “How se-
vere should the sanctions be?”.52 Traditionally, the ius puniendi was seen as the 
state’s exclusivity in shaping the criminal law standard, i.e. exclusivity in deter-
mining the rules on liability for off ences, the scope of its own jurisdiction and, 
above all, the scope of criminalisation and penalties for typifi ed acts.53 Th e ba-
sis of the right to punish was, on the other hand, seen in the so-called “natural 
right” (ius naturale), yet the moment a state emerged meant that each of the 
subjects renounced their individual ius naturale and strengthened the rights 
of the sovereign.54 In a democratic state governed by the rule of law, human 
dignity and freedoms may, in principle, be restricted only because of the free-
doms and rights of others.55 Assuming a utilitarian objective of punishment, 
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland in its Art. 31 (3)56 defi nes the crite-
ria to be met to introduce an intervention of criminal law57. 
Another thing is that complementarity can, in principle, function success-
fully in conditions of symmetry of liability rules before a  national court and 
a court of international law. In the absence of symmetry, this functioning will 
ropean integration – selected issues on the example of Poland’, Societas et Iurisprudentia 2016, 2; 
eadem, ‘Sanctions from the perspective of ius puniendi: between criminal liability and liability for 
a misdemeanour, and administrative liability. Th e example of Poland’, Societas et Iurisprudentia, 
2016, 3.
52 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, Oxford 2003; A. Ashworth, L. Zedner, P. Tomlin 
(eds.), Prevention and the limits of the criminal law, 1st ed., impr. 1, Oxford 2013, VIII; J. Deigh, 
D. Dolinko (eds.), Th e Oxford handbook of philosophy of criminal law. Philosophy of criminal law, 
New York 2011, XIII, [1].
53 See e.g. W. Jedlecka, Suwerenność w dobie…, op. cit., pp. 22–31; W. Zalewski, ‘Sprawiedli-
wość „sprawiedliwości naprawczej”’, GSP, 2016, vol.  35, pp.  565–576; Z.  Muras, ‘Uprawnienia 
procesowe pokrzywdzonego w ustawodawstwie romańskim’, Prok. i Pr., 2009, no. 11–12, pp. 78–
109; R. Kmiecik, ‘Pokrzywdzony jako oskarżyciel a „sprawiedliwość naprawcza” – rys historyczny 
z perspektywy współczesnej’, Ann. UMCS, Sect. G 2009–2010, vol. 56–57, pp. 93–112.
54 More on this R. Pawlik, Kontrawencjonalizacja w polskim prawie karnym i wykroczeń. Anali-
za teoretyczno-dogmatyczna na tle porównawczym, Kraków 2016, p. 140ff .
55 A. Zoll, in: T. Bojarski (ed.), System prawa karnego. Źródła prawa karnego, Warszawa 2011, 
p. 228; see Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at 
Rome on 4 November 1950, amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5 and 8 and supplemented by Protocol 
no. 2, Journal of Laws 1993.61.284, as amended.
56 K. Wojtyczek, ‘Zasada proporcjonalności jako granica prawa karania’, Cz.PKiNP, 1999, 2, 
33, p. 33ff .; see also M. Królikowski, ‘Dwa paradygmaty zasady proporcjonalności w prawie kar-
nym’, in: T. Dukiet-Nagórska (ed.), Zasada proporcjonalności w prawie karnym, Warszawa, 2010, 
p. 48; see also a judgement of the Constitutional Court of 26 April 1995, K 11/94, OTK 1995, 
no. 1, item 12, LEX no. 25538. 
57 See e.g. L. Garlicki, ‘Komentarz do Art. 31’, in: L. Garlicki (ed.), Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej. Komentarz, vol. III, Warszawa 2003, p. 7; see also e.g. judgement of the Constitutional 
Court of 15 December 2004, K 2/04, OTK-A 2004, no. 11, item 117; see also e.g. judgement of 
the Constitutional Court of 29 June 2001, K 23/00, OTK 2001, no. 5, item 124; judgement of the 
Constitutional Court of 12 January 2000, P 11/98, OTK 2000, no. 1, item 3; judgement of the 
Constitutional Court of 30 October 2006, P 10/06, OTK-A 2006, no. 9, item 128; J. Warylewski, 
Prawo karne. Część ogólna, Warszawa 2004, p. 86; J. Potulski, ‘Glosa do postanowienia SN z dnia 















































215Scope of Exclusion of the Statute of Limitations on Criminal Responsibility under Article 105(1)
be signifi cantly weakened or even eliminated.58 In reference to Polish Criminal 
Code and ICC Statute, diff erences are indicated fi rst and foremost in Art. 10 CC 
and Art. 26 ICC Statute; according to the latter the Court has no jurisdiction 
over any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commis-
sion of a crime, while the Polish Criminal Code adopts as a rule the completion 
of 17 years of age, exception cases the 15th year of age but, interestingly, not in 
reference to any of the types under Chapter XVI. A lack of symmetry can be seen 
elsewhere, too, including e.g. under Art. 110 ICC Statute on the reduction of 
the sentence, and as to the person criminally responsible (Art. 30 ICC Statute), 
where the Polish legislator envisaged a wider scope of liability, including actions 
of both direct and possible intent. Some limitations of the scope of criminal re-
sponsibility arise moreover from the principle of individual criminal liability, 
known to the Polish domestic order (Art. 25 ICC Statute).59
With regard to the principle of complementarity, it is also worth noting 
that the ICC Statute in its provisions oft en uses concepts that are both im-
precise and ambiguous and simply unknown to the Polish Penal Code. Th is 
presents fundamental diffi  culties in terms of their faithful refl ection in nation-
al legislation, which also does not have a positive impact on the functioning 
of the above principle.60 From the perspective of the Polish order, however, 
it should be stressed that for the principle of complementarity to function 
smoothly, it is also crucial to precisely defi ne the scope of penalisation, so that 
the ICC can unequivocally assess the extent to which the crime was the subject 
of proceedings before a Polish court.
Th e Act of 20 May 2010 amending the Criminal Code, the Police Act, the 
Act – Provisions introducing the Criminal Code and the Act – Code of Criminal 
Procedure introduced a number of changes to the Criminal Code, including new 
types of off ences, transferring to the Polish Criminal Code the solutions adopt-
ed in the ICC Statute. Th us, the scope of Article 113 CC was extended by the 
introduction of the following punishable off ences: public provocation to initiate 
an aggression war and public praise for initiating or conducting such a war; acts 
perpetrated by taking part in a mass attack or one of the attacks against a group of 
people, undertaken with the aim of implementing or supporting the policy of the 
state or organisation; attack on a demilitarised zone; destruction, appropriation, 
damage, seizure, or misappropriation of property in an occupied area. Th e cata-
logue of off ences penalised by Article 124 CC was moreover supplemented by 
actions such as inter alia forcing people to participate in armed activities against 
58 M. Rogacka-Rzewnicka, ‘Wzajemne relacje…’, op. cit.
59 See on this e.g. A. Zabłocka, ‘Statut Międzynarodowego Trybunału Karnego a polskie pra-
wo karne materialne’, Kw.Pr.Pub., 2001, 3, 119.
60 Th is relates e.g. to the crime of apartheid (Art. 7 (1j) of the ICC Statute) and the crime in-
















































their own country, the use of corporal punishment, imprisonment, rape, assassi-
nation of personal dignity and recruitment to the armed forces of a person under 
18 years of age or actual use of such a person in armed activities. A provision was 
added to penalise incitement to the foregoing. Penalties are moreover imposed 
on a person who allows the foregoing to be committed by someone under their 
actual authority or supervision, by failing to meet the obligation of adequate su-
pervision over them.61
According to the explanatory memorandum to the draft  amendment, the 
purpose of the amendment was to introduce into the Polish Criminal Code 
the types of off ences which include the solutions and scope adopted in the 
ICC Statute, including crimes against humanity and certain war crimes.62 
According to the authors of the draft  amendment, the proposed regulations 
along with the currently binding provisions of Chapter XVI of the Criminal 
Code will nearly completely correspond to the types of crimes under the ICC 
Statute, and will thus ensure the jurisdiction of Polish courts over perpetrators 
of such crimes to exclude jurisdiction of the ICC Tribunal in cases related to 
Polish citizens.
Summing up the above refl ections on Art. 105 § 1 CC and the interpre-
tation of the exemption arising from this provision, one should assume that 
the defi nitions of the crime of genocide (Art. 6 ICC Statute), crimes against 
humanity (Art. 7 ICC Statute), war crimes (Art. 8 ICC Statute) and the crime 
of aggression (Art. 8 bis ICC Statute) are constructed autonomously, for the 
purpose of the Statute, in isolation from the divisions of off ences established in 
States Parties which, aft er all, derive from diff erent legal cultures.63 In such a sit-
uation, it is not possible to choose an internal legal order and, according to it, 
impose legal statutory defi nitions and solutions on the other States-Parties. As 
has already been emphasised, the division of off ences adopted in a given state 
depends solely on its decision and varies signifi cantly between the States-Par-
ties to the ICC Statute.64 In accordance with the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties drawn up in Vienna on 23 May 196965 (Art. 31), the treaty 
should be interpreted in good faith, in line with the ordinary meaning to be 
ascribed to the words used within it in their context and in light of its object 
61 Cf. justifi cation of the draft  Act of 20 May 2010 amending the Act – the Penal Code, the 
Police Act, the Act – Provisions introducing the Penal Code and the Act – the Penal Procedure 
Code. Lex-el.
62 http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prace/prace.html (accessed 31.01.2020).
63 R. Pawlik, ‘Ius puniendi…’, op. cit.; eadem, ‘Sanctions from the perspective…’, op. cit.
64 In accordance with Article 128, the original of these Statutes was drawn up in Ara-
bic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. 120 states voted in favour, 7 opposed and 
21  abstained. Ratifi cations for 30 January 2020, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en 















































217Scope of Exclusion of the Statute of Limitations on Criminal Responsibility under Article 105(1)
and objective. In view of the above, there is no basis for adopting automatic 
symmetry of concepts between the national order and the Treaty. Naturally, 
it is possible to use the acquis of international law, including the adopted net-
work of concepts, even if the Articles of the Statute referred to explicitly state 
(Articles 6–8 bis of the ICC Statute) that the defi nitions contained therein are 
constructed for its purposes, but nevertheless, as it seems, such an operation in 
the case of the ICC Statute, due to the principle of complementarity, would 
require an explicit statement by the legislator, especially in a situation such as 
that of Article 105 § 1 CC where, in the international order, there are overlap-
ping diff erent possible understandings of the categories listed there. Further-
more, we cannot forget that one of the fundamental principles of criminal law, 
with primarily a safeguarding role, is that of adequate defi nition of the types of 
prohibited acts (nullum crimen sine lege certa), which imposes an obligation on 
the legislator to exercise maximum precision in the process of designing crim-
inal provisions, leading to a result which enables a clear distinction to be made 
between punishable behaviour and non-punishable behaviour, and within the 
class of punishable behaviour  – a  clear distinction to be made between acts 
which meet the characteristics of diff erent types of criminal off ences.66 
At this point, it can only be mentioned that the German legislator has adopted 
slightly diff erent solutions to such off ences, bringing national law into line with 
international criminal law, in particular the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, by introducing the Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (hereinaft er VStGB), 
which comprehensively regulates the consequences of off ences against the rights 
and values protected by international law in Germany. Th e law was proclaimed 
on 26 June 2002 and entered into force on 30 June 2002.67 Th e VStGB in § 5 
(Unverjährbarkeit) assumes that the prosecution of off ences under this law and 
the enforcement of penalties imposed for them is not time-barred, without refer-
ring, as the Polish legislator does, to concepts which may have a diff erent scope 
in the international order and using a kind of general clause covering all types de-
scribed in the VStGB. In Section 2, the VStGB (Straft aten gegen das Völkerrecht) 
defi nes types of punishable off ences, dividing this part into three principal sec-
tions: genocide and crimes against humanity (Völkermord und Verbrechen gegen 
die Menschlichkeit), war crimes (Kriegsverbrechen) and the crimes of aggression 
(Verbrechen der Aggression), and the fourth one, including other off ences (Son-
stige Straft aten) such as the violation of the supervision obligation and failure to 
66 R. Pawlik, ‘Znamiona ilościowe w procesie kontrawencjonalizacji w kontekście zasady nul-



















































report an off ence.68 Under § 2, provisions of general criminal law shall apply to 
the acts described in this Act, unless this Act provides for specifi c provisions in 
sections 1, 3–5 and 13 (4). 
Leaving aside the legislative technique itself, which is to separately identify 
this issue within a specifi c law, it is vital to emphasise its transparency and com-
pactness, which does not leave too much room for sometimes contradictory 
interpretations of the basic concepts known to other legal systems. Th e Ger-
man regulation draws on the doctrine of international law, its transparency 
stemming from theoretical constructions, and thus does not stir the controver-
sy that oft en arises at the interface of matters falling under diff erent branches 
of normative order. 
A similar problem as in the case of Art. 105 § 1 CC also emerged under 
Art. 4 Section 1 of the IPN Law.69 Under this regulation, the crimes referred 
to in Article 1(1)(a), which constitute crimes against peace, humanity or war 
crimes under international law, shall not be subject to the statute of limita-
tion.70 In its resolution of 14 October 2015,71 the Supreme Court observed 
that a deliberate deprivation of liberty of another person, once specifi c con-
ditions are met, may be seen as a crime against humanity which is not subject 
to the statute of limitation, even if it does not meet the characteristics of an 
off ence under Art. 118a § 2 (2) CC. When adopting the above opinion, the 
Supreme Court concluded that in order to decode Art. 3 and 4 of the IPN 
Law, one should also invoke international law instruments. On this basis, it 
was concluded that, pursuant to Article 4(1) of the IPN Law, there is no statute 
of limitations for an off ence which meets the defi nition set out in Article 3 of 
the IPN Law, according to which crimes against humanity are, in particular, 
crimes of genocide within the meaning of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted on 9 December 1948,72 as 
well as other grave persecution of persons due to their membership in a specifi c 
68 A.  Eser, H.  Kreicker (eds.), Nationale Strafverfolgung völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen, Bd. 1: 
Deutschland (von H. Gropengießer, H. Kreicker), Freiburg i. Br. 2003; J. Hartmann, ‘Das deutsche 
Völkerstrafgesetzbuch’, in: H.-H. Kühne, R. Esser, M. Gerding (eds.), Völkerstrafr echt. 12 Beiträge 
zum internationalen Strafr echt und Völkerstrafr echt, Os nabrück 2007, p.  121 ff ; J.  Geneuss, 
Völkerrechtsverbrechen und Verfolgungsermessen. §  153f StPO im System völkerrechtlicher 
Strafr echtspfl ege, Nomos Verlag 2013; G. Werle (ed.), Völkerstrafr echt, Unterkapitel Völkerstrafr echt 
in Deutschland, p. 167 ff ., 3, Tübingen 2012.
69 Law of 18 December 1998 on the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for 
the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, i.e. Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1882.
70 Th e provision of Article 4 Section 1 of the IPN Law, which excludes the application of the 
statute of limitations to the crimes referred to in Article 1 Section 1a of that Law, constitutes a spe-
cial provision (lex specialis) with respect to Art. 105 § 1 CC, whose equivalent in Criminal Code of 
1969 was Art. 109. Tak. V KK 290/17, LEX no. 2454230.
71 I KZP 7/15, LEX no. 1808193
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national, political, social, racial, or religious group, if they were committed by 
public offi  cials or instigated or tolerated by them and is a crime against human-
ity within the meaning of Art. 7 (1) 1 ICC Statute. According to A. Zoll and 
S. Tarapata, the notion crimes against humanity used under Art. 105 § 1 CC, 
which should be interpreted in line with the order to adopt a uniform meaning 
for the same term used on the basis of the same law has, aft er all, a far diff erent 
meaning than the term “crime against humanity under international law” to 
which the provision of Article 4(1) of the IPN Law refers, with respect only 
to the crimes referred to in Article 1(1a) of the IPN Law.73
In conclusion, it should be stressed fi rst of all that the law of punishment 
is an individual law of the country concerned and can therefore only be mod-
ifi ed by the will of the country itself. In the case of Article 105 § 1 CC, it is 
possible to see a construction that is not entirely precise and that meets con-
stitutional standards. On the one hand, it is legitimate to assume that Article 
7 CC containing legal defi nitions of crimes and misdemeanours should also 
apply to Article 105 CC, while on the other hand, looking at the content of 
Article 43 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, we should consider 
a solution consisting in repeated, in the case of applying the exclusion of the 
possibility of limitation based on Article 105 § 1 CC in the area of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, examination of whether a specifi c act falls within 
the minimum standard set out in the Convention of 26 November 1968, and 
then in Article 43 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, and then 
the statute of limitations on the punishment of such an act would be waived. 
Th is interpretation does not require a  specifi c statement by the legislator, as 
the Convention of 26 November 1968 ratifi ed by Poland forms part of the 
domestic legal order (Art. 91 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland). 
A slightly diff erent situation will arise in the case of crimes against peace and 
war crimes, where it would be possible to adopt interpretative rules based on 
Art. 7 CC. Th eoretically, a solution adopted by S. Tarapata and A. Zoll would 
be possible, consisting in the statement that the word “crime” used in Art. 105 
§ 1 CC, following the interpretative directive consisting in an order to adopt 
a uniform meaning of the same term used in the Act, must be understood sim-
ilarly as under Article 7 § 2,74 yet solely in a situation if the scope of actions 
penalised under Chapter XVI corresponded to the scope of actions under the 
Convention of 26 November 1968. Otherwise, i.e. if the scope of criminalisa-
tion were narrower than that provided for in the Convention, Article 105 § 1 
CC would raise important questions of interpretation in the light of Article 
73 In this context see esp. – S. Tarapata, A. Zoll, in: W. Wróbel, A. Zoll (eds.), Kodeks karny. 

















































43 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. In this respect we might 
evoke the German construction adopted in the Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, whose 
§ 5 assumes that the prosecution of off ences under this law and the enforce-
ment of penalties imposed for them are not subject to statutory limitation. 
Th e adoption of a similar, separate structure in the Polish order, in view of Ar-
ticle 91 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland would, however, require 
alignment of the adopted solutions with international acts ratifi ed by Poland, 
either by a typifi cation of punishable behaviour based on the scope imposed by 
the aforementioned acts of international law, or by references to the conceptual 
framework used by international law. Th e advantage of excluding this category 
of off ences in a separate regulation, as is the case in Germany, would be the fact 
that interpretation problems such as those arising in connection with Article 7 
of the CC could easily be avoided. 
For a long time the relevant literature has stressed the multicentricity of the 
system in light of increasing globalisation processes,75 yet it must be remem-
bered that one of the crucial principles of criminal law, of guarantee character, 
is the principle of an adequate identifi cation of types of off ences (nullum cri-
men sine lege certa), which imposes an obligation on the legislator to maintain 
maximum precision in the process of designing criminal provisions, ensuring 
an outcome which enables a clear distinction to be made between punishable 
behaviour and unpunishable behaviour, and in the former enabling a clear dis-
tinction between behaviours which carry the characteristics of individual types 
of criminal acts.
As the above considerations have shown, the defi nitions of the crime of gen-
ocide (Article 6 of the ICC Statute), crimes against humanity (Article 7 of the 
ICC Statute), war crimes (Article 8 of the ICC Statute), and crimes of aggression 
(Article 8 bis of the ICC Statute) are constructed autonomously, for the pur-
poses of the ICC Statute, in isolation from the divisions of off ences established 
in the States-Parties, which are countries with diff erent legal cultures. Th erefore, 
it is impossible to choose an internal legal order and accordingly to impose le-
gal statutory defi nitions and specifi c systemic solutions. As emphasised above, 
the division of off ences adopted in a given country depends solely on the deci-
sion of the country in question and is very diff erent within the States-Parties to 
the ICC Statute. In view of the above, there is no basis for adopting automatic 
symmetry of concepts between the national order and the treaty. 
Finally, we should invoke the aforementioned Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, according to which (Article 31) the Treaty must be interpret-
ed in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be attributed to 
the  words used in it in their context and in light of its object and objective. 
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Under Article 33, where a treaty text has been established as authentic in two 
or more languages, it shall have equal force in each of them, unless the treaty 
decides or the parties have agreed that, in case of divergence, the text concerned 
shall prevail. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those which 
is seen as original for the text will be considered authentic only if the Treaty so 
provides or the parties agree. It shall be presumed that the words used in the 
Treaty have the same meaning in each of the original texts. When a comparison 
of the original texts shows a diff erence in meaning which is not removed by the 
application of Articles 31 and 32, the meaning which, having regard to the ob-
ject and objective of the Treaty, best reconciles those texts, should be accepted. 
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Abstract 
Modern criminal law introduces as a general principle a  solution not to prosecute of-
fenders when it is actually possible to do so only aft er a considerable period of time has 
elapsed since it was committed. A criminal act is then very oft en completely erased from 
the memory of society, and its perpetrator is very oft en already physically and mental-
ly diff erent person, therefore doubts arise as to the advisability of further prosecution 
and conduct of proceedings in relation to such perpetrators. However, exceptions to 
this rule are provided. Th ese include the principle of the non-expiration of the criminal 
responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity, which was expressed in the 
convention adopted on 26 November 1968 by the UN General Assembly and to which 
Poland acceded on 11 November 1970. Th e Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 
2 April 1997 in Article 43 assumes, that war crimes and crimes against humanity are not 
subject to the statute of limitations. Th e consequence of this regulation is an exception 
contained in Article 105 of the Criminal Code, which excludes the possibility of statute 
of limitations for crimes against peace, humanity and war crimes. A similar provision in 
this respect was already included in the Criminal Code of 1969 in Article 109, except 
that its scope was limited to war crimes and crimes against humanity. In Article 105(1) of 
the Criminal Code, the principle of non-prescription was enshrined more broadly than 
in Article 43 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, also covering war crimes. 
It should be noted, that the defi nition of the scope of crimes not subject to the statute of 
limitations, adopted in Article 105(1), generally corresponds to the title of Chapter XVI 
of the Criminal Code (Off ences against peace, humanity and war crimes). In Chapter 
XVI, however, there are also included regulations (e.g. Article 119(1) and (2), Article 
121(1) and (2), Article 125(1) and Article 126(1) and (2)), in case of which there are 
signifi cant doubts as to whether they may be covered by the principle indicated in Article 
105(1) of the Criminal Code. Th is and other issues lead to a closer examination and anal-
ysis of the scope of exclusion of the statute of limitations for criminal off enses pointed out 
in Article 105 § 1 of the Polish Criminal Code, which will be the subject of this study.




















































































Although more than 75 years have 
elapsed since the end of the Second 
World War, the magnitude of crimes 
and their long-term effects, caused 
also by lawyers e.g. in German special 
courts, make the subject of liability 
of the state in the context of the Second 
World War ever topical and valid. His-
toria magistra vitae est, and the process 
of learning from history should in this 
case cover not only the years 1933–1945, 
but also the entire post-war period. 
Justice was neither restored nor meted 
out. One of the reasons for the lack of 
administration of justice was West Ger-
many’s conscious policy of personal 
continuity after the Second World War. 
The latter was the topic of the Rosen-
burg Exhibition – the Federal Ministry 
of Justice of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in the Shadow of National 
Socialist Past. The texts grew out of 
the context of the exhibition and show 
the far-reaching consequences of War 
and Nazi crimes in international rela-
tions of a legal nature.
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